Carol Greenwald, editor of the Israel Action Alert, wrote her dissertation on the effectiveness of macro-economic policies on stimulating Israeli exports for a Ph.D. from Columbia University.

Is it possible for Arab leaders to establish peaceful and respectful relations with Israel? By way of answering, it is worthwhile comparing the actions of the two Arab authorities that have reached agreements with Israel in recent years—the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the Jordanian government. The agreements they reached with Israel (in 1993 and 1994, respectively) each contained specific obligations on the Arab signers to accept Israel and live in harmony with it. The extent to which these obligations were then carried out reveals much about the Arab parties’ intentions.¹

Both the Jordanian government (in the Treaty of Peace) and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) (in its various agreements with Israel) declared the end of hostilities between themselves and Israel. These instruments are unequivocal. In Jordan’s case, we find that

Likewise, agreements signed by the PLO require the parties to “achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation through the agreed political process.” The intent to rely on a political process for conflict resolution is further underlined by the creation of “a mechanism of conciliation to be agreed upon by the parties” to help them when they cannot reach agreement. ²

The agreements both further confirm the future harmony of Israel and its neighbors by ending all official incitement, hostile actions, or violent operations, with a promise to prosecute those who do. In addition, the PA is explicitly required to prevent hostility towards the settlements and to extradite murderers of Israelis to Israel for trial. The accords also make positive requirements to foster mutual understanding, such as removing all discriminatory barriers to normal economic relations, cooperating in the development of new and existing water resources, and ensuring that their educational systems contribute to peace between the Israeli and Palestinian peoples.³

The agreements prohibit certain unilateral actions by the Arab parties. The Palestinians must not take steps that affect the permanent status of the territories (such as calling for actions by the United Nations General Assembly on the legality of the settlements in Judea and Samaria). The Jordanians agreed not to make changes unilaterally in either the Jordan and Yarmuk rivers or their courses.⁴

Finally, the treaties have a military dimension. The Palestinian accords limit the number of men under arms in the PA and the kinds and numbers of weapons these forces can possess, and they prohibit the manufacture of weaponry in PA-controlled areas. Jordan may not station or permit entry to its territory of military forces that threaten Israel’s security.⁵

So much for promises; what did the Jordanians and Palestinians actually do in the five-six years since signing these agreements?

Leaders. In the Jordanian case, the most notable change in behavior was that of King Husayn himself. The monarch stressed again and again that the peace with Israel was permanent and non-conditional. He perhaps put this most starkly when he left his sick bed to visit the Palestinian and Israel negotiators at Wye, Maryland, in October 1998, in support of an agreement between them:

The king’s statements set the tone for other members of the government, which maintains active and public contacts with Israelis. For example, the Jordanian ambassador, Marwan Mu‘ashir told the Israel lobby in May 1998, that his government “is committed to a full peace with Israel ... . Jordan is committed to continuously addressing the Israeli public with a clear message of peace, regardless of agreement or differences with the sitting government in Israel.”⁷ The state-controlled radio and television reinforce the positive messages of the leaders.

In contrast, Yasir Arafat and the Palestinian leadership by preference turn disputes into issues of potential and actual violence. Arafat has continued to call for jihad and to refer to Hamas suicide bombers as “martyrs.” In a typical statement, this one at the Organization of the Islamic Conference meeting on Jerusalem in July 1998, Arafat declared:

In a speech broadcast on PA television Arafat said, celebrating Yahya ‘Ayyash (the Hamas bomb maker responsible for the deaths of more than fifty Israelis): “We are all candidates for martyrdom ... in memory of the noble and brave holy martyrs Abu Iyad, Abu’l-Hul, Abu Muhammad, and before them Abu Iyad and before them Yahya ‘Ayyash and after them Yahya ‘Ayyash.”⁹ The PA-controlled media constantly reinforce these messages of violence and terror. And at times, talk has turned into action, such as the violence instigated by the PA over the opening of a second entrance to the Hasmonean tunnel in Jerusalem in September 1996, resulting in the death of sixteen Israelis.

Islamists. Although King Husayn bravely led the way to transform Jordan’s discourse with Israel, Jordan did not made all the changes required by the treaty. The king generally avoided implementing the requirements that would cause him directly to confront important elements of Jordanian society, and specifically the Islamists. This may have to do with the unpopularity of the new relations with Israel; a January 1998 poll (conducted by the Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan) found 80 percent of Jordanians describing Israel as their enemy, results that a Jordan Times editorial interpreted to mean “how shallow the peace process has become.”¹⁰ The leading Islamist organization, the Muslim Brethren, controls the majority of student unions and half the twelve professional organizations. (This explains why individuals who make contacts with Israelis or visit Israel are threatened with expulsion from their professions.) Such actions violate Section 10 (a) of the treaty. Further, the Muslim Brethren, a vehement foe of Israel, remains a legal entity in Jordan and has a substantial parliamentary bloc.

The PA has not acted against the operational capability of Hamas as required by the Oslo accords, which require it to “take all measures necessary to prevent terrorism.”¹¹ Instead, Arafat and the PA leadership have warmly embraced the terrorist organization, Hamas, as its brother in the liberation of occupied Palestine, although at times they have played the game of good cop/bad cop. This has been particularly true when terrorist attacks have been seen as having inopportune timing. Thus, Brig. General Izz-ad-Din explained that the call for Hamas to halt its military activities was only to facilitate the pullback of Israeli forces contemplated in the Wye agreement.¹² Col. Jibril Rajub, the chief of the PA’s Preventive Security Forces, summed up the PA attitude towards Hamas in a 1998 television interview, “We view Hamas as part of the national and Islamic liberation movement …We are not interested in arrests.” The head of Israeli intelligence, Major General Moshe Ya’alon, stated that Arafat was “nurturing the terrorist infrastructure of Hamas and protecting it rather than dismantling or curbing it…[Arafat] makes sure to retain the potential to resume the attacks. It is Arafat who gives the attacks a green light.”¹³

Textbooks. Article 11 (1c) of the Treaty of Peace requires Jordan to refrain in all government publications from adverse or discriminatory references or expressions of hostility toward Israel. The Muslim Brethren has controlled the ministry of education since 1989, which goes far to explain why Jordanian textbooks still retain their antisemitic and anti-Israeli propaganda—against the terms of Article 10 section(c) of the Treaty of Peace. A representative schoolbook passage comes in the context of a story about a Palestinian refugee sitting in Jordan and telling a story to his son:

Note that the places named—Acre, Haifa, and the Negev—are all parts of Israel proper. The map accompanying this lesson, “Palestine Our Homeland,” also pretends that Israel does not exist.¹⁵ When asked about such texts, and they are legion, the Jordanian government replies that it will clean up the textbooks only when there is a comprehensive Arab peace with Israel, i.e., when Syria and the PA have also concluded agreements with it.¹⁶

As for the Palestinians, Article XXII(2) of Oslo 2 states:

The PA does not fulfill this promise. Most striking is to see how the PA replaced the non-offending texts used when Gaza and the West Bank were under Israeli control with books that contain antisemitic and anti-Israeli passages, drawing both on Jordanian texts and commissioning new ones which are far more offensive than the Jordanian ones. The new materials contain such passages as:

King Husayn indelibly established his personal commitment to peace with Israel by visiting the families of seven Israeli girls slain by a Jordanian soldier. The sight of the Muslim monarch bowing to Israeli Jewish commoners and asking for forgiveness on behalf of his people greatly impressed Israelis and helped convince them that Jordan was serious about peace. It also sent a powerful message to Jordanians. (Nor was this the only message; the soldier was tried in a Jordanian court and sentenced to life in prison.)

Also, on the plus side, with but a single exception (which took place in June 1996), the Jordanian authorities have stopped all terrorist infiltration from its territory into Israel since 1994. This accomplishment of the peace treaty reflects the security relationship that evolved between Israel and Jordan from decades of secret cooperation, particularly with regard to intelligence exchanges and antiterror efforts.

On the minus side, Amman seems to draw a distinction between terrorists carrying out raids from its own territory (which it disallows) and persons on its territory who plan and direct those activities (which it permits). Thus, much of the Hamas leadership lives in Jordan; and when Israeli agents in September 1997 tried to assassinate Khalid Mash‘al, a Hamas leader responsible for planning several bus suicide bombings in Israel, this led to a Jordanian outcry about Israel’s violation of the country’s territorial integrity. Further violating the treaty,¹⁹ Husayn insisted that, to make amends, Israel release Sheikh Ahmad Yasin, the spiritual leader of Hamas, from prison; to make matters worse, when he arrived in Amman, the king kissed him and sent him by his personal helicopter to Gaza. The continued presence of the Hamas leadership and headquarters in Amman goes against Article 5 of the treaty which requires both parties to prevent the presence of terrorists in their territory. This distinction between foot soldiers acting and leaders planning has no legal basis; the latter is as illegal by the terms of the treaty as the former.

In contrast to this mixed record, the PA has flat-out refused to wage a comprehensive campaign against terrorist groups or their infrastructure. The Oslo accords and other agreements explicitly and repeatedly call on the PA to combat terrorism and take legal action against terrorists. But the PA does neither, and makes no excuses for this. As Nabil Sha‘th, a PA minister and senior negotiator, has said, “There are no provisions for dismembering Hamas or the Islamic resistance or their offices ... or any of the things Israel considered the infrastructure of terrorism.”²⁰ Muhammad Dahlan, the PA preventive security chief in Gaza, explained right after the signing of the Wye memorandum in October 1998: “I cannot arrest a Palestinian citizen who has killed an Israeli.”²¹

This Palestinian reluctance has had consequences. Terrorism by Palestinians originating in PA-controlled territory has taken the lives of 279 Israelis since the Declaration of Principles was signed in Washington in September 1993. This was a greater loss of life from terrorism than in any comparable period since the founding of the state. Indeed, terrorist attacks occurred virtually every month from September 1993 through February 1999.²² Arafat and other top PA officials never offered public remorse for these killings, much less the emotional contrition exhibited by King Husayn. They could rarely go beyond a mumbled “we oppose terrorism"; much of the time, there was only silence. By way of justification, they held that to do more would not help the Palestinian side in the negotiations, thus acknowledging that terrorism was a PA tool in pressuring Israel to make concessions.

Increasing PA culpability, most terrorists after engaging in violence in Israel take refuge in PA-controlled territory. In response, the PA sometimes rounded up the usual suspects and then, in what came to be known as “revolving door justice,” soon released them. This record—giving refuge to terrorists, token arrests, and the exaltation of martyrs—points to the PA leadership at least approving of violence against Jews and perhaps being complicit in it.

The Israel-Jordan peace treaty envisions a security relationship based largely on trust that the countries’ political leaderships had developed over prior decades. Frequent and publicized meetings of high ranking military officials, administrative coordination, and various cooperative activities have fulfilled these expectations. For example, the Jordanian interior minister and Israeli police minister signed the first police cooperative agreement between Israel and an Arab state in October 1995 to fight drug trafficking and exchange intelligence.²³

In contrast, Israel’s accords with the Palestinians have many and detailed restrictions on Palestinian actions. To provide for domestic order, the Palestinian Authority won from Israel the right to establish a police force; but it was to be a constabulary, not an army. The two Oslo accords explicitly enumerated the quantity and types of weapons permitted by a numerically limited Palestinian police force whose membership was to be approved on a name by name basis by Israel. Well, that was the theory.

In fact, the PA itself admits that the Palestinian police force has reached 40,000 men, well beyond the 30,000 sanctioned by Oslo 2. The Wye memorandum reaffirmed this provision, requiring a reduction in its size from 40,000 to 30,000, but this, too, was just words. In the memorable phrasing of Ghazi al-Jabali, the PA police chief, speaking immediately after the signing of the Wye memorandum, the reduction in manpower “is no problem ... . We will get around it by adopting a policy of transferring policemen.”²⁴

The PA has also ignored the provisions in the accords which required Israel to approve on a name-by-name basis members of the PA police force in order to prevent known terrorists from joining. Several known terrorists subject to Israeli extradition
warrants are even serving on the PA police force²⁵—a real thumb in the eye. Wye also reiterated the Oslo agreement requirement that the PA transfer to Israel a list of would-be PA policemen (to ensure that terrorists not serve on the force) but Israel never received a list of names.

As for weapons, the accords restrict the PA police to rifles to be kept in the confines of PA police stations; in fact, the Palestinian Preventive Service headed by Jibril Rajub possesses such weapons as PK3 and MPK-5 sub-machine guns which it carries all around.²⁶ More broadly, Foreign Minister Ariel Sharon told reporters in December 1998 that the PA had stockpiled a huge number of weapons, many of them totally illegal:

Dahlan, the PA preventive security chief, makes it clear why the PA has so much contraband: only days after the Wye memorandum was signed, he had the nerve to assert that “there is no agreement on lowering the number of weapons in the PA’s possession.”²⁸ It comes as no shock to learn that the trilateral committee set up in the Wye memorandum to deal with the unauthorized introduction of weapons and explosives into PA areas never convened despite repeated Israeli requests.²⁹ The agreements prohibit the manufacture of weapons in the PA area; nonetheless, the Palestinian Legislative Council passed legislation in 1998 allowing arms manufacturing, and the PA has indeed established a number of small weapons-producing factories.³⁰

In 1995, the Jordanian parliament voted to end its participation in the Arab boycott of Israel. Work continues on a free trade agreement and the elimination of non-tariff barriers. There is expanding cooperation in utilizing water more efficiently, in connecting the electricity grids in the Aqaba-Eilat region, in exploring joint tourism, and in discussing major joint infrastructure projects (such as building a Red Sea-Dead Sea canal or a railroad between the two seas). The countries have together asked the European Union to permit duty-free entry to products produced by Israeli-Jordanian joint ventures. The Eilat-Aqaba airports have been used since 1997 for domestic flights within the two countries, so that Israelis flying to their own town of Eilat often land in Israeli planes in Aqaba and then shuttle to Eilat. Jordan’s Aqaba airport’s name is to be officially changed to Peace Airport. The Jordanian legislature in 1995 repealed legislation making it a crime to sell Jordanian land to Jews.

Negative popular sentiment toward normalization of relations with Israel has discouraged substantive economic links, however. Most economic projects remain in the planning stages, as Jordanian businessmen are reluctant to enter into joint ventures with Israelis for fear of being labeled economic collaborators.³¹ The professional associations threaten disciplinary action (including expulsion) against members who deal with Israelis, effectively blocking any cross-border activities. This is spontaneous from below, not helped by the government, indeed, against the wishes of the government.

The Palestinian track is less positive, in part because the PA has taken a variety of steps to stymie the cooperation so emphasized in the agreements.³² The PA refuses to allow joint ventures with Israelis inside its territory, even as it welcomes foreign investment from around the world, including American Jewish money. Violence, terrorism, and rampant antisemitism have also had a chilling effect on private Israeli business investment in PA areas. The PA passed legislation in 1998 making Israeli ownership of Palestinian real estate a “harm to national security” that constitutes a “crime of high treason” punishable by death. ³³ The murders of five Palestinian land dealers who sold property to Israelis indicated that the Palestinian Authority was not simply using rhetoric.

In contrast to the excellent Jordanian record of consultation, the PA continually acts unilaterally. The PA’s solemn promises in each of the agreements it has signed to negotiate final status issues directly with Israel seem not to count for much. On several occasions, it has broken off security cooperation with Israel, refused to meet with Israeli counterparts, to exchange security related information—all contrary to its obligation for joint security cooperation. The Palestinian police have unilaterally ignored provisions of Oslo II stating that Israeli nationals may be detained but not arrested by the PA police (until the arrival of a joint patrol). Oslo II requires the Palestinian Council to tell the Israeli side of the Legal Committee about legislation it has passed, so that Israel can make sure the legislation does not conflict with the terms of the agreements; this has not taken place.

Agreements the Palestinians signed with Israel require that all disputes be resolved directly between them; if this fails, they may resort to other frameworks only via a mutually-agreed upon mechanism. The PA ignores this and repeatedly seeks out others—especially the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly—when disagreements arise. A PA initiative prompted special sessions of the U.N. General Assembly on November 13, 1997, and February 5, 1999, to ostracize Israel. The PA was also the driving force behind the convening of the Fourth Geneva Convention signatories on July 15, 1999, to try alleged Israeli war crimes (for building settlements in the West Bank and Gaza).

The Oslo negotiations are explicitly to lead “to a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolution 242 and 338" (resolutions 242 and 338 refer to areas taken by Israel in the 1967 war); but Arafat has unilaterally changed the basis for negotiations from 242 and 338 to Resolution 181 (the 1947 U.N. Partition Plan that gives the Palestinians not only all of the West Bank to the Jordan River, but also the Galilee and parts of the northern Negev, including Beersheva). Thus did he declare in Moscow on April 6, 1999, that the “right for a Palestinian state to exist is based on Resolution 181 and not on the Oslo agreements.”³⁴ Abu’l-A‘la, of the Palestinian Legislative Council announced, even more explicitly, that “the borders of the Palestinian state ... are those set by the 1947 U.N. Partition Plan, Resolution 181.”³⁵

Palestinian leaders have also pressured Israel by threatening unilateral actions, like Arafat’s repeated warnings in the first half of 1999 that he would declare a Palestinian state on May 4, 1999.

The PA has violated almost every promise it made to Israel and even the few exceptions (the amending of the PLO’s charter or security cooperation) have been fulfilled only partially. The list of disappointments is a long one. It has exceeded limits on its police force and weaponry; manufactured and smuggled in weapons; not destroyed the infrastructure of terrorism; glorified terrorists as martyrs; not changed its educational system to foster mutual understanding and peace; incited violence; called for jihad and martyrdom; made antisemitic statements. Add to these that it uses a map of “Palestine” on PA television that erases Israel and repeatedly makes statements denying Israel’s right to exist and one can only conclude that the PA views its accords with Israel as but a phase in a long-term plan (the Plan of Phases promulgated in 1974) to create a Palestine from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean.

Jordan has a different record. Although the peace with Israel remains a peace between governments, not peoples, it is peace by which the government does abide. Jordanian officials signal that they want to make peace with Israel work. Symbolic of this, they hammer out differences with Israel at the bargaining table, without making threats of violence. Jordanian frustrations with Israeli policies are expressed in meetings of top officials; they do not lead to a break-off of talks or public threats to use violence to achieve bargaining positions.³⁶ The authorities have not overridden strong domestic sentiments against normalization of relations with Israel but have done their best in this regard.

Jordanian actions show that an Arab leadership can make agreements with Israel and keep them; the Palestinians could do so also should they really want to.³⁷ What does this imply for U.S. policy? That the Clinton administration should cease its neo-colonialist attitude towards the Palestinians, who in Assistant Secretary of State Martin Indyk’s remarkable phrase are seen as “children” to be humored.³⁸ They are distinctly not children but adults responsible for their actions who should be expected to observe their word. Only be insisting that the PA carry out the letter of its agreements is there a hope for resolving the Israel-Palestinian conflict. Only by insisting that the leadership demonstrate an unceasing and uncompromising commitment to peace can this goal spread to the whole population. Anything less than this reduces peace treaties to pieces of paper and denies another generation the benefits of improved relations.

¹ Note that the following analysis looks only at actions by the PA and Jordan, not those of Israel; our goal is not to assess the compliance of both sides but to focus on Arab actions. Further, this study concentrates on the period of King Husayn and not that of King ‘Abdullah, for the latter is still finding his sea legs. This said, there is reason to believe he is moving away from his father’s direction. On this, see Steve Rodan, “Special Report: Jordan’s Weak King Worries U.S., Israel,” Middle East Newsline, July 20, 1999.
² Declaration of Principles, article XV (1) and (2); Oslo 1, Article (1) and (2); and Oslo 2, Article XXI, Articles (1) and (2).
³ Treaty of Peace, Art. 6 (4a), Art. 7 (2a); and Oslo 2, Art. XXII (2), Annex 6.
⁴ Treaty of Peace, Annex II, Art. V (1).
⁵ Treaty of Peace, Art. 4 (4).
⁶ Oct. 23, 1998; Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan website at http://www.jordanembassyus.org.
⁷ Ambassador Marwan Mu‘ashir, “New Relationships that Are Reshaping the Middle East,” American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) Policy Conference, May 20, 1998, at http://www.jordanembassyus.org.
⁸ “Sayings of Chairman Arafat in 1998,” Israeli Government Press Office (Tel Aviv), Dec. 2, 1998.
⁹ Ibid., Dec. 2, 1998.
¹⁰ Jordan Information Bureau at http:// www. jordanembassyus.org.
¹¹ Cairo agreement, May 1995, Art. XVIII; reaffirmed in Hebron agreement, Jan. 1997.
¹² Al-Hayat al-Jadida, Nov. 3, 1998.
¹³ Al-Jazira Television, May 27, 1998. Quoted in Morton Klein and Bertram Korn, Jr., Five Years of Palestinian Arab Violations of the Oslo Accords (New York: Zionist Organization of America, 1998), p. 5.
¹⁴ Our Arab Language for 5th Grade , p. 65, cited in Itamar Marcus, Palestinian Authority School Textbooks (Jerusalem: Center for Monitoring Peace, 1998), section 1d, at http://www.edume.org.
¹⁵ Cited in Marcus, Palestinian Authority School Textbooks, section 1e, section 1d.
¹⁶ Conversation with Itamar Marcus, Feb. 17, 1999.
¹⁷ Islamic Education for Ninth Grade, p. 79, cited in Marcus, Palestinian Authority School Textbooks, section 1b.
¹⁸ Islamic Education, Part Two, for Fourth Grade, p. 67, cited in Marcus, Palestinian Authority School Textbooks, section 1b.
¹⁹ The Treaty of Peace, Art. 4, Sec. 5(b), requires the parties “to take necessary and effective measures to prevent the entry, presence and cooperation in their territory of any group or organization, and their infrastructure, which threatens the security of the other party by the means of incitement to the use of violent means.”
²⁰ The Jerusalem Times, Dec. 18, 1998.
²¹ Al-Ayyam, Oct. 26, 1998; “Palestinian Commitments vs. Pronouncements Since Wye,” Israel Government Press Office, Nov. 9, 1998.
²² Conversation with David Bar-Ilan, Feb. 24, 1999.
²³ Lori Plotkin, Jordan-Israel Peace: Taking Stock, 1994-1997 (Washington: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 1997), p. 19.
²⁴ Al-Quds, Nov. 4, 1998.
²⁵ These include: ‘Adnan al-Ghul, Kamal Khalifa, Yasir Yusuf Mustafa Khasin, Mahmud Sanwar, Sufyan Abu Jadyan, ‘Abd al-Fatah as-Sitri, Salam Abu Ma‘ruf, ‘Abd al-Khadir Amr, Yusuf Malhi, and Usama Abu Taha (Ha’aretz, July 3, 1998); also Amr ‘Abd ar-Rahman, Yasir Muhammad Musa Aram, Bassam Subhi ‘Isa, ‘Atif Hamadan, Iyad Hamdi Abu-Shakafa, Iyad ‘Abd al-Qadir Isma‘il Bashiti, and Yusuf Mahmud ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Malhi (Government of Israel, Oct. 22, 1998, at http//www.israel-mfa.gov.il).
²⁶ Ha’tzofeh (Tel Aviv), Feb. 1, 1999.
²⁷ Quoted in Independent Media Review and Analysis (IMRA), Dec. 16, 1998.
²⁸ Al-Ayyam, Oct. 26, 1998.
²⁹ Foreign minister’s report, cited on IMRA, Dec. 6, 1998.
³⁰ Ma‘ariv, Oct. 20, 1998.
³¹ Reuters, Nov. 7, 1996.
³² Oslo I, Annex IV Protocol on Economic Relations, Preamble: “the two parties view the economic domain as one of the cornerstones in their mutual relations ... . Both parties shall cooperate in this field in order to establish a sound economic basis for their relations ... .”
³³ “Foreign Ownership of Real Estate in Palestine,” Palestinian Legislative Council website at http://www.pal-plc.org/english/english.htm.
³⁴ The Wall Street Journal, May 11, 1999.
³⁵ Al-Hayat Al-Jadida, Dec. 21, 1998.
³⁶ PA Television, Aug. 21, 1998, cited in Itamar Marcus, Palestinian Media Watch, Special Report #4 (Jerusalem: Center for Monitoring Peace, 1998), p. 2.
³⁷ The Egyptian record of compliance with their 1979 peace treaty with Israel is somewhere between the PA’s and Jordan’s. There has been peace in the sense of an absence of violence for twenty years but no attempt by Egypt’s government to foster normal relations with Israel or to encourage acceptance of Israel.
³⁸ Statement by Assistant Secretary Martin Indyk to a meeting of the American Jewish Committee, Feb. 22, 1999, Washington, D.C.