During the course of the war in Syria, one of the main contingents of forces fighting on the side of the Assad regime was the so-called ‘Forces of the Friends’ (Arabic: Quwat al-Asdiqa’): that is, formations of Syrian fighters that were supported and overseen by personnel from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and/or Hezbollah. Collectively, these formations constituted the ‘Local Defence Forces’ network, a project more broadly coordinated with the Syrian military. With the collapse of the Assad regime, these formations have similarly collapsed and do not constitute ‘stay-behind’ sabotage networks for the Iranians and Hezbollah to undermine the new government.
As observers and historians come to document the history of the conflict, it will be important to try to track down and interview those who worked in the ‘Forces of the Friends’ in order to learn about their personal experiences in these networks, not only because of a general dearth of information on these groups, but also because the most accessible, publicly available information tends to come from partisan, pro-opposition sources that frequently spoke of these networks as ‘Iranian militias’. Of course, trying to track down and interview veterans has its own limitations and obstacles: people may be unwilling to speak candidly or at all out of fear of reprisal from the new government, and interviewees may try to recast their motivations in light of the fact they were on the losing side. But these problems do not mean we should not try.
As observers and historians come to document the history of the conflict, it will be important to try to track down and interview those who worked in the ‘Forces of the Friends’ in order to learn about their personal experiences in these networks
The following interview was conducted on 30 December 2024 with a friend who was working with the ‘Forces of the Friends’ from the days prior to the collapse of Assad’s regime. He is a Sunni with family origins in al-Zabadani (a town that was besieged by the Assad regime and Hezbollah). Some of the topics discussed include:
- What were the reasons why people enlisted with the ‘Forces of the Friends’ rather than the regular Syrian army?
- The nature of service and assignments in the ‘Forces of the Friends’.
- The composition of the ‘Forces of the Friends’ and claims about conversion to Shi‘ism among members.
- Relations with other actors on the regime side, such as the Fourth Division and the National Defence Forces.
- The Islamic State insurgency in the desert region.
- The final collapse of the regime.
- In the bigger picture, what was the purpose of the ‘Forces of the Friends’ in Syria, and how did it compare to Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Hashd in Iraq?
Q: Can you tell me a little about your life before the events? When were you born? Were you raised in al-Zabadani?
A: 1998. I am from al-Zabadani, but I was born in Darayya and lived there. At the start of the crisis I was in Darayya. Two of my siblings died in Darayya in 2011, and then we were displaced to al-Zabadani. In 2017 we returned to al-Sham.
Q: How did your siblings die in 2011?
A: One was shot by a sniper. The other was killed in the Darayya massacre: the regime killed them.
Q: At the start of the crisis what was your position on what was happening?
A: I was neutral but once my siblings died, we became opposed to the regime. It is impossible for anyone to love the killing of his brother, but I saw the prisons among us, and how fear permeated. My family were afraid for me and my siblings after two died. It was a murderous and oppressive regime. At the start of the crisis, they committed much wrongdoing.
Q: Yes by God. So you went to al-Zabadani?
A: Not to the town of al-Zabadani itself but a village next to it called Serghaya. We remained there from 2013 until 2017 when we came to Kafr Susa in Damascus. Our home in Darayya is destroyed. Currently we rent. With regards to the friends, I was very satisfied in working with them.
Q: So when did you enlist with the forces of the friends first? And for what reasons?
A: 2017, for the following reasons: to protect myself from having to go to the army, and the salary was very helpful to us. You know how difficult the situation was. In particular, we the people of al-Zabadani were very much harassed by the checkpoints in the crisis. Whether or not you had something against you, they would take you. There was a lot of fear. But as for the friends, I only saw good from them. I never saw any of them commit a massacre or kill someone in an act of wrongdoing. Our regime was oppressive. I lived through this atmosphere. The son of al-Sham’s countryside and the son of al-Ghouta will say the same thing. No one spoke up because of fear, and we lost hope the regime would fall.
Q: With which formations did you work in the forces of the friends? And in which battles did you participate? How were the conditions of service?
A: Hadhrat Abbas Brigade, Qamr Bani Hashim Division, and finally Regiment 47. I participated in the battles of T2 pumping station and Albukamal. The conditions of service were that our service would be reckoned as being army service, and the salary and working conditions were all more merciful than the army. We did not have officers from the army, which was the greatest blessing, because we could not bear their regime and mindset. Everything was better. I served in the Dayr al-Zur desert and Ma‘izila [village in al-Raqqa province] at holding points.
There was a lot of fear. But as for the friends, I only saw good from them. I never saw any of them commit a massacre or kill someone in an act of wrongdoing. Our regime was oppressive. I lived through this atmosphere. The son of al-Sham’s countryside and the son of al-Ghouta will say the same thing. No one spoke up because of fear, and we lost hope the regime would fall.
Q: What was the salary exactly?
A: 100 dollars, so I was getting 1,400,000 Syrian pounds.
Q: Can you clarify: did they transfer you from the forces of the friends to the regular army eventually?
A: No. I was in Dayr al-Zur. All in Dayr al-Zur remained with the Iranians and were not transferred to the army.
Q: There was a lot of talk about ‘conversion to Shi‘ism’ within the ranks of the forces of the friends. Can you clarify the truth about this?
A: No, it’s a lie. No one ever did this in front of me. Most of the forces of the friends were Sunnis, but there were people also who are originally Shi‘a, like Nubl and al-Zahara’ and Homs.
Q: Yes, and there are people who voluntarily converted, right?
A: I have now heard about this, but during my service I did not see anyone convert to Shi‘ism.
Q: And the friends did not pressure people to convert?
A: Not at all. Notice what my name is. No one every degraded me with a word or made me hear an insult.
Q: Did the Iranians ever clarify to you the reason for deployment to Dayr al-Zur? For example, did they ever speak about a ‘land route’ for the resistance?
A: I would hear this: that Iraq, Syria and Lebanon are one common route. They did not speak directly about this. In the end: it was a matter of state secrets. They would not tell them to anyone.
Q: Did you target the American forces in Dayr al-Zur?
A: Yes. Israel struck 12 bases in Dayr al-Zur.
Q: Yes, I know that the Israelis targeted them in Dayr al-Zur and killed al-Hajj Rusul.
A: Correct.
Q: Can you clarify: was your regiment led by a Iranian?
A: Yes, al-Hajj Malik.
Q: And did any officers from the Syrian army have any role?
A: No, there were no officers. There were Syrian officers, but not officers.
Q: How were the relations between you, the regular army and the National Defence Forces in Dayr al-Zur?
A: It was all good. There were problems in the final period between the National Defence and the Iranians, but I don’t know the reason why.
Q: And the Iranians had no relations with the National Defence in Dayr al-Zur?
A: No. In the final period, the authority entirely belonged to the Fourth Division.
Q: In Dayr al-Zur? Did this cause problems between the Fourth Division and the Iranians?
A: There were no problems, but the Fourth Division monopolised their authority over all.
Iraq, Syria and Lebanon are one common route. They did not speak directly about this. In the end: it was a matter of state secrets. They would not tell them to anyone.
Q: I see. But this is an important point, because it shows that the Fourth Division was not affiliated with the Iranians as some think.
A: I used to think so. When we were in al-Sham, the bases of Hadhrat Abbas Brigade all belonged to the Fourth Division’s 555 Regiment- which you must know of.
Q: Yes. So you mean that there were bases shared between the Fourth Division and the Iranians?
A: Yes, only bases. But no support or assignments. Each to his own.
Q: How was service in the badiya region and combating Da‘esh? As it seems, Da‘esh was a long-term problem in the badiya.
A: But Da‘esh ended in 2018, nothing called Da‘esh remained.
Q: Yes, I know that the ‘caliphate’ ended but guerrilla warfare continued in the badiya.
A: They would carry out ambushes above all and disappear into the desert. The Tanf base protected them.
Q: Hahahaha. But it became a problem for the regular army and the allies? I mean, did many martyrs fall?
A: Yes, by God. I was on holding points. They would only carry out ambushes, we would only know that they killed so-and-so and so-and-so, or that they would plant mines.
Q: Were any companions of your regiment martyred in their ambushes?
A: Yes, many were martyred.
Q: In the final days, what happened exactly?
A: When Hama fell and the insurgents headed towards Homs, they gave an order for us to withdraw and abandon our positions.
Q: So eventually your regiment withdrew from the badiya, and some of your companions ended up in Iraq?
A: Yes. Some of our people went to Iraq, only a few though. In the end everyone has returned home.
When Bashar was in power, Israel would strike, and the army was stronger, and no one would say a word. The new government has received a collapsed state, and Bashar sold us to Israel. He has given it all the locations of weapons, and the first thing they hit was all of our air defences.
Q: Do you hope for good relations between Iran and Syria in the future?
A: I hope with all my heart. And Ahmad al-Sharaa spoke yesterday about preserving Iran’s sacred sites, and they have protected the Iranian embassy.
Q: What do you think of the idea of the ‘axis of resistance’?
A: By God, I don’t know what to tell you. But we the Syrian people have become exhausted. We want to live. All the world is waging war on the axis of resistance.
Q: For example Israel is present in some areas of al-Qunaytra, and there are people on the outside who say ‘the new government must mobilise to fight it.’ What do you think of this sort of talk?
A: When Bashar was in power, Israel would strike, and the army was stronger, and no one would say a word. The new government has received a collapsed state, and Bashar sold us to Israel. He has given it all the locations of weapons, and the first thing they hit was all of our air defences.
Q: In my view there are many exaggerations on the issue, with the claim that the forces of the friends were a ‘parallel army’ like ‘Syrian Hezbollah’ etc.
A: No. The forces of the friends were not like Hezbollah in their forces, not even with the force of the Afghans. They were auxiliary forces, but not with the force of Hezbollah or the Hashd Sha‘abi. The forces of the friends’ weapons were the weakest weapons: Chinese weapons.
