Journalism, the saying goes, is the first rough draft of history. The Israel-based journalist, Seth J. Frantzman, a senior Middle East correspondent for The Jerusalem Post and an adjunct fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracy in Washington, has written an illuminating and succinct second draft of the war that began on October 7, 2023, with the terrorist group Hamas’s barbaric attack on Israel. His account usefully synthesizes much of what is now known about the event and the fighting in Gaza that followed.
Specifically, although completed while Israel’s Gaza campaign was still under way and before the Israeli armed forces turned their attention to Lebanon, The October 7 War provides three of the services that good history can offer: It tells the story of the war—through April 2024—in a single, well-organized volume. It sifts facts from falsehoods about what happened, a particularly welcome contribution given that much of the war’s news coverage has been biased against Israel. Finally, it begins the task of identifying what aspects of the war are enduringly significant rather than merely of passing importance or inconsequential.
Frantzman divides his account into three parts. The first lays out the background of Hamas’s assault, which he characterizes as a serious and tragic failure by Israel. He attributes this failure to Israel’s erroneous confidence that the terrorist organization was effectively deterred from mounting a major attack; reliance on sophisticated technology deemed capable of effectively countering whatever Hamas chose to do; and—due to these preconceptions—a failure to appreciate the significance of information that flowed into its intelligence system regarding Hamas’s preparations for the attack.
The second part describes the day of the attack and the week and month that followed. Drawing on the author’s personal reporting, it gives the reader a vivid sense of the confusion and horror that Israelis experienced, as well as the heroism displayed by many individual Israelis.
The book’s third section deals with the war that Israel fought against Hamas in Gaza in response to the events of October 7. The author explains that the Israeli army advanced relatively slowly to minimize casualties within its ranks and among Gaza’s civilian population—an effort it which it succeeded. His account of the fighting describes the integrated, high-tech systems of surveillance, communication, and firepower that made Israeli forces precise, efficient, and deadly. However, he also notes that Israel’s technological wizardry did not obviate the need for “boots on the ground” —Israeli foot soldiers—to accomplish the country’s mission in Gaza’s crowded cities.
Other accounts of the conflicts set in motion by October 7 will inevitably appear. Until they do, The October 7 War provides a valuable resource for readers seeking a concise and enlightening account for readers of the first of them.
Michael Mandelbaum
Professor Emeritus, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS)
