Is Iran primarily a Shi’ite power, or is its identity broader? For decades, the Iranian leadership would say they sought to lead the Islamic world, if only Sunnis could recognize the theological error of their ways and revert to the fold. After all, while Sunnis say the Shi’ites split from the true path, the Shi’ite narrative is the opposite. The Iranian regime’s disdain for Sunnis was readily apparent, however. While Tehran boasted a cathedral and more than a dozen synagogues, the regime refused to recognize any Sunni mosques in its capital. The Islamic Republic also repressed Kurds and the Baloch, not only because they were ethnic minorities, but also because they were Sunni.
Over the last decade, however, Iran has reinvented itself as a true patron for all Muslims. Arab states once emphasized their Islamic identity; today, they both de-emphasize their Islamic identity and shed anti-Zionism. Consider Saudi Arabia, for example: In 2005, Saudi Arabia declared the anniversary of the proclamation of the Kingdom to be a national holiday. This might seem innocuous, but it shed the pretense that Saudi Arabia was simply an Islamic state and made it a nationalist one. Likewise, while Saudi Arabia once funded anti-Zionism worldwide, today it openly flirts with Israel.
In hindsight, the evolution of Arab thought is logical. Most Arab states are only a few generations old. Lacking historical or popular legitimacy, they embraced Islam as a glue to legitimize themselves. Israel was a useful “other.” Such evolving trends orphan Arab reactionaries who cling to old ideas.
It is against this backdrop that the Islamic Republic senses an opportunity to lead not only Shi’ites, but also all Muslims. Indeed, both Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and President Masoud Pezeshkian have alluded to this in recent days. Speaking before Iranian Sunni community leaders, Khamenei warned that the enemy is working to divide the Shi’ite and Sunni populations, whether “inside [Iran] or outside.” Pezeshkian, meanwhile, opined, “Muslims are brothers. … Why shouldn’t we be able to travel to each other’s countries?” Such comments are increasingly becoming the rule, rather than the exception, from Iranian officials. Islamic unity is a new theme. The late President Ebrahim Raisi, for example, talked about how Muslim unity could be a bulwark against “the enemies’ plans.” Muslim unity, he advised, could lead to Israel’s defeat.
While Iranian leaders often bluster, they now go beyond rhetoric. Qods Force Commander Esmail Qa’ani has met with Sunni leaders in Iraq and cultivates Sunnis in the Sultanate of Oman as well.
The Islamic Republic of Iran seeks to uphold the rejectionist ideals now abandoned by Arab states in order to rally Muslims. Antisemitism and anti-Zionism are part of the Iranian regime’s core ideology. Despite sectarian differences, these values appeal to Sunnis who feel lost or left behind. Arab silence on the war in Gaza has become an opportunity for Iran to reach out to Arabs who are disappointed in their own governments. Khamenei has tried to exploit this by calling for Muslim states to end trade with Israel.
For decades, the regime has publicized Khamenei as “the leader of the world’s Muslims.” It used to be a mockable proposition. Shi’ites are a minority sect, and most Shi’ites chose other ayatollahs as the recipients of their donations. Now, however, it seems that Khamenei’s aspiration might become reality. This will prove perilous on three grounds.
First, Sunni rivals might exploit the Iranian regime’s unpopularity among Iranians; the Islamic Republic can then reciprocate and destabilize Sunni governments. Get ready for a sectarian proxy war across the Islamic world.
Second, Iran can spark crises among Muslims in Europe. Much of the Muslim population in Europe fled to the continent to flee secular dictators in Egypt, Syria, and Turkey. Sunni Islamism thrived. So, too, did extremism as Muslims failed to assimilate and turned to anti-Zionism to resolve their identity crisis. The Islamic Republic’s sectarian promotion of Shi’ism insulated it from any ability to influence anger among the Sunni diaspora. Now that Iran bids for the loyalty of the Arab diaspora, it can also use them to subvert Western democracies.
Third, by transitioning away from a Shi’ite patron to a Muslim patron, Iran can better use Sunni militias as proxies. Diplomats often say Iran is pragmatic, but pragmatism does not limit itself to peace-making; it can also cement new alliances to counter U.S. interests. Iran has been the biggest supporter of Palestinian terrorist groups who are Sunni. In Syria, Iran also recruits Sunni clans.
The diplomatic breakthrough that enabled the Abraham Accords was not the beginning of the end, but rather the end of the beginning as the Muslim world now aligns in new and dangerous ways.
