For much of the twentieth century, Iran and Iraq have had an antagonistic relationship that culminated in the Iran-Iraq War. In 1988, Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Khomeini was forced to drink the “poisoned chalice” by agreeing to a ceasefire with Iraq, a concession that extinguished his vision of exporting the Islamic Revolution into the country. However, 15 years later – in 2003 – this dynamic was dramatically altered by the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq.

Beyond revenge, Iran’s policy toward Iraq has been driven by several strategic motives: keeping Iraq weak to prevent it from becoming a renewed threat while exploiting it economically; strengthening Iranian-backed Shiite proxies to shift the regional power balance against Sunnis; promoting Iran’s version of Shiism at the expense of Iraq’s; using Iraq as a platform to advance broader regional ambitions, particularly against Israel; finally, accelerating the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq.

Iran’s strategic plan can be divided into two distinct phases. The first phase, from 2003 to 2011, was marked by the U.S.-led coalition’s presence in Iraq, which restricted Tehran’s activities to a more covert and restrained level. The second phase, beginning in 2012, saw the emergence of a security vacuum that allowed Iran to pursue a more open and aggressive strategy toward Iraq. Initially, Iran was concerned about the U.S. military presence in the country. However, with the continued deployment of U.S. forces in the region, Tehran seized the opportunity to expand its influence. The establishment of the Quds Force in the 1990s, under the leadership of Qassem Suleimani, an enigmatic yet influential figure in Iraq, further enhanced Iran’s influence.¹ Additional factors that strengthened Iran’s position included the porous borders in the post-Saddam era and the U.S.-led coalition’s limited understanding of Iraq’s political dynamics, which Iran skillfully exploited to further its own interests.

The broader context of Iran’s strategy is deeply rooted in the Iran-Iraq War and its catastrophic consequences for Iraq. Notably, the three Iranian leaders who would shape Iran’s policy in post-Saddam Iraq all played active roles in the conflict. These leaders included then-President Ali Khamenei, who later became supreme leader and visited the front lines; Qassem Suleimani; and his successor, Esmail Qaani. Both Suleimani and Qaani served as military commanders during the Iran-Iraq War. All three leaders – Khamenei, Suleimani, and Qaani – harbored a profound compulsion to seek revenge whenever the opportunity presented itself.

An Iraqi journalist, Khaled al-Qaraghuli, emphasized that “the Iranian regime’s philosophy of revenge is not a question of theory, wishful thinking, or expectations but rather an important part of any new Iranian president’s policy upon ascending power.” The journalist also pointed out that Iran had to settle accounts with members of the former Iraqi regime to ensure that no one perceived Iran as defeated. Furthermore, he suggested that the 2003 U.S. invasion provided Iran with the opportunity to occupy Iraq “under the American stupid cloak.” ²

Iran implemented its strategy of revenge with the support of various Shiite militia proxies it had cultivated since the Iran-Iraq War. Following the 2003 U.S. invasion, a common objective united Iran and certain Shiite factions – retribution against Sunnis broadly and former Baathists specifically. Iran exploited the chaos following the invasion to settle scores from the Iran-Iraq War, launching “a vicious and coldly efficient Iranian campaign of revenge on Iraqi Air Force pilots who bombed Iran during the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s.” ³ By 2009, Iranian agents had killed 182 Iraqi pilots and forced an additional 800 to flee the country.⁴

Similarly, Iraqi politician Ali Allawi noted that shortly after the invasion, approximately 10,000 members of the pro-Iranian Badr Corps “organized into death squads began hunting and executing senior Sunni regime loyalists, as well as Shi’a citizens who had collaborated with the regime.” ⁵

Iran continued its vendetta in other nuanced but equally dangerous ways, targeting not just the Sunni Iraqi elite but the entire population of the country. One of the harshest Iranian actions was the shutdown of water resources. By 2021, Iran had blocked approximately 12 major rivers that flow from its territory into the Tigris in Iraq. Additionally, Iran diverted the course of the Sirwan river, which used to flow into Iraq, along with other tributaries feeding Iraq’s large dams. Ghazi Faysal Hussein, Director of the Iraqi Center for Strategic Studies, described Iran’s stance as “a form of war.” ⁶ Another observer suggested that Tehran’s efforts to control water resources were “part of the hegemonic policy pursued by Iran and its plan to destroy Iraq and harm its economy and the interests of the Iraqis.” ⁷

Similarly, another study criticized Iran’s “water mafia” for exploiting this vital resource to gain political influence and secure lucrative transactions.⁸ Iran justified its policies by citing its own water problems. However, the deeper issue lies in what analysts described as hydro-hegemony – essentially, “hegemony at the basin level,” which is “typically in favor of the most powerful actor.” ⁹

Another form of economic leverage that Iran has employed against Iraq is control over the supply of gas. Iraq depends on Iran for 40 percent of its gas imports. Due to Baghdad’s various domestic and economic challenges, it has accrued a substantial debt to Tehran. Iraq’s failure to repay these debts on time has led to conflicts between the two countries and has caused severe socioeconomic crises in Iraq. For instance, in 2002, Iraq repaid part of its debt in Iraqi dinars, which triggered a liquidity crisis and hindered the government’s ability to pay salaries to millions of public servants. An Iraqi official complained that Iran’s approach “was limited to achieving quick imaginary successes to prove that they are the most capable of dealing with Iraq’s intractable problems, so they took us out of a well to throw us into a sea.” ¹⁰

At times, Iran has resorted to more aggressive tactics such as reducing the supply of gas and even electricity, thereby “contributing to power shortages, public discontent and political problems.” ¹¹ For example, in May 2023, due to Iraq’s outstanding debts, Tehran decided to cut gas exports by half, causing electricity shortages and economic disruptions.¹² Additionally, with the support of its allied forces in Iraq, Iran has blocked other countries from extracting and producing gas there.¹³ Iran’s gradual weakening of Iraqi sovereignty was highlighted once again in July 2024, when Tehran signed a deal with Turkmenistan to supply gas to Iraq, excluding Iraqi officials from the agreement.¹⁴

Iran’s most effective tool for infiltrating Iraq were the various proxy militias it helped establish in the 1980s, which expanded rapidly after 2003.¹⁵ Surprisingly, Iran even extended support to the anti-Shiite Sunni militant group Al-Qaeda. Leading members of Al-Qaeda, including Sayf al-Adl, the organization’s third-ranking leader, and the three sons of its leader, Osama bin Laden, were welcomed in Tehran. Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence supported Al-Qaeda agents within Iran by providing them with identity cards and passports, as well as supplying money and weapons to their operatives in Iraq.¹⁶

Iran leveraged its Iraqi proxy militias to achieve multiple goals: to destabilize the Iraqi government, even when Shiite-led;¹⁷ to weaken the Sunni and Kurdish communities within Iraq; to push out U.S. forces; and to deploy these militias in foreign ventures, whether for the purpose of bolstering Bashar Assad’s regime in Syria or launching attacks against Israel.

The U.S.-led coalition’s decision to disband the Iraqi Army in 2003 created a security vacuum that greatly fueled the rise of Iranian proxy militias. As the new Iraqi Army was gradually formed, these militias evolved into direct competitors. The Iranian regime became the primary sponsor of the militias’ activities through the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which came under the command of General Qassem Suleimani in 1998. Suleimani played a critical role in forming, empowering, and directing these militias until his death in 2020. Additionally, Suleimani acted both as a strategist and commander in various military operations carried out by Iraqi forces.¹⁸ Suleimani notably told U.S. General David Petraeus, Commander of the Multinational Force-Iraq (2007-2008), “you should know that I Qassem Suleimani, control the policy for Iran with respect to Iraq.” ¹⁹ As early as 2010, National Security Member, Muwaffaq al-Rubay’i asserted that Suleimani was “the most powerful man in Iraq without question ... Nothing gets done without him.” ²⁰ A capable commander, Suleimani succeeded in expanding the organization’s capabilities to encompass paramilitary, diplomatic, and intelligence activities.

In the 1990s, the Quds Force was tasked with collaborating with Iraqi resistance groups against the Baath regime. Reportedly, the Quds Force used “members of Lebanese Hezbollah, the Badr Corps, and, later, Jaysh al-Mahdi to establish Iranian surrogate military cells throughout Iraq that could increase or reduce violent attacks against the coalition on order.” At the same time, the Iranian regime was cautious not to implicate itself in these attacks “because it had little desire to engage the United States in open warfare.” ²¹ Nevertheless, even without its own troops on the ground, Iran established over 151 military bases along the common border with Iraq to demonstrate its strength and empower its militias.²²

The status and role of Iran’s proxy militias in Iraq can be divided into three main periods. The first phase, spanning from 1980 to 2003, encompassed their formative years. The fact that members of Shiite organizations, such as al-Da’wa and the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), found refuge in Iran before and during the Iran-Iraq War significantly bolstered Tehran’s expansion of power in Iraq. Iran played a crucial role in organizing, financing, and training the militant wing of these organizations, known as the Badr Corps.²³ The Badr Corps, established by Iran in 1982, consisted of either Iraqi prisoners of war or Iraqi refugees. Operating from their base in Iran, they conducted acts of sabotage and subversion in southern Iraq to facilitate a future uprising against the Baathist regime. Although the Badr Corps took part in the Shiite intifada of March 1991 that followed the Gulf War, their efforts did not lead to significant success.²⁴

The second phase, starting in 2003, saw the emergence of Iranian proxy militias, a development made possible by the dismantling of the Baath Party and its military following the U.S. invasion. Taking advantage of the political and security vacuum in post-Saddam Iraq, Iran strengthened its longstanding Shiite allies and cultivated new ones. Among these new allies was Jaysh al-Mahdi, which subsequently rebranded itself as Saraya al-Salam. Established in 2003, this group served as the armed wing of the Sadrist movement led by Muqtada al-Sadr. Saddam’s relationship with Iran was complex, marked by periods of Iranian support and instances of backing his rivals. For instance, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq (AHH), led by Qays al-Khaz’ali, emerged in 2006 following a split from Jaysh al-Mahdi. Iran provided military and financial backing to AHH, which has enabled it to develop into a military proxy in Iraq. The group has demonstrated its loyalty to Iran by distributing 20,000 posters of Ayatollah Khamene’i, expressing a preference for Iranian leaders over Iraqi ones, and participating in military operations beyond Iraq’s borders.²⁵

In 2007, Katai’b Hezbollah (KH) was established as an Iranian proxy militia with support from Lebanon’s Hezbollah and the IRGC. Unlike other proxy militias, the members of KH pledge allegiance to Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Khamene’i rather than Iraq’s Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. Like AAH, the group has participated in military operations beyond Iraq’s borders.²⁶ Despite their differing allegiances, KH, AHH, and Jaysh al-Mahdi were united by a common objective: to combat U.S. forces, Sunni groups, and Kurdish factions. Together, they significantly contributed to Iraq’s instability.

The third phase, starting in 2014, marked the proxy militias’ rise to peak prominence as they took on a leading role in the fight against ISIS. Several factors contributed to their rapid rise, the most significant being the collapse of the Iraqi Army during the war against ISIS. The army’s complete failure and the existential threat that ISIS posed to the Iraqi state significantly enhanced the militias’ role, solidifying their image as Iraq’s saviors.²⁷ Their status was enhanced when Sistani’s Jihad Fatwa (al Jihad al- kafa’i), issued on June 13, 2014, urged the defense of Iraqi cities in the wake of Mosul’s fall three days earlier.²⁸ The fatwa prompted then-Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to establish the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF, or al-Hashd al-Sha’bi), which later became an umbrella organization for approximately 40 existing and newly formed militias.²⁹ These included militias from Iraq’s minority populations, such as Sunni tribal fighters, as well as Christian and Yazidi militias, all of which came under Iran’s influence. ³⁰

A study of the PMF claims that Iran’s proxy militias have served as “a critical mechanism of Iran’s deep state in Iraq.” The militias’ senior Iranian commanders operated independently of the Iraqi government’s chain of command, occasionally acting against its interests. This separation enabled Iranian commanders to wield considerable influence over Iraqi security forces, frequently employing military pressure to influence their actions.³¹

Another study that documented the militias’ atrocities in Iraq revealed that the central government’s lack of oversight enabled them to interfere in various sectors of public life, including health and education. Reports indicate that “their leaders and members have been storming university buildings and schools to deliver sectarian and radical religious speeches to students.” This interference has effectively “undermined every aspect of the Iraqi people’s lives.” ³²

An Iraqi journalist succinctly summarized the role of the militias by stating:

Iran skillfully utilized its soft power to transform Iraq into an economic lifeline, enabling it to bypass Western sanctions imposed in 2006. Tehran’s economic infiltration began shortly after the 2003 Iraq War. In August 2004, Iran allocated $300 million for construction projects in Iraq, with a significant portion reserved for the acquisition of hotels, restaurants, and other service-oriented businesses.³⁴ By 2020, approximately 110 Iranian companies were operating across various sectors, including import, export, construction, and energy.³⁵ Tourism has served as a significant means of expanding Iran’s influence in Iraq, particularly through religious pilgrimages to the holy Shiite cities of Najaf and Karbala. In 2022, over three million Iranians participated in a pilgrimage to Karbala. This influx was facilitated, in part, by the waving of visa requirements for travel between the two countries a year earlier, making Iraq one of the few countries to which Iranians could easily travel. Additionally, the Iranian government actively encouraged these pilgrimages to advance its own Shiite interpretation of Islam.³⁶ This marks a significant shift from the Baathist era when Shiites, particularly those from Iran, were banned from participating in such pilgrimages.

To enhance its spiritual and economic influence, Iran invested substantial amounts of money in the reconstruction of Shiite holy sites, totaling 17 shrines valued at hundreds of millions of dollars.³⁷ In Najaf, Iran allocated $500 million for renovations of the Imam Ali shrine, while in Karbala, it invested $600 million in expanding the Imam Hussein shrine. This expansion is considered the most significant development at the shrine in 300 years. Khameine’i personally led both projects, with the Iranian Quds Force overseeing their implementation.³⁸ Iran’s initiatives in this regard mirror the practices of the Safavid rulers, who invested in the restoration of holy sites and facilitated the pilgrimage of thousands of Persians. Although the Safavids ruled Persia for 220 years and controlled Iraq only briefly – from 1508 to 1534 and again from 1623 to 1638 – they “never gave up their rhetorical and theoretical claim to Iraq.” ³⁹

Another project, the first of its kind in the history of the two countries, is the construction of a 32-kilometer railroad between Salamcheh and Basra. Construction on the railroad commenced at the end of 2023 and served several strategic objectives: facilitating the movement of millions of Iranian pilgrims to the holy sites of Najaf and Karbala; strengthening economic and trade relations between the two nations; and connecting Iran to the Mediterranean, thereby advancing its regional aspirations.⁴⁰

In addition to religious initiatives, Iran has employed various economic strategies to evade sanctions and extend its influence in Iraq. These strategies include smuggling; laundering money through Iraqi Islamic banks; granting tax exemptions to Iranian companies; and selling weapons to Iranian proxy militias at prices three times higher than the market rate. These practices prompted the Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al-Sudani to remark in 2023 that Iraq lacked a functioning banking system, which produced significant problems related to the “money laundering process, smuggling of currency and a fake trade with fake documents.” ⁴¹

To facilitate its transactions with Iraq, Iran established several banks, including private ones. By 2010, seven of these banks were operating in Iraq.⁴² In 2019, a private Iranian bank established 7 branches in Iraq.⁴³ In the same year, an agreement was signed between the Central Banks of Iraq and Iran, enabling customers of both banks to open accounts in either country and conduct their banking transactions in Iraqi dinars and euros.⁴⁴

In summarizing the consequences of Iran’s economic encroachment into Iraq, Cordesman and Khazai note:

The extent of Iran’s economic influence is evident in the widespread use of the Iranian rial as a medium of exchange in southern Iraq.⁴⁶ Meanwhile, Iran has sought to “eliminate its competitors [Turkey and Saudi Arabia] from auctions and competitions in large investment projects through its financed groups and by using intimidation tactics.” ⁴⁷ As a result, by 2023, Iraq became the primary destination for Iranian non-oil products.⁴⁸

Iran has worked to cement its influence in Iraq by positioning its proxy militias in key centers of power, interfering in governmental decision-making, and seeking to shape the country’s political trajectory. One of the methods it employed was electoral interference. Heather Stephenson noted that “Iran had a motive to toy with the elections of their arch enemy, who killed hundreds of thousands of their people” through tactics like destroying ballot boxes and intimidating voters.⁴⁹

Another strategy Iran used to strengthen its grip on Iraq’s political system was promoting individuals with ties to Iran that extended back to the Baathist era. A look at Iraq’s prime ministers over the past 20 years reveals that five out of seven were either activists or supporters of the al-Da’wa Party, with some having lived as refugees in Iran during the Baathist era. Moreover, all seven prime ministers developed dependent relations with Tehran, further strengthening Iran’s influence over Iraqi politics.

The most powerful and longest serving Prime Minister was Nouri al-Maliki, holding two consecutive terms from 2006 to 2010 and 2010 to 2014. Initially, Maliki was widely seen as an Iraqi nationalist dedicated to promoting non-sectarian politics.⁵⁰ The United States initially regarded Maliki as the ideal candidate to stabilize Iraq. However, he soon exhibited authoritarian tendencies, often acting counter to the interests of the U.S.-led coalition. Maliki grew increasingly dependent on Iran for his political survival. Analysts pointed out that, despite presenting himself as a U.S. ally, he was, in reality, closely aligned with Iran.⁵¹ Moreover, Maliki reportedly “directly participated in the Commission of war crimes … against the Iraqi people.” ⁵² Iran’s ability to exploit the fractured Iraqi political system allowed it to play a significant role in facilitating Maliki’s rise to power on two occasions: in 2006 and 2010. In 2010, Suleimani’s personal influence was particularly critical.⁵³

Iran’s role as a power broker was once again underscored following the October 2021 general elections. These parliamentary elections took place against the backdrop of significant anti-government protests that had erupted in October 2019 and persisted for over a year, primarily in the Shiite regions of Iraq. The political unrest forced the government to move these elections to 2021, one year ahead of schedule. However, the election results only deepened the crisis, revealing the intra-Shiite divisions between pro-Iranian and anti-Iranian factions. On one side was Muqtada al-Sadr, who, despite his history of shifting allegiances, positioned himself as a staunch Iraqi nationalist and vocal opponent of Iran. On the other side were five pro-Iranian Shiite parties, which in March 2021 formed a coalition known as the Coordination Framework (al-itar al-tansqisi). Maliki was the key politician behind the formation of this coalition, hoping to lead the next cabinet. However, the election results were deeply disappointing for the bloc, as it failed to secure a majority. The major victor was their rival, Muqtada al-Sadr, who won 73 seats, with an additional 17 members joining his list later. Despite this success, al-Sadr opposed forming a coalition government with the pro-Iranian bloc and was unable to establish one with the Kurdish and Sunni parties. As a result, he chose to boycott parliament and withdrew all his party members.

Al-Sadr’s unexpected decision temporarily deepened the political crisis, allowing the pro-Iranian bloc and its Iranian patron to exploit the vacuum he had created. The 73 seats from Sadr’s bloc, now under the control of the Coordination Framework, gave them leverage to pressure the Kurds and Sunnis into joining their coalition government. After more than a year of political deadlock, Muhammad Shiya al-Sudani, a confidant of Maliki, was finally tasked with forming a cabinet. Without a political party of his own, Sudani was perceived as too weak to stand up to the pro-Iranian bloc or Iran, sharply differing from his predecessor, Mustafa al-Kadhimi. Once again, Esmail Qaani, the new commander of the Quds Force, played a crucial behind-the-scenes role in orchestrating a solution that aligned with the interests of both the pro-Iranian bloc and Tehran.⁵⁴

Iran has also kept a vigilant eye on developments in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), which has strengthened its autonomy since 2003, frequently at the expense of Baghdad’s central authority. The KRI’s stability and pro-Western orientation led the United States to establish the Al-Harir Air Base in the region, which remained operational even after most American forces withdrew from Iraq.

Alarmed by these developments, Tehran devised a three-pronged strategy: undermining the KRI’s autonomy, asserting Iraqi control over the region, and driving out American forces. Iran has long employed a divide-and-rule strategy to weaken the Kurds. Recognizing the persistent rivalry between the two major Kurdish parties – the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) – Iran sided with the PUK, capitalizing on historical ties dating back to the 1960s and its geographic proximity to the PUK’s stronghold in the Sulaymaniya governorate.

A prominent example of Iran’s involvement in the KRI occurred in September 2017, following the Kurdish independence referendum. On the eve of the referendum, Qassem Suleimani, who had longstanding ties with the PUK, cautioned its Kurdish leadership to withdraw their forces from the disputed areas of Kirkuk, threatening a “fiery” onslaught from Iraqi forces and Iranian-backed fighters if they did not comply.⁵⁵ Then, on October 14 , 2017, Suleimani issued a 48-hour ultimatum to the PUK leadership to allow the Popular Mobilization Forces (al-Hashd al-Sha’bi) to enter Kirkuk, a demand that was eventually met.⁵⁶ Prime Minister Haydar al-Abadi deployed elite forces to seize control of Kirkuk, but the main responsibility rested with the three Shiite militias: Badr, AHH, and KH.⁵⁷

Even more concerning were Iran’s periodic cross-border artillery strikes into the KRI, which included ground incursions of up to 10 kilometers into the region, along with attacks by helicopter gunships and unmanned aerial vehicles.⁵⁸ Additionally, since 2018, the KRI has been a prime target for coordinated attacks from Baghdad, Iran, and pro-Iranian militias. From September 2018 to October 2023, the Iranian regime and its proxies conducted 32 assaults on the Kurdistan region.⁵⁹ Some of their drone and missile strikes were aimed at U.S.-led coalition facilities to hasten their withdrawal from the region. Similarly, to bolster its military presence in the KRI, Iran reportedly constructed a military outpost on Cheekha Dar Mountain, the region’s highest peak.⁶⁰

On the political front, Tehran exerted pressure on the KRI to comply with its demands regarding the formation of the Iraqi government following the 2021 elections. Concerned about the potential alliance between Kurdish parties and the anti-Iranian Sadr bloc, Iran launched a multi-layered campaign designed to destabilize the region, focusing on its most critical sector – energy. In February 2022, the Federal Judicial Council in Baghdad ruled that the KRG’s 2007 Oil and Gas Law was unconstitutional.⁶¹ The ruling was further reinforced by attacks from pro-Iranian proxy militias on oil facilities in the region, forcing the Kurdish leadership to align with the pro-Iranian coalition. This situation reflects Iran’s objective to enhance its influence in the KRG, and Baghdad’s aim to revert to the centralized governance system that prevailed before the 1990s.

The U.S.-led coalition’s military occupation of Iraq posed a complex dilemma for Iran. Tehran welcomed the fall of its chief adversary – the Baath regime and Saddam Hussein, specifically. Nevertheless, it viewed the presence of Western troops on neighboring soil as an ideological, political, and security threat. In response, Iran devised a strategy for Iraq centered on balancing two key objectives: the elimination of the Baath regime with the help of U.S. forces, and the rapid expulsion of U.S. forces once that goal was achieved. Iran’s approach unfolded in two distinct phases: the initial months following the occupation, during which U.S. forces dismantled the Baath infrastructure; and a subsequent phase after ISIS captured parts of Iraq in 2014, when these forces became instrumental in preventing Iraq’s collapse.

From the outset, a fundamental asymmetry existed between Iranian and American objectives in Iraq. As Iraq’s neighbor, Iran harbored longstanding ambitions there, rooted in its geographical proximity and deep cultural ties. In contrast, the United States was a distant foreign power that pursued the idealistic goal of fostering democracy. While Iran possessed a deep understanding of Iraq’s culture and history, the United States had only a superficial grasp. Iran regarded Iraq’s substantial Shiite population as having a deep religious and cultural connection to Iran. By contrast, the United States and its allies were perceived as complete outsiders, attempting to impose an alien Western political system on Iraq. Jalal al-Din al Saghir, a SCIRI politician, poignantly captured this asymmetry when he stated: “[t]he Iranians will stay in the place forever till the Judgment Day and the Americans will withdraw. The Americans built their status on their military and their political viewpoints. They didn’t try to find shared lines of interest or common ground … The Iranians dealt with this matter in a more positive way.” ⁶²

Throughout the entire U.S.-led coalition’s military occupation of Iraq, Iran was particularly cautious to avoid any direct military confrontation. However, it did employ “its intelligence service, its diplomats and attaches, ‘private’ citizens, business covers, and foreign nationals to support its efforts at asymmetric political warfare and to study American capabilities and vulnerabilities.” ⁶³ At the same time, Iran aimed to expedite the withdrawal of U.S. forces through two complementary strategies: orchestrating attacks by its proxies to make their presence intolerable and exerting pressure on the Iraqi government to call for their withdrawal. By 2011 pro-Iranian forces were responsible for two-thirds of all violent incidents targeting Americans in southern Iraq.⁶⁴

Recognizing Iran’s strategic objectives early in the conflict, General Petraeus remarked:

Indeed, these attacks persisted unabated until the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq at the end of 2011. Iran’s success can be attributed to a combination of simultaneous Iraqi push and American pull factors. Regarding the former, the pro-Iranian Maliki government played a crucial role in this process, reinforcing Iran’s goal – to destroy any residual influence that the U.S. military could have in Iraq after 2011.⁶⁶ Suleimani reminded Iraqi leaders that U.S. forces would soon depart from Iraq, while Iran would continue to be a formidable neighbor. He further asserted that Iraqi leaders who cooperated with Iran would benefit from political support and financial assistance, while those who opposed Iran would face “dire consequences.” ⁶⁷

Meanwhile, President Barack Obama’s decision to withdraw U.S. forces came despite the recommendations of commanders on the ground. For years, U.S. perspectives on Iraq had been conflicting, with the Democratic Party pushing for a swift withdrawal and the Republican Party opposing this strategy. Upon taking office in 2009, Obama actively promoted the withdrawal of U.S. troops. In 2011, he informed Prime Minister Maliki that all U.S. forces would be pulled out by the end of that year. Consequently, within two months, a rapid withdrawal of 40,000 troops and 30,000 contractors took place, leaving many significant issues unresolved.⁶⁸

Obama painted an optimistic picture of his decision, stating that “what we have now achieved is an Iraq that is self-governing, that is inclusive, and that has enormous potential.” The president went on to argue that Iraq had the potential to be “a model for others that are aspiring to create democracy in the region.” ⁶⁹ Little did he realize that in less than three years, ISIS would unleash chaos in Iraq, compelling the United States to intervene once again. Shortly after the defeat of ISIS in 2015-2016, Iran resumed its war of attrition against U.S. forces through its proxy militias. This campaign has persisted even as U.S. troop numbers remained below 2,500 in 2024. Unwilling to tolerate even a symbolic U.S. presence, Iran pressured Sudani to negotiate the withdrawal of all U.S. troops.

Iran’s success in exerting influence in Iraq did not lead to complacency among Iraqis. Rather, the most significant challenge emerged from former Baathists and military factions, such as Al Qaeda and ISIS, that specifically targeted Shiites and Iranian proxy militias. Major General Mizher Rashid al Tarfa al-Ubaydi, a former officer under the Baath regime, commented on the deep-seated hostility that these groups held toward Iran:

The spokesman for the Islamic Army in Iraq, Ibrahim al-Shammari, expressed similar views. He stated that between the two occupations – the American and the Iranian – the latter represents a greater threat to Iraq. While the United States does not consider Iraq a part of America, Iran views Iraq as an integral part of its territory.⁷¹

In fact, resentment against Iran gradually permeated various segments of Iraqi society, particularly among large portions of the Shiite population. For example, Iranian attempts to assert influence over the Shiite tribes in the South sparked anti-Iranian and anti-militia revolts in those areas as early as 2007.⁷² These sentiments culminated in the October 2019 protest movement, referred to as Harakat Tishreen, which endured for over a year. The movement ultimately resulted in the resignation of Adil Abd al- Mahdi’s government and the scheduling of elections for October 2021.

Iran was the primary target of the protests from the very beginning, as demonstrated by slogans like “Iran Out, Out” (Iran barra barra) and “Baghdad Will Remain Free” (Baghdad tabqa hurra), along with “We Want a Homeland” (nurid watan), emphasizing the demand for sovereignty. During these youth-led demonstrations, protesters burned Iranian flags and attacked the headquarters of pro-Iranian parties and organizations.⁷³ In cities such as Najaf, Karbala, and Basra protesters even went so far as to set fire to Iranian consulates.⁷⁴ Similarly, protesters launched campaigns to boycott Iranian products while encouraging the purchase of locally made goods.⁷⁵ Another example of anti-Iranian activity was the defacement of images of Khamene’i and Suleimani.⁷⁶

Attacks against Iran proliferated on social media, with one angry commentator remarking: “[t]his is what happens to countries which were invaded by Iran: unemployment, destruction, pollution, illiteracy, anarchy.” Labeling Iran an evil terrorist state, another commentator stated: “go out of our country, we don’t know you, we don’t want you, we don’t love you. You burnt our country, you provoked sectarianism, you brought Al-Qaeda [.]” ⁷⁷ Confronted with these significant setbacks, the Iranian leadership did not remain passive. Instead, it urged its Iraqi militia proxies to suppress the movement through armed force. In total, they killed more than 600 of their Iraqi Shiite kinsmen.⁷⁸

Another serious setback for Iran occurred shortly after the protests erupted. On January 3, 2020, a U.S. drone strike near Baghdad Airport killed Qassem Suleimani, along with Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the Deputy Chairman of the PMF and Commander of KH. Just hours after Suleimani’s death, Khamene’i appointed Brigadier General Esmail Qaani as his successor. However, commentators noted that Qaani’s leadership style was “a far cry from Suleimani’s brand of charismatic, risky leadership.” ⁷⁹ Iran faced another setback at the end of 2020 when four Shiite groups, linked to Ayatollah al-Sistani, withdrew from the PMF and established a parallel force.⁸⁰

Meanwhile, anti-Iranian sentiments have become widespread in political discourse, largely due to the increased freedom of expression. One of the most prominent critics of Iran and the PMF is Sajjad Taqi Qassim, a Shiite himself, who mourned the plight of the Shiites 20 years after the fall of the Baath regime. Qassim argued that both parliamentary and local elections did not benefit the Shiite community; instead, they served to strengthen Iran’s influence in Iraq, legitimized pro-Iranian militias, and created further hardships for the Shiite population.⁸¹ Qassim also stated that the Shiites did not govern Iraq; instead, Iran held the real power. The suffering his country endured was a direct consequence of its neighbor’s actions. The United States, he contended, had no historical claim on Iraq, nor did it obstruct the flow of water from 43 rivers or impede the nation’s progress in energy, industry, and agriculture. All these problems, he asserted, could be traced to Iran’s actions and its influence over Iraq.⁸²

Similarly, Salam al-Muhandis accused Iran of controlling Iraq and exerting a negative influence on its political decision-making. He claimed that Iran used thieves and gangsters to embezzle Iraq’s wealth and dishonor its citizens. While Iraq may appear to be a sovereign nation, he argued, it operates more like an Iranian province.⁸³ Mohandas also lamented the Iraqi people’s abandonment of secularism in favor of Islamism, which aligned with Iran’s ambitions and was propagated by Iraq’s “head of snakes.” The adoption of an Islamic identity has contributed to some of the highest levels of corruption globally, fueled violent social interactions, and led to elevated rates of unemployment and poverty on the international stage.⁸⁴

For his part, Khalid Qara Ghuli referred to Iran as a “holy cow” and criticized the United States for effectively delivering his country into Iran’s hands. He argued that Tehran had successfully deceived the United States and its Arab allies, reaping the benefits without firing a single bullet or spending a single toman. These countries, he asserted, should have anticipated that Tehran would seek revenge against the nation that had opposed it for eight years, and served as a major obstacle to its expansionist ambitions and efforts to export its revolution.⁸⁵

Another scholar, Al-Shammari, asserted that Iran solidified its control over Iraq by embedding its agents throughout the country. Iran systematically undermined key sources of Iraqi income, including agriculture, industry, and trade. However, the most harmful aspect, he contended, was Iran’s imposition of religious hegemony over the Iraqi state. This combination of political and economic interference, along with other detrimental actions, has led to the emergence of a new hybrid regime in Iraq, blending both democratic and authoritarian elements.⁸⁶ Meanwhile, another scholar, Mahdi Qasim, criticized the pro-Iranian Shiite proxy militias for following direct orders from Iranian commanders rather than the Iraqi Army.⁸⁷

Finally, Sa’d al-Kinani compared Iran and its pro-Iranian proxy militias to two figures mentioned in the Old Testament and the Quran, notorious for their corruption and destructive powers – Gog and Magog (Ya’juj was Ma’juj). While Shiites in Iran made significant advancements in military, agricultural, and industrial sectors, their counterparts in Iraq regressed in virtually every sector. Kinani emphasized that the troubles Iraq has faced stem from Iran’s “expansionist, destructive, and sectarian project.” ⁸⁸

All these journalists and scholars highlight the identity crisis that Iraqis in post-Saddam Iraq have faced: Iraqi patriotism versus pro-Iranian ties; Shiite fundamentalism versus a more secular approach; and pro-Iranian versus pro-American orientations.

Over a period of two decades, Iran has successfully infiltrated Iraq and expanded its hegemony without resorting to direct military annexation. This strategy stands in stark contrast to the historical methods used by the Persian and Ottoman Empires, which seized Iraqi territory through military conquests. It also differs significantly from the three major conflicts that Western powers initiated against Iraq: Britain’s involvement in World War One and the U.S.-led coalition’s military occupation of the country in 1991 and 2003, respectively. Iran’s success stemmed from a confluence of significant factors: the U.S. forces’ strategic mistakes that inadvertently layed the groundwork for Tehran’s influence; Iran’s ambitions coupled with its deep understanding of Iraq; the weakened resistance capabilities of Iraq; and the shared interest between certain segments of the Iraqi Shiite community and the Iranian regime.

Iran has pursued multiple objectives in Iraq, seeking to transform the country into a puppet state that would no longer present a threat, as it did during the Iran-Iraq War. The successive Iraqi governments that cooperated with Iran were either too weak to withstand its coercive pressures or blinded by self-interest. As a result, they failed to recognize Iran’s true intentions, which allowed Iranian influence to grow unchecked.

The complex interaction between the United States and Iran, as well as between the United States and Iraq, played a crucial role in shaping Baghdad’s submissive stance towards its neighbor. Although the Shiites became the primary beneficiaries of the U.S.-led military occupation of Iraq, elevating them to positions of power, many began to view the United States and its allies as occupiers and sought to expel them. In response, Iran actively spread anti-American and anti-Western propaganda among the Iraqi population. Caught in this tug-of-war, the Iraqi Shiite-led governments typically chose to curry favor with Iran, purposely distancing themselves from their American occupiers. As a result, Iraq experienced a significant loss of sovereignty and grew increasingly dependent on Iran in both domestic and foreign policy.

The Iranian threat continued to preoccupy Iraqi politicians long after the end of the Iran-Iraq War. This was particularly evident during the FBI’s interrogation of Saddam Hussein following his capture on December 13, 2003. Saddam’s argument was that he had effectively deterred Iran by convincing its leaders that Iraq possessed chemical weapons. He also claimed that Iraq was more fearful of Iran than of the United States due to their shared border and Iran’s ambitions to annex Iraqi territory, particularly in the Shiite south. Anticipating that Iran’s significant military buildup would pose a serious threat not only to Iraq but to the entire region, Saddam concluded: “The Iranians do not understand unless you break their heads.” ⁸⁹ Whether Saddam genuinely feared Iran more than the United States remains uncertain. However, one thing is clear: two decades later Saddam’s predictions have indeed come to fruition.

1. Heather Stephenson, “How Iran Won Our Iraq War,” Tufts Now, March 26, 2019 (hereafter, Stephenson, “How Iran Won”).

2. Khaled al-Qaraghuli, “If the Iranians Continue to Perceive Iraq as a Precious Archeological Piece in Their Museum, They Are Totally Erroneous,” Sawt-al-Iraq, Nov. 26, 2023.

3. “Wikileaks Exposes Iran’s Secret Revenge on Iraqi Pilots for the 1980s War,” ABC News, Dec. 3, 2010.

4. Ibid.

5. Joel D. Rayburn and Frank K. Sobchak, The U.S. Army in the Iraq War, vol. 1, Invasion – Insurgence – Civil War, 2003-2006 (US Army War College Press, 2019), 125 (hereafter, Rayburn and Sobchak, US Army).

6. Faris-al Omran, “Iran’s Diversion of Water Resources Away from Iraq ‘a Form of War’,” Diyaruna, Dec. 28, 2021.

7. Ibid.

8. Banafsheh Keynoush, “Water Diplomacy Not Enough to Fix Iran-Iraq’s Water Dispute,” Pacific Council on International Policy, March 20, 2019.

9. Mark Zeitoun and Jeroen Warner, “Hydro-Hegemony – A Framework for Analysis of Transboundary Water Conflict,” Water Policy Sept. (2006).

10. Suada al-Salhy, “How Iraq Caused a Currency Crisis by Paying Iran in Dinars,” Middle East Eye, March 4, 2023 (hereafter, Al-Salhy, “How Iraq Caused a Currency Crisis”).

11. Bilal Wahab and Dennis Ross, “Iraq’s Power Problem, pt. 2, Implication of the New Oil for Gas Deal with Iran,” Policy Analysis/Policy Watch 3759 July 19 (2023).

12. Bijan Khajehpour, “Deep Dive: The Significance of Iran-Iraq’s Energy Swaps,” Amwaj, July 29, 2023.

13. Yasir Rashid, “Iran’s Economic Infiltration on Iraq,” IRAM, Nov. (2021) (hereafter, Rashid, “Iran’s Economic Infiltration”).

14. “Turkmenistan and Iran Sign a Deal to Supply Gas to Iraq,” Associated Press, July 4, 2024.

15. By 2016, more than 100 militias operating outside government control were responsible for committing multiple atrocities. “Militias in Iraq: The Hidden Face of Terrorism,” Geneva International Centre for Justice, Sept. 2016 (hereafter, “Militias in Iraq”).

16. Husam Suwaylim, “The American Dilemma in Iraq and Scenarios for the Future, Al-Diffa, July 2008, 27.

17. Iran’s paradoxical strategy provided it with leverage to escalate violence, and then capitalize on the ensuing stability once the violence subsided. See Joseph Felter and Brian Fishman, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq: Politics and ‘Other Means’,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, Oct. 13, 2008, 6 (hereafter, Felter and Fishman, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq”).

18. “Militias in Iraq,” 32.

19. Anthony H. Cordesman and Sammy Khazai, “Iraq in Crisis,” Jan. 2014, 195, https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/wps/csis/002991/f_029991_2473.pdf (hereafter, Cordesman and Khazai, “Iraq in Crisis”).

20. Ibid.

21. Rayburn and Sobchak, US Army, 188.

22. “An American Organization: The Turkish and Iranian Military Operations in Kurdistan Region Caused Hundreds of Victims,” Shafaq News, Aug. 14, 2024

23. Felter and Fishman, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq,” 7.

24. Rayburn and Sobchak, US Army, 14.

25. Dylan O’Driscoll and Dave Van Zoonen, “The Hashd al-Shaabi and Iraq: Subnationalism and the State,” MERI (2017): 22.

26. Ibid., 22.

27. The newly established Iraqi army has become a symbol of corruption, dysfunction, and immorality. See “Militias in Iraq,” 4.

28. For Sistani’s role in Iraqi politics, see Sajad Jiyad, God’s Man in Iraq: The Life and Leadership of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani (The Century Foundation, 2023).

29. See “Militias in Iraq.”

30. Jessa Rose, Duri-Agri, Omer Kassim et al., “Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces,” Institute for the Study of War, 2017, 37.

31. Ibid., 28-31.

32. “Militias in Iraq,” 2.

33. Anas Mahmud al-Shaykh Muzhir, “Evaluating the Withdrawal of the American Forces,” Shafaq News, Jan. 11, 2024.

34. Felter and Fishman, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq,” 39.

35. Rashid, “Economic Infiltration.”

36. Tony Gamal Gabriel, “Influx of Iranians Bolsters Iraq Arbaeen Pilgrimage,” Al- Monitor, Sept. 17, 2022.

37. Rashid, “Economic Infiltration.”

38. John Davison, “Iran Expands Shrines and Influence in Iraq,” Reuters, Dec. 2, 2020

39. Rudy Mathee, “Iraq Relations in the Safavid Period,” Encyclopaedia Iranica.

40. Maziar Motamedi, “Why Is the Shalamche-Basra Railroad So Important to Iran and Iraq?,” Al Jazeera, Sept. 6, 2023.

41. David Cloud, “US Bans 14 Iraqi Banks in Crackdown on Iran Dollar Trade,” Wall Street Journal, July 19, 2023.

42. “Iranian Bank Branches in Iraq,” Iraq-Business News, April 6, 2010.

43. “Iranian Bank Opening 7 Branches in Iraq,” Iraqi Economist Network, Sept. 30, 2019.

44. Al-Salhy, “How Iraq Caused a Currency Crisis.”

45. Cordesman and Khazai, “Iraq in Crisis,” 294.

46. Yoel Guzansky, “‘Made in Iran’: The Iranian Involvement in Iraq,” Strategic Assessment 13, 4, Jan. (2011): 92.

47. Rashid, “Economic Infiltration of Iraq.”

48. “Iran Emerges as the Top Destination for Iranian Non-Oil Exports,” Shafaq News, Dec. 4, 2023.

49. Stephenson, “How Iran Won.”

50. Babak Rahimi, “Iran’s Declining Influence in Iraq,” The Washington Quarterly winter (2012).

51. Kevin M Woods, Williamson Murray, Elizabeth A Nathan et al., Saddam’s Generals: Perspectives of the Iran-Iraq War (Institute for Defense Analysis, 2011) ,109 (hereafter, Woods, Murray, and Nathan, Saddam’s Generals).

52. “Militias in Iraq,” 32.

53. Cordesman and Khazai, “Iraq in Crisis,” 142-143.

54. For example, Khadimi attempted without great success to enforce a law against the pro-Iranian militias. See Yaron Schneider and Raz Zimmt, “A New Government in Iraq: The Significance for Tehran and the Iranian Camp,” INSS Insight 1659, Nov. 15 (2022).

55. Raya Jalabi, “Iran Seen as Winner after Iraq’s Kurds Lose Referendum Gamble,” Reuters, Oct. 31, 2017.

56. Vadim Volokhov, “Collaboration Is Destroying Independence of Kurdistan,” Boryfsen Intel, Oct. 22, 2017.

57. Jennifer Cafarella and Omer Kassem, “Iran’s Role in the Kirkuk Operation in Iraq,” Institute for the Study of War, Nov. 8, 2017.

58. Ahmed Ali, Michael Knights, and Michael Eisenstadt, “Iran’s Influence in Iraq,” Policy Watch 1806, May 6, 2011 (hereafter, Ali, Knights, and Eisenstadt, “Iran’s Influence in Iraq”).

59. “Attacks on the Kurdistan Region by Iran and Its Iraqi Proxies,” Washington Kurdish Institute, Nov. 2, 2023.

60. Tamer Badawi, “Iran Security Anxiety in Iraqi Kurdistan,” Carnegie Endowment for Peace, Nov. 8, 2022.

61. Ibid.

62. Felter and Fishman, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq,” 54.

63. Cordesman and Khazai, “Iraq in Crisis,” 188.

64. Ali, Knights, and Eisenstadt, “Iran’s Influence in Iraq.”

65. Jeanne F. Godfroy, James S. Powell, Matthew D. Morton et al., The US Army in the Iraq War, v. 2, Surge and Withdrawal (U.S. Army War College Press 2019), 227 (hereafter, Godfroy, Powell, and Morton, US Army in the Iraq War).

66. Cordesman and Khazai, “Iraq in Crisis,” 202.

67. Ibid, 521, 532.

68. Godfroy, Powell, and Morton, US Army in the Iraq War, 572.

69. Ibid., 550, 569.

70. Woods, Murray, and Nathan, Saddam’s Generals, 108-109.

71. “The Iraqi Resistance after Four Years of Occupation,” Qana Bila Hudud, April 11, 2007.

72. “The Mullahs Against the Shi’a,” Al Watan al-Arabi, July 28, 2007.

73. “In the Pictures ... Burning Iranian Flags in the Demonstrations ‘Iraq Revolts’,”Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, Oct. 3, 2019 (hereafter, “Burning Iranian Flags”); and “Live Bullets Kill New Demonstrators, Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, Oct. 3, 2019.

74. Alissa J. Rubin, “Iraqis Rise Against Reviled Occupier: Iran,” New York Times, Nov. 4, 2019 (hereafter, Rubin, “Iraqis”); Zaidon Al Kinani, “Karbala’s Response to a Leading Protester’s Assassination: Anti-Iran Sentiment and Electoral Boycott,” Iram Center, June 4, 2021.

75. Arwa Ibrahim, “Why Are Iraqi Protesters Targeting Iranian Buildings?,” Al Jazeera, Nov. 29, 2019.

76. Rubin, “Iraqis”.

77. “Burning Iranian Flags.”

78. “The Iraq Report: Domestic Instability Rises as Iraq Hosts Saudi Iran Talks,” The New Arab, May 12, 2021.

79. Ali Alfoneh, “Who Is Esmail Qaani, The New Chief Commander of Iran’s Qods Force?,” Policy Watch 3236, Jan. 7 (2020).

80. Al-Salhi, “How Iraq Causes a Currency Crisis.”

81. Sa’ad al-Kinani, “Gog and Maggog,” Sawt al-Iraq, March 14, 2024.

82. Sajjad Taqi Qasim, “America Puts the Responsibility on Iraq for Actions Committed by Militias Which Admit Their Loyalty to Iran,” Sawt Kurdistan, Dec. 10, 2023.

83. Salam al-Muhandis, “The State of the Rulers and One Million Thieves,” Shabakat Akhbar al-Iraq, Jan. 1, 2024.

84. Salam al-Muhandis, “The Snakes’ Struggle in the Land of Iraq,” Sawt Al-Iraq, March 10, 2024.

85. Khaled al-Qaraghuli, “Iran (Israel Today in Iraq): A Holy Cow Which Is Forbidden To Touch It or Its Followers?,” Sawt al-Iraq, Jan. 22, 2024.

86. Fawazz Ali Nasir al-Shammari, “Merging Democracy and Dictatorship in Post-2003 Iraq,” Sawt al-Iraq, March 7, 2024.

87. Ibid. See also Mahdi Qasim, “As If the Iraqi Army Has Hit the American Army and the Latter Answered,” Sawt al-Iraq, Jan. 7, 2024.

88. Sajjad Taqi Qasim, “The Shi’a Participation in the Elections Is a Guarantee for Iran’s Influence in Iraq,” Sawt Kurdistan, Nov. 21, 2023.

89. Saddam Husayn, “The Iranians Do Not Understand Unless You Break Their Heads,” Al-Sharq al Awsat, July 3, 2009.