Michael Rubin, director of policy analysis at the Middle East Forum and senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, spoke to a February 12 Middle East Forum podcast (video). The following summarizes his comments:
Iranian-backed Houthi militants are harming the international economy by disrupting global shipping in the Red Sea with anti-ship missile and drone attacks. The Houthis, a Shia tribe in northern Yemen, have been accumulating weapons since their uprising in 2004 against the government of Yemen. In 2009, Iran shipped weaponry to the Houthis in an effort to counter its regional Sunni foe, Saudi Arabia, which had begun “sectarian propaganda” against the Houthis. Iran’s assertiveness coincided with the commencement of the Obama administration, and the regime, which was emboldened to “test the waters,” concluded that there was “permissiveness.”
Even today, many U.S. policymakers are in denial regarding “Iranian fingerprints” in the Houthis’ actions, fearing that policy recommendations would then have to address Iran as a “rogue regime.” One need only consider Iranian rhetoric to recognize the alliance between the regime and the Houthis. In January 2015, Ali Shirazi, Iran’s representative to the Quds Force, a branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) charged with cultivating and supporting terrorist groups, considered the Houthis “a version of Hezbollah” that confronts Islam’s enemies. In May 2015, Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, indirectly reinforced Shirazi’s pronouncement, citing the regime’s responsibility to support “the oppressed people” of Yemen. When Iranian leaders speak on behalf of supporting the Houthis, “we need to take them at their word.”
Understanding the Iranian dictatorship requires American analysts to put aside “wishful thinking” and admit Iran is a “dictatorship of omission rather than commission.” Whatever Khamenei does not expressly forbid is permitted, which can be seen in how the Quds Force and the IRGC operate. There is a “separate culture of command” not typically found in other dictatorships, so that a Houthis drone strike on a ship leaves no “smoking gun” pointing to a direct order from Iran.
Hudaydah, the Yemeni port that receives a large portion of Iran’s weapons shipments, was on the verge of being seized by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) until some of the UAE’s ships were mined by the Iranians outside the Strait of Hormuz. The UAE reconsidered, ceased actively fighting in Yemen, and vacated their base in Somaliland, which left a power vacuum.
America should deny Hudaydah to bad actors by encouraging other forces, including possibly the separatists of the Southern Transitional Council (STC), to enter it and block transit through the port, thereby denying access to the Houthis.
The Biden Administration’s decision to use the Navy to escort ships is similar to the Obama administration’s successful anti-piracy operation off the coast of Somalia. In the current circumstances, the Biden Administration’s approach is unlikely to work because the anti-piracy operation was in “deep blue water one hundred miles from shore” where drones were not a threat. However, the Bab-el-Mandeb strait, through which all the ships bound for the Red Sea must pass, is a narrow chokepoint that exposes ships to many dangers.
The Biden administration’s current posture in the Red Sea is analogous to the Reagan administration’s re-flagging of Kuwaiti tankers in the Persian Gulf in 1987 to counter Iranian aggression. It bears remembering that it ended in a military confrontation with Iran in 1988 during Operation Praying Mantis, the success of which restored deterrence and quieted the regime.
The Biden administration’s failure to target the Houthis could result in a disaster once other regional militants see that “what happens in the Bab-el-Mandeb doesn’t stay in the Bab-el-Mandeb.” The Iranians once referred to themselves as a “regional power,” but a decade ago they redefined themselves as a “pan-regional power” to include the Persian Gulf and the Northern Indian Ocean. Today, “they define their strategic boundaries as the Eastern Mediterranean and the Gulf of Aden.” Now, Iran seeks to encircle countries such as Israel in a “stranglehold” and, without deterrence, will continue to advance in the region.
If Iran calls America’s bluff, the U.S. must be willing to do what it takes to make them pull back. It does not require acting every time, but deterrence is as much “psychological as it is military.”
Deterrence, however, “isn’t just a rhetorical strategy.” Terrorists decide whether to act as part of a “cost-benefit analysis.” If the cost to the terror group is smaller than the advantage gained, they strike. Small Iranian boats buzz U.S. ships in the Persian Gulf, taunting America’s unwillingness to act. If Iran calls America’s bluff, the U.S. must be willing to do what it takes to make them pull back. It does not require acting every time, but deterrence is as much “psychological as it is military.”
Steps to restore deterrence could include launching patrols from Somaliland with a four-man Osprey crew, which is more efficient and far less of a drain on resources than the time U.S. naval ships need to spend in port for maintenance. Deterrence also requires leaning on the Sultanate of Oman, which has been giving the Houthis safe haven and transiting anti-ship missiles for the militants. It is time for America to realize that “not all our so-called allies are on the same page as we are.”
Finally, deterrence involves targeting the IRGC overseas. When they target Americans, “it behooves us therefore to push back.” Waiting until there is a mass casualty event from a Houthi attack before reacting is “asking for trouble.” A more responsible approach is to target Iranian boat missile transfers, which would give their captains pause. “We need to be much more proactive than reactive.”
