Continuing my interviews with veterans of the Syrian war who fought on the side of the Assad regime and worked with the Iranians/Hezbollah, I present the following recent interview I conducted with the person who led the ‘313 Force’, a formation that worked with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps but was dissolved some time before the final collapse of the regime. In this interview, we discuss his own experiences during the war, the role of the Iranians and Hezbollah and how they interacted with the Assad regime, and the new government and the issue of confronting Israel.
Parenthetical insertions in square brackets are my own.
Q: When the demonstrations broke out what did you think of them? Did you feel that the demands were legitimate? What did you think of the regime’s response to the demonstrations?
The demonstrations came out with justified demands. But there were in my view foreign agendas that began to invest in the situation.
A: The demonstrations came out with justified demands. But there were in my view foreign agendas that began to invest in the situation. On the other side, there were some figures of the regime who think in a barbaric and arrogant way, an example of them being Atef Najib.* I will give you an example regarding him.
The father of one of my friends was one of his men when he was in Damascus. Atef was mentally disturbed such that every night he would place some of his men in his security branch’s cells and have them beaten for no reason. This is not a fictitious example, but rather the reality I heard from my friend. As for the regime’s response, it was a harsh response, harsher than a criminal response, even as the demonstrations themselves were no crime.
Q: Would it not have been better for the friends [Iran and Hezbollah] to have advised Assad to resign?
A: Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah undertook a positive mediation role between the opposition and Assad, and it was effective. Sayyid Hassan enjoyed great popularity and affection among the masses of Syrian society, but Assad did not listen to the advice. At the same time, there were a number of sides undertaking various roles in the region and in Syria in particular. And in any case, the Hezb could not abandon its most important supply line: namely, Syria. It should also be noted that before the friends got involved militarily, there were many negotiations and political initiatives, but all of them failed.
Q: When did you yourself decide to bear arms, and for what reasons?
A: In the beginning, I did not known anything about the revolution or anything else. But when I reached the age of 20 and began to study at university, the Da‘esh began to appear and began committing the most horrific massacres. Thus I decided to take action and bear arms against this organisation, and I considered that the forces of the friends were the best avenue to enter into this battle.
Q: And for what reasons with the forces of the friends in particular, instead of the regular army?
The regular army would deal with its personnel in a horrific way, and operated on the principle of the slave and the master, and was notorious for stealing.
A: The regular army would deal with its personnel in a horrific way, and operated on the principle of the slave and the master, and was notorious for stealing. As for the friends, they treated people well and their capability was better. Even many of the army personnel defected and joined the friends. It should be noted that the number of the friends [i.e. Syrian personnel working with Iran and Hezbollah] was more than 70,000 and 90% of them were Sunnis. At the same time, there was obligatory service imposed on all citizens. After the agreement it was decided that time working with the friends should be reckoned as obligatory service, and this is what pushed many to join the friends.
Q: Was the salary better for example?
A: Of course the salaries were small but better in comparison with the army.
Q: When you assess the forces of the friends in Syria what were their aims?
A: Combating Da‘esh.
Q: Some say for example that the forces of the friends were tantamount to a parallel army, while others say that the forces were only tantamount to auxiliary forces for the purpose of reinforcing the regular army.
A: Auxiliary forces, and no more than that.
Q: Were all the salaries, weapons and training from the Iranians, Hezbollah and the Iraqi brothers?
A: The training and salaries were conducted by specialists [from the friends]. The weapons were from the army. There were no weapons that differed from the army’s weapons. I am speaking about the formation I worked with. I personally would avoid all the battles in which we would confront the Free Army; likewise the personnel that worked with me did not like Bashar or his army and at the same time they loved the country and hated Da‘esh. I will give you an example. A brother from Hama was working with me and had a sniper rifle. One time we were in Shaykh Maskin [in Deraa], and there were two armed men in front of us and so I put my hand on his shoulder and told him: leave them and do not fire on them. They are not a target for us. He was struck with bewilderment by my remarks to him. In the evening, we drank tea and chatted, and he said to me: Why did you make this request from me? I told him: we are in Shaykh Maskin and they are of the Free Army. They are not a target for us. This was a general policy I followed.
I personally would avoid all the battles in which we would confront the Free Army; likewise the personnel that worked with me did not like Bashar or his army and at the same time they loved the country and hated Da‘esh.
Q: There was a lot of talk about proselytisation for Shi‘ism among the forces of the friends. Was this true?
A: I would hear this sort of talk, but until now no one called on me to convert to Shi‘ism, nor do I know anyone who had this put to him. I would hear this thing but I did not see it on the ground.
Q: Were there also other aims for the forces of the friends? For example there was much talk about securing a land route between Iraq and Lebanon via Syria for the purpose of weapons.
A: Of course: securing the supply line to Lebanon, and supporting Hezbollah. This was the most important aim.
Q: And likewise building a resistance front against the entity [Israel] on the Golan?
A: There was a suggestion for this but it was not implemented.
Q: After 2020 many of the personnel of the forces of the friends were transferred to the regular army. What were the reasons for this?
A: This is a decision made between the Syrian and Iranian leaderships: after the Da‘esh presence was ended, there was no longer a reason for the presence [of the forces of the friends].
Q: Also the Syrian leadership wanted to implement the obligatory service laws right?
A: No no, they were far removed from these ideas.
Q: And in the end why was the formation you worked in dissolved?
A: It was decided to dissolve the formation I worked in like the rest of the formations.
In the end we remained as a formation of just 90 people. There was no longer a formation. I also left military work after the continual change of leaders.
Q: Because of the agreement between the two sides [the Syrians and Iranians].
A: In the end we remained as a formation of just 90 people. There was no longer a formation. I also left military work after the continual change of leaders.
Q: What do you mean when you say ‘they were far removed from these ideas’? In your view the idea of implementing the laws of military service was just a pretext?
A: No. I did not even hear of this sort of thing. This is just talk of personnel who thought this was the case. The matter is bigger than this, with various pretexts. A great number of the senior officers [of the army] were annoyed about Iran’s presence in Syria and were working to dismantle the forces [of the friends].
Q: In the end the friends could not oppose this?
A: The friends were very courteous with the [Syrian] government, and they would deal with it kindly, contrary to how the matter has been portrayed.
Q: In the end why did the regime fall? Did the friends make a big mistake in supporting Assad?
A: No, the friends were not involved in the matter. The army was tired, and Assad made mistakes. The friends were there to support the army, not to fight on behalf of it. The last meeting between Larijani** and Assad was two days before the fall. Larijani knew that Assad wanted to fight but did not have an army.
Q: In your view, has the axis of resistance come to an end with the fall of Assad?
A: No.
The resistance is not necessarily under the government’s sovereignty. Fighting Israel is a Shari‘i obligation, whether or not the government wishes for it.
Q: Why in your view?
A: The axis is an idea and creed. I am certain that after Bashar al-Assad, Syria will be stronger and firmer in terms of dealing with Israel. Yes, we don’t deny that Assad was a positive factor in the axis, but he was not the entire axis.
Q: Of course Israel is occupying parts of Qunaytra and Deraa. How should the new government deal with this problem?
A: The resistance is not necessarily under the government’s sovereignty. Fighting Israel is a Shari‘i obligation, whether or not the government wishes for it.
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Notes
*Atef Najib headed ‘political security’ in Deraa in 2011. His response to the demonstrations has been seen as a catalyst for unrest. He was recently found and arrested by the new government.
**Larijani is an advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader who met with Assad on 6 December 2024. Assad fled the country on 8 December.
