When Hamas executed six Israeli hostages on August 29 or 30, 2024, the world reacted with outrage. Unfortunately, many directed their anger more at Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and less at the Hamas terrorists who perpetrated the crime. Even inside Israel, protestors criticized Netanyahu for refusing a ceasefire deal that they said would have saved hostage lives.
Hamas has de-legitimized Israel’s military actions post-October 7, 2023. Western journalists have accepted its narratives at face value and both they and diplomats treat “Gaza Ministry of Health” numbers at face value, never mind that Hamas arbitrarily generates these numbers. Hamas also skillfully plants images and commits war crimes by hiding its forces within civilian populations and institutions. Even as the Israel Defense Forces successfully eliminated key Hamas leadership and destroyed Hamas tunnels in Gaza, not only global public opinion but also Western allies demanded that Israel cease its operations, regardless of the impact to its military and strategic objectives. It may be morally inverse, but the fact that Israel, rather than Hamas, is the focus of global anger is proof that Israel has lost the information war.
Rather than obsess about how to convince the world that its actions are justified, perhaps Israel should accept defeat in the information battle in order to win the strategic war. True, such a recommendation contradicts current doctrine. Strategists, diplomats, and military commanders learn that information and influence campaigns are crucial components of coherent strategy. This assumes goodwill and a propensity toward fairness among outside observers. Adversaries understand this and seek advantage from Israel’s sensitivity to criticism.
In the current Gaza war, the physical destruction of Hamas must be the strategic imperative. Jerusalem should jettison any action that limits Israel’s ability to achieve this objective. When the Israel Defense Forces caved to international pressure to pause operations in Rafah based on distorted narratives about Gaza civilian casualties, for example, they lost initiative, affirmed Hamas narratives, and allowed Hamas to regroup. If the Israel Defense Forces had remained focused on the strategic objectives, they might have not only achieved strategic success but also ended Hamas’s information campaign by more quickly ending conflict, rather than drawing it out to Hamas’s propaganda advantage.
Going forward, then, Israel should allow the following tenets to shape its current and future campaigns:
First, reduce or eliminate Hamas’s ability to transmit from inside the combat zone through either hamming or destruction of communication infrastructure.
Second, block access of Western journalists to any active battlefield. There is no protected right to enter a combat zone. Ignore howls of protest and respond either with silence or simple statements explaining the Israeli actions.
Third, Israel’s leadership no longer should try to counter Hamas messaging. Instead, all future public statements will simply report facts from the ground, such as advances and casualties, with the aim to rob Hamas and its allies of informational ammunition they can use to undermine Israeli and Western resolve.
