Understandably, the fall of Assad’s regime has raised questions about the future of relations between the Sunni Arab and Alawite communities in Syria. Some analysts such as Lina Khatib, drawing on a generally conciliatory tone towards minorities struck by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s leadership as the regime collapsed, have suggested that it is now time to move beyond “Sunni vs Alawite” as a binary for understanding Syria’s transitional phase.
I have to say that whatever one’s personal sentiments about Assad’s downfall, such a suggestion is far too premature. It certainly seems true that once Assad’s regime finally collapsed, people across different sects and ethnicities in Syria felt relieved to be finally rid of Assad and the repressive regime, but that does not mean that sect-coded animosity has simply died out overnight. The fact is that the Assad regime was perceived by many Sunni Arabs in the country as embodying an Alawite-dominated regime oppressing the Sunni Arab majority, and the duration of the war, sectarian rhetoric on both sides and war crimes have contributed to an inflaming of tensions since 2011. Of course this does not mean simplistically seeing developments in the country solely in terms of Sunnis vs. Alawites, but it would be naive to imagine that resentment and tension have vanished, especially among individuals over whom the insurgent leadership does not exercise full control.
For example, below is what one contact- an insurgent originating from the coastal region of Syria where there is a large Alawite population- posted recently:
!["Between us [Sunnis] and them [Alawites] are mountains of corpses and rivers of hatred, and blood, blood, blood and wailing and long revenge. To the descendants of apes [i.e. Alawites].”](https://cdn-mef.meforum.org/dims4/default/fb605b7/2147483647/strip/true/crop/581x157+0+0/resize/581x157!/format/webp/quality/90/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fk2-prod-mef.s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com%2Fbrightspot%2F32%2F46%2F87eb55fd4d078775a11a384c58b1%2Faymeen-tweet.png)
Although ‘descendants of apes’ is also a sectarian insult employed against Jews, but it has been used against Alawites as well. Most recently, reports have now emerged of unrest flaring among Alawite communities on the coastal region and in Homs. To get a sense of sentiment among at least some Alawites about what is currently going on, I decided to interview a friend who has been a guest post contributor to this site. This friend, who once led an Iranian-backed formation called ‘al-Ghalibun’ but had come to recognise some time before Assad’s downfall that he was essentially the root of the problems in Syria and was thus happy to see him gone, is himself an Alawite and a resident of Latakia. While he has no desire to see Assad or his regime return, he is concerned about the future of Sunni-Alawite relations in the country under a leadership dominated by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, whose own break from al-Qa‘ida he is skeptical of (I personally am not skeptical of the breaking of ties, but it should be recognised that the matter may be harder to explain to some people inside Syria).
In my view, it would not be wise to dismiss the concerns here as simply the work of Iranian agitation, propaganda by the ‘resistance axis’, or sabotage by ‘regime remnants,’ even if not all or most Alawites share the concerns to be outlined here. The perceptions outlined here are real and need to be taken seriously by those concerned for Syria’s future and not driven by an agenda of simply attacking the new government.
For comparison as a cautionary tale against blaming incidents on Iran and pro-Assad remnants, it was claimed in pro-opposition media that the burning of a Christmas tree in the Christian town of al-Suqaylabiya in Hama was the work of pro-Assad saboteurs: in fact, it was foreign jihadists who committed the act.
It certainly seems true that once Assad’s regime finally collapsed, people across different sects and ethnicities in Syria felt relieved to be finally rid of Assad and the repressive regime, but that does not mean that sect-coded animosity has simply died out overnight.
Below is the interview I conducted with my friend.
Q: What has aroused the [Alawite] people’s anger?
A: During less than a week, dozens of martyrs have fallen in acts of treachery committed by the insurgents in various areas, solely because they belong to the Alawite sect. Of course I have sent you only samples from the past two days as conveyed by how they talk about the assassinations. These acts were preceded by the burning of three shrines, and the shaykhs and elders of the Alawites were calling on the youth to be patient and not be dragged into fitna [internal strife]. Yesterday there appeared a video of the burning of the shrine of Abu Abdullah al-Husayn bin Hamdan al-Khasibi, which is in Aleppo. He was the advisor of Sayf al-Dawla al-Hamdani and his mufti and religious teacher. He is the shaykh of the Alawite mystical way and author of the book al-Hidaya al-Kubra: i.e. he is the shaykh of the religion for us, and our greatest authority after then twelve imams.
The insurgents entered his tomb, burned it and killed five youth among those serving the shrine. The video did not appear because of the fact that no one [of the servants] remained in Aleppo, until today. The youth’s zeal became aroused and they rose up in demonstrations without any attacks or curses. They only called for revenge against the people in the video who killed the shrine’s servants and burned it. In the meantime, the other side and the prostitute Arabic channels have insisted that the video is old (they think that the video was filmed 15 days ago), as though the right of the shrine and blood become invalidated by the passage of time after 15 days. They have ignored what this means for the sect and they have not issued any apology. Meanwhile, let us compare what happened yesterday [25 December] with the following: Uzbek insurgents burned a Christmas tree in a Christian locality. The Christians protested, and immediately a delegation from the Hay’a [Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham] came, apologised and promised to hold the perpetrators accountable, and they put a new tree in place at the Hay’a’s expense.
Q: What’s this talk about Luqman Gharra [an Alawite shaykh]? They accuse him of being affiliated with Iran?
A: Incorrect. He is one of the Alawite shaykhs, and has no connection with Iran. He studied Ja‘afari Shari‘a [Twelver Shi‘i Islamic law] and has gained deep knowledge of it. Many of our shaykhs are like him. For in the end, we are a mystical way from the Twelver schools of jurisprudence: i.e. we apply Ja‘afari law, but we have a Sufi philosophy and a mysticism that springs from this law.
Q: Okay, now there is talk about the killing of 14 members of the Interior Ministry in an ambush in Tartous countryside? Now they are accusing ‘regime remnants’ of the operation. What’s your opinion on these words?
A: There are no regime remnants. The problem is that when they carry out attacks on the people, they describe these as individual acts. The people make contact to complain to the Hay’a, but they do not offer a serious response. The people decide to close off their areas and prevent any insurgents from entering, and they ask the Hay’a to coordinate before entering, but the Hay’a does not respond. Cars of masked men enter and they terrify the people by firing into the air, and they steal cars and mobile devices, and engage in verbal and physical attacks. After repeated occurrences of these incidents, some of the people have shut off their areas and dealt with any individuals who are not affiliated with the Hay’a. Then the Hay’a comes and decides that those who fended off these people are among ‘remnants of the regime.’
Q: Do you fear a sectarian war will break out?
A: It’s possible.
Q: Okay, so in order to calm the situation, what is required of the Hay’a?
A: Nothing.
Q: But surely for example they must stop the sectarian incitement against the Alawites, and respond to the people’s complaints?
A: They can’t even if they wanted. The hyenas cannot remain in human clothing. They will tear this clothing apart and show their true face sooner or later. Extremist Islamic thought cannot be contained by any civil framework. They will tear off this mask and bring out their Shari‘a to apply it. This has been tested everywhere and the results have always been the same.
Q: By God, something regrettable. Is there anything required of the international community?
A: Yes. They must stop applying experiments and theories on us. We are not experimental rats. This international experiment in turning one of al-Qa‘ida’s wings into statesmen, staff and men wearing ties will not succeed and they know it. But it seems that they are considering the ramifications of this experiment in terms of time and psychological impact, that’s all.
Q: In short the Hay’a is not suitable to rule Syria?
A: This is an experiment. We don’t know what its aim is nor how long it will last. It can be said that we don’t want its military ramification to be filled with bloodshed, but we are waiting and seeing.
Q: Can it also be said that no one wants the return of the Assad regime?
A: Of course. No one wants any face of the former regime from Bashar to the lowest official in his time. We want a federal system: this is what is appropriate for Syria’s diversity, and ensures the security of all and the freedom of every region int erms of its beliefs and way of life.
