Barany, of the University of Texas at Austin, opens his book with a provocative question: “How can we account for the Gulf militaries’ ineffectiveness despite their privileged material endowments?” In answering, he seeks to fill a scholarly gap left by Kenneth Pollack, whose influential critique of Arab armies overlooked the armed forces of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states.[1]
Based on interviews with Western advisors in the region and GCC military personnel, Barany contends that these forces’ limitations stem from a mixture of “political-structural” and “socio-cultural” factors. He argues that they exist primarily to protect the ruling families of the Persian Gulf states, often from internal opposition. To combat external threats, rulers rely on British and particularly U.S. protection, ensured by on-going purchases of Western weapon systems.
Barany argues that the dominance of Gulf rulers and their focus on maintaining internal stability inhibits the institutional development of the armed forces and the emergence of empowered meritocracies in their officer and non-commissioned officer corps. So, too, do cultural traits associated with authoritarian societies, such as an emphasis on conformity and avoidance of individual accountability. Consequently, most of the Gulf states have not developed armed forces capable of combating external threats.
The exception is the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which “has paid far more attention to and has been far more successful in reforming its armed forces than other GCC states.” This has been evident in Yemen, where UAE forces successfully executed combined arms and counterinsurgency operations. By comparison, their allies have struggled.
While identifying factors that limit the development of Gulf armed forces, Barany’s study has its own limitations. His analysis of the tactical and operational performance of Saudi and Emirati forces in Yemen is quite brief, consisting of roughly five pages on each. He does not specify the objectives that either sought to achieve, beyond the political goal of ending the war. As a result, he does not provide a comprehensive assessment of Saudi or Emirati military effectiveness in the only conflict in which Gulf armed forces have played a leading role.
More generally, the fact that at least one of these armed forces has begun to overcome political and cultural constraints suggests that the book is less an exposition of the enduring characteristics of Gulf militaries and more a snapshot as these forces proceed through the same uneven process of professional growth as other militaries before them.
[1] Armies of Sand: The Past, Present, and Future of Arab Military Effectiveness (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019).
