How do Sunni jihadist groups – in particular the Islamic State (IS) and al-Qaeda– view the fight against Israel and what are the practical implications of their views?¹ Answers to these questions affect the ability of these groups to gain recruits and engage in more acts of violence.² Although both groups share the understanding of the fight as a religious war against Jews and call on Muslims to support the cause of Palestine by carrying out attacks on Israeli, Jewish, and Western targets, they have sharply different views on Hamas: IS maintains an ideologically purist position as opposed to Al-Qaeda’s expressions of populist solidarity. In addition, IS has continued to emphasize the particular importance of opposing and fighting the Shiites as an essential component of rectifying the course of the Palestinian struggle – a position that is not adopted by Al-Qaeda even as it too is generally hostile to the Shiites.

The two groups’ ability to present themselves to wider Muslim audiences as viable outlets to support the Palestinian cause is limited, but there is a heightened threat of individuals being incited by IS in particular to conduct attacks on Israeli, Jewish, and Western targets. Reports of actual attacks and disrupted plots suggest that it is IS and not al-Qaeda that is leading the way in incitement and inspiration, illustrating that while al-Qaeda is not necessarily irrelevant, IS presents the overall greater threat. The fact that IS represents the greater threat is another measure of how the group has outdone Al-Qaeda despite the fact that al-Qaeda is the older organization.

Reflective of long-standing trends, IS’s official propaganda on the conflict has been more widespread and coordinated than Al-Qaeda’s. This is particularly evident in the consistent output of IS’s central media department, which produces its weekly Arabic-language newsletter, al-Naba’ (“News”). IS supporters translate and distribute the newsletter in multiple languages, amplifying the group’s messaging reach. Given IS’s broader and more consistent media efforts, it is fitting to examine its views on the conflict. The contrast with Al-Qaeda’s perspective is significant, especially since Al-Qaeda has been less successful in organizing plots or inspiring attacks, particularly against Israeli, Jewish, and Western targets. This analysis explores the practical implications of each group’s stance and the overall security threat they pose.

IS’s discourse on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict exemplifies the broader Sunni jihadist perspective, framing the struggle with Israel not as a territorial or nationalist issue but as a religious war between Jews and Sunni Muslims. For IS and other jihadists, the conflict with Jews predates the establishment of Israel. They perceive Israel and its actions as contemporary manifestations of the Qur’an’s traditionally negative depictions of Jews.³

It could be argued that the Qur’anic polemics against Jews specifically reference the Jewish tribes of Yathrib who opposed the early Muslim community. However, IS and other jihadists interpret these passages as attributing enduring characteristics to Jews, applying them universally to both past and present contexts. Examples of these alleged negative characteristics include the repudiation of God; insolence; distortion of God’s words; treachery; the killing of prophets; and an inherent hostility toward Muslims. In February 2023, an IS editorial titled “Kill the Jews,” published in its weekly Arabic-language newsletter al-Naba’, underscored these portrayals and posed a rhetorical question: can anyone genuinely claim that the conflict with Jews is not fundamentally rooted in religion?⁴ The situation in “Palestine” is depicted as a “natural result of the Jews’ enmity to the Muslims and their sowing of corruption in the land.” Palestinians are thus reminded that the conflict with Jews must be understood as purely religious, with an emphasis on the value of targeting synagogues and Jewish places of worship. The editorial was published following a bomb attack in Jerusalem in November 2022, with the attacker’s image featured at the top, despite IS not officially claiming responsibility for the attack. The editorial further urged Muslims to target Jewish neighborhoods and places of worship in Europe and worldwide. This IS messaging, which frames the conflict as a religious war against Jews and advocates for global attacks on Jewish sites, has remained consistent. Since October 7, this narrative has been continually reinforced as part of broader efforts to support Muslims in Gaza and Palestine.⁵

Despite inciting war against Jews, IS and its organizational predecessors have consistently maintained that apostasy – the act of abandoning Islam after embracing it – is worse than original disbelief (i.e., not believing in Islam from the outset). This conviction stems from the view that it is more grievous to abandon the truth after formally accepting it than to never accept it at all. This emphasis on the greater evil of “apostasy” is articulated in IS’s official manifesto of beliefs titled “This Is Our Creed and This Is Our Methodology,” ⁶ which is a slightly modified version of an Al-Qaeda In Iraq manifesto from 2005.⁷ Both documents contain the following key statement: “The disbelief of apostasy is worse by consensus [of scholars] than original disbelief [;] therefore, in our view, fighting the apostates is of greater priority than fighting the original disbeliever.”

Applying this principle to Israel, IS argues that the fight against Israel cannot be truly effective as long as it is surrounded by “apostate” entities – those that either act as allies of the Jewish state or undermine the struggle. Israel itself, governed by Jews who are seen as “original disbelievers” for never having accepted Islam, remains a target. The “apostate” states that act as allies and shields for Israel include its Sunni Arab neighbors such as Jordan and Egypt.⁸ Even more troubling in IS’s view are Iran and Iranian-aligned Shiite armed factions that form the “axis of resistance.” IS sees these groups as exploiting the Palestinian cause to further their own interests while promoting religious doctrines that in IS’s view corrupt Islam from within.

An al-Naba’ editorial, titled “Dots on Letters,” exemplifies this mindset in its commentary on the escalation of fighting between Israel and Hezbollah in fall 2024. According to the editorial, the conflict between the “Rafidites” (a derogatory term used by IS to refer to Twelver Shiism, which dominates Iran’s government and forms the core of the “axis of resistance”)and Jews is not a true religious struggle in the same sense as the conflict between Jews and Sunni Muslims, which IS views as a battle between disbelief and belief. Instead, IS frames the Jewish-Shiite conflict as a war between “two disbelieving sides that wage war against Islam.” ⁹ However, IS contends that the rise and dominance of the “Rafidites” poses a greater threat to Islam and Muslims. This is because Muslims universally recognize Jews as disbelievers, with large-scale conversions to Judaism of no concern. According to IS, the Jews threaten both the lives and wealth of Muslims. In contrast, the harm from the “Rafidites” is far worse as they can lure Muslims into their false religion, corrupt Islam from within, and falsely portray themselves as the true defenders of the Palestinian cause.

Additionally, IS draws historical parallels with the period when secular Arab nationalism was the leading force in the fight against Israel.¹⁰ According to IS, this ideology represented a form of apostasy that could have led Muslims astray from Islam had it prevailed in the war against Israel. Even so, the greater perceived evil of the “Rafidites” does not justify an alliance with Jews, just as the evil character of Jews should not lead believers to support Iran and the “axis of resistance.” IS highlights what it perceives as the absurdity of this conflict as follows: while it considers all Jewish targets legitimate, Iran and the “axis of resistance” supposedly adhere to rules of engagement. For example, Iran’s ballistic missile strike was reportedly limited to hitting (allegedly empty) Israeli military installations rather than targeting gatherings of Jews in order to maximize casualties.¹¹

IS spokesman Abu Hudhayfa al-Ansari also emphasized the perceived greater evil of the “Rafidites” in his January speech, stating that while Jews may aspire to a state extending from the Nile to the Euphrates (the “greater Israel” conspiracy theory)¹² , the “Rafidites” have their own ambitions for a “Shiite crescent” stretching from the Mediterranean to Iran.
Additionally, they seek to take over the Arabian Peninsula, and, by implication, the two holiest Islamic sites – Mecca and Medina.¹³

By extension, the hostility to Iran and to the Shiites’ “axis of resistance” applies to aligned Sunni factions: most notably, Hamas. IS messaging frequently condemns the “apostate Ikhwan” (referring to the Muslim Brotherhood) for collaborating with Iran and its “axis of resistance,” specifically targeting Hamas in these denunciations.¹⁴ According to IS, “true Sunnis” must disavow both Shiites and Jews as nonbelievers while agreeing that jihad is obligatory against both groups. As for the “apostate Ikhwan” that has sided with the “Rafidite camp,” IS asserts that their fate is sealed, labelling them “traitors to the Sunnis.”¹⁵ This hostility toward Hamas as an “apostate” movement explains IS’s refusal to praise the October 7 attacks against Israel or express any sympathy for Hamas in its ongoing conflict with Israel in Gaza and beyond.

Israel’s military campaign in Gaza and the broader conflict with the “axis of resistance” have not altered IS’s fundamental calculation: the war against various “apostates” – particularly the Shiites – takes precedence over the fight against Israel. These “apostates” must first be disposed with and brought down so that preparation can be made for the decisive clash that would destroy the Jewish state.¹⁶ Broadly speaking, this approach parallels the reasoning behind prioritizing the “near enemy,” a concept first articulated by the Egyptian jihadist thinker Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj. Faraj, who was involved in the 1981 assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat, argued in Jihad: The Neglected Duty that focusing on eliminating “colonialism” (represented by entities like Israel) is futile without first overthrowing the “disbelieving rulers” in Muslim lands and establishing a comprehensive Islamic system.¹⁷ However, Faraj had little to say about sectarian differences within Islam in contrast to IS’s vehement anti-Shiite ideology, which is heavily influenced by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s harsh denunciations of the Shiites.¹⁸

In summary, IS’s discourse on fighting Israel promotes a strategy of “fight all the disbelievers everywhere and wherever you can.”¹⁹ IS members and supporters are instructed to attack any disbelievers they can feasibly target. For instance, an IS member involved in the insurgency in one of its “provinces” (such as Iraq, Syria, or Mozambique) is encouraged to intensify such efforts based on central leadership directives. Similarly, an IS supporter in Europe who cannot join a frontline “province” in its fight against an “apostate” state, but is able to attack a local Jewish or Christian community, is urged to carry out such attacks.

In common with IS, Al-Qaeda views the conflict with Israel ultimately as a religious one against Jews, not merely a conflict rooted in the occupation of land. However, Israel’s existence as a state on “Muslim land” is a real grievance for them, just as it is for IS. The idea of the conflict as fundamentally religious is illustrated by a lengthy question-and-answer video about the “Al-Aqsa Flood” (the name for the Hamas-led October 7 assault) with Khalid Batarfi, then leader of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). When asked what his message was for the “Muslim masses,” Batarfi emphasized that:

Similarly, presumed Al-Qaeda leader, Sayf al-Adel, frames the conflict with Israel as a fight against the Jews themselves.²¹ Like IS, he draws on the Qur’an to assert that the Jews are inherently problematic, emphasizing that “the descendants of God’s prophet Isaac (peace be upon him) are the Jews, and they are the group with whom God has become angry and about whom God has warned us, for the Almighty said: ‘You will surely find that the people most hostile to the believers are the Jews and the idolaters’ (Qur’an 5:82).” ²²

Likewise, Al-Qaeda has emphasized the importance of launching attacks against Jews and Western targets. For Sayf al-Adel, there should be “no red lines” when it comes to targeting Jews, as he claims the Jews have shown no limits in killing civilians and destroying mosques and infrastructure in Gaza.²³ An Al-Qaeda General Command statement titled “Supporting and Endorsing the Operations of Lone Lions Against the Aggressing Zionists” ²⁴ calls for attacks on Jews and Western targets. The “people of Islam” are urged to follow the example set by the “Liberation Vanguards” who claimed responsibility for murdering an Israeli businessman in Alexandria in May 2024.²⁵ The statement also encourages the establishment of groups dedicated to “the art of punishing the Jews, Americans and those allied with them.” ²⁶ In addition, AQAP has released a media series titled “Inspire,” a name that recalls its earlier notorious English-language magazine. The series includes incitement and technical instructions for attacks on American and Western targets in support of Palestine.²⁷

There are significant differences between the discourses of Al-Qaeda and IS. Al-Qaeda seeks a more populist approach, while IS rejects any attempt to appeal to popular sentiment if it compromises ideological purity. The difference between the two groups is most apparent in their attitudes toward Hamas since October 7. While IS continues to view Hamas as an “apostate” entity that deserves no praise, Al-Qaeda has been eager to endorse Al-Aqsa Flood and Hamas’s ongoing fight against Israel. For instance, Batarfi described the October 7 assault as a “blessed operation,” praising its planning and the claimed rapid collapse of enemy forces.²⁸ Al-Qaeda’s General Command (central leadership) has even gone so far as to portray Al-Aqsa Flood as a historic moment of jihad, comparable to the 9/11 attacks.²⁹

Similarly, Al-Qaeda has issued condolences for Hamas leaders and their relatives killed by Israel. For instance, in April, Al-Qaeda’s General Command issued a statement expressing condolences to the Haniyeh family following the deaths of three of Ismail Haniyeh’s sons and four of his grandchildren in Israeli airstrikes on Gaza, praying for God to make “great the reward of his eminence Shaykh Abu al-‘Abd Ismail.” ³⁰ Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) issued a eulogy for Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh after his assassination by Israel in July 2024, calling him a “martyr” and “one of the leaders of the mujahideen of Islam” struck down by “the perpetual enemy of Allah, His Messenger and the Muslims: the Jews.” ³¹ Most recently, Al-Qaeda’s central leadership issued a eulogy for Hamas leader Yahya al-Sinwar.³² This contrasts with IS’s denunciation of Sinwar for aligning with the “resistance axis” and its criticism of those who portray him as a hero. IS even sarcastically referred to Hamas’s Al-Aqsa Flood as a “flood of deviation in creed.” ³³

Al-Qaeda’s praise for Hamas has not been universally accepted among all jihadists outside the IS camp. As Cole Bunzel has noted, Al-Qaeda’s stance has attracted criticism from those who may support Hamas’s Al-Aqsa Flood but believe that the group’s shortcomings in implementing Islamic law and its alliance with Iran should not be overlooked.³⁴

Two independent jihadist thinkers who represent this more purist position are Jordanian-based Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and Canadian-based Tariq Abd al-Halim. The latter, in particular, suggests that Al-Qaeda’s praise for Hamas is linked to alleged close ties between Iran and Mustafa Hamid, who is the father-in-law of Sayf al-Adel and reportedly oversees Al-Qaeda’s central media wing – al-Sahab Media.³⁵ The Emirati outlet Akhbar al-Aan also supports the idea that Iran controls Al-Qaeda’s central organization.³⁶ However, AQAP, which has similarly praised Hamas and the Al-Aqsa Flood but is sharply critical of Iran and its role in the region, has rejected the notion of Iranian control. Given AQAP’s importance as one of Al-Qaeda’s main branches, one would expect the central leadership to instruct AQAP to refrain from criticizing Iran and its Shiite allies if it were truly under Iranian control. AQAP’s anti-Iran stance was evident in a statement condemning Israel’s strike on the Houthi-controlled port of Hodeidah in Yemen. In this regard, AQAP sought to adopt a populist angle by condemning what it perceived as Israeli aggression against sovereign Muslim lands, which it claimed were “under Western occupation and its agents of apostate collaborationist governments.” At the same time, AQAP made it clear that it does not overlook “the existing enmity between us and the Houthi group, which is the arm of Rafidite Iran in Yemen,” nor does it ignore “the group’s crimes against our people in the land of Yemen in general.” Finally, AQAP asserts that it is “fully aware that the Rafidite Shia are the pickaxe to destroy Islam … the religion of the Imami [Twelver] Shia is based on betrayal of Muslims.” ³⁷

While Al-Qaeda has expressed praise for Hamas and the al-Aqsa Flood, it refrains from endorsing Iran and its Shiite allies in the “axis of resistance” for their actions against Israel. It also refuses to offer condolences when senior personnel from Iran or Shiite factions are killed by Israel.

In summary, while Al-Qaeda holds no sympathy or solidarity with Shiites, unlike IS it has not made an anti-Shiite strategy central to its approach to destroying Israel and “liberating Palestine.” Al-Qaeda’s approach reflects long-standing concerns within its central leadership about making attacks on Shiism a key element of jihadist strategy. This tactical difference dates back to the time of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and his focus on targeting Shiites in Iraq.

A more plausible explanation for Al-Qaeda’s support for Hamas is that, aside from praising the October 7 attacks, the group seeks to avoid popular criticism for focusing on ideological and political differences with Hamas during Israel’s military campaign in Gaza. Instead, it prioritizes supporting and expressing solidarity with Gaza’s defenders. This line of reasoning was also evident in an interview I conducted with the “Wage Jihad with Your Wealth” campaign – an initiative established in northwest Syria to collect donations for Gaza led by the independent Gazan jihadist al-Zubayr al-Ghazi. The argument put forth was that while Hamas had made mistakes and it was appropriate to offer advice and criticism prior to the war, the focus during the conflict should be on supporting efforts to resist Israel’s assault.³⁸

Both Al-Qaeda and IS share similar views on the conflict with Israel, framing it as a war against all Jews and justifying attacks on Western and Jewish targets. Nevertheless, the two groups diverge sharply in their views on Hamas. Although neither group sympathizes with Shiites, IS harbors significantly more intense anti-Shiite sentiments, which also shape its approach to the conflict with Israel. For IS, destroying Israel is impossible without first eliminating Shiite influence. This line of reasoning is absent from Al-Qaeda’s discourse.

More generally, their shared common ground on Israel is insufficient for any reconciliation or alliance. For IS, Al-Qaeda remains an “apostate” movement due to its rejection of IS’s caliphate and its alignment with IS’s enemies – essentially aiding non-Muslims against Muslims, which IS views as a “nullifier” of Islam. Conversely, Al-Qaeda considers IS a group of “Kharijites” (a term in Sunni discourse for extremist Sunnis) whose attacks against fellow Sunni Muslims must be resisted. On the ground, this rivalry – quite apart from the fight against Israel – has produced ongoing clashes between IS and Al-Qaeda affiliates in the Sahel³⁹ and Somalia.⁴⁰

To the extent that different views on the conflict with Israel contribute to the competition between the two groups, they also serve a specific purpose: providing IS with additional rhetorical ammunition to criticize Al-Qaeda. For IS, Al-Qaeda’s support for the “apostate” Hamas serves as another example of its ideological deviations. Even on minor tactical issues, IS seizes every propaganda opportunity to criticize Al-Qaeda. For instance, IS used Sayf al-Adel’s recommendation that Muslims take advantage of compulsory military service to build combat skills as further proof of Al-Qaeda’s deviancy, arguing that serving in the security forces of “apostate” governments constitutes an act of apostasy.⁴¹

While concerns have been raised about the growing power or resurgence of IS and Al-Qaeda affiliates in locations such as Syria (IS), the Sahel (Al-Qaeda and IS), Somalia (Al-Qaeda and IS), Mozambique (IS), and the Democratic Republic of Congo (IS), there is no evidence linking these affiliates’ successes or recruitment gains to messaging about the Gaza conflict or the broader struggle with Israel and the “axis of resistance.” Instead, these insurgencies are primarily driven by local dynamics.

On a broader level, it is doubtful that IS and Al-Qaeda can position themselves as the groups that Muslims should support after October 7. They fail to offer compelling reasons to back them as viable alternatives to Hamas or the wider “axis of resistance,” especially since Hamas and its allies have inflicted real damage on Israel and present themselves as the forces standing up to the Jewish state. In Al-Qaeda’s case, one could reasonably question why the group deserves special support from Muslim audiences, given its proclaimed solidarity with Hamas. In global protests for Gaza and Palestine, groups like Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis garner sympathetic chants, while IS and Al-Qaeda do not.

Although it is unlikely that either group will see a significant boost in their fortunes due to the October 7 attacks and its aftermath, there is genuine concern about the potential for individuals to be influenced by incitement from Al-Qaeda or IS to carry out attacks on Israel, Western countries, and Jewish or other non-Muslim targets. Inspiring an attack does not require mass support but only one determined individual. In this regard, IS poses a greater threat, reflecting the broader view that it is now the leading force in the global Sunni jihadist movement, both in terms of propaganda output and international influence.

Since October 7, there have been multiple IS-linked attacks and plots around the world, including the Moscow concert hall attack;⁴² suicide bombings in Iran;⁴³ an attack on Shiites in Oman;⁴⁴ a stabbing spree in Germany;⁴⁵ an assault on a church in Istanbul;⁴⁶ disrupted plots in Israel;⁴⁷ and foiled plots targeting Jewish sites in the United States⁴⁸ and the United Kingdom.⁴⁹ All these attacks and plots can be traced back to IS’s calls for attacks on Jews, Christians, and “apostates.” They are presented as a means to express genuine support for Gaza and Palestine by pledging allegiance to IS and pursuing its jihadist agenda. In contrast, there have been no significant terrorist attacks or disrupted plots linked to Al-Qaeda since October 7.⁵⁰ (Editor’s note: this article was written prior to the discovery of a military study of an Al-Qaeda training manual and biological toxin in the house of Axel Rudakubana, who murdered three children in Southport, England, in July 2024. But even if Rudakubana’s support for or links to Al-Qaeda come to be established, the overall statistical point made here remains valid).

Without a decisive resolution to Israel’s military campaigns, the one in Gaza in particular, it will still be possible for IS and Al-Qaeda to exploit the events for propaganda purposes, likely giving rise to further disrupted attacks and plots in Israel and the West. Most of these attacks and plots will likely be tied to IS.

1. For the purposes of this paper, the discussion of jihadism will focus on Sunni groups that view armed jihad as inseparable from the survival and success of Muslims—primarily Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS). In other words, for these groups, jihad is seen as an eternal, global struggle. See Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, “Defining Jihadism,” Gatestone Institute, April 11, 2024.

2. See e.g., Jason Burke, “Gaza Conflict Could Fuel IS and Al-Qaida Revival, Security Experts Warn,” The Guardian, July 19, 2024.

3. For a recent discussion, see Meir M. Bar-Asher, Jews and the Qur’an (Princeton University Press, 2021).

4. “Kill the Jews,” al-Naba’ 376, Feb. 2, 2023, 3.

5. See. e.g., the speech by IS spokesman Abu Hudhayfa al-Ansari titled “And Kill Them Wherever You Find Them,” transcribed in al-Naba’ 424, Jan. 4, 2024, 3-5 (hereafter, “Kill Them”); and “Wretched Is the Course and Wretched Is the Fate,” al-Naba’ 462, Sept. 26, 2024, 3 (hereafter, “Wretched Is the Course”).

6. “This Is Our Creed and This Is Our Methodology,” al-Himma Library, 2015.

7. “Our Creed and Our Methodology,” Al-Qaeda in Iraq (Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers), 2005.

8. See, e.g., “Practical Steps to Fight the Jews,” al-Naba’ 413, Oct. 19, 2023, 3, which states that the “apostate Arab armies and governments” immediately surrounding Israel constitute a defensive wall for the Jewish state, while the “armies of the Gulf states” serve as its defensive back line.

9. The term “Rafidites” is specifically used to refer to Twelver Shiism, which, according to the IS Office of Research and Studies treatise Ruling of the Sharia on the Shia Sects, is labeled as such because its adherents rejected the caliphates of Abu Bakr and Omar (the first two Sunni successors of the Muslim community) and, thus, in the view of IS, rejected Islam. This designation should not be applied to Yemen’s Houthis, who are part of the “axis of resistance” but follow Zaydi Shiite Islam, not Twelver Shiism. However, in a November 2014 speech titled “And Even If the Disbelievers Hate It,” Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi referred to the Houthis as “Rafidites,” mistakenly treating them as if they were adherents of Twelver Shiite Islam. Regardless, IS holds the view that all Shiite sects—whether Twelver, Zaydi, or Ismaili—are “apostate” sects. The only exceptions are groups such as the Druze, who do not claim to be Muslims, and, thus, are not considered part of Islam. See “Ruling of the Sharia on the Shia Sects,” Office of Research and Studies (first printing, undated; likely 2015).

10. “Dots on Letters,” al-Naba’ 463, Oct. 3, 2024, 3.

11. Ibid.

12. For a historical discussion of the existence of this conspiracy theory in the Arab world, see Daniel Pipes, “Imperial Israel: The Nile-to-Euphrates Calumny,” Middle East Quarterly (March 1994). Belief in an Israel of such geographical extent is extreme and has never influenced Israeli government policy. For a more recent example, see “Similarities Between the Rafidites and Jews,” al-Naba’ 463, 8, which states that the Jews’ “Greater Israel” extends only “from the sea to the river” (i.e., from the Mediterranean to the Jordan River).

13. “Kill Them.”

14. “Wretched Is the Course.”

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj, “Jihadism 101: The ‘Neglected Duty’” (c. 1979-1981), 28.

18. See, e.g., Zarqawi’s lecture series “Has the Story of the Rafidites Come to You?,” June 2006.

19. This is most evident in Abu Hudhayfa’s January 2024 speech.

20. “Questions and Answers About Al-Aqsa Flood and Its Repercussions,” al-Malahem Media, Oct. 29, 2023 (hereafter, “Questions and Answers”).

21. Ayman al-Zawahiri, the previous leader of al-Qaeda, was killed in July 2022. However, Al-Qaeda has yet to release a statement regarding his death or announce a successor, likely because Sayf al-Adel, a key figure within the group, is believed to be in Iran.

22. See Sayf al-Adel (penname Salim al-Sharif), “This is Gaza: A War of Existence, Not a War of Borders,” al-Sahab Media, 4, July 2024, 10.

23. Ibid., 9-10.

24. “Supporting and Endorsing the Operations of Lone Lions Against the Aggressing Zionists,” al-Qaeda General Command, May 2024 (hereafter, “Lone Lions”).

25. Rina Bassist, “Egypt Investigating Killing of Israeli Businessman in Alexandria,” al-Monitor, May 7, 2024.

26. “Lone Lions.”

27. For example, “Inspire – What America and the West Do Not Expect: Open Source Jihad to Restore Palestine,” al-Malahem Media, Dec. 29, 2023.

28. “Questions and Answers.”

29. “Now, Now the Fighting Has Come: Statement Eulogizing the Heroic Commander Yahya al-Sinwar (May God Have Mercy on Him),” Al-Qaeda General Command, Oct. 2024 (hereafter, “Now the Fighting Has Come.”)

30. “Statement of Condolences and Congratulations to the Haniyeh Family,” Al-Qaeda General Command, April 2024.

31. “The Martyrdom of Shaykh Ismael Haniyeh (May Allah Have Mercy on Him),” Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, July 31, 2024. Note that AQIS issued the English-language statement, along with versions in Urdu, Arabic and Pashto.

32. “Now the Fighting Has Come.”

33. “The Man Fights for the Sake of Courage,” al-Naba’ 466, Oct. 24, 2024, 3

34. Cole Bunzel, “Hamas and al-Qaida: The Concerns of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi,” Jihadica (June 10, 2024).

35. Ibid.

36. See post by Akhbar al-Aan’s, “M. Nureddin,” Aug. 13, 2024.

37. “Statement About the Jewish Occupying Entity’s Bombing of Yemen,” al-Malahem Media, July 27, 2024.

38. Interview, May 2024.

39. “Killing of 27 Personnel of the Nigerien Army and 24 Personnel of the ‘al-Qaeda’ Militia in Attacks of the Caliphate’s Soldiers in Niger and Burkina Faso,” al-Naba’ 453, July 25, 2024, 4.

40. “Special Source to al-Naba’: The Caliphate’s Soldiers Seize New Areas and Kill and Wound More Than 50 Personnel of the ‘al-Shabaab’ Militia in Eastern Somalia,” al-Naba’ 439, April 18, 2024, 4.

41. “That the One Who Has Perished Should Perish Upon Evidence,” al-Naba’ 454, Aug. 1, 2024, 3. For IS, it is an act of apostasy to serve in national armies even if the goal is just to acquire military expertise.

42. Official Statement (IS), Amaq News, March 22, 2024.

43. Official Statement (IS), Amaq News, Jan. 4, 2024.

44. Report, Amaq News, July 16, 2024.

45. Statement, Amaq News, Aug. 24, 2024.

46. Report, Amaq News, Jan. 28, 2024.

47. “Shin Bet Says It Foiled Plot by Arab Israelis, Palestinians to Assassinate Ben Gvir,” Times of Israel, April 4, 2024.

48. “Pakistani National Charged for Plotting Terrorist Attack in New York City in Support of ISIS,” U.S. Department of Justice (Office of Public Affairs), Sept. 6, 2024.

49. “Three in Court Over Alleged Plot to Attack Jewish Community,” BBC, May 14, 2024.

50. Aaron Zelin, “The Gaza War Has Jump-Started a Weakened al-Qaeda,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Oct. 4, 2024.