Israel’s Military Failure, Gaza’s Dismal Future

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Israelis widely agreed in the aftermath of the Oct. 7, 2023, massacre that Hamas must no longer rule Gaza; indeed, it had to be destroyed. Some 16 months later, however, Hamas remains a powerful institution. The question of Gaza’s future governance, as a result, has become fluid and confused.

This situation raises several questions: Why did the powerful Israeli military, the one that defeated three Arab state armies in six days, fail to defeat a rag-tag militia? What are the possible ways forward for Gaza? What is the most likely outcome? What would be the best one?

An Israeli consensus emerged immediately after Oct. 7 on the need to destroy Hamas, which had ruled Gaza since 2007. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu variously vowed that Hamas would be “defeated,” “demolished,” “destroyed,” and “eliminated.” Other high-ranking government figures echoed him, with then-defense minister Yoav Gallant stating that “There will be no situation in which Israeli children are murdered in the fields and in which Hamas will continue to exist.” And U.N. ambassador Gilad Erdan declared, “Now is the time to obliterate Hamas terror infrastructure, to completely erase it.” Public figures gave vent to a unique fury. Gallant called Hamas members “human animals” and former prime minister Naftali Bennett dubbed them “Nazis.”

Then came the threats. The deputy parliamentary speaker called on Israel to “burn Gaza.” An unnamed defense official announced that “Gaza will eventually turn into a city of tents. There will be no buildings.” The heritage ministercalled on attacking the 365-square-kilometer territory of Gaza, an area bit larger than Albany, Western Australia, with nuclear weapons. A hip-hop anthem promising to rain hell on Israel’s enemies jumped to the #1 spot. A pop singer called for Israel to “Erase Gaza. Don’t leave a single person there.” A television news anchor delivered an off-script tirade:

In short, other than scattered leftists expressing timid dissent, a ferociously anti-Hamas and anti-Gaza mood seized Israel.

Two major developments then impeded Israel from acting on these objectives: its hostages and Hamas’ allies.

The taking hostage of some 250 Israel residents created a large, vocal, and politically influential cohort which convinced roughly two-thirds of the Israeli body politic that the release of hostages took precedence over defeating, demolishing, destroying, and eliminating Hamas. As early fury transformed into a sober concern for victims held in appalling circumstances, eagerness to reach a deal with Hamas meant accepting its continued existence.

Simultaneously, Oct. 7 prompted both the Islamic Republic in Iran and its proxies, Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen, to attack Israel in what became known as Iran’s “ring of fire.” It featured two major barrages of missiles and drones from Iran, Hezbollah missiles and rockets against Israel’s north, leading to the evacuation of some 80,000 Israelis, and missile and unmanned aerial vehicle assaults from Yemen. Together, these strikes prompted Jerusalem to respond, especially against Hezbollah but also against Iran and the Houthis, thereby prematurely putting aside the war on Hamas itself and so leaving the Gaza war effort incomplete.

Other developments further added to the distraction: Netanyahu’s legal problems and his surgery, unceasing threats by his coalition partners to bolt, and the Trump-imposed deal to trade Palestinian prisoners for Israeli hostages, in which Israel effectively agreed not to restart its war on Hamas.

In the aggregate, these factors led to the current impasse, leaving the Government of Israel confused and incapacitated, with a flailing military effort and no clear goal. U.S. intelligence reports that Hamas has recruited ten to fifteen thousand members since Oct. 7. According to the Washington Post, Netanyahu “may have decimated Hamas’s fighting capabilities and leveled much of Gaza, but he has failed to completely loosen the group’s grip inside the enclave.” Amos Yadlin, a former Israeli military intelligence chief, finds that “Israel failed in its mission to destroy Hamas as a government.” Assessing nearly 16 months of fighting, Giora Eiland, a former director of Israel’s National Security Council, called the Gaza war “a failure.”

Predictably, proposals for the “day after” in Gaza span a wide spectrum. Going in rough order from the least to the most assertive Israeli position, these include:

Hamas rule: Hamas itself, of course, intends to keep control of Gaza and in this it can count on the support of several important governments, including those of Türkiye and Qatar. Chaim Levinson of Ha’aretz categorically states that “Qatar’s ambition is to establish a colony” in Gaza.

Palestinian Authority rule: The Biden administration and nearly all Western powers as well as international organizations demand that Mahmoud Abbas’ decrepit Palestinian Authority on the West Bank be given Gaza to rule. For Westerners, this means building up the PA so that it effectively governs. For Muslim-majority countries, this means, as Israeli journalist Khaled Abu Toameh explains, continued Hamas rule: “the P.A. government [will] collect the garbage, rebuild destroyed houses and pay salaries to Palestinians in Gaza, while Hamas is busy rearming, regrouping and getting ready for the next attack on Israel.”

Multinational forces: Various commentators propose a medley of Arab and international forces, perhaps under U.N. auspices, to provide security in Gaza.

An Israeli-sponsored Gazan self-rule: Netanyahu supports the idea that Jerusalem work primarily with Gazans to rebuild their territory. “Civil affairs and responsibility for public order will be based on local actors with ‘management experience’” and not connected to violence against Israelis. The Israeli military took initial steps with an informal pilot program of “humanitarian pockets” in areas of Gaza where Hamas does not rule. These local governing bodies included community leaders tasked with distributing humanitarian aid and revising school curricula.

Israeli rule: The right-wing in Israel demands the expulsion of Gazans and the territory re-occupied and settled by Israelis. This has found surprising U.S. support, including from Florida Governor Ron DeSantis, Sen. Tom Cotton, and former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley. Most notably, however, President Donald Trump picked up on the idea: “You’re talking about a million and half people, and we just clean out that whole thing. I’d rather get involved with some of the Arab nations and build housing at a different location where they can maybe live in peace for a change,” he said, subsequently specifying Egypt and Jordan as destination countries.

Some of these scenarios have no chance of implementation, starting with the expulsion of Gazans. Simply put, which country would take in this population of two million? To ask the question is to answer it.

PA rule is nearly as unlikely, given that it controls almost none of the West Bank and all current and potential future governments in Jerusalem would block such a step because, no less than Hamas, the PA seeks Israel’s destruction.

Even if Arab and international forces could be found and paid for, prior multinational initiatives (e.g., the anemic “European Union Border Assistance Mission at the Rafah Crossing Point” or the failed U.S.-U.K. prison guards in Jericho) suggests it would permit the full reemergence of Hamas, and so be rejected by Israel. As Eugene Kontorovich of the Kohelet Policy Forum notes, “In the Middle East, these missions have proven to be futile, and in the rare cases where they were effective, they served the aggressor.” That said, in a small way, this has already taken place, with one hundred U.S. contract soldiers manning a Gaza checkpoint.

With three options down, that leaves Gazans in charge, either under the auspices of Hamas or Israel. While initially, Hamas rule seemed out of the question, today it appears to be the most likely outcome, with all the horrors that entails for Gazans and Israelis.

The best solution is Gazans ruling under Israeli supervision, the one Netanyahu endorsed. Already on the afternoon of Oct. 7, even as the massacre was underway, I wrote an article proposing that while the attack on Israel by Hamas “is a humanitarian horror,” it is “also a strategic opportunity for Israel, the U.S. and democracies everywhere.” After Gaza had been cleared of Hamas, I suggested, “Israel would find a great number of its inhabitants ready to start over and build productive lives rather than focus endlessly and hopelessly on the destruction of Israel.”

Unfortunately for Gazans and Israelis alike, the Israeli priority of releasing hostages and the distraction of taking on Hamas’ allies meant Israeli forces did not destroy Hamas, did not liberate Gazans from oppression and extremism, and did not free Israel from a murderous jihadist group. What once appeared to be likely now looks forlorn. Once again, Israel’s over-rated security establishment has managed to clutch defeat from the jaws of victory.

The Australian print title: “Gaza Failure: War Unlikely to End Hamas’s Reign of Terror.”

The Australian online title: “Five Possible Solutions to the Gaza Problem.”