Today, the Eighth Brigade, a local armed formation based out of the town of Busra al-Sham in east Deraa countryside in southern Syria, announced its dissolution via a video statement issued by a leading figure in the formation called ‘Muhammad al-Hawrani.’ What is the background behind this event and what is its significance? For example, is the event connected to the new Syrian government’s ties with Russia and the United Arab Emirates as some have speculated?
The Eighth Brigade was originally formed in 2018 as the Assad regime reclaimed control over the insurgent-held regions of Deraa and al-Qunaytra provinces. Led by Ahmad al-Ouda, the group had its foundations in the insurgent group Farqat Shabab al-Sunna. Initially, the Eighth Brigade received the backing of Russia, which helped broker ‘reconciliation’ agreements in the south. The Eighth Brigade became part of the Russian-backed V Corps. The main benefit of this affiliation was that personnel received salaries from Russia. Members of the brigade also performed shifts with the Syrian army in Latakia province. However, the group had no real role in military operations outside the south.
Members of the brigade also performed shifts with the Syrian army in Latakia province. However, the group had no real role in military operations outside the south.
In addition, by 2021, the Russians cut off support for the Eighth Brigade, with the group’s affiliation transferred from the V Corps to the regime’s military intelligence (specifically branch 265). This change in affiliation led to a significant reduction in financial benefits, with only a select number of personnel receiving salaries that were little better than the salaries of regular personnel in the Syrian army (i.e. around $15-20 per month). Further, the rotations in Latakia stopped, and the group became limited to a local holding and security force and intermediary actor for resolving disputes, with its main base remaining in Busra al-Sham. Some of this information comes from a useful background report by Daraa 24 on the group, but it is also corroborated by someone I knew who served in the Eighth Brigade and eventually quit.
By late 2024, some personnel in the group were having their service in the group reckoned as equivalent to compulsory military/reserve service and were accordingly granted discharge from military service by the regime’s Ministry of Defence. However, the group never really had loyalty to the regime, but was rather adapting to survive the reality of the return of regime control. Once the regime began to collapse, the group, like other local factions in the south, turned against the regime.
Although the Eighth Brigade was characterised as the ‘largest faction’ in Syria’s south, this needs to be understood in relative terms compared with other armed factions in the country. A Daraa 24 report in April 2024 put the number of members at around 1200 . While these numbers might be significant at the local level in Deraa, characterisations of the Ahmad al-Ouda as equivalent to Libya’s Khalifa Haftar that emerged after Assad’s fall were greatly exaggerated. At best, the group was simply a local holding force and mediator: it could not have seriously mounted any challenge to depose Ahmad al-Sharaa from rule, who is backed by a far great number of fighters who were in his Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and allied factions.
The recent announcement to dissolve the Eighth Brigade should be understood as simply coming within the framework of the new central government’s desire to impose order and security wherever it can in Syria. The fall of the regime did not mean the end of security incidents in Deraa such as assassinations. The existence of local armed groups acting independently of the security forces embodied in the police and the ‘public security’ apparatus is obviously an impediment to imposing order and security.
The Eighth Brigade’s dissolution represents a step forward for the new Syrian government in its desire to properly impose authority and control over various regions of Syria.
Today’s announcement to dissolve the Eighth Brigade did not come out of the blue but was rather the culmination of a process beginning since Friday as contingents of the Eighth Brigade began handing themselves and their weapons over to the ‘public security’ forces, within the framework of locally-mediated negotiations and agreements with the central government. Further, it should be noted that in other parts of Deraa province, contingents of the ‘public security’ forces have already begun arriving and recruiting new local personnel (e.g. see the photo below featuring ‘public security’ personnel from the Yarmouk Basin village of Koaiya).
In light of the actual history of the Eighth Brigade and the recent context, speculation that the dissolution of the group has something to do with the new Syrian government’s ties to Russia and the UAE should also be dismissed. The fact is the Eighth Brigade had lost Russian support a long time ago, and there is no good evidence that the UAE ever gave meaningful support to the Eighth Brigade.
On the wider level, the Eighth Brigade’s dissolution represents a step forward for the new Syrian government in its desire to properly impose authority and control over various regions of Syria, but the Eighth Brigade is ultimately just one piece of a larger puzzle. There are still issues regarding how to deal with and properly integrate other groups such as Druze factions in al-Suwayda’, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces, ‘Syrian National Army’ factions in north Aleppo countryside that have enjoyed Turkish support.
