Israel entered 2024 still in the first stages of a war on several fronts, fought against a loose alliance of Islamist forces aligned with the Islamic Republic of Iran.
This war had been triggered, of course, by the Hamas massacres of Oct. 7, 2023, in the Gaza border area. But the conflict had rapidly expanded beyond these narrow boundaries with the commencement of Lebanese Hezbollah attacks on Israel’s north from Oct. 8; Yemeni Houthi aggression against shipping on the Red Sea/Gulf of Aden; missile launchings against the port of Eilat and other Israeli targets; and Iraqi Shia militia attacks against Israel, beginning in the same month.
The conflict reached its height in April 2024, with the first direct Iranian missile attacks on Israel.
Israel’s achievements significantly weakened the regional axis led by Iran, which in recent years formed the main challenge to the West and Israel emerging from the Middle East.
This war is not yet over, but the second half of 2024 witnessed an impressive sequence of Israeli achievements on the strategic level. These successes have drastically reduced the dimensions of the conflict. They have also significantly weakened the regional axis led by Iran, which in recent years formed the main challenge to the West and Israel emerging from the Middle East.
Complacency deriving from these achievements would be an error. The other notable element deriving from the events of recent months is the resurgence of Sunni political Islam, which is seeking to benefit from the weakened state of the Iranians and their allies.
The series of successes showcase the very high caliber of Israel’s capacities in intelligence and air warfare. But they also reveal that the jeremiads concerning the supposedly parlous state of Israel’s conventional ground forces, heard in Israeli public discourse in recent years, were exaggerated.
Looking back over the year’s events, it can be seen that the rescue of Israeli hostages Noa Argamani, Shlomi Ziv, Almog Meir Jan and Andrei Kozlov from Hamas captivity in the Nuseirat refugee camp on June 8 commenced the ascendant trajectory for Israel. This operation, carried out by members of a special police unit, was testimony to the return of close Israeli intelligence coverage of Gaza, a factor sorely lacking in the pre-Oct. 7 period.
The next achievement, this time on a strategic level, was the targeted assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh, in an Iranian regime-maintained facility in Tehran on July 31.
In September, the Israel Defense Forces also began a limited ground operation inside Southern Lebanon, with the intention of destroying the extensive military infrastructure built by Hezbollah in the border area.
On Sept. 17, Israel’s detonation of thousands of booby-trapped pagers carried by Hezbollah operatives wiped out an entire echelon of the organization’s senior and middle-ranking members.
This was followed by the assassination of veteran Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah on Sept. 27, and of his successor, Hashem Safieddine, on Oct. 3.
On Sept. 17, Israel’s detonation of thousands of booby-trapped pagers carried by Hezbollah operatives wiped out an entire echelon of the organization’s senior and middle-ranking members.
As these spectaculars were taking place, the ground army was slowly but surely grinding up Hezbollah’s holdings along the border, and continuing its operations against Hamas in Gaza.
October saw a tripling of attacks on Israel from the Iraqi Shia militias, and a second direct Iranian missile attack on Oct. 1. In contrast to the episode in April, this time Jerusalem struck back hard, effectively destroying Iran’s air defenses and striking at facilities related to the nuclear program on Oct. 26.
The month also witnessed the killing in Gaza of Yahya Sinwar, architect of the Oct. 7, 2023, massacre.
From November, the series of successes began to produce diplomatic results. Iran, after issuing blood-curdling threats of retribution for the Oct. 26 raid, apparently thought better of it. No response has yet come.
On Nov. 27, Hezbollah agreed to a ceasefire, unilaterally abandoning its stated determination to continue fighting until a ceasefire in Gaza was reached.
On Dec. 23, the Iraqi Shia militias also announced a unilateral cessation of their attacks on Israel.
Since efforts to foment insurgency against Israel in Judea and Samaria have been thwarted, the only active fronts remaining are Gaza itself and the attacks of the Houthis in Yemen.
On the same day as the announcement of the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah, meanwhile, the Sunni Islamists of the Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) organization began their astonishing drive toward Damascus. Iran’s weakness and Hezbollah’s disarray (along with Russia’s quagmire in Ukraine) enabled HTS to face Syrian President Bashar Assad’s enfeebled army alone, and to easily brush it aside.
The fall of the Assad regime was thus a by-product of Israel’s earlier series of successes. It constituted a very significant additional blow to Iran’s regional axis, leaving Hezbollah isolated on the Mediterranean, cut off from the land supply routes from Iran via Iraq and Syria.
Israel’s successes have a number of implications. On the one hand, they reveal the hollowness of much of Iran’s rhetoric about its “Axis of Resistance.”
At the deeper level, the emergence of HTS on the borders opens the way for the Sunni variety of political Islam, supported by Turkey, to once more constitute a challenge.
This gathering, it turns out, is profoundly inferior in capabilities compared to those of its opponents, once it commits the cardinal error of allowing itself to be drawn onto a conventional battlefield. Euphoria would be misplaced. The Iranian regional project is not finished. The regime itself is still there. Iranian associated forces are still dominant in Yemen, Iraq and Lebanon, and powerful among the Palestinians. But the setbacks they have experienced are profound.
On the other hand, the advance of HTS shows that political Islam, whether of Sunni or Shia variety, remains the only game in town when it comes to the mobilized and militarized politics at ground level of the Middle East. Indeed, the HTS victory represents the return of Sunni Islamism to center stage in the region for the first time in some years (since the defeat of ISIS and the toppling of Muslim Brotherhood rule in Egypt.)
Hamas, of course, straddled the divide between the two, being a Sunni Islamist group nevertheless aligned with Iran. HTS’s victory, from this point of view, is the second major manifestation of Sunni political Islam in the last couple of years. The first was Oct. 7.
HTS’s triumph was made possible because of the tacit patronage of Turkey. So Israel’s achievements since June 2024 have had the effect of profoundly weakening the Iranians and their proxies.
But at the deeper level, the emergence of HTS on the borders opens the way for the Sunni variety of political Islam, supported by Turkey, to once more constitute a challenge. Much has been achieved; much still remains ahead.
Published originally under the title “Much Has Been Achieved; Much Remains Ahead.”
