Trump’s 2019 decision to withdraw US troops from Kurdish-controlled Rojava Kurdistan in northern Syria, was defended at the time by conservative commentators and can be seen as part of the first Trump administration’s “principled realism”. More than five years later we can ask the crucial question: Does this strategy still hold?
A quote often mistakenly attributed to former US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, is that the US has “no permanent friends or enemies, only interests”. Whatever its origin, it aptly describes the US’ historically inconsistent policy toward the Kurds. The Kurds in Iraq and Syria are often referred to as “the good Kurds” from the US perspective because of their role as a reliable ally in combating ISIS and maintaining regional stability. In contrast, the Kurds in Turkey are viewed as “the bad Kurds,” given Turkey’s strategic importance as a US ally. Meanwhile, the Kurds in Iran remain a potential, albeit inactive, ally for the US. Notably, the US has never supported Kurdish independence, not even for the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). The fallout from the 25 September 2017 advisory referendum on KRG independence, which saw the then President of Iraq’s Kurdistan region, Massoud Barzani resign, and Iraqi forces retake Kurdish territory, highlights the significant risks and complexities tied to this issue.
Trump 2.0 and the Middle East
Donald Trump’s second term, in line with the America First Agenda, reconsiders existing alliances with the aim of fostering regional peace. For the Kurds and their homeland, Kurdistan —partitioned among Iran, Iraq, Syria, Turkey, and South Caucasus— this could bring new opportunities thanks to their democratic mindset. Supporting the Kurds, as a realistic strategy rooted in “ideology”, offers concrete “outcomes” as their dedication to democratic governance makes them valuable stabilizers in the volatile Middle East.
Trump’s 2019 decision to withdraw US troops from Kurdish-controlled Rojava Kurdistan in northern Syria was defended at the time by conservative commentators and can be seen as part of the first Trump administration’s ‘principled realism.
Trump’s decision to hastily withdraw US special forces in October 2019 in the face of a Turkish invasion into Rojava (Western) Kurdistan during his first term left lasting scars and ignored the Kurds’ critical role in regional stability. Nevertheless, despite the shifting dynamics since then, Kurds have shown resilience and a steadfast commitment to fighting extremism in Syria and Iraq. Along with their counterparts in Turkey and Iran, their values mirror Western principles, offering practical benefits to US interests.
The KRG in Iraq has been the most stable area in a volatile country. However, as Trump moves forward with his plan to withdraw US troops from Iraq, the focus will likely shift to maintaining a limited presence in the Kurdistan region. This likely decision reduces US military footprints. Despite its relative stability, KRG lacks critical military capabilities, especially in terms of air defense, making it vulnerable to Iranian-backed militias operating in the region. As a consequence of this existential and political disarray, the KRG is confronted with significant challenges that have undermined its capacity to engage effectively with the global economy. A stronger Kurdish defense system would reduce American reliance on direct intervention, allowing the US to focus on its broader strategic objectives without becoming entangled in local conflicts. The KRG provides a valuable staging ground for US forces, allowing for rapid response capabilities against Iran and its proxies and supporting operations to dismantle remaining ISIS networks. It also continues to provide the US with a reliable and strategically positioned airbase near Hawlêr (Erbil) International Airport —offering a stable alternative to the often uncertain Incirlik Air Base in southeast Turkey.
The Kurds are caught between the US and Turkey
In 2019 and for the second time, Trump gave tacit approval for Turkey to launch a military offensive into Rojava Kurdistan. This move permitted Turkish forces to occupy parts of the area under Kurdish self-administration, subjecting the local Kurds to displacement, violence, and Turkification. Pure Turkish expansionism has led to the ethnic cleansing of Kurds, replacing them with Turkish and Arab settlers in a bid to transform the demographic landscape of the region. Trump undermined the very stability that Washington claimed to support.
Despite facing significant security risks from Turkey and its mercenaries, Kurdish forces continue to provide critical security for the region, combating ISIS remnants and Iranian-backed proxies.
As Trump now pushes for further American troop withdrawals from Syria, and potentially Iraq, with some forces retained for oil security, the Kurds remain caught between their US alliance and the threat of Turkish incursions. Despite facing significant security risks from Turkey and its mercenaries, Kurdish forces continue to provide critical security for the region, combating ISIS remnants and Iranian-backed proxies. However, their areas require a no-fly zone, as they have the ground capacity for defense while also managing the al-Hol camp, where thousands of ISIS fighters are held. In Turkey, the Kurdish situation presents unique challenges.
The US-Turkey relationship during Trump’s first term was marked by Trump’s strong rapport with Turkish President Erdogan who has already shown his excitement for Trump’s second term. The West in general has granted Turkey impunity in its domestic handling of the Kurds, treating Kurdish rights and autonomy as internal matters. The dynamic could shift if Trump seeks to reconcile Turkey’s increasingly complex relationships with both the West and Israel. Despite recent pro-Hamas moves by Turkey, Trump, who admires Erdogan, is highly likely to seek to repair Turkey’s relationship with Israel —potentially using this peace to advance a renewed Abraham Accords framework.
After Trump withdrew his support for the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), under the leadership of Commander-in-Chief Mazloum Abdi, the US still retained approximately 900 troops in the region. However, a potential rapprochement between Turkey and Israel might further endangers the SDF and the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), as it would embolden Turkey’s aspirations to dismantle Kurdish self-governance. This risk necessitates a critical reassessment by the US administration of its stance on Kurdish protection. Since the fall of Assad, the US presence has increased to around 2,000 troops in Syria, primarily to deter Turkish proxies from seizing Kobani and other areas of the AANES.
Trump, the Kurds and Iran
Iran itself will face even tougher challenges during Trump’s second term. Trump’s approach to Iran has traditionally been the maximum pressure campaign, culminating in his 2018 withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal known as JCPOA. With the Iranian regime increasingly vulnerable after recent geopolitical shifts —particularly following Israel’s October 2024 strikes on Iranian military targets and its weakening after severe blows to Hamas, Hizballah, and other proxies in Iraq— Trump will resume a hardline stance aimed at isolating Tehran.
The America First agenda in Trump 2.0 need not exclude the Kurds, as they are anchors of stability that cannot be ignored in a larger strategic calculation by Washington.
The Kurds in Iran, who played a significant role in the 2022-23 Jina Revolution, are a potential ally for any US administration willing to support liberalizing forces. Such recognition would grant Washington credibility with dissidents in Iran and send a powerful message against regional repression. America’s previous successful interventions in 1991 and 2003, which helped establish the autonomous KRG, underscore a long-standing moral obligation to support the oppressed Kurdish cause, making US support for Kurds across the region both strategic and consistent.
Including the Kurds in the US’ new foreign policy agenda
The Kurds can take the lead in resolving the security landscape of the New Middle East, aligning with US national interests and bolstered by steadfast American support for democratic forces. In the meantime, the long-term stability of the region necessitates a shift in approach from a reliance on threat tactics to the establishment of a new space with reliable partners.
There is potential for a more sustained US approach to the Kurdish nation, the largest stateless group in the Middle East. The new US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, has emphasized that the sole focus of US foreign policy is to advance American national interests as defined by Trump. That said, the America First agenda in Trump 2.0 need not exclude the Kurds as they are anchors of stability that cannot be ignored in a larger strategic calculation by Washington. In fact, reconciling US interests with Kurdish independence and security could be a powerful counterweight to rising authoritarianism, offering a path to international stability that accords with American ideals of freedom, democracy, autonomy, and partnership. The need for a national partner in a sovereign, independent Kurdistan, whether founded upon the KRG or Rojava’s self-rule, to counter Turkish and Iranian expansionism, is essential in the new Middle East led by the US and reflective of “principled realism.” Trump prided himself on being the leader who ends “forever wars,” but this does not mean he can overlook security concerns of the US and its allies. Abandoning allies would risk squandering the goodwill carefully cultivated over decades of US foreign policy.
