Foxbats over Dimona is a welcome addition to the history of the Soviet role in the 1967 Six-Day War and the USSR’s strategic deception. The return of Russia’s adversarial stance towards the West makes it particularly relevant.
Through archival work and interviews, the authors persuasively argue that the Soviet role in triggering the Six-Day War was greater and more decisive than previously thought. Ginor of the Hebrew University and Remez, a journalist, contend that the USSR provoked and caused the Six-Day War, that the Kremlin wanted to destroy Israel’s nuclear weapons program, and that it planned to deploy its military power directly against Israel in support of Egypt and Syria.
To achieve that, the Soviet Union’s policy positions and documents were shaped to reflect deception and outright propaganda. Soviet disinformation, including doctored “aerial photographs,” claimed that Israel was massing troops for an attack against Syria and other Arab states. The Soviets also engaged in military provocations such as the flight of Soviet MiG-25 (“Foxbat”) reconnaissance planes over Israel’s Dimona nuclear plant before the war. Its mischief led Egypt and Syria to prepare for war and then Israel to launch a preemptive attack.
The authors find that the Soviets were on the brink of a massive intervention in the Middle East which, had it occurred, would have dramatically changed the balance of forces between the United States and the USSR. It did not take place only because of the astounding Israeli six-day victory.
Foxbats over Dimona is priceless in fostering knowledge about the Kremlin’s methods to provoke crises and conflicts to advance its interests and power, knowledge that remains relevant. In summer 2008, for example, Russia provoked a conflict with Georgia through a disinformation campaign, then blamed Georgia for the conflict. It also engaged in military provocations, such as Russian military flights over Georgian territory, shooting down Georgian reconnaissance drones, and Russian-instigated attacks by its South Ossetian proxies.
