The Kurdish district of Afrin in northwestern Syria, which came under the control of Turkey’s armed forces and allied Syrian militias in 2018, has experienced significant demographic changes. From the moment it entered this region, Turkey has engaged in demographic engineering to systematically alter Afrin’s ethnic composition by resettling Arab and Turkmen families in this predominantly Kurdish area. Turkey’s demographic engineering strategy in Afrin is multifaceted, involving forced displacement, destruction of historical sites, unauthorized settlement construction, and the seizure of agricultural lands and properties. This article explores Turkey’s demographic engineering strategy in Afrin and evaluates its broader implications for the region and beyond.

Shortly after the outbreak of Syria’s civil war in 2011, the Afrin district in northwestern Syria came under the control of the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG). The YPG and its political wing, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), governed the olive-rich region until January 2018 when Turkish forces and their Syrian allies launched a major offensive, ultimately ousting the Kurdish groups from the area.

Turkey views the YPG as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), officially designated as a terrorist organization by the United States and the European Union in addition to Turkey itself. The YPG has firmly denied any organizational or operational ties to the PKK, rejecting Turkey’s attempt to classify it as a terrorist group. The United States has supported the YPG’s stance, making a clear distinction between the two Kurdish groups. Since 2014, Washington has relied heavily on the YPG, the dominant faction within the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), in its military campaign against the Islamic State (IS) terror group in Syria. This partnership has led to the liberation of most of the territory once controlled by IS militants.

Prior to the 2011 conflict, Afrin was the least Arabized of Syria’s three distinctively Kurdish regions in the north. The other two regions, Jazira and Kobani, have historically undergone significant population shifts, primarily due to Arabization policies enacted by successive Arab nationalist governments, particularly during the direct rule of Hafez al-Assad and the Baath Party in the 1970s.

For various reasons, the district of Afrin was spared the Arabization campaigns that affected other parts of Syrian Kurdistan. According to the most recent census conducted in 2010 by Syria’s Central Bureau of Statistics, the Afrin district, which includes the city of Afrin, six other subdistricts, and 366 villages, had a population of 523,000.¹ The 2010 census did not include data on the ethnic composition of the Afrin district, as the Syrian state did not recognize Kurds as a distinct ethnic group. However, Kurdish sources estimate that at least 97 percent of Afrin’s prewar population was Kurdish. The remaining 3 percent consisted of Arab and Turkmen residents, primarily concentrated in villages such as Maryamin. Some Arab residents of Afrin had migrated from the nearby Manbij district, particularly from the al-Bubanna and al-Omeyrat clans.²

The concept of demographic engineering has been used to describe various conflicts worldwide. Therefore, it is crucial to define it clearly from the outset in order to avoid oversimplifications and misunderstandings.

Scholars of international law have thoroughly documented cases in which states have enacted deliberate resettlement policies to change the ethno-national makeup of specific regions. This article adopts the term “demographic engineering” to describe the range of policies that states use to alter the ethno-national composition of a region, including forced displacement, destruction of historical sites, construction of unauthorized settlements, and the expropriation of agricultural lands and properties.

In the case of Syria, demographic engineering has a long history. Most notoriously, in 1974, the Baath regime under Hafez Assad, the late father of the current leader Bashar al-Assad,³ initiated the so-called Arab Belt project. This massive Arabization campaign involved seizing agricultural land owned by Kurdish landowners in the northeastern province of Hasaka and redistributing it to Arab farmers from the Aleppo and Raqqa provinces. As part of the project, the regime constructed dozens of modern villages for Arab settlers along sections of the border between Syria and Turkey.⁴

During Syria’s civil war, most factions involved in the complex conflict have practiced demographic engineering to varying degrees. The regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and its Iranian-backed militias spearheaded the forcible displacement of large numbers of Sunni Arab residents in the suburbs of Damascus, Homs, and Latakia, replacing them with Shiite Muslims from elsewhere in Syria as well as from countries like Lebanon and Iran.⁵ Demographic engineering is a defining feature of the sectarian nature of the Syrian civil war, which has pitted the Alawite regime against predominantly Sunni rebels.

Turkish-backed armed groups and other rebel factions have launched similar campaigns against the Kurds in northern Syria. Their operations there have been even more systematic and organized. When Turkey launched its offensive in Afrin it relied on a coalition of more than a dozen Syrian militias, totaling about 25,000 fighters, to support Ankara’s ground invasion. The operation, codenamed Operation Olive Branch, included at least 17 Syrian Sunni extremist groups, some of which were created by Turkish intelligence agencies specifically to combat Kurdish forces in Syria.⁶

Among these extremist groups were the Suleiman Shah Brigade and the Hamza Division, both of which have since terrorized the local Kurdish population. Last year, the U.S. Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions on both militias and their respective leaders. The Treasury reported that under the leadership of Mohammad Hussein al-Jasim – also known as Abu Amsha – members of the Suleiman Shah Brigade “have been directed to forcibly displace Kurdish residents and seize their property, providing vacated homes for Syrians from outside the region who are often related to fighters in the brigade.” ⁷

In 2017 Turkey established the Syrian National Army (SNA) to direct its so-called counterterrorism efforts in northern Syria. The objective was to replace the various rebel groups operating in the region with an armed force aligned with the Turkish-backed Syrian Interim Government, which had gained control of parts of northwestern Syria.

The question of whether Turkey intended for the SNA to become a serious fighting force remains open to debate. Its recruitment efforts were primarily focused on existing Sunni Arab groups or on members of the refugee community in Turkey. From the outset, it was evident that Turkey aimed to create a radicalized force that could be readily mobilized to combat the Kurds.

A review of the factions that aligned with the SNA for the invasion of Afrin sheds light on Ankara’s intentions. Among the 17 armed groups that participated in the Syrian part of the operation against the YPG, none held moderate views toward the Kurds or other non-Arab and non-Sunni Muslim communities, nor did they exhibit secular tendencies.

Many members of the SNA factions, including those in the Suleiman Shah Brigade and the Hamza Division, were former fighters with the Islamic State or the Al-Nusra Front, Al-Qaeda’s Syrian branch. The SNA’s loyalty was firmly aligned with Ankara, a fact made evident when Turkey deployed many of its members as mercenaries to support its military operations in Azerbaijan, Libya, and even Niger.⁸

Most independent observers of the Kurdish situation in Syria would agree that Turkey’s plans to alter the demographic landscape of Afrin began in earnest in 2018, when Turkey launched a large-scale offensive against Syria’s Kurdish region, culminating in its complete occupation.

The initial phase of the offensive was designed to defeat militarily all Kurdish forces. After a two-month operation, Turkish forces and allied Sunni militias successfully took control of Afrin. Their objective was to prevent thousands of Kurdish civilians, who had fled their homes to escape Turkish bombardment, from returning. As their control over the region expanded, they began displacing Kurds in greater numbers.

According to Izzadin Saleh, executive director of the Kurdish advocacy group Synergy Association for Victims, Turkey’s goal from the outset was to occupy Afrin and alter its demographic characteristics. He stated that one of the key factors contributing to the early demographic shifts in Afrin was a widely reported agreement, brokered by Turkey and Russia, which facilitated the relocation of hundreds of thousands of Sunnis from a former rebel stronghold in the eastern Ghouta region near Damascus to Afrin. A significant percentage of these newcomers were permitted to occupy the vacant homes that belonged to displaced Kurds. This agreement effectively barred the original Kurdish owners from returning.⁹

On numerous occasions, returning Kurdish families sought to reclaim their properties but were prevented from doing so by the new occupants. These families’ complaints to Turkey’s allied radical authorities were not only dismissed but also resulted in discriminatory treatment. The few families that chose to return to Afrin – months after the Turkish invasion – either were forced to relocate to other areas or to continue living under Turkish occupation stripped of their own homes.¹⁰

The growing influence of Turkey’s radical allies in Afrin came at the expense of local Kurds. While Ankara initially attempted to maintain control over the armed groups within the framework of the so-called SNA, it soon became evident that these groups had little interest in governance. Their primary objective was to enrich themselves by looting and seizing the properties of Kurdish residents.

Once direct fighting with the YPG and other Kurdish groups ceased, Turkish forces subjected the local Kurdish population in Afrin to arbitrary arrests, abductions, and torture. Since then, residents have reported that their homes, lands, and olive crops have been looted and seized by Turkish-backed fighters and their families. According to a report by Human Rights Watch, these actions violate the laws of war and may constitute war crimes.¹¹

When Turkey announced its intention to launch cross-border offensives, including the one in Afrin, it made clear that one of its objectives was to establish “safe zones” in occupied regions for the purpose of resettling Syrian refugees displaced in Turkey. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has repeatedly proposed returning over one million Syrian refugees from Turkey to Turkish-occupied areas in northern Syria, despite warnings from the United Nations and other international organizations that Syria remains unsafe for refugees.

In the case of Afrin, it is important to note that most of the refugees who have settled there are from other parts of Syria. Human rights experts warn that large-scale resettlement, as seen in Afrin, would drastically alter the region’s ethnic composition. Bassam Alahmad, executive director of Syrians for Truth and Justice (STJ), an organization that has extensively documented abuses in Afrin, states that prior to Turkey’s occupation approximately 130,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) from other parts of Syria lived there. Their presence, however, had not altered the region’s demographic balance

The devastating earthquake that struck parts of Turkey and Syria in 2023, including Afrin, presented Turkey and its allies with a golden opportunity to expedite the Arabization of the Kurdish region while framing the process as humanitarian aid. Under the pretext of providing relief for earthquake survivors in Syrian opposition-held areas, several aid organizations from the Gulf states, along with a few Palestinian groups, quickly entered Afrin with cash donations. Their goal was to support Turkey’s plans for constructing settlements for Arab families from elsewhere. Dozens of new settlements, featuring residential units, schools, and mosques, were rapidly built in Afrin to accommodate tens of thousands of internally displaced people from other parts of Syria.

As an illustration, a relief group named al-Khair Foundation, known for its connections to the Muslim Brotherhood, announced plans to establish a new residential complex in an area south of the city of Afrin. This declaration came just 20 days after the earthquake.¹³ Additional aid organizations from Qatar and Kuwait, and more recently from Saudi Arabia, have initiated housing projects in Afrin and other Turkish-occupied regions of northern Syria.¹⁴

Before the earthquake, a Palestinian aid organization called Ajnadeen announced its funding for a housing project intended for Arab settlers in Afrin. Photos and videos of the project’s first phase were published on the group’s website.¹⁵ This announcement sparked outrage among Kurdish rights groups, which accused the Palestinian organization of directly contributing to demographic changes in Afrin. Earlier reports about Palestinian aid groups funding projects in Afrin prompted the Palestinian Authority’s Foreign Affairs Ministry to issue a statement (September 2022), condemning the establishment of Palestinian-funded settlement projects in Afrin and other areas of northern Syria.¹⁶

Many Palestinian refugees have joined the ranks of new Arab settlers in Afrin. According to Abdulrahman Apo, a Kurdish politician from Afrin currently residing in Erbil (Iraqi Kurdistan), approximately 10,000 Palestinians have been relocated to newly constructed settlements in Afrin. Authorized by Turkey and its allies, over forty housing projects – settlements intended to accommodate displaced Arabs and Turkmen – have been established in Afrin, most constructed following the 2023 earthquake.¹⁷

As Alahmad of STJ points out, some Arab donors may not fully grasp the situation on the ground or the complex ethnic dynamic in Afrin and other parts of Syria. However, it is the Turkish government and Turkish-backed local non-governmental organizations that supply information and draft grant proposals. Alahmad emphasized that both parties are directly accountable for the role these funds play in reshaping the region’s demographics.

Turkey’s efforts to depopulate Afrin of its indigenous Kurdish population extend beyond direct forced migration and the construction of settlements for Arab and Turkmen residents. It has also designed initiatives designed to erase Afrin’s Kurdish identity. When Turkish forces and their Syrian allies seized control of Afrin in March 2018, a video went viral online. The footage showed jubilant militiamen in Afrin’s main square as they destroyed the statue of Kawa the Blacksmith, an important symbol of Kurdish liberation.¹⁸ The video’s creators sought to intimidate Afrin’s Kurdish population.

Afrin’s cultural heritage underwent sweeping changes, impacting nearly all public spaces, including prominent landmarks, squares, roundabouts, and schools. Symbols and markers of Kurdish identity were rapidly replaced with Islamic or Turkish names.¹⁹ Since Afrin’s occupation, armed groups have regularly targeted Kurdish cultural celebrations like Newroz. In March 2023, four Kurdish civilians from the same family were killed during the Newroz festivities by members of an SNA faction from Jinderis. An SNA-affiliated judicial body reportedly detained the perpetrators who were linked to Jaysh al-Sharqiyah, one of the SNA’s most notorious factions. However, Kurdish human rights groups expressed doubts that they would be held accountable, asserting that the SNA’s judicial system lacks credibility and cannot ensure a fair and impartial trial.

The widespread construction of settlements across Afrin, frequently featuring mosques and other Islamic centers, has also contributed to the destruction of non-Muslim religious sites. For example, militiamen demolished the Bir Sadiq shrine, an important Yazidi religious site in the village of Qatma. Additionally, several Yazidi cemeteries and shrines in the villages of Basoufan and Qibar were either destroyed or damaged.²⁰ Also, armed groups carried out illegal excavations at Nabi Horo, a historical landmark in Afrin dating back to 300 BC.

Afrin is renowned for producing some of the finest olives and olive oil in the region. Since 2018, Turkish-backed militias controlling various parts of Afrin have discovered multiple ways to profit from olive oil production. During the harvest season, reports have surfaced of militants seizing olives from families who have fled their homes and lands. In addition to imposing taxes, militias charge farmers for transporting their olive harvests at designated checkpoints. However, since olives are an essential part of Afrin’s local identity, some armed groups have sought to weaken this connection. Kurdish media reports indicate that after the city’s occupation in 2018, Turkish-backed militias have cut down or burned more than 21 million olive trees.²¹

In June 2024, the Berlin-based European Center for Kurdish Studies published a report comparing population figures in four of Afrin’s seven subdistricts from 2010 to 2023. Although the analysis did not include the city of Afrin itself, the group found that the region—along with other surveyed Kurdish cities and towns—has experienced a significant demographic shift marked by a sharp decline in the Kurdish population.

The study analyzed official government statistics from the 2010 census alongside figures from 2023. The group noted that these numbers were supplied by a Syrian NGO that has been compiling population data since 2011.

One conclusion drawn from the report pertains to Afrin’s subdistrict of Jinderis:

The report documents a comparable decline of the Kurdish population in three other subdistricts of Afrin: Rajo, Shera, and Shiye.²³

While this article concentrates on demographic shifts in the Afrin region, a similar phenomenon has unfolded in Serekani (Ras al-Ayn in Arabic), another Kurdish city in northeast Syria that fell under Turkish control after a major offensive in 2019. Building on their experience in Afrin, Turkish military forces and their allied militias ensured that their demographic engineering efforts in Serekani were more subtle. This approach involved the gradual resettlement of Syrian refugees from Turkey to Serekani and Tel Abyad, a Kurdish-controlled city in northeast Syria. Simultaneously, Turkish-backed authorities in Serekani placed obstacles in the way of returning residents who had fled at the onset of the incursion.²⁴

Alahmad, the director of STJ, stated that Turkey and its allies have employed various methods of forced displacement. “For instance, they have repeatedly utilized the Alok water pumping station [in Serekani] to cut off water access for hundreds of thousands of people in other parts of northeast Syria, compelling many to leave due to water scarcity,” he explained. Turkey, however, denies intentionally cutting off water access through the Alok station, attributing the region’s water shortages to climate change and drought conditions.²⁵

Turkey’s demographic engineering in Afrin and other parts of northern Syria is likely to have enduring consequences for Syria’s Kurdish population, contributing to growing ethnic tensions between Kurds and Arabs. Such systematic demographic changes will complicate the search for solutions to Syria’s 13-year-old conflict.

Many Kurdish politicians and groups contend that Afrin came under Turkish control due to a political deal brokered between Ankara and Moscow. While a military solution to expel Turkish forces and their allies from Afrin may be unfeasible at present, many Kurds hold out hope that a new international agreement could restore the city to Kurdish governance—or, at the very least, facilitate the return of its native residents.

Ethnic and sectarian strife played a pivotal role in the outbreak of Syria’s civil war in 2011. The deliberate resettlement of Arabs from other regions into traditionally Kurdish areas in the north threatens to exacerbate tensions, potentially sparking conflict not only in the north but across Syria. Many of these Arab settlers originate from southern and central Syria, increasing the risk that intercommunal violence could spread beyond northern Syria to other parts of the war-torn country. Thus, it is crucial for local, regional, and international actors to confront the unfolding crisis in Afrin, driven by Turkey’s demographic engineering. Failing to acknowledge the ongoing demographic shifts in Afrin could lead to an even greater crisis in the future. Taking meaningful action to address the current situation in Afrin could also provide a foundation for addressing broader challenges tied to Syria’s prolonged conflict. These challenges include widespread economic hardships affecting millions in both Assad-controlled and opposition-held areas, deepening sectarian divisions between Sunnis and Alawites, and the urgent need for a durable political solution.

1. Hussein Naaso, “Al-Taghyeer al-Dimoghrafi fi Afrin (Ro’ya Qanouniyeh),” (Arabic), Yek Dem, Feb. 1, 2019. Some sources suggest that this figure may include Afrin natives who now reside in Aleppo or other areas but whose civil registration remains linked to Afrin.

2. Mohamed Billo interviewed by author on Oct. 12, 2024. Billo is a journalist from Afrin who was forced to flee following the Turkish occupation.

3. Sasha Ghosh-Siminoff, “Demographic Engineering in Syria Sets the Stage for Future Conflicts,” New Lines Institute, March 13, 2020.

4. “Ma Hiya Qissat al-Hizam al-Arab fi al-Jazirah al-‘Oliyah (Muhafazat al-Hasakah)?” (Arabic), Analysis and Strategic Study Organization, May 18, 2021.

5. Martin Chulov, “Iran Repopulates Syria with Shia Muslims to Help Tighten Regime’s Control,” The Guardian, Jan. 13, 2017.

6. Sirwan Kajjo, “Who Are the Jihadists Fighting Alongside Turkey in Syria?,” Gatestone Institute, March 20, 2018.

7. “Treasury Sanctions Two Syria-Based Militias Responsible for Serious Human Rights Abuses in Northern Syria,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, Aug. 17, 2023.

8. Levent Kemal, “From Rebel Factions to an Army: Efforts to Tame the Syrian National Army,” Atlantic Council, June 18, 2024.

9. Author interview with Izzadin Saleh, Executive Director of the Synergy Association for Victims, Sept. 25, 2024.

10. Martin Chulov, “‘Nothing Is Ours Anymore’: Kurds Forced Out of Afrin After Turkish Assault,” The Guardian, June 7, 2018.

11. “Everything is by the Power of the Weapon,” Human Rights Watch, Feb. 29, 2024.

12. Author interview with Bassam Alahmad, Executive Director of Syrians for Truth and Justice (STJ), Oct. 11, 2024.

13. The al-Khair Foundation reported on its website that the housing units in Afrin will be reserved for the displaced people affected by the earthquake.

14. “Five Years of Injustice are Enough:” Investigative Study on Violations Against Kurds and Yazidis in Northern Syria,” Synergy Association for Victims, Nov. 13, 2023.

15. Sirwan Kajjo and Nawroz Rasho, “Settlement Construction in Syrian District Renews Accusations of Demographic Engineering,” Voice of America, Jan. 12, 2023.

16. The Palestinian Authority’s (PA) then-Foreign Affairs Minister, Riyad al-Maliki, sent the letter to “the notables of Afrin” in response to a complaint that some activists from Afrin filed through the PA’s Consulate General in Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan.

17. Asaad al-Haj, “’Asharat al-Mustawtanat fi Afrin Muthu Bidayat al-‘Am … Kayfa Istaghalat Turkiye Zilal Shubat fi Afrin?” (Arabic), North Press, November 19, 2023.

18. Samuel Osborne, “Turkish forces seize control of Syrian town of Afrin and celebrate by tearing down statue of Kurdish hero” The Independent, March 18, 2014.

19. “Northern Syria: Replacement of Kurdish Landmarks in Afrin, Turkification in Al-Bab,” Syrians for Truth and Justice, Aug. 29, 2024.

20. Mariana Karkoutly, “Escalating Human Rights Violations in Syria’s Afrin: 2024 Update,” Ceasefire Centre for Civilian Rights and Kurdish Center for Studies and Legal Consultancy (YASA), May 2024. This report was submitted to the U.N. Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria.

21. “Cutting, burning 21 million, five thousand trees in occupied Afrin,”, Hawar News Agency, August 6, 2024.

22. Siamend Hajo and Eva Savelsberg, “Escape and Arabization: A Comparative Analysis of Population Figures in Traditionally Kurdish Areas of Syria Between 2010 and 2023,” European Center for Kurdish Studies, June 2024.

23. Ibid.

24. “Taghyeer Dimoghrafi … Erdogan Yuskin Milyonen fi Tel Abyad wa Ras al-Ayn,” Al-Arabiya, December 9, 2019.

25. For more on this matter, see the statement signed by 49 Syrian organizations.