In a recent interview with Alexander McKeever, the analyst Aron Lund has noted that as historians look back on the rapid collapse of the Assad regime, the events in Aleppo (and by extension the wider northwest Syria front) will be important to examine, particularly in terms of what was happening on the regime side. What was the role of various units of Syrian personnel and the role of the regime’s foreign allies?
The following interview was conducted recently with a source who had been linked to the Martyr Ali Zayn al-‘Abidin Berri Brigade, a unit that was part of the Iranian and Hezbollah-backed Local Defence Forces network and worked in particular with Hezbollah’s al-Radhwan special forces. Some notable issues discussed include whether the insurgent offensive was basically ‘pre-emptive’, what role, if any, Israeli strikes played in contributing to the collapse of the regime, and whether there was ‘betrayal’ within the ranks of the regime forces, in particular among some of the Local Defence Forces’ units.
Q: First, when the attack on Aleppo city took place, was this expected? How did the forces responsible for defending Aleppo prepare?
A: The expectation was that the Syrian army and auxiliary forces would attack Idlib and north Idlib countryside. Around a month and a half before [the insurgent offensive] began], Division 25 sent up reinforcements. The division was redeployed from Ithriya to north Aleppo countryside and Saraqeb [in Idlib].
Q: So the army was preparing for an offensive operation on Idlib?
A: Correct. Three days before [the insurgent offensive began], the Russians engaged in violent clearance on Idlib and its countryside: Tronba, Nayrab, Jobas, Tell Mardikh.
Q: And what was the role of the Local Defence Forces in these preparations? For example the Martyr Ali Zayn al-‘Abidin Berri Brigade?
A: The Martyr Ali Zayn al-‘Abidin Berri Brigade was in Saraqeb with the Radhwan Forces. The Radhwan men were on guard against any penetrations that the Hay’a [Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham] might carry out. They were supporting the positions and how the forces were deployed from Shaykh Ahmad to Saraqeb, Nayrab and Jobas. The line was heavily supported, and likewise in Tell Karatin and al-Talihiya. Two days after the Russians stopped striking, the attack on Regiment 46 in Aleppo took place, as well as on Anjara and Qatban al-Jabal. After facing resistance, the Hay’a’s forces reached the square of death [in Aleppo] and Saraqeb. Attacks took place [in Aleppo] but they could not initially approach, and Hezbollah’s forces asked the Republican Guard: why is there no clearance taking place on your part? They said in reply: there is no order from the leadership to do so.
Q: Is it true that the Israeli strikes impacted the forces’ capabilities on the fronts?
A: Some days before [the offensive took place], Israeli aircraft struck the front and martyrs of the Hezb died. Among these martyrs was the commander of the Saraqeb front. It’s 90% certain that Israel played a big role in its strikes on Aleppo and Idlib countryside. There is a serious piece of information I am now going to tell you: when the Hezb saw that the Syrian army was not fighting or that there were no orders to do so, contacts took place between the Hezb and the Hay’a. In the context of these contacts, the Hezb began withdrawing all the fighters affiliated with it from the fronts and assembling them in Kafr Amim, and then headed to Hama and Homs.
Q: And did the personnel of the Martyr Ali Zayn al-‘Abidin Berri Brigade go with them to Hama and Homs?
A: Before the Hay’a’s men reached the al-Sham [Damascus] route, the brigade emptied all the reserve ammunition warehouses in Kafr Amim and Saraqeb. And there were no clashes: i.e. they did not enter the battleline, because Saraqeb was not attacked, but rather the attack took place from Aleppo countryside towards Aleppo city. For this reason, those in Saraqeb withdrew towards Hama. Two days after Saraqeb was handed over, forces from the Hezb came to Sayyid Jawad Ghafari who had come to Hama to participate in military operations: note Sayyid Jawad is Iranian. Sayyid Jawad withdrew the men in Hama towards Homs and then to Damascus. Then contact took place between Sayyid Jawad and Sayyid Maytham Mazen (also Iranian) on the Palmyra-Ithriya front, asking him to withdraw all his forces to Homs.
Q: How many martyrs from the Martyr Ali Zayn al-‘Abidin Berri Brigade died on the fronts during those battles?
A: Not a single martyr. Many abandoned their weapons. Four hours before Aleppo fell, the commander of Liwa al-Baqir came to the commander of the Martyr Ali Zayn al-‘Abidin Berri Brigade and told him: there is coordination between me and the Hay’a’s men so that we should not fight. Syria has gone. Within days Syria will be in the Hay’a’s hands.
Q: I see. So the stories about Liwa al-Baqir’s defection are true?
A: Of course. Khalid al-Mari‘i is the commander of Liwa al-Baqir.
Q: But why did they decide to defect? For example it’s been said that Liwa al-Baqir had good relations with the friends [Hezbollah and Iran].
A: True, they had good relations with the friends. But I will tell you something: the deputy commander of the Deterring the Aggression operations room- Zakur Abu Ahmad Bakari- is the cousin of Liwa al-Baqir’s leader: i.e. from the same tribe. And there was coordination. The leader sensed that the country had fallen and he decided to coordinate with him.
Q: And likewise the Martyr Ali Zayn al-‘Abidin Berri Brigade decided to coordinate with the Hay’a?
A: Initially the decision of the Martyr Ali Zayn al-‘Abidin Berri Brigade was to leave Aleppo and they began to head to Homs and then Damascus, and on the night Homs fell they headed back to Aleppo with the Hay’a. After they saw what had happened, no hope remained. And the one who secured the two brigades’ defection was the deputy commander of the operations: Zakur Abu Ahmad from the Hay’a.
Q: And when did Hezbollah’s forces decide to abandon the field, and for what reasons?
A: After they saw that the army would not fight and that there were no orders after the Hama battle. I will tell you: in all the battles that took place in Syria, the leadership was always in contact with the fighters, but this time there were no reinforcements, contacts or ammunition reaching the fronts.
I will tell you: in all the battles that took place in Syria, the leadership was always in contact with the fighters, but this time there were no reinforcements, contacts or ammunition reaching the fronts.
Q: So the main reason is that the army got tired and no longer wanted to fight?
A: This is the main reason. After it saw that all the officers and leaders fled, and were handing over the country and going on their way.
Q: With regards to the personnel and leaders of the Martyr Ali Zayn al-‘Abidin Berri Brigade, did they all do taswiya [regularisation of status]?
A: The leaders received security guarantee with the Hay’a, and the military personnel did taswiya so they could return to their civilian life.
Q: Currently how do you assess the situation in Aleppo, better than the days before its fall?
A: Aleppo is safe, but the living situation is difficult. Work has stopped. There is an abundance of cheap food goods, but there is no work. Work is very little. Praise be to God: we did not expect this sort of situation.
Q: Can I ask you more about the history of the brigade? Was the Martyr Ali Zayn al-‘Abidin Berri Brigade working with the friends from the beginning? And were all its members from the Berri family?
A: Not all the brigade’s members were Berri: no, many of them were not from the Berri family. Of course the brigade was established with the friends.
Q: So the training and salaries all came from the friends.
A: Yes.
Q: But the weapons were from the army?
A: No, also from the friends.
Q: Were all the members of the Martyr Ali Zayn al-‘Abidin Berri Brigade Sunnis?
A: Correct. Most of the personnel were Sunnis, as though there was no difference between Sunnis and Shi‘a. The biggest evidence for this is that members of the brigade successfully worked with our brothers from Nubl and al-Zahara’ [Shi‘a villages in Aleppo].
Q: There was a lot of talk about conversion to Shi‘ism in the friends’ formations. Is this true?
A: No, there was no conversion to Shi‘ism. No one would get involved in another’s business. All the directives were military, not religious. The Shi‘i would remain Shi‘i and the Sunni would remain Sunni.
Q: Why were the friends very interested in Aleppo to the point that Aleppo more or less became the centre of the Local Defence Project?
A: The Local Defence was first established in Aleppo from the Bekara tribe and from the Berri family that belongs to the Jis tribe, as well as part of the Asasina tribe and Nubl and al-Zahara’. They took an interest in the large number of people from these tribes and villages. For example they took an interest in the Martyr Ali Zayn al-‘Abidin Berri Brigade because it was a force that allowed the Berri family to coordinate with the Local Defence. Same thing for the Baqir Brigade for its tribe. The Iranians won a great deal of popular support in Aleppo from among these tribes, and popular support plays a big role as you know.
Q: And likewise Aleppo was important in securing the supply of weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon?
A: Correct.
