A newly unsealed US federal indictment has revealed how Turkey emerged as a critical financial and logistical hub in a sprawling Iranian weapons-trafficking network that supplied drones, ammunition and bomb components to Sudan’s military.
The case exposes close links between Turkish and Iranian defense contractors and shows once again how Turkish territory, companies and financial channels are being exploited to circumvent international sanctions and facilitate illicit arms transfers. It also points to a deeper pattern of cooperation between elements of Turkey’s defense sector and Iranian procurement networks.
The 33-page indictment, filed in the US District Court for the Central District of California on May 1, charges Iranian national Shamim Mafi, also known as Raheleh Mafi, with conspiring to violate US sanctions laws.
The 33-page indictment, filed in the US District Court for the Central District of California on May 1, charges Iranian national Shamim Mafi, also known as Raheleh Mafi, with conspiring to violate US sanctions laws by brokering massive arms deals involving Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) and Sudanese military entities.
While the indictment focuses on sanctions violations and weapons trafficking, the court documents repeatedly identify Turkey as a preferred operational and financial node used by the alleged conspirators to move money, arrange payments and facilitate sensitive transactions linked to Iranian military exports.
The indictment and attached FBI affidavit reveal how banks and the corporate sector as well loosely controlled foreign exchange houses in Turkey were used to transfer funds from Sudan to entities and individuals associated with the Iranian regime.
The revelations reinforce longstanding warnings by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) about Turkey’s persistent shortcomings in combating terrorism financing and illicit money flows through its financial system, particularly via loosely regulated money exchange houses that allegedly launder billions of dollars annually for terrorist groups and organized crime networks.
FATF put Turkey on its “grey list” in 2021 over serious deficiencies in anti-money laundering and counterterrorism financing controls. Although Turkey was removed from the list in 2024 after taking a number of corrective measures and pledging further reforms, the newly disclosed US indictment suggests that significant vulnerabilities remain in the country’s financial and regulatory framework.
The indictment also confirms longstanding concerns among Western intelligence and law enforcement agencies that Turkey has become a permissive environment for sanctions evasion networks tied to Iran, Sudan and other hostile nations.
According to the indictment, Mafii is an Iranian national who moved to Turkey some time in 2013. For her, Turkey was not merely a transit point but a long-term operational base from which she cultivated business, intelligence and procurement relationships. She later moved to the US to become a lawful permanent resident residing in California and travelled frequently between the United States, Iran, Turkey, Oman and the United Arab Emirates while operating Atlas International Business LLC, an Oman-based front company allegedly used to broker arms sales on behalf of Tehran.
She also maintained a footprint in Turkey’s defense industry, forging ties with Turkish defense contractors and even registering businesses in Turkey, underscoring the extent to which the country served as both a commercial and logistical platform for the network’s activities.
For her, Turkey was not merely a transit point but a long-term operational base from which she cultivated business, intelligence and procurement relationships.
Mafi’s first husband reportedly worked for Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), Tehran’s primary civilian intelligence agency responsible for both domestic surveillance and covert foreign operations. She was also said to have maintained close ties with senior MOIS figures. According to the indictment her connections proved influential enough that an MOIS official arranged an exemption for her son from Iran’s mandatory two-year military service.
According to the indictment Mafi was initially instructed to establish a business in Los Angeles purportedly to earn commissions by helping Iranian Americans resolve disputes involving assets seized by the Iranian government. US investigators allege that the capital and operating costs associated with setting up the company were financed by an MOIS agent, a detail the FBI said was consistent with Iranian intelligence directing and supporting Mafi’s activities on US soil.
Investigators said Mafi remained in close contact with an Iranian intelligence operative between December 2022 and January 2026, communicating through WhatsApp and meeting in person on multiple occasions, according to the federal indictment.
The FBI affidavit attached to the indictment also revealed MAFI’s political ties to Iran’s ruling establishment. According to the document, on June 28, 2024, the secretary of the Headquarters for Ethnic, Tribal and Religious Affairs in the presidential campaign of one candidate offered her a position. Although the affidavit did not name the candidate, the description clearly points to Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf.
The candidate sent MAFI a letter in Farsi appointing her as head of the Women’s Headquarters for Ethnic, Tribal and Religious Affairs for Ghalibaf’s 2024 presidential campaign. The appointment suggested that MAFI enjoyed the trust of senior Iranian political figures closely aligned with the IRGC, given Ghalibaf’s long career as a former IRGC Aerospace Force commander, police chief and Tehran mayor.
The FBI affidavit said MAFI’s appointment to a senior role in Ghalibaf’s presidential campaign indicated that she was trusted by high-ranking Iranian political figures and aligned with their ideology and policies. Investigators assessed that such trust was consistent with MAFI acting on behalf of Iranian government interests, including in the weapons-brokering operations.
US prosecutors allege that beginning in at least February 2024, Mafi and her associates orchestrated deals involving Iranian-made Mohajer-6 armed drones, aerial bombs, bomb fuses, AK-47 ammunition and other military hardware destined for Sudanese military entities amid Sudan’s devastating civil conflict.
The wording strongly suggests reliance on Turkey’s sprawling informal money exchange sector, which has long attracted scrutiny for weak oversight and vulnerability to money laundering and sanctions evasion schemes.
The documents show that Turkey played a central role not only as a transit and coordination point but also as a cash-clearing facility designed specifically to avoid detection by the international financial system.
One particularly revealing exchange cited by prosecutors involved payment discussions for a contract involving 240 million rounds of AK-47 ammunition valued at more than $100 million. On October 21, 2024, Mafi allegedly advised a Sudanese intermediary to avoid formal banking channels and instead use cash-based exchange systems in Turkey.
“I think you should go to the cash transfer process,” Mafi allegedly wrote in a WhatsApp message cited in the indictment. “I know it will be very sensitive. I[t] should be in small amounts. In turkey we can just accept in exchange. And it should be in cash.”
The wording strongly suggests reliance on Turkey’s sprawling informal money exchange sector, which has long attracted scrutiny for weak oversight and vulnerability to money laundering and sanctions evasion schemes.
Under pressure from the FATF, the Islamist government of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan introduced new reporting requirements for cash exchange houses in an effort to address Turkey’s longstanding shortcomings in combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism.
However, enforcement of those measures remained weak and inconsistent, with exchange houses continuing to process transactions linked to terrorist groups and organized crime syndicates. Mafi’s alleged recommendation to break transfers into smaller amounts through exchange houses in Turkey suggests she understood how to circumvent regulatory safeguards and avoid triggering financial red flags.
The indictment further alleges that payments tied to Iranian drone contracts were routed through Turkish exchange offices. On January 13, 2025, Mafi allegedly provided Sudanese representatives with the contact information for a Turkish money exchange house to receive approximately $2.7 million connected to a contract for Mohajer-6 armed drones. Two days later she reportedly issued a receipt confirming that nearly $1 million had been received “through a Turkish money exchange” linked to the drone deal.
The repeated use of Turkish exchange networks in the alleged conspiracy is significant because it points to the operational utility of Turkey’s loosely regulated financial ecosystem for sanctioned actors seeking to move funds outside conventional banking oversight.
The indictment also alleges that the conspirators planned to channel payments through bank accounts in Turkey or the United Arab Emirates on behalf of Iran’s MODAFL, the entity overseeing Iran’s military procurement and defense industries.
The court filing outlines how Mafi and her associates allegedly coordinated directly with Iranian military and defense officials, including personnel linked to the IRGC.
A January 2025 amendment to the drone contract reportedly stated that payments would be made “to an account provided by MODAFL in the UAE or Turkey,” indicating that Iranian defense-linked entities were using financial channels in both countries to facilitate transactions tied to the weapons deal. The reference also suggests that Iran maintained access to banking arrangements in Turkey that could be used to process sensitive financial transactions despite international sanctions and export-control restrictions.
US prosecutors further cited evidence that a company associated with Mafi in Turkey would facilitate ammunition deliveries. In August 2024 Mafi informed Sudanese representatives that 10 million rounds of ammunition “were ready” and that the transaction would be arranged through “a company in Turkey associated with defendant MAFI.”
The court filing outlines how Mafi and her associates allegedly coordinated directly with Iranian military and defense officials, including personnel linked to the IRGC, MODAFL, the Defense Industries Organization (DIO) and the Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO).
One section of the indictment alleges that Mafi formally petitioned the IRGC’s Deputy Directorate of Readiness and Support to authorize the export of 55,000 bomb fuses to Sudan. The contract required advance payments to a currency exchange in Turkey,
One of the most significant revelations in the FBI affidavit concerns the apparent involvement of a Turkish defense contractor in the broader Iranian weapons procurement and export network. According to the document, investigators discovered that Shamim Mafi possessed a 352-page sales brochure from an unnamed “Turkish defense company,” described in the affidavit as “one of the largest all-round defence manufacturers and suppliers in Turkey.”
The catalog allegedly featured OJAN-500 aerial bombs — unguided air-dropped munitions of Iranian origin — that prosecutors say were being marketed for Sudan as part of the covert arms deals orchestrated by Mafi and her associates. The presence of the Iranian bombs in the Turkish company’s promotional materials suggests a possible overlap between Turkish defense-sector intermediaries and Iranian military procurement networks operating in violation of international sanctions.
The affidavit suggests the Turkish company’s materials were being used in connection with Iranian weapons procurement and export negotiations, raising questions about possible overlap between Turkish defense-sector intermediaries and Iran’s military export apparatus. Investigators noted that the OJAN-500 bomb was linked to Iran’s Ministry of Defense Export Center (MINDEX) and described it as an Iranian-designed high-explosive aerial bomb intended for use against ground targets including buildings, fortifications and troop concentrations.
The affidavit states that Mafi told investigators that “many Turkish defense firms acquired their technology from Iran, purchasing Iranian military equipment and then reverse-engineering it for mass production.”
Another striking detail emerged from an FBI summary of Mafi’s December 2024 interview with US Customs officials. According to the affidavit, Mafi said she was traveling to Turkey to meet a longtime business partner employed by the unnamed Turkish defense contractor and claimed she had previously introduced him to Iranian companies during meetings held in Iran.
She reportedly told investigators that she had earlier worked for the Turkish businessman as an interpreter and had personally accompanied him during visits to Iran, where she facilitated contacts and introductions with Iranian companies. The account suggests that Mafi played an active intermediary role linking Turkish defense-sector figures with Iranian companies tied to military procurement and arms-related business activities.
Most notably, the affidavit states that Mafi told investigators that “many Turkish defense firms acquired their technology from Iran, purchasing Iranian military equipment and then reverse-engineering it for mass production.” If corroborated, the claim could have far-reaching implications, suggesting that Iranian military technology may have found its way into segments of Turkey’s defense production chain despite international sanctions and export restrictions.
The case sheds light on the increasingly sophisticated methods used by Iranian procurement and arms trafficking networks to exploit regional jurisdictions that maintain extensive commercial ties with Tehran while also preserving relations with Western countries.
Turkey occupies a particularly strategic position in that ecosystem. Despite being a NATO member, the Erdogan government has deepened economic, political and intelligence ties with Iran in the last decade while resisting stricter enforcement of Western sanctions regimes.
Turkish banks, gold traders, exchange offices and logistics companies have repeatedly surfaced in major sanctions evasion investigations in recent years. The most notorious example was the multibillion-dollar Iran sanctions-busting operation run through Turkey’s state-owned Halkbank, which US prosecutors said helped Tehran secretly move billions of dollars in oil revenue through fraudulent gold and food transactions.
The latest indictment suggests that similar vulnerabilities continue to exist in Turkey’s financial and commercial systems, particularly through informal exchange mechanisms that enable large cash movements with limited transparency.
The case also raises broader geopolitical concerns because the alleged Iranian arms shipments were intended for Sudan’s military during an active civil war that has devastated the country and triggered one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises.
According to prosecutors Mafi admitted during an April 18, 2026, FBI interview at Los Angeles International Airport that she knew her activities violated US sanctions on Iran.
The case is likely to intensify scrutiny on Turkey’s role as a permissive jurisdiction for sanctions evasion, illicit finance and covert procurement networks linked to Iran’s military-industrial complex.
The indictment seeks criminal forfeiture of assets allegedly derived from the scheme and charges Mafi with conspiracy, sanctions violations and aiding and abetting offenses under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).
As the case moves forward, additional co-conspirators based in Turkey could potentially face indictment as well, or prosecutors may at least disclose the identities of the Turkish entities and individuals who allegedly worked with Mafi in facilitating the procurement, financing and transfer of Iranian weapons systems and military-related components.
The case is likely to intensify scrutiny on Turkey’s role as a permissive jurisdiction for sanctions evasion, illicit finance and covert procurement networks linked to Iran’s military-industrial complex. As Western governments tighten enforcement against Iranian weapons proliferation, Turkish financial and commercial channels may increasingly come under the microscope of US and European investigators.
Documents referenced in this article are available in the original Nordic Monitor version.
