In 2014, a whirlwind that swept in from the desert shocked the world. At the height of its self-proclaimed caliphate, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS or IS) had captured one-third of Syria and 40 percent of Iraq.
ISIS caused alarm not just because of its members’ fanaticism and viciousness but also because of their speed in routing well-equipped conventional armies. In Soldiers of End-Times, Levy tackles this problem at its sharp edge: whence the source of the Islamic State’s military effectiveness and how was it defeated?
Levy, of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, persuasively attributes ISIS’s battlefield success to flexibility and to mastery of regular and irregular warfare (also known as “hybrid warfare”). “Throughout the war, IS proved adept at innovation and adaptability, especially in low-tech areas,” Levy notes. For example, its capture of Ramadi in 2015 was preceded by hit-and-run attacks and assassinations to demoralize Iraqi security forces and pro-government tribes. Fast, hard-hitting attacks relied on highly motivated troops backed by ISIS’s signature weapon: low-tech but highly effective bomb-laden suicide vehicles that served as the equivalent of tanks, artillery, and airstrikes.
As ISIS’s enemies regrouped, supported by U.S. airpower, the tide turned. Now on the defensive, ISIS lost most its territory by the end of 2017. Yet even in defeat, the organization displayed formidable combat skills. The 2017 battle of Mosul was less Lawrence of Arabia and more Stalingrad or Iwo Jima, with ISIS forces making grim use of fortifications and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) as they fought to the death.
The Islamic State’s success fits into a larger context. From the Maccabees to the Viet Cong, aggressive and motivated irregulars have defeated conventional forces—as long they could shape the battlefield. Once ISIS decided to hold cities like a regular army, its fate was sealed—assuming the forces arrayed against it were willing to pay the price.
Yet, Levy points out the drawback of engaging irregulars like ISIS in conventional combat: bombed-out cities and massive civilian casualties. Instead, Levy believes that Washington would do better to provide local forces with high-tech support such as armed drones and cyberwarfare. Left unanswered is whether military means can really defeat an insurgency without addressing root causes such as poverty and poor government. As Soldiers of End-Times demonstrates, these groups may be formidable but not unbeatable.
