Over the past five decades or so, Egypt has capitalized on its geostrategic importance in the Middle East to obtain the financial support sorely needed to keep its economy afloat and its political order intact. The North African country has come close to the brink of economic collapse several times over these decades, only to be rescued by regional and international allies through large-scale aid and debt relief packages. This pattern spawned the view, especially popular among Egyptian elites, that while Egypt may bend with the wind of economic distress, it will not break—in short, Egypt will remain “too big to fail.” ¹

The motives behind the massive economic support Cairo has received over the years from a host of parties—including the United States, European countries, the Gulf states, and international financial institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and others—are clear enough. An economic meltdown in Egypt would add another hot spot of unrest to a region already plagued by civil wars, humanitarian crises, and failed states, further destabilizing it. With a population of 116 million as of mid-2024, Egypt is by far the most populous Arab country. An economic calamity there would likely have spillover effects on other countries in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean. Such a crisis could trigger an exodus of migrants across the Mediterranean toward southern European shores, presenting a grim scenario for European states. Concerned parties within the region and beyond have worked on precluding such an eventuality by continuing to provide aid to the Egyptian government.

By early 2022, years of economic mismanagement and faulty planning, coupled with

the adverse effects of the Covid-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine, had led to a grave economic crisis in Egypt. This crisis, arguably Egypt’s worst in decades, involved a serious liquidity shortage, mounting debt, multiple currency devaluations, soaring inflation, and market volatility. The conflict in Gaza rubbed salt into the wounds of Egypt’s socioeconomic injury. Israel briefly suspended natural gas exports to Egypt on safety grounds, leading to hours of power cuts across the country. Additionally, Suez Canal transit revenues, a main source of foreign currency for Egypt, dropped by almost a quarter in the 2023-2024 financial year, owing to repeated Houthi attacks on ships navigating the Red Sea.² Tourist flows to Egypt were also affected, though only moderately and for a short period. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) estimated that, due to the war, Egypt’s combined revenues from the Suez Canal and tourism could shrink by up to $13.7 billion over the 2023–2024 and 2024–2025 fiscal years.³

In response, Egypt’s Western and Gulf allies rushed to salvage its cash-strapped economy. Between February and March 2024, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) invested $35 billion in Egypt to develop the Ras el-Hikma region on its Mediterranean coast. The IMF expanded its 2022 loan program with Egypt from $5 billion to a total of $8 billion. The World Bank pledged over $6 billion in financial support, while the European Union (EU) promised an aid package of $8 billion (consisting of loans, investment, and grants).

In less than four weeks, Egypt secured a global bailout totaling well over $50 billion. These hefty aid packages enabled the government to stave off bankruptcy, narrow the fiscal deficit, reverse the freefall of the Egyptian pound, and wipe out the black market. The worst was avoided, and a measure of financial stability was restored to the country. But a pivotal question remains: For how long will these cash injections stabilize Egypt’s frail economy? While not entirely clear, the answer will partly depend on how strongly Egyptian officials believe their country is “too big to fail” and whether they are, as a result, not in a haste to undertake urgent reforms.

The assumption that “Egypt is too big to fail” was born from a historical pattern shaped by several landmark events. After becoming the first Arab state to make peace with Israel in the late 1970s, Egypt began receiving annually some $2 billion in security and economic assistance from the United States—clearly a reward for its bold move. Weighed down by an exploding population, dwindling earnings, and a burdensome foreign debt, the 1980s were still a bad time for Egypt’s economy. Egypt’s active participation in the U.S.-led coalition to undo Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait, however, gave its economy a kiss of life. In return for its support, the US, Japan, the Gulf states, and others wrote off nearly 40 percent of Egypt’s burgeoning debt.

In a similar vein, Egypt found itself in dire straits in 2013, following the forcible removal from power of its first democratically-elected president—Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). As political unrest gripped the country, economic conditions worsened considerably, driving some observers to speculate whether Egypt was on the verge of collapse or civil war.⁴ But as the MB replaced Iran as the bête noire of cash-rich Gulf states following the Arab Spring of 2010–2011,⁵ Saudi Arabia and the UAE stepped in to bolster the new regime in Cairo. Between July 2013 and August 2016, they provided around $30 billion in the form of oil shipments, soft loans, and deposits to Egypt’s Central Bank.⁶

Whether acting as a bulwark against Soviet penetration of the Middle East, promoting Arab-Israeli conciliation in the 1970s and 1980s, buttressing Gulf security by counterbalancing Iraqi and Iranian power in the 1990s and 2000s, or reversing gains made by Islamist groups in the post-Arab Spring era, Egypt was financially rewarded—sometimes quite lavishly. Consequently, the idea that the largesse of Egypt’s friends in Washington, Brussels, Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and other capitals can invariably be secured to prop up its struggling economy has over the years permeated the thinking of policymakers, mostly in Cairo but also elsewhere.

Troublingly, the complacency fostered by this idea has disincentivized Egyptian officials from focusing on what should be their top priority: economic—and by extension, political—reform. Whatever merits Egypt’s state-led and military-managed model of economic development may have once had, it has now run its course. With roots laid in the post-colonial era and deepened over the last decade, this model has now resulted in a permanent state of crisis. Economic prudence (and political responsibility) calls for restructuring the economy in ways that would cease or lessen its excessive reliance on external lifelines. However, for many years, sound economic strategies have been replaced by parochial political considerations with dire consequences for both the economy and society.

While Egypt’s economic woes can be attributed to multiple causes, including population growth and resource scarcity, the interference of politically-motivated plans has undoubtedly mired the economy. Above all, there is the vast economic empire built over decades and run by the country’s powerful military. This empire spans sectors as diverse as construction, manufacturing, telecommunication, energy, trade, and tourism, while also benefitting from tax exemptions, subsidized energy, and access to capital and cheap labor.⁷ Although the Egyptian military’s economic activities are more visible than substantial, as measured by percentage of GDP,⁸ it remains a powerful economic actor. It has a strong foothold in various sectors and industries, wielding massive influence over economic regulation and legislation. Notably, it controls public land, which constitutes approximately 94 percent of Egypt’s gross surface area,⁹ manages around one-quarter of total government spending on public infrastructure projects,¹⁰ and engages in multiple joint ventures with private companies. These ventures are predicated on a weak economic rationale. They crowd out private capital, deter foreign investors and inhibit private sector growth, eventually creating fiscal and trade imbalances that require constant external cash flows.

There is also the Sisi regime’s more recent proclivity to set up high-cost and high-visibility but low-return megaprojects ostensibly aimed at impressing the citizenry and bridging the regime’s legitimacy deficit—what Middle East scholar Robert Springborg has referred to as the “wow factor.” ¹¹ These debt-fueled projects include an $8 billion extension of the Suez Canal, a new capital east of Cairo with an estimated cost of $58 billion, and a $4.4 billion high-speed train linking the sparsely populated resorts in eastern and northern Egypt.

There is an understanding among economic experts that Egypt can least afford to cling to these practices during tough economic times. The IMF has repeatedly exhorted Egypt to level the playing field and reduce the role of state-run companies in the economy. To secure urgently needed loans from the IMF—a total of four since 2016, making Egypt the Fund’s second-largest debtor—the Egyptian government has pledged to gradually liberalize markets. However, it should be noted that Egypt has a dismal track record of following through with promised reforms. For decades, privatization schemes have been a standard component of Egypt’s loan agreements with the IMF, yet little progress has been made on this matter. In December 2022, the Egyptian government introduced a State Ownership Policy, which purportedly sought to boost the private sector and divest the state from various economic sectors.¹²

More than two years later, the initial procedures taken to sell two military-owned companies—one operating gas stations and the other a bottled water firm—have yet to be finalized. This has led to renewed doubts about the state’s commitment to divesting itself of the ownership of the economic enterprises it has long clung to. Indeed, between July and September 2023—more than a year into Egypt’s stifling liquidity crisis—a military conglomerate expanded its economic footprint by acquiring a 20 percent stake in an energy company for approximately $52 million and a 24 percent stake in three steel companies to the tune of $322 million. In April 2024, another army entity obtained fishing rights in the waters of the Toshka Lakes in southern Egypt. Signaling that their appetite for megaprojects has not petered out, Egyptian authorities unveiled a plan in March 2018 to add a second lane to the 80-kilometer Suez Canal waterway.¹³

The Egyptian government’s obstinate aversion to reform has been encouraged by the steady stream of foreign aid it has secured over the years. This appears to reflect a case of “moral hazard.” The term, which dates back to the late nineteenth century,¹⁴ describes situations in which economic actors tend to take higher risks because they are immune to the consequences or know that the costs will be borne by other parties (as in the case of insurance).¹⁵ Economists have used the concept of “moral hazard” to analyze the correlation between insurance and behavior, specifically focusing on how perceived protection against losses can reduce the incentive for caution or responsible decision-making. Along the same lines, the uninterrupted and often unconditional flow of aid to Egypt may have fostered a lack of urgency in undertaking painful reforms and instituting long-term economic restructuring plans. In other words, it has inhibited economic reform and good governance by perpetuating economic inefficiencies and deepening the country’s dependence on outside help.

Furthermore, over time, a sense of entitlement to foreign assistance has become embedded among the country’s political elites,¹⁶ who view it as a deserved reward for Egypt’s role as a force for moderation, peace, and stability in the troubled Middle East. Speaking in 2022 about U.S. assistance to Egypt, Amy Hawthorne, who was then the deputy director for research at the Project on Middle East Democracy, explained:

This spirit has poisoned Egypt’s relations with Washington and the Gulf state capitals. In July 2024, U.S. Senator Bob Menendez, then chairman of the influential Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was found guilty by a jury of accepting bribes of gold and cash from Egypt to, among other things, speed its access to military aid. The case appears to reflect the sense of entitlement with which senior Egyptian officials often approach U.S. aid. In the opinion of former U.S. Congressman Tom Malinowski, “the Egyptians behave as if they can get away with just about anything. They act as if they have protectors behind the scenes in Washington who will ensure the money keeps flowing no matter what.” ¹⁸ Gulf officials and diplomats have expressed similar frustrations in private. Early Gulf enthusiasm for the prospects of Egypt’s economic future, most evident between 2013 and 2015, has since waned. In recent years, Gulf support for Egypt has shifted from grants to mutually beneficial investments, coupled with demands for economic and administrative reform. Explaining the adjustment at the 2023 Davos World Economic Forum, the Saudi finance minister said, “we used to give direct grants and deposits without strings attached and we are changing that.” ¹⁹

To be sure, the terse saying that Egypt is “too big to fail” hides a key second phrase, which is implied by omission but grasped by all: namely, that Egypt is also too weak to make good. Together, the two phrases convey that Egypt will neither collapse nor become a success story. Understood this way, Egypt’s allies have tended to prioritize short-term stability in Egypt over long-term progress and advancement. This is a myopic view because keeping Egypt barely afloat runs counter to the long-term interests of both Egypt and its allies. Obviously, aid intended as a quick fix provides temporary relief rather than a permanent solution. Worse, as previously noted, it feeds a mindset that is inclined to evade addressing long-running structural defects. Without substantial reform, the status quo will persist, meaning that the livelihoods of millions of Egyptians will continue to be beset by poverty, unemployment, and a lack of equal opportunity—a ticking bomb if left unaddressed. Rather than giving it aspirin that merely stops it from falling apart, Egypt needs a comprehensive treatment plan that begins by setting it on a trajectory of meaningful economic reform. Further, since many of of Egypt’s economic difficulties are rooted in the authoritarian nature of its regime, economic reform must go hand in hand with broader political and social reforms.

Time is not on Egypt’s side—reform and self-reliance are its only viable path forward. For political and economic reasons, future bailouts are far from a foregone conclusion. As a rule of thumb, states’ geopolitical influence shifts over time, and Egypt’s clout has waned over the past decade, particularly with the rise of other Middle Eastern powers, notably Saudi Arabia. Indeed, without the war in Gaza, which has hurt Egypt economically but bolstered its geostrategic importance, it is doubtful that Cairo would have been able to garner such large amounts of aid in such a short span of time. There is also growing frustration with Cairo’s poor human rights record and the oversized economic role of the state. Suggesting that the age of aid without reform may soon come to an end, a Cairo-based diplomat stressed, “this [last round of aid] is Egypt’s last shot to get it right.” ²⁰ In other words, Egypt’s supposed immunity to failure is not a permanent guarantee.

From an economic perspective, further short-term rescues in the absence of long-term changes may not be feasible or available anytime soon. Dodging reform while suffering from unsustainable finances serves to compound long-neglected problems, thus raising the cost of each new assistance program. While in 2016 Egypt needed a $12 billion loan from the IMF to consolidate its fiscal position, it required over $50 billion in 2024 just to mitigate a full-blown crisis and narrowly avert default. Since 1956, Egypt has faced at least eight significant financial crises, nearly all of which were resolved with the help of external assistance.²¹ With these crises now taking place at shorter intervals in a country whose people—and demands—are rapidly growing, larger aid packages will be needed more frequently. Whether donors will be ready to step up their contributions is anybody’s guess. Despite receiving up to $97 billion from Gulf states between 2013 and 2020 in the form of aid, investment, and bank deposits (including more than $46 billion from Saudi Arabia alone),²² along with billions more from other lenders and donors, Egypt’s economy failed to break free from the bottleneck. This has driven some observers to wonder whether the Egyptian economy has already become “a bottomless pit.” ²³ As Ishac Diwan, who teaches at the Paris School of Economics, put it: Egypt “may be becoming too big to bail (emphasis mine).” ²⁴

To break free from the trap of dependency, Egypt needs deep reform. The United States and other concerned parties must urge it to take this path. This should begin with embarking on a comprehensive program of economic reform, one whose implementation should not be diluted by narrow political calculations. The primary objective of such a plan must be to unlock the vast, yet untapped potential of Egypt’s large and young population. There is no better way to achieve this than by activating the role of the private sector, which employs 80 percent of the country’s workforce but is burdened with many challenges. Chief among these challenges is the fierce competition that the private sector faces from state-owned companies, which enjoy privileged access to state funds and contracts as well as low-paid labor. As a result, the private sector has shrunk, and capital outflows have occurred frequently in past years. As a percentage of GDP, private investment declined from 15 percent in 2008 to just 2 percent in 2021 (for perspective, the rate is 37 percent in China, 22 percent in India, and 11 percent in Pakistan).²⁵ Between October 2015 and October 2024, Egypt’s Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI), which gauges the activity of the non-oil private sector on a monthly basis, remained below the 50-point threshold (indicating a state of contraction) in 99 out of 109 months—about 90 percent of the time.²⁶ For this process to be reversed, the state must let go of its grip on markets and industries, and ensure fair competition among all stakeholders. In other words, it needs to transform its role in the economy from player to regulator.

Private-sector-led growth will create more jobs and opportunities, thereby increasing national output and exports. This will, in turn, narrow the country’s hard currency deficit, the root cause of its financial dependency. Owing to their contribution to GDP growth, job creation, and the promotion of skills and entrepreneurship, small and medium enterprises (SMEs), often referred to as the “missing middle,” should receive special attention.²⁷ Such an emphasis will enable Egypt to harness the potential of its youthful population. Around two-thirds of Egyptians, roughly 70 million people, are under the age of 35—a huge untapped economic resource.

No matter how extensive, economic reforms will introduce little unless accompanied by meaningful political reforms. The Economist Intelligence Unit’s 2023 Democracy Index classified the Egyptian regime as “authoritarian” (the Index’s lowest category), ranking it 127th out of 167 countries.²⁸ Authoritarianism stifles economic growth in various ways. For instance, low levels of law enforcement pose a major hurdle to processes of economic transformation. In the 2023 Rule of Law Index, issued by the World Justice Project, Egypt ranked 136th out of 142 countries, receiving the lowest score in the Middle East and North Africa region.²⁹ Respect for human rights and civil liberties is another crucial precondition for successful reform. Economic development requires innovation, creativity, and free thinking, yet human rights abuses breed fear and feelings of insecurity—there can be no innovation without freedom. Looking further ahead, the Egyptian government must recognize that the impact of fiscal and financial measures aimed at lifting the economy will be limited unless they are complemented with steps toward good governance, accountability, and respect for human rights.

A gradual transition to a democratic system governed by the rule of law will elevate Egypt’s standing in the world. Egyptians have long held that their country is the geographic center of the Old World. However, Egypt’s integration into the modern world has been rather slow and incomplete. To be fully part of the present-day world, a state must embrace its fundamental values of liberty, equality, and justice. Not only will deeper integration into modernity and alignment with its principles mobilize the capabilities of millions of Egyptians; it will also foster Egypt’s reputation and appeal while generating favorable media coverage.

Making significant progress along these tracks will allow Egypt to rebrand itself. Politically, the name Egypt today evokes the image of a sclerotic regime reliant on a sprawling security sector, running a labyrinthine (and largely ineffective) state bureaucracy, and overseeing a sick economy. In recent years, state bodies and pro-state media have raised the slogan the “New Republic” to describe President Sisi’s vision for the future of Egypt.³⁰ But that title is without much substance—nothing “new” lies beneath it. Alternatively, if Egypt manages to reinvent itself as a freer, more open, and competitive place, it will become a model of soft power in the Middle East. Eventually this will translate into tangible benefits for the economy, including larger inflows of foreign investment and tourism. Furthermore, it will lower the rates of brain drain, defined as the massive, one-way migration of highly skilled people to countries offering better living and working conditions. These rates, particularly among physicians, have risen considerably in recent years, adversely affecting economic growth.³¹

Without a breakthrough, Cairo will remain crisis-ridden, vulnerable to exogenous shocks, and heavily dependent on the purses of its Western and Gulf friends. Only by breaking the cycle of crisis, aid, deferred reform, entitlement, and more aid can Egypt become too big to fail (on its own) and big enough to rise and prosper.

Nael Shama

Independent Scholar

Nael M. Shama, PhD, is a political scholar and writer who focuses on the international relations and comparative politics of the Middle East.

1. See, for instance, Nourhan Moussa, “Egypt is Too Big to Fail,” Ahram Online, May 19, 2023. https://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/50/1204/500999/AlAhram-Weekly/Opinion/Egypt-is-too-big-to-fail.aspx, accessed Dec. 23, 2024. For different views on the subject, see Steven Cook, “Is Egypt Too Big to Fail?,” Council on Foreign Relations, Feb. 7, 2013; https://www.cfr.org/blog/egypt-too-big-fail, accessed Dec. 23, 2024; and Taylor Luck, “Too Big to Fail? The Consequences of Egypt’s Economic Troubles,” The Christian Science Monitor, Aug. 30, 2023; https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2023/0830/Too-big-to-fail-The-consequences-of-Egypt-s-economic-troubles, accessed Dec. 23, 2024.

2. “Suez Canal Revenue Drops as Some Shippers Shun Red Sea,” Reuters, July 18, 2024; https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/suez-canal-revenue-drops-some-shippers-shun-red-sea-2024-07-18/, accessed Dec. 23, 2024.

3. United Nations Development Programme, Potential Socioeconomic Impacts of the Gaza War on Egypt: A Rapid Assessment (2024), 5; https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/2024-05/final_rapid_assessment_impact_of_gaza_on_egypt_19-5-2024.pdf, accessed Dec. 23, 2024.

4. See, for instance, Judy Dempsey, “Judy Asks: After the Egyptian Coup, a Civil War?,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 10, 2013; https://carnegieendowment.org/europe/strategic-europe/2013/07/judy-asks-after-the-egyptian-coup-a-civil-war?lang=en, accessed Dec. 23, 2024.

5. Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, “Egypt-Gulf Ties and a Changing Balance of Regional Security,” The Cairo Review of Global Affairs Jan. 12 (2015); https://www.thecairoreview.com/tahrir-forum/egypt-gulf-ties-and-a-changing-balance-of-regional-security/, accessed Dec. 23, 2024.

6. David Butter, “Egypt and the Gulf: Allies and Rivals,” Chatham House, 2020, 1; https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/CHHJ8102-Egypt-and-Gulf-RP-WEB_0.pdf, accessed Dec. 23, 2024.

7. For details on the economic activities of the military, see Zeinab Abul-Magd, Militarizing the Nation: The Army, Business, and Revolution in Egypt (Columbia University Press, 2017); and Yezid Sayigh, “Owners of the Republic: An Anatomy of Egypt’s Military Economy,” Carnegie Middle East Center, 2019; https://carnegie-production-assets.s3.amazonaws.com/static/files/files__Sayigh-Egypt_full_final2.pdf, accessed Dec. 23, 2024 (hereafter, Sayigh, “Owners of the Republic).

8. Sayigh, “Owners of the Republic,” XV, 7–8.

9. Abdel-Fattah Barayez, “‘This Land is Their Land’: Egypt’s Military and the Economy,” Jadaliyya Jan. 25 (2016); https://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/32898, accessed Dec. 23, 2024.

10. Yezid Sayigh, “Egypt’s Military Now Controls Much of Its Economy. Is This Wise?,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Nov. 25, 2019; https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2019/11/egypts-military-now-controls-much-of-its-economy-is-this-wise?lang=en, accessed Dec. 23, 2024.

11. Robert Springborg, “Follow the Money to the Truth About Al-Sisi’s Egypt,” POMED (2022): 3; https://pomed.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/2022_01_Final_SpringborgSnapshot.pdf, accessed May 5, 2022.

12. For an in-depth analysis of this policy, see Yezid Sayigh, “Assessing Egypt’s State Ownership Policy: Challenges and Requirements,” Carnegie Middle East Center, May 8, 2023; https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/05/assessing-egypts-state-ownership-policy-challenges-and-requirements?lang=en&center=middle-east, accessed Dec. 23, 2024 (hereafter, Sayigh, “Assessing Egypt’s State Ownership Policy”).

13. Menna Osama, “Explainer: What You Need to Know About Proposed Suez Canal Expansion,” Ahram Online, March 5, 2024; https://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/1235/518881/Egypt/Urban--Transport/Explainer-What-you-need-to-know-about-proposed-Sue.aspx, accessed Dec. 23, 2024.

14. For a good study on the genesis of the term “moral hazard” and the evolution of its connotations, see David Rowell and Luke Connelly, “A History of the Term ‘Moral Hazard’,” The Journal of Risk and Insurance 79, 4 (2012): 1051–1075.

15. As the term of “moral hazard” moved from the insurance-industry literature to the economics literature, it became a value-neutral concept. The American economist Mark Pauly famously noted that “moral hazard” has, in fact, little to do with morality.” See Mark Pauly, “The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment,” American Economic Review 58, 3 (1968): 531.

16. Robert Bowker, “Egypt: Diplomacy and the Politics of Change,” Middle East Journal 67, 4 (2013): 588.

17. Quoted in “U.S. Power and Influence in the Middle East: Part Three,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 21, 2022; https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-power-and-influence-middle-east-part-three, accessed Dec. 23, 2024. See also Hafsa Halawa’s comments in “Egypt’s Economic Turmoil,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 16, 2023; https://www.csis.org/analysis/egypts-economic-turmoil, accessed Dec. 23, 2024.

18. Quoted in Robbie Gramer, “Blue Hawk Down,” Foreign Policy Sep. 29 (2023); https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/09/29/menendez-corruption-indictment-senate-foreign-relations-congress-egypt/, accessed Dec. 23, 2024.

19. “Davos 2023: Saudi Arabia Changing No-Strings Aid, Finance Minister Says,” Reuters, Jan. 18, 2023; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/davos-2023-saudi-arabia-changing-no-strings-aid-minister-says-2023-01-18/, accessed Dec. 23, 2024.

20. Quoted in Judith Miller, “How Hamas Saved Egypt,” Tablet, May 15, 2024; https://www.tabletmag.com/sections/israel-middle-east/articles/how-hamas-saved-egypt, accessed Dec. 23, 2024.

21. Ruchir Agarwal and Adnan Mazarei, “Egypt’s 2023–24 Economic Crisis: Will This Time Be Different?,” Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2024, 2,5; https://www.piie.com/sites/default/files/2024-08/pb24-6.pdf, accessed Dec. 23, 2024.

22. Summer Said and Chao Deng, “Saudi Arabia, Gulf Countries Want Better Returns for Bailing Out Egypt,” The Wall Street Journal, April 7, 2023; https://www.wsj.com/articles/saudi-arabia-gulf-countries-want-better-returns-for-bailing-out-egypt-e6e8b047, accessed Dec. 23, 2024.

23. See, for example, Sebastian Sons and Inken Wiese, “The Engagement of Arab Gulf States in Egypt and Tunisia Since 2011: Rationale and Impact,” DGAP Analyse (German Council on Foreign Relations) 9 (2015): 26; and Sara Nowacka, “A Bottomless Pit? EU Increases Support for Egypt,” Spotlight (The Polish Institute of International Affairs) 21 (2024); https://pism.pl/publications/a-bottomless-pit-eu-increases-support-for-egypt, accessed Dec. 23, 2024.

24. Ishac Diwan, “Is Egypt Too Big to Fail or Too Big to Bail?” in Sayigh, “Assessing Egypt’s State Ownership Policy.”

25. Ibid.

26. Eulerpool, “Egypt Manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI)”; https://eulerpool.com/en/macro/egypt/manufacturing-pmi, accessed Dec. 23, 2024.

27. For more details on Egypt’s “missing middle,” see Amr Adly, Cleft Capitalism: The Social Origins of Failed Market Making in Egypt (Stanford University Press, 2020).

28. For further details, see Economist Intelligence Unit, “Democracy Index 2023”; https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/democracy-index-2023/, accessed Dec. 23, 2024.

29. Rule of Law Index (World Justice Project), “Rankings”; https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/global/2023, accessed Dec. 23, 2024.

30. For an official presentation of the achievements of the “New Republic,” see State Information Service, “The New Republic: Egyptians’ Gateway to a Dignified Life”; https://www.sis.gov.eg/UP/SIS%20English%20Publications/%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%A1%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B7%D9%86%20%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AC%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%B2%D9%89%20%D9%86%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%89.pdf, accessed Dec. 23, 2024. For an alternative view, see Hesham Sallam, “The Autocrat-in-Training: The Sisi Regime at 10,” Journal of Democracy 35, 1 (2024): 87–101.

31. Sally Mohamed Farid Mahmoud, “The Brain Drain in Egypt and Its Impact on Economic Growth,” Humanities and Social Sciences Letters (Conscientia Beam) 8, 4 (2020): 380–396. For a study on the motivations of migrating physicians, see Ibrahim Kabbash, et al., “The Brain Drain: Why Medical Students and Young Physicians Want to Leave Egypt,” Eastern Mediterranean Health Journal 27, 11 (2021): 1102–1108.