It may seem to be ancient history, but the truce Israel and Lebanon established upon Israel’s founding brought security if not peace to the two countries, at least until the mid-1960s. The truce began to erode as Arab anger grew in the wake of Israel’s repeated defeat of Arab states in the 1948, 1967, and 1973 wars, bolstering the populist appeal of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The Lebanese government’s 1969 decision to permit the PLO to operate from southern Lebanon transformed the area into a launch pad for attacks on Israel. This escalated tensions, leading to invasions in 1978 and 1982, subsequent military campaigns in 1996 and 2006, and finally near-daily Hezbollah attacks on Israel from October 2023 until Israel’s efforts to eradicate the Hezbollah leadership in September 2024.
Each of these military campaigns ended with a ceasefire. Different generations of Western and United Nations officials voiced the same pabulum, declaring their commitment to see all parties abide by their responsibilities—only to ignore violations when it was diplomatically convenient to do so. A common flaw unites the repeated failures of these agreements to hold: the inability of the international community and the government of Lebanon to enforce compliance among non-state actors.
Regional powers complicated the situation further. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Egypt and Syria supported the PLO, and Syria’s support continued long after. Following Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon to stop PLO terrorism, Iran supplanted Egypt as the sponsor of unrest, and Hezbollah supplanted the PLO. First the PLO, and then Hezbollah, coerced the Lebanese government, violating U.N. resolutions and provoking Israeli retaliation.
U.N. efforts to break this dynamic failed. The U.N. created the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in 1978 to monitor the cessation of hostilities after the first major Israel-Lebanon border conflict. Vague mandates and a lack of decisive actions hampered UNIFIL’s effectiveness. Comprising troops from countries that view Israel critically or European nations’ approach to the conflict with moral equivalence, UNIFIL struggled to maintain security or enforce U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1701 (2006) that called for Hezbollah’s disarmament.
As the smoke settles on the current conflict, it is essential to break the cycle of the past. Certainly, the Lebanese government should disarm Hezbollah, as required by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701, but trust is not enough. Instead, the international community should take inspiration from the Korean Peninsula: Lebanon needs a demilitarized zone (DMZ).
A demilitarized buffer zone could reduce opportunity for activities by non-state actors. A clear demarcation and the establishment of a DMZ would serve as a deterrent against any external influence that seeks to destabilize the region.
Drawing parallels from the DMZ enforced between North and South Korea, a similar arrangement could be established between Lebanon and Israel. This DMZ would extend from the Damour River, between Sidon and Beirut south to the Israeli border, creating a zone that prohibits all military presence. Only police patrols—and specific battalions from the national army—should enter this zone. Drones, cameras, canine units, and minefields could help ensure denial of space to infiltrators. Early warning signals, sirens, and air, land, and sea curfews could mark any breach.
Such a DMZ would reduce the potential for armed conflict and create a conducive environment for dialogue and reconciliation. By mandating the absence of military arms, including rifles and small arms, the DMZ effectively would diminish the threat of organized violence.
For the DMZ to have legitimacy, it is crucial that both the Lebanese and Israeli governments agree to its establishment, with endorsement from as many global powers as possible. Israel should have no objection. The Lebanese government may complain about sovereignty issues, but such territorial restrictions should be considered a necessary price to pay compared with the acceptance, since 1969, by Lebanese officials of repeated violations of the country’s sovereignty by the PLO, Syria, Iran, and Hezbollah. The Lebanese people themselves would accept a DMZ because wars imposed upon them by non-state actors exhaust them. Southern Lebanese want quiet.
Those Lebanese who tied themselves to slain Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah’s coattails might whine, but their catastrophic effect on their communities and Lebanon should lead to their ostracism, not give them a path to re-empowerment. Only when Lebanon’s national government embraces neutrality with Israel and grows strong enough to monopolize the use of force within its own borders should Israel, Lebanon, and any outside guarantors shrink the DMZ until it dissolves by mutual agreement.
