While it was easy to follow, via social media, the military developments on the ground in real time as Assad’s regime collapsed, historians will still need to write accounts of what was going on behind the reports about various localities falling to the insurgents. Performing research for these accounts will hopefully involve recovery of important internal documents and interviews with personnel who fought on both sides.
In this post, I present an in-depth interview conducted on 20 January with an individual who is originally from the Idlib Shi‘a village of Kafariya (whose original inhabitants have still not returned) and served in the Iranian and Hezbollah-backed ‘Local Defence Forces’ network until the very end. Following the regime’s final collapse, he fled from Syria to Lebanon. In this interview, he explains his own unit’s role in the final fighting, his broader feelings about what happened and how he views the roles of Russia, Iran and Hezbollah in Syria.
An interview conducted on 20 January with an individual originally from the Idlib Shi‘a village of Kafariya who served in the Iranian and Hezbollah-backed ‘Local Defence Forces’ network until the very end.
Interestingly, the interviewee continues to defend the deposed president Bashar al-Assad- a perspective I am interested in hearing from people inside Syria or who left following the final collapse of the regime, whereas I could not care less to hear the views supporters of Assad who are not Syrian or those like ‘Partisan Girl’ who live far away in the comfort of exile.
While it was easy to follow, via social media, the military developments on the ground in real time as Assad’s regime collapsed, historians will still need to write accounts of what was going on behind the reports about various localities falling to the insurgents. Performing research for these accounts will hopefully involve recovery of important internal documents and interviews with personnel who fought on both sides.
In this post, I present an in-depth interview conducted on 20 January with an individual who is originally from the Idlib Shi‘a village of Kafariya (whose original inhabitants have still not returned) and served in the Iranian and Hezbollah-backed ‘Local Defence Forces’ network until the very end. Following the regime’s final collapse, he fled from Syria to Lebanon. In this interview, he explains his own unit’s role in the final fighting, his broader feelings about what happened and how he views the roles of Russia, Iran and Hezbollah in Syria.
Interestingly, the interviewee continues to defend the deposed president Bashar al-Assad- a perspective I am interested in hearing from people inside Syria or who left following the final collapse of the regime, whereas I could not care less to hear the views supporters of Assad who are not Syrian or those like ‘Partisan Girl’ who live far away in the comfort of exile.
Q: First can you describe to me your last days in Syria? Were you on the fighting fronts? How were your feelings?
A: Brother I will tell you what happening in detail. I was not in the Aleppo battle because I was on leave permit. As soon as the attack on Aleppo began, my friends and comrades in the regime I was in came out, and when they first arrived, they deployed at the barriers to support our brothers in Nubl and al-Zahara’. The men did an excellent job, and the insurgents could not take on inch in the area they were in. But regrettably, in the rest of the areas there was no resistance, and I learned why later: betrayal by the senior officers!
I was in contact with most of the brothers who were on the front, and their morale was very high. As I told you, the lack of steadfastness at the rest of the positions where the army was present had a great impact on their front, and the only solution was to withdraw so that they would not be besieged. And in fact, the order for withdrawal and evacuation of the two villages of Nubl and al-Zahara’ came like a lightning bolt upon all the brothers in general and the people of the two villages in particular. Indeed, the withdrawal was carried out towards the al-Safira area. In so far as we were popular committees or Local Defence Forces, we could not control this situation: that is, the distribution of the army’s forces and their redeployment and the formation of primary and secondary defensive lines. This situation requires responsible persons in the state.
The men did an excellent job, and the insurgents could not take on inch in the area they were in. But regrettably, in the rest of the areas there was no resistance, and I learned why later: betrayal by the senior officers!
We withdrew to Hama in order to organise defensive lines in Hama, in fear that Hama would fall. And in fact, we began repositioning and deployment, and our assignment was in the village of Khattab. And if you remember, the village of Khattab stood for more than 3 days as the insurgents could not take it. But the sleeper cells that were in the ‘taswiya’ [‘regularisation of status’] areas like Talbisa and al-Rastan had great impact on us and they cut our reinforcement lines, and forced us to rely on the Homs-Salmiya-Hama route, and this route was long, whereas we could be in Hama within a quarter of an hour via the al-Rastan and Talbisa route. On our last day in the village of Khattab, betrayal arose among us, perpetrated by personnel from the army. We were deployed on the barriers, and from the heart of the area we were in, three tanks defected with their crews, and there was an agreement with the insurgents whereby the insurgents’ attack would begin from the front at the moment the tanks defected. The tanks that defected began firing on our personnel and our carriers and vehicles from behind. The inghimasis and personnel began attacking from the front, and a very fierce battle arose in these moments. The army withdrew and we remained alone in the field. Because of the large number of the enemy and the loss of control, we were forced to withdraw to the al-Baytara area. The lack of reinforcement and resistance by the army created a large gap, and we and our men were not sleeping at night, and our situation was difficult. The men got exhausted, and we withdrew to Hama city.
On the next day at six in the morning we left for the village of al-Shayha, and we found a contingent of the army in the village cutting the road between al-Shayha and the al-Baytara area. We headed to them and took their place. An officer came and took this contingent of them in order to use them to reinforce the position located to our right. This position was Tallat al-Shayha. When we came to the village of al-Shayha, the information was that the positions to our right were under our control as well as those to the left, while the enemy were located in front of us. We deployed our forces and weapons. At around 9:30, we were surprise to learn that the forces that were on Tallat al-Shayha were withdrawing towards Hama city, and after the army’s forces withdrew in around 15 minutes, the ground clearance began against the points we were deployed at, with this clearance being done with artillery, mortars and drones, aiming to advance and take up positions on Tallat al-Shayha that was 500 metres away from us. We were observing them and relaying their coordinates so that they could be struck with artillery, but there was no cooperation with us. We clashed with the insurgents using the arms available to us, and while we were in the middle of the clashes, instructions and orders came for us to withdraw, because none besides us continued fighting. We withdrew to Hama city, and there were Palestine liberation forces there. But regrettably there were no orders to fight and resist.
We withdrew from Hama to Homs via the Salmiya route. On the next day we came and reviewed the deployment points of the popular committees in the Shia villages, since ther were the areas nearest to the direction of Hama. So we deployed and spread the brothers on the fronts of al-Mukhtariya, Kafr Abd and al-Mushrafa, as well as Darat Izza. Our commanders told us: ‘Homs must not be allowed to fall. Even if all the men are martyred, Homs cannot be allowed to fall.’ Despite all the abandonment and all the exhaustion we had faced, the men and brothers raised each other’s spirits and we went to the fronts. But we had no help or aid to form strong defensive lines that would be difficult to penetrate, not to mention that the morale had collapsed. By this point, I bear witness by God that the Local Defence Forces were the only ones that were fighting. The other remaining military contingents did not fire a bullet.
By this point, I bear witness by God that the Local Defence Forces were the only ones that were fighting. The other remaining military contingents did not fire a bullet.
Our information and the area’s geography told us that the easiest and fastest route to reach Homs would be via Talbisa, al-Rastan and Darat Izza, and in fact the clearance and bombing began on this axis, and they tried to advance from it, but praise be to God, because of the strikes we inflicted on them, they could not advance, and they switched their direction to the eastern side in the direction of al-Sa‘an and Salmiya-Hama, and they were able to advance from this front. Their advance on the al-Sa‘an front impacted us, because we were coming under siege. I am talking here about events on 7 December, at the time of the Maghrib prayer. Even so, we continued to be steadfast and hold our ground, while the bombing and clearing against our front intensified. We remained in al-Mukhtaria and Kafr Abd until 11 at night, but after this we lost control and were forced to withdraw from all of Homs.
It should be noted that in every area, martyrs and wounded were falling in our ranks. Brother Aymenn, what would annoy and overwhelm you was the fact that we had weapons, equipment and ammunition, but there were no instructions to fight. The orders that were being given to the army were for withdrawal. Syria did not fall, but rather was handed over through agreements and dirty politics.
When we left Homs orders came for us to go to Tartous, and during this period our families and relatives in al-Sayyida Zaynab were in contact with us, and telling us that the sleeper cells in the area had begun to activate and mobilise. So we contacted our commanders and ask them what work did we have in Tartous when our people are in al-Sham and we must protect them. They replied to us that the al-Sham [Damascus] route was dangerous, and the insurgents of al-Qalamun might have cut the routes. We replied to them that we would go to Damascus: if we were martyred on the route, this would be for the sake of protecting our people in al-Sayyida Zaynab. In fact, we changed our route and headed towards al-Sham.
We did not know that when Homs fell, Damascus also fell. We were thinking that the regime was still standing in Damascus. Praise be to God, we reached Damascus without any problems, but the roads were full of tanks withdrawing from the military points and positions in Damascus countryside towards Damascus, not to mention the soldiers who were heading back on foot from Homs to Damascus, in addition to stolen and burned military vehicles. When we reached Damascus, our friends in al-Sayyida Zaynab contacted us, and said that it had been agreed to hand over all weapons, and not obstruct anyone, and to avoid problems, in order to avoid sectarianism and protect the area from battles. When we reached al-Sayyida Zaynab, the heavy weapons were handed over to a representative of the leader of the sect, while our individual weapons remained with us. This happened at 3:30 a.m. on 8 December. The streets of al-Sayyida Zaynab were filled with people: some fleeing, others afraid, and no one knowing what to do. At this time, I could not sleep. Sir, it should be noted that I had gone more than a week without sleeping more than two hours each day. We remained awake till 8. I slept and woke up at 11:30 for noon prayer. I woke up, prayed and spoke with my family and siblings, and I decided to go to Lebanon, until the situation should calm down and we should know where the country was headed. In fact, myself, my brother who was a volunteer with the Military Security, and some friends left. On the next day I told my family to get out. They got out and we have come and settled here.
You find people who are joyful to be rid of Assad but they have no problem with the fact that Israel is reaching Damascus, and have no problem with Turkey taking the north of the coastal region, and have no problem with America taking the east of the Euphrates.
As for my feelings, oh brother Aymenn, they were all a sense of being overwhelmed: overwhelmed for the martyrs, overwhelmed for the exhaustion, torment, cold and heat. When I left, Israel was bombing al-Mazza airport, our tanks were in the streets, our weapons were burning, our institutions being robbed. All this pile-up of things, plus the innocent people who could not leave.
Until now I defend President Assad. I defend him because he is a noble Arab person, who believed in the Palestinian cause and the resistance movements. I know we had corrupt people and criminals in the country, and I find fault with Assad: why did he let them be? But during Assad’s time, there wasn’t this fear. During Assad’s time, you know there was a state and it gave you your right, not like now, when people are on edge, besides the partition projects that are being outlined, as well as the new Israeli occupation. You find people who are joyful to be rid of Assad but they have no problem with the fact that Israel is reaching Damascus, and have no problem with Turkey taking the north of the coastal region, and have no problem with America taking the east of the Euphrates. Their problem was with the person of Assad because he has a stance and did not normalise with Israel, did not barter with Turkey, and did not accept American offers.
Q: Brother can you clarify what was the regiment you were in?
A: Our regiment was an offensive regiment: infantry of course. Our missions would be where the battles were. But our main mission was to defend Damascus should any incident arise. Before Aleppo, we were in the Ithriya area, chasing the Daesh remnants in the badiya.
Q: Also, what were the main forces responsible for defending Aleppo’s lines?
A: I don’t have precise information.
Q: It has also been said that Division 30 of the Republican Guard was responsible for this front, and there was corruption in it. Is this true?
A: Also I don’t have information. But what I am certain of is that the Iranian and Lebanese advisors and some of the Syrian officers responsible for the military situation were liquidated by some of the traitor officers, who had been bought off by Turkey.
Q: There is a lot of talk about many personnel of the Local Defence Forces having been transferred to the regular army beginning from 2020.
A: Correct.
Q: And also about reduction in the number of advisors from the Revolutionary Guard and Hezbollah during the last days.
A: Because of the Russians’ betrayal, and giving information to the Israelis so they could be assassinated and targeted.
They were transferred in order to please the Saudis and the Emirates, who had promised the government aid and support, if the number of foreign forces on Syrian land were reduced.
Q: Why were the personnel transferred to the regular army? In your view was this step a big mistake?
A: They were transferred in order to please the Saudis and the Emirates, who had promised the government aid and support, if the number of foreign forces on Syrian land were reduced. This was the biggest mistake, and the first nail in the coffin of Assad’s government.
Q: Isn’t the government the one that requested the transfer of the personnel because of compulsory military service laws?
A: This is empty talk.
Q: This is what I heard: that the friends were much better than the regular army’s officers, so many of the youth would join their regiments rather than the regular army.
A: This sort of talk existed before 2018.
Q: And in the end the government demanded the transfer of the personnel wanted for service, and the Guard and the Hezb agreed to this.
A: I was wanted for compulsory service, but the door of taswiya was opened for us in 2018, where we would enter the army’s rank but our service would be with the friends.
Q: Yes I remember this agreement in 2017. But the agreement ended after 2020, and the regular army demanded the transfer of all wanted personnel.
A: The agreement was suspended, correct. In 2021, the government requested to reduce the number of personnel of the auxiliary forces, and the reason and pretext was that there was corruption in our midst, and there were youth who did not perform regular service in the military contingents.
Q: In your view, what was the nature of the Local Defence Forces project? For example some said the aim was to create a ‘parallel army’ like Hezbollah, while others say that the aim was only to establish auxiliary forces because of the problems in the regular army. What’s your view?
What I know is that Iran did not want to open any support front, and even al-Aqsa Flood happened without coordination with the front. Iran wanted to acquire nuclear weapons first.
A: The auxiliary forces are like the Basij forces in Iran and like the Hashd Sha‘abi in Iraq. They are a force from the community that have their own military training and contingents, and have combat missions alongside the army’s forces.
Q: But in coordination with the regular army, right?
A: Yes, and under the army’s command.
Q: Some say that Hezbollah and the Iranians pressured Assad to open the Golan front, but Assad rejected this, and so there were tensions between the two sides. Is this true, or just rumours?
A: These are just rumours. What I know is that Iran did not want to open any support front, and even al-Aqsa Flood happened without coordination with the front. Iran wanted to acquire nuclear weapons first.
Q: Okay, let’s go back to 2011. Some that Assad should have resigned then so that the country would not be drawn into war, and they also say that the fundamental problem was the existence of an oppressive regime with oppressive security branches. What’s your view of this?
A: At the beginning of 2011, the remands were freedom and reforms. When the government and president agreed to the people’s demands, the roof of the demands rose to bringing down the regime and regime change. Here the president’s response was that there are elections, especially as not all the people wanted to bring down Assad. But when things became apparent and the intentions of these people became clear, Assad had no choice but to resist and defend the country. The security branches are the foundation of any state. Are there no intelligence branches in America? Are there no security branches in France?
Q: Over the course of the war, how do you assess the Russians’ role? Did they have a positive role or bad one in all meanings of the word?
The Russian forces’ mission was to steal Syria’s resources of phosphate and oil. In all our oil crises, we found no support and help for us except from Iran, even though they were being threatened.
A: It was very bad, as though they wanted the war to continue. When we came near to liberating Deraa, they intervened to implement taswiya with Ahmad al-Awda’s forces. The taswiya allowed them to retain their weapons, and they were like a ticking time bomb. Likewise was the situation in East Ghouta and Qalamoun. In 2016, when the battle began to liberate south Aleppo countryside, and were seeking to reach the villages of Kafariya and al-Fua that were besieged, and when the Iraqi forces reached Tel al-Eis and al-Ikarida and Banis, the Russians also reached an agreement with the Turks for the Olive Branch area. The Russian forces’ mission was to steal Syria’s resources of phosphate and oil. In all our oil crises, we found no support and help for us except from Iran, even though they were being threatened. Even so, their support for Syria did not stop.
Q: Some say that Assad had to offer reforms during the last years, but he did not do so. What do you think of this?
A: Assad had to begin eliminating the corruption and sowers of corruption on the inside in 2018, when most of the battles stopped in 2018, but the Caesar law and siege imposed on the Syrian government left him no space to undertake reform. Let’s also not forget the corona crisis and the Aleppo earthquake.
Q: Finally, has the resistance axis come to an end? And what’s your message to Syrians?
A: Imam Ali (peace be upon him) says: war has ups and downs: one day in our favour against our enemy, and another day in favour of our enemy against us. The resistance axis is a path on which we have been raised and on which we will raise our children. I hope the Syrians will return to their Arabness.
