Undercover in Syria: How MEF Built a Secret Network in the Heart of a Conflict

For a decade, under the iron grip of the Assad regime, a group of brave individuals risked everything to get the truth out. While Syria descended into civil war and international attention fluctuated, the Middle East Forum quietly built an underground network of informants who meticulously documented the regime’s transformation into a narco-state. Now, as the Assad dynasty’s 50-year reign has collapsed, MEF can at last reveal how this clandestine operation illuminated one of the darkest corners of modern tyranny—a state-sponsored drug empire that reached the highest levels of Syrian leadership and extended throughout the region.

The Syrian civil war erupted in 2011 as part of the broader Arab Spring uprisings, but quickly descended into a complex proxy conflict involving regional powers, international actors, and numerous armed groups. As violence escalated and the regime fought for survival, Bashar al-Assad turned to his traditional allies—Iran and Hezbollah—who provided critical military support. This intervention would prove decisive not only for the regime’s survival but also for its evolution into a narco-state.

“During the years of the war that Syria witnessed, Damascus and its countryside were considered a key transit route for drugs towards most of the Syrian regions and beyond,” reported one MEF source in July 2022. “Damascus is the primary supplier and the first stop for all smugglers in all Syrian governorates, as its location near Lebanon has given it high importance.”

As international sanctions tightened and traditional revenue streams dried up, the Assad regime increasingly turned to drug production and trafficking to finance its operations. What began as a survival strategy soon evolved into a vast criminal enterprise involving the highest levels of the Syrian government, military, and security apparatus.

MEF’s investigation revealed that at the heart of Syria’s drug operations was the Syrian Army’s 4th Division, a special military unit with direct allegiance to the Assad family, commanded by Maher al-Assad, Bashar’s brother.

“Since its formation, the 4th Division has been considered a special military division of the Assad family and owes direct allegiance to them,” noted an MEF source. “The responsibility for overseeing drug trafficking rests with the 4th Division’s Security Bureau. As for the financial returns that are collected, they are for the benefit of the 4th Division as a whole.”

The 4th Division operated with remarkable precision and discipline. Our sources documented how they would create “gaps” in border security by ordering regular border guards to hand over adjacent points to Division forces. “Then the Division issues orders to the two points to stop any patrols. The shipments are passed through these two points and transferred to their warehouses inside Syria,” explained one source.

The narcotics were typically stored in warehouses located in paramilitary and security areas in the Qalamoun countryside, especially in Al-Sabourah and Zabadani. The movements enjoyed complete secrecy, with army conscripts who encountered drug loads often kept “totally in the dark by their officers. These recruits believe they are carrying out routine missions by bringing in military or logistical equipment.”

The head of the 4th Division Security Office, Brigadier General Ghassan Bilal, emerged as a central figure in drug trafficking operations. Working under him were a cadre of officers dedicated to various aspects of the drug trade, including:

• Colonel Firas Hikmat Kreidi, an officer in the 4th Division’s Security Office who supervised smuggling in the Jabal Al-Sheikh region.
• Lieutenant Basil Ibrahim, a trusted officer from Tartous who facilitated movement of drug shipments.
• Numerous lower-ranking officers who provided security escorts, managed checkpoints, and coordinated with smugglers.

MEF’s investigation identified numerous members of the Assad family directly involved in drug operations, creating a family enterprise that controlled all aspects of the trade.

Bashar Talal al-Assad, known as Abu Qaswara, emerged as one of the largest drug and arms dealers in Syria. “Abu Qaswara enjoys great security clout as he is from the Assad family,” reported a source in September 2022. His right-hand man, Siwar Yousef, acted as the front for Abu Qaswara’s drug business, running day-to-day smuggling operations. Among smugglers, Siwar earned the nickname “the octopus” due to his extensive and complex network of relations with security agencies and smugglers.

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Waseem al-Assad and Samer al-Assad were identified as key figures in production and distribution. Waseem possessed specialized knowledge of chemical compounds used in Captagon production. “Waseem Al-Assad has the experience through chemists working for him to modify the main chemical compound in Captagon pills so that it is of lower cost and greater quantity,” noted a source. “He grinds the pills and recycles them by mixing them with other materials that reduce their effectiveness.”

Our investigation documented how the Assad family members established a hierarchy within the drug trade, with each branch controlling specific territories and aspects of the operation. For example, Samer al-Assad oversaw operations in “the area of Al-Bassa which is located in northwestern Syria and is administratively part of Latakia city,” while Waseem controlled routes through Homs to Latakia.

One of the most remarkable aspects of the Syrian drug operation was its manufacturing infrastructure. MEF sources identified numerous factories throughout Syria that served as fronts for drug production.

In the Damascus countryside, our sources documented a factory known as “Rayan Plast,” ostensibly a plastics factory for the manufacture of water tanks. In reality, “narcotics are manufactured and packaged in hidden cargo bays inside vehicles or in specific goods in which the drugs will be smuggled.” This factory was owned by Rabie Shaheen, described as “the commander of the National Defense Forces in the Jaramana region and a major drug dealer.”

Another significant operation was a factory in the Sabineh area in the Damascus countryside, near the industrial city of Hosh Blas. This facility produced “Diana Chocolate” as a cover while manufacturing various drugs. As one source explained: “In the drug manufacturing lab, the drugs are produced and packaged in hidden cargo bays inside vehicles or in specific goods in which the drugs will be smuggled.”

In August 2022, MEF sources identified a drug factory in a villa located on the road between Jaramana and the town of Mleiha, operated by the National Defense Forces. This location was described as “one of the most important sites for the distribution of drugs and one of the most important centers for the trade and manufacture of narcotic substances in the capital, Damascus.”

The investigation also uncovered major production facilities in Assal Al-Ward on the Syrian side and the town of Al-Tofil on the Lebanese side of the border. “These facilities are run by local groups working under the supervision of Hezbollah and the 4th Division, producing large quantities primarily for export,” reported a source in November 2022.

The involvement of Lebanese Hezbollah in Syria’s drug trade emerged as a crucial element of the operation. After Hezbollah’s intervention in Syria to support regime forces, the group “infiltrated the structure of the military divisions and battalions of the Syrian army, the main centers in the state, the crossings, ports and airports,” according to MEF sources.

This infiltration created the foundation for an extensive drug trafficking partnership. Key Hezbollah figures identified in Syria’s drug trade included:

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• Haj Abbas Safadi, a Lebanese commander who headed a Hezbollah checkpoint at the main entrance to the Sayida Zainab area from the Damascus airport road. He facilitated “the entry of raw materials used in the drug industry into the Sayida Zainab area, part of which is transferred to Jaramana and other parts of the Damascus countryside where there are many Captagon factories.”
• Ali Faour (Abu Haider), who commanded a 200-fighter group called “The Angels of Imam al-Jawad” under the Zainabiyoun militia banner. Speaking Persian fluently and enjoying strong relations with Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) militia leaders, Faour played “a major role in escorting Lebanese and Iranian pilgrims and securing their entry to Syria from Lebanon and Iraq” while simultaneously being “closely linked to the drug trade network in Syria.”
• Haj Hassan Al-Houli and Haj Abdulkarim Danaoui, field commanders in Lebanese Hezbollah who supervised drug shipments from the Bekaa and Baalbek to Arsal and Rankous in the Damascus countryside.

The relationship between Hezbollah and the Syrian regime’s drug operations was mutually beneficial. As one source explained: “After the outbreak of the Syrian revolution and the intervention of Hezbollah and Iran in Syria in favor of regime forces, and the subsequent infiltration of Hezbollah into the structure of the military divisions and battalions of the Syrian army, the main centers in the state, the crossings, ports and airports, the drug business has become key to securing financial resources to cover the expenses of the military operations that it carries out.”

MEF’s investigation mapped an extensive network of smuggling routes that carried drugs from Syria throughout the region and beyond.

Our sources identified several key smuggling corridors:

1. The Ain al-Jawzah route: A secret smuggling route used by Lebanese Hezbollah that runs between the village of Halboun and the Syrian-Lebanese border. It includes “a 10km long dirt road with a fully equipped tunnel beneath it protected by Hezbollah and the 4th Division,” according to a source from September 2022.
2. The Deir al-Ashayer corridor: A secret dirt road to the town located between Syria and Lebanon. “The town administratively belongs to Lebanon but is used as a training area for the Syrian army. On the Syrian side, there is a Hezbollah training center located in the 130th Brigade base of the 10th Division,” reported a source in October 2022.
3. The Farzal-Arsal-Fleita route: Starting from the Lebanese town of Farzal, passing through the outskirts of Arsal, and reaching the Syrian town of Fleita, then to Rankous and finally to the Syrian coast.
4. The Rukban drone corridor: Near the Rukban camp, where “a coordination agreement was reached between one of the major drug smugglers in southern Syria, Rafi Al-Ruwais, and another person named Osama Al-Diat, aka Abu Ahmad Al-Sahwa” to use drones to transport drugs into Jordan.

Drugs moved from Syria primarily in two directions: “towards import/export companies at the port of Tartus, specifically to the warehouses of the Sahel Company owned by Jamil al-Assad, uncle of President Bashar al-Assad, where they are prepared for export within legitimate cargo; and towards southern Syria for distribution to smugglers who move the drugs into Jordan and Arab Gulf countries.”

An underground drug smuggling tunnel.

MEF sources noted that drug trafficking from Syria to Libya increased due to the “relatively easy movement of ships between these countries. From Libya, the drugs are smuggled into Europe through various means.”

The methods of concealment were often ingenious. One source described how smugglers would use “cigarette cartons, where entire cars carrying cigarette cartons are loaded and drugs are placed between them in a careful way as to conceal them entirely.” Another reported method involved hiding drugs in “loads of bulgur wheat and freekeh, which are then prepared in manual or mechanical factories for the benefit of export towards the Gulf countries via Jordan, or towards Egypt and Greece.”

MEF’s investigation profiled numerous individuals who played crucial roles in the Syrian drug trade beyond the Assad family members and Hezbollah commanders already mentioned. These profiles provided unprecedented insight into the operation’s human dimension.

Muhammad al-Badawi, nicknamed “Abu Fares,” emerged as one of the most dangerous people involved in smuggling, especially drug smuggling, for the 4th Division. “What distinguishes Abu Fares is the great experience in smuggling that he has before the Syrian revolution,” noted a July 2022 report. “He has strong relations with dealers and smugglers from Hezbollah and smugglers and drug dealers in southern Syria and Jordan.”

Major General Ramadan Youssef Ramadan was identified as a long-time smuggler who used his military position to carry out operations. “He started working in this field (i.e., drug and cigarette smuggling) when he was commander of the 35th Special Forces Regiment deployed in the countryside of Damascus and in Lebanon,” reported a source in July 2022. “As a result of the presence of units of this regiment in Lebanon, Major General Ramadan was able to form a large network of relations with the people of southern Lebanon and Hezbollah operatives and drug dealers.”

Lieutenant Colonel Alaa Al-Ahmad, nicknamed “Alaa Jawiya,” was documented as a key figure in Air Force Intelligence involved in drug trafficking. “Lt. Col. Alaa occupies the position of being responsible for the Air Force Intelligence checkpoints in southern Syria and enjoys remarkable security arrangements, as he moves under the protection of a heavily armed convoy between Damascus, As-Suwayda, and Daraa,” reported an August 2022 source.

Hussein Mortada, a Lebanese Shiite journalist who worked for Hezbollah and Iranian militias in Syria, was revealed to be deeply involved in drug trafficking. “Taking advantage of his influence, Hussein Mortada publicly enters cars carrying narcotics from Lebanon to Syria without being subjected to any security checks,” reported an October 2022 source. “On a monthly basis, two armored Chevrolet cars with tinted windows and not carrying number plates are loaded with narcotic pills and hashish.”

Another striking case was that of Mustafa Al-Wara, nicknamed “Houta,” who operated a real estate office in Damascus as a front for drug distribution. “This real estate office is currently the front for a large drug distribution center in Damascus and its countryside,” noted a source in October 2022. “The name of the office is Mafatih al-Wara, or ‘Keys of Piety,’ an old name for the shop that has not changed for a long time and that plays on Mustafa’s surname meaning piety.”

One of the most revealing aspects of MEF’s investigation was documenting how entire military units became corrupted by the drug trade. The 130th Brigade of the 10th Division emerged as a particularly illustrative case.

In October 2022, MEF sources documented a dramatic incident involving the brigade’s commander, Brigadier General Abdullah Suleiman. A high-level convoy led by Major General Zuhair al-Assad, commander of the Syrian Army’s Second Corps, arrived at the 130th Brigade headquarters to arrest Suleiman “on charges of embezzlement and drug trafficking.” The arrest came after “a shipment of drugs that was seized by the Syrian military and customs on the Homs International Highway on its way to Latakia” was traced back to Suleiman’s group.

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The source explained that this arrest was orchestrated because “influential parties were disturbed by Suleiman’s movements, feeling he was trying to create his own space in drug smuggling and bypassing the existing hierarchical authority.” After the arrest, Suleiman was taken to Qardaha in Latakia Governorate for a meeting with Siwar Yousef and Bashar Talal al-Assad. Several days later, he returned to his command position, with the official line being that “he had been vacationing with family and friends.”

Meanwhile, Colonel Samer Ali, the security officer of the 130th Brigade, was described as “the mastermind of the drug trade in the Brigade.” Sources reported that “because of the great support of senior officers in the Syrian state and the protection that Colonel Samer Ali enjoys, no one is able to approach him or impede any of his drug activities.” So brazen was his involvement that he “grows cannabis in the garden of his office in the 130th Brigade HQ.”

The investigation revealed a complex network of relationships within the brigade. Colonel Samer Ali was protected by his cousin, Brigadier General Ratib Ali, commander of operations of the Second Corps, who was “the one who carries out the inspection.” Colonel Ali’s activities were “closely linked with the Lebanese Hezbollah in its drug smuggling activity.”

Particularly disturbing was the report that “Captagon pills are widely used within the division but in secret, and many individuals and elements take Captagon and hashish. The NCO source is one of the dealers who trades in this substance within the 10th Division and under the protection of the brigade commander and Colonel Samer Ali.”

MEF’s investigation documented how certain areas of Syria became effectively lawless zones dedicated to drug operations, with regime security forces prevented from exercising authority.

The Sayida Zainab area near Damascus emerged as a particularly important hub. Sources reported in October 2022 that “both Military Security and the Fourth Division are prevented from carrying out their duties within the Sayida Zainab area.” The sources confirmed that “in October 2022, the Fourth Division and groups from Military Security carried out a mission to arrest wanted Iranian men, but these wanted men managed to escape to the Sayida Zainab area and hide there until today.”

This area was under effective Hezbollah control. “Hezbollah in the Sayida Zainab area harbors wanted persons from other militias or those who have criminal cases and are being prosecuted by the Syrian regime,” noted a source. “Their entry into the Sayida Zainab area provides them with the necessary protection, as this area is considered Iranian territory, and the Syrian regime or the Syrian army has no authority over it except for some police stations and official governmental offices.”

Even drug dealers arrested by local police enjoyed Hezbollah protection: “When drug promotors are arrested by the police in the Sayida Zainab area, they are still protected by Hezbollah. They do all they can to release the suspect, even going as far as intimidating police officers who are involved in arresting drug distributors.”

Similar situations existed in other parts of Syria. The town of Jaramana was described as “one of the most important sites for the distribution of drugs and one of the most important centers for the trade and manufacture of narcotic substances in the capital, Damascus. This town is the largest warehouse for narcotics of all kinds in the region.”

As production expanded, Syria became a major source of drugs throughout the region and beyond. MEF’s investigation traced how Syrian-produced drugs, particularly Captagon, were exported globally.

“Drug trafficking operations that take place across the Syrian coast are confined to groups working for the benefit of Noah Zuaiter, a Lebanese national and a major drug mafia leader who works under the protection of Hezbollah and in coordination with Maher al-Assad,” reported a source in July 2022.

After drugs arrive in Syria, they primarily followed two export pathways:

1. Maritime Routes: Drugs were transported “to Tartous and shipped by sea to all parts of the world in large quantities.” The ports of Latakia and Tartous emerged as crucial exit points, with shipments primarily destined for Europe via Libya or directly to Gulf states.
2. Land Routes: Drugs moved south through Daraa and As-Suwayda toward the Jordanian border. From Jordan, shipments could reach Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries.

The scale of these operations was industrial. One source noted that Bashar Talal al-Assad’s factory produced drugs “in high volumes and all the products from the two factories are prepared for export outside Syria and are not sold or offered in the local market.”

The methods of concealment for international shipment were elaborate. One approach involved agricultural products: “In the grain packaging factories, the packing containers of the most famous brands of Syrian grains are used after they were confiscated from their original factories or stolen before being shipped. They are refilled with drugs of appropriate shape and weight that are identical or as close as possible to the type of legume that will be packed in the bag or package.”

Other methods included hiding drugs inside plastic water tanks, within chocolate products, and in building materials. “The smugglers intrude on almost all Syrian companies working in the field of packing legumes and grains, and they are forced under duress to overlook what drug smugglers are doing if they discover that their goods have been mixed with drugs,” reported a source in August 2022.

While the regime focused on exporting drugs for revenue, the investigation revealed a growing addiction crisis within Syria itself, particularly in areas recaptured from opposition forces.

“Drugs have become a real threat to the population in Syria in general and in Eastern Ghouta in particular, especially after the Syrian regime recaptured it in 2018,” reported a source in October 2022. “This is due to the unprecedented spread of drug abuse, so much so that children have been exploited to sell it.”

The sources explained a deliberate strategy by the regime: “By flooding these areas with drugs, the 4th Division aims to tighten its control over these areas, spread corruption and lawlessness, and recruit agents using drug addiction. The main goal is to stop any return of anti-regime activity.”

The situation in Eastern Ghouta was particularly troubling: “Many women and men have become openly addicted to drugs, and narcotic pills have become widespread in the Eastern Ghouta. These drugs enter Eastern Ghouta after being handed over to drug dealers by some elements of the security and military checkpoints of the Syrian regime and under the supervision of officers who transport drugs from the nearby Qalamoun areas.”

Drug dealers recruited children for distribution: “The drug dealers who work with the Syrian intelligence services in all their forms assign children as young as 14 years of age with the task of promoting and distributing these materials in the entire region,” noted a source in October 2022.

MEF’s investigation uncovered details about the financial aspects of the drug operation, revealing how profits were distributed and managed.

“The smuggling activity is largely supervised by the 4th Division. Its profits are shared according to a 70/30 split, with seventy percent for the 4th Division and thirty percent for officials, security officers and army officers associated with a strong and old relationship with Iran and Hezbollah who physically facilitate the drug trade,” reported a source in July 2022.

The financial returns from drug trafficking were systematically channeled to support military operations. “The money made from the illicit trade forms the basis for the financing of military and commercial activities linked to the 4th Division,” noted a source.

Images: Shutterstock. Original illustration.

Brigadier General Ghassan Bilal, head of the 4th Division’s Security Office, played a central role in managing these funds. The drug profits created a parallel economy within the regime’s military and security apparatus, allowing officers to enjoy lavish lifestyles despite Syria’s economic collapse.

This financial incentive created fierce competition between various regime elements. “A state of competition prevails among the officers of the Fourth Division over which of them can establish stronger relationships with drug dealers and smugglers in order to obtain additional funds over on top of the salaries that they receive as military officers,” noted a source in October 2022.

The regime maintained plausible deniability through an elaborate system of fronts and proxies. MEF’s investigation documented how businessmen, journalists, and other civilians were used as facades for drug operations.

“The Fourth Division security office coordinates with businessmen who act as fronts in the drug trade. These businessmen are Ziad Al-Rahwanji, owner of the Tariq Bin Ziyad Company, and Mohamed Qaband, a former member of the People’s Assembly and owner of the Qaband Company for Artistic Production,” reported a source in October 2022.

Media figures also played a role. Hussein Mortada, a Lebanese Shiite journalist who worked for Hezbollah and Iranian media outlets, was revealed to be deeply involved in drug trafficking. “Hussein Mortada stores weapons and drugs intended for smuggling in the home of his sister’s children, Sahar Mortada, who is married to a Damascene named Mumtaz al-Madani,” noted a source in October 2022.

The use of fronts extended to real estate operations: “Mustafa Al-Wara nicknamed ‘Houta’... owns a real estate office in Talat Al-Afif (steep road in Al-Afif neighborhood), opposite Al-Afif Park and Al-Afif Mosque, situated behind the French Embassy. The name of the office is Mafatih al-Wara, or ‘Keys of Piety,’ an old name for the shop that has not changed for a long time and that plays on Mustafa’s surname meaning piety. This real estate office is currently the front for a large drug distribution center in Damascus and its countryside.”

MEF’s decade-long investigation would not have been possible without the courage and dedication of individuals inside Syria who risked everything to document the regime’s criminal activities. Building and maintaining such a network under one of the world’s most repressive surveillance states presented extraordinary challenges.

The organization sought individuals who had legitimate reasons to be present in sensitive areas—merchants, civil servants, military personnel, and local professionals—who could observe and report without raising suspicion. Many sources were motivated by what they had personally witnessed—family members lost to regime violence, the corruption they saw daily, or simply a deep conviction that the truth needed to be documented.

The network operated under extreme security challenges. Communications were carefully compartmentalized, with multiple layers of verification to protect both the sources and the integrity of the information. Sources often used coded language, irregular reporting schedules, and trusted intermediaries to relay intelligence.

For sources embedded within regime-controlled areas, daily life meant navigating constant suspicion while maintaining a convincing facade of loyalty. The psychological burden was immense—living with the knowledge that discovery would mean torture and death, yet continuing to document the regime’s crimes.

While MEF’s investigation focused primarily on the drug trafficking operation, sources also documented Iran’s growing presence and influence within Syria. The investigation revealed how Iran used the Syrian conflict to establish a permanent military foothold in the country, create smuggling corridors for weapons, and build ideological influence through religious and educational institutions.

The relationship between Iran, Hezbollah, and the Syrian regime’s drug operations was symbiotic. Iranian-backed militias provided protection for drug shipments, while drug profits helped finance these militias’ operations in Syria and beyond.

Areas like Sayida Zainab became effectively Iranian territory, where even Syrian security forces couldn’t operate without permission. “The area is witnessing a growing conflict between the Fourth Division groups and the IRGC-affiliated militias located in the Sayida Zainab district,” reported a source in October 2022.

The revelations from MEF’s decade-long investigation provide crucial context for understanding the challenges facing Syria in its post-Assad transition. The deeply entrenched nature of these criminal networks—involving military units, security services, and affiliated militias—presents significant obstacles to building legitimate governance.

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With the fall of the regime in December 2024, the power dynamics that sustained the drug empire have been disrupted, but the networks and infrastructure largely remain in place. The key individuals identified by MEF’s investigation—4th Division officers, Hezbollah commanders, and Assad family members—will likely seek to preserve their lucrative operations despite the regime’s collapse.

The international community faces the challenge of not only rebuilding Syria’s legitimate institutions but also dismantling a sophisticated criminal enterprise that has become deeply embedded in the country’s economic and security structures.

MEF’s decade-long investigation has provided an unprecedented window into one of the most sophisticated state-sponsored criminal enterprises in modern history. By meticulously documenting the Assad regime’s transformation into a narco-state, the organization has created a vital historical record that will be essential for accountability efforts and institutional reform in Syria’s future.

The investigation stands as a testament to the courage of those who risked everything to document the truth during Syria’s darkest hours. For these brave individuals, the fall of the Assad regime represents both vindication and hope—that the evidence they gathered will contribute to justice, and that their country might finally emerge from the shadow of dictatorship into a more transparent and accountable future.

As Syria enters a new chapter, the documentation provided by MEF’s network will serve as a crucial resource for those working to address the legacy of corruption, criminality, and addiction left by the Assad regime’s drug empire. The road ahead remains challenging, but it begins with the truth—painstakingly gathered, verified, and now finally revealed to the world.

Assad Family Members

• Maher al-Assad: Brother of Bashar and commander of the 4th Division
• Bashar Talal al-Assad (Abu Qaswara): Relative of Bashar al-Assad and major drug dealer
• Waseem al-Assad: Expert in chemical compounds used in Captagon production
• Samer al-Assad: Controlled drug operations in Latakia area

4th Division Officers

• Brigadier General Ghassan Bilal: Head of the 4th Division Security Office
• Colonel Firas Hikmat Kreidi: Officer in the 4th Division’s Security Office
• Lieutenant Basil Ibrahim: Officer from Tartous involved in smuggling operations
• Lieutenant Colonel Abdulkarim Suleiman: 4th Division officer involved in drug transport

Hezbollah Commanders

• Haj Abbas Safadi: Lebanese commander at Sayida Zainab checkpoint
• Ali Faour (Abu Haider): Commander of “Angels of Imam al-Jawad” militia
• Haj Hassan Al-Houli: Field commander supervising drug shipments
• Haj Abdulkarim Danaoui: Field commander working with Al-Houli

Syrian Military Officers

• Major General Ramadan Youssef Ramadan: Long-time smuggler in the 35th Special Forces Regiment
• Lieutenant-Colonel Alaa Al-Ahmad (Alaa Jawiya): Air Force Intelligence officer involved in drug trafficking
• Brigadier General Abdullah Suleiman: Commander of the 130th Brigade
• Colonel Samer Ali: Security officer of the 130th Brigade

Smugglers and Dealers

• Muhammad al-Badawi (Abu Faris): Smuggler operating in Beit Jinn area
• Rafi Al-Ruwais: Major drug smuggler in southern Syria
• Osama Al-Diat (Abu Ahmad Al-Sahwa): Smuggler using drones near Rukban
• Mustafa Al-Wara (Houta): Real estate office owner in Damascus fronting drug operations

Front Men and Facilitators

• Hussein Mortada: Lebanese journalist involved in drug trafficking
• Ziad Al-Rahwanji: Owner of Tariq Bin Ziyad Company
• Mohamed Qaband: Former People’s Assembly member and owner of Qaband Company
• Rabie Shaheen: Commander of National Defense Forces in Jaramana and owner of Rayan Plast factory