Is democracy incompatible with Islamic revivalism? Many in the West think so, arguing that “the rejection of even a chimerical notion of democracy is actually inherent in Islamic religious doctrine.”¹ Others hold that “deeply ingrained Islamic” cultural traditions are a “negative condition” that “may prevent democratic development.”² These pessimistic views make two faulty assumptions, however: that democracy is possible only in one form, and that Islam can be expressed in only one way.

The Islamic heritage, in fact, contains concepts that provide a foundation for contemporary Muslims to develop authentically Islamic programs of democracy. This broader understanding of democracy has important implications for U.S. policy toward the Muslim world. American support for democracy in the Muslim world must recognize the possibility of many different formats for popular political participation. Washington need not back specific movements, but it should support the possibility of their participation in emerging democratic political systems.

The Roots of Democracy

Widespread acceptance of democracy as a legitimate basis for political order is a phenomenon of the modern era. It tends to be forgotten that as late as the end of the eighteenth century, most Western political thinking was based on principles other than democracy. Paul E. Corcoran writes that

“Divine right” of monarchs remained an issue in European politics until just two centuries ago. Even in the United States, the Founders had at best ambiguous views about democracy. Michael Levin observes that while “the absence of entrenched aristocratic and ecclesiastical power gave the United States a propitious basis from which to move towards modern democracy,” this “was certainly not a path the founders intended to explore.”⁴

The emergence and acceptance of democratic theories, institutions, and practices in the West involved, as it does today, a complex process of redefining and combining nondemocratic, even anti-democratic, traditions with existing democratic customs, often of a consensual nature. In the early modern and modern eras, this heritage was reformulated in light of new perceptions about social, religious, and political needs and rights. For example, the “idea of popular sovereignty was simply incompatible with the theocentric concept of princely power and the increasingly rigid imperial structure of the Roman Church,”⁵ but this did not prevent people who still believed themselves to be Christian from creating democratic systems in Western Europe and North America.

Most societies have indigenous traditions that incorporate decision making by consultation and some popular participation. In Western Europe, the reconceptualization of premodern traditions played an important role in the development of modern democratic institutions. Hugh Chisholm, a prominent scholar of English history, could write in the classical eleventh edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica that “we find in the Anglo-Saxon polity, as developed during their rule in England, all the constituent parts of parliament.”⁶ The assemblies of yeoman peasants like the things of Scandinavia were reenvisioned as precursors of modern parliaments, as reflected in the very names of the parliaments in Norway (Storting) and Iceland (Althing). The modern democratization processes even involve reconceptualizing what may have been anti-democratic themes, combining these with the protodemocratic and democratic elements in every tradition. The Magna Carta, now seen as a major document in the history of Western democracy, was a royal promise of privilege made to a group of nobles.

Thus, indigenous concepts and institutions can interact with the experiences and structures of the modern era, creating the potential for democratization in contemporary societies. This background has positive implications for understanding the process of democratization throughout the world and its implementation today. Although the ruling elites in most major societies had significant reservations about democracy, “most people in the world can call on some local tradition on which to build a modern democracy. . . . The evidence is clear that both the idea and the practice of democracy are foreign to no part of the world.”⁷

Islamic Heritage

What elements in the Islamic tradition have Muslim thinkers redefined and reconceptualized in the service of democracy? Despite the great dynamism and diversity in contemporary Muslim political thought, certain concepts are central to the political positions of virtually all Muslims. According to Abul Ala Maududi (a major Sunni thinker of India, then Pakistan, who lived 1903-1979, and established the leading South Asian Islamic revivalist organization, the Jamaat-i-Islami), the “political system of Islam has been based in three principles . . . Tawheed (Unity of God), Risalat (Prophethood) and Khilafat (Caliphate). It is difficult to appreciate different aspects of the Islamic polity without fully understanding these three principles.”⁸

Unity of God. Muslims unanimously agree on the unity of God as the central concept of Islamic faith, tradition, and practice. Ismail Raji al Faruqi, a Sunni Islamic scholar and activist, writes that at “the core of the Islamic religious experience . . . stands God Who is unique and Whose will is the imperative and guide for all men’s lives.”⁹ Similarly, the modernist Sunni intellectual Fazlur Rahman holds that this doctrine “is central to the Qur’an--without which, indeed, Islam is unthinkable.”¹⁰ Ayatollah Khomeini, a Shi`i theologian, addressed Muslims as “followers of the school of tauhid [tawhid].”¹¹

Building on the base of the imperative will of God for all aspects of human life, in political philosophy this imperative means that there can be only one sovereign, and that is God. Some non-Muslim analysts, as well as old-fashioned conservative Muslims and extremist fundamentalists, argue that tawhid makes “Islamic democracy” a self-contradiction: the sovereignty of God contradicts the sovereignty of the people. Thus, Maududi maintains that the profound tie between God and political legitimacy means that

However, contemporary Muslims like Maududi do not reject democracy; they do insist that it be framed within tawhid.

In this system, “every Muslim who is capable and qualified to give a sound opinion on matters of Islamic law, is entitled to interpret that law of God when such interpretation becomes necessary. In this sense the Islamic polity is a democracy.”¹²

Shi`is share the tawhid-based political perspective of a Sunni like Maududi. Ayatollah Bakir as-Sadr, executed by the Iraqi government in 1980, is an oft-cited political theorist in the Islamic Republic of Iran. He maintained that in an Islamic state, a jurist should hold the position of final religious authority as the “Deputy General of the Imam” (in Shi`i theology, the imam is the divinely designated messianic leader). He acknowledged a role for representative government and political participation. The “Deputy General” should “have the support of the majority of the members of the consultative council of the religious authority. . . . In case there are more than one person eligible for holding the position of religious authority, people have a right to choose one of them through a referendum”¹³ Ayatollah Khomeini emphasized in his Last Will and Testament that it was the “heavy responsibility of the people” to select “experts and representatives for the selection of the leader or the Leadership Council.” He advised the people of Iran “that in all elections, those of the president, Majlis representatives, or selection of experts for the choice of the Islamic Leadership Council, you must take part. . . . All of you, from the Maraje’ [religious authorities] and great ulama to the bazaaris, farmers, workers and government employees, are responsible for the destiny of the country and Islam.¹⁴

For Baqir as-Sadr, the development of representative government constitutes a new and important era in Islamic history.

The unity of God provides the conceptual and theological foundations for an emphasis on political equality. A hierarchical, dictatorial system has historically been condemned as non-Islamic. As early as Mu`awiya, the fifth caliph in the Sunni Muslim view, the label “king” (malik) had become a negative term for arbitrary personal domination.¹⁶

¹⁷Human agency. Prophethood and Caliph are the concepts of the human agents involved in implementing the Islamic message. Prophethood refers to the belief that God reveals His will to humans through specific individuals recognized as prophets. Muslims believe that God’s comprehensive revelation was made through Muhammad and recorded in the Qur’an. This provides the primary foundation for all Islamic institutions.

Caliph, the second major concept defining activities of humans, has two important meanings and usages. The first, most common meaning is the title, “successor” to the Prophet Muhammad as the leader of the Islamic community. Thus, the political system of the early Islamic state was the caliphate. The Ottoman sultan was the last Muslim ruler widely to be recognized with the title of caliph; the office and title were subsequently abolished with the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1924.

The second meaning relates to the Qur’anic usage of the term caliph, dating from before the death of Muhammad and the establishment of the political caliphate. In the Qur’an, caliph refers to all humans, identifying them as the deputies or agents of God on earth. During the second half of the twentieth century, this Qur’anic meaning has received increased emphasis by Muslim revivalist thinkers. They are moving away from the caliphate as a ruling system toward a vision of the role of all humans in politics. As such, it provides a possible foundation for an Islamic democratic perspective. Maududi utilized this concept of caliphate as a basis for finding democracy in Islam:

This interpretation has specific implications for the political system in that

The identification of caliph with humanity as a whole (rather than a single political leader) can also be seen in the Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights, a document drawn up by the Islamic Council of Europe. This identification provides a foundation for concepts of human equality and of opposition to hierarchy and systems of domination. In Pakistan, for example, the concept provided the basis for the Jamaat-i Islami’s call for elections and opposition to martial law during the rule of General Zia ul-Haq.

The absolute sovereignty and oneness of God as expressed in the concept of tawhid and the role of humans as defined in the concept of caliph provide a framework within which Muslim scholars, both Sunni and Shi`i, have developed distinctive political theories conceived as democratic. These formulations may not always fit into the limits of a Western-based definition of democracy but they represent important alternative perspectives in the contemporary global context of democratization. They involve special definitions and recognitions of popular sovereignty and an important emphasis on the equality of humans and their obligations as “rightful bearers of this trust [i.e., government].”¹⁹

Operational Concepts for Islamic Democracy

Several Islamic concepts have a key role in the development of Islamic democracy: consultation (shura), consensus (ijma`), and independent interpretive judgement (ijtihad). These terms have not always been identified with democratic institutions, and even today have a variety of usages. Nonetheless, like reinterpreted concepts such as citizen and parliament in the Western tradition, they have become crucial concepts for the articulation of Islamic democracy.

Consultation. Advocates of Islamic democracy have sought to broaden the traditional understanding of consultation, understood to be by the ruler with his populace. Fazlur Rahman argues that the classical doctrine of consultation was in error because it presented consultation as the process of one person, the ruler, asking subordinates for advice; in fact, the Qur’an calls for “mutual advice through mutual discussions on an equal footing.” He goes so far as to state that those who deny the Muslim community its democratic voice “are wittingly or unwittingly guilty of rendering Islam null and void.”²⁰

The importance of consultation as a part of Islamic systems of rule is widely recognized. Muhammad Hamidullah places consultation in a generally accepted framework:

Baqir as-Sadr relates consultation to the rights of the people: “The people, being the vicegerents of Allah, have a general right to dispose of their affairs on the basis of the principle of consultation,” and this should involve “the formation of an assembly whose members are the real representatives of the people.”²²

The popular caliphate in an Islamic state is reflected especially in the doctrine of mutual consultation (shura). All Muslims as vicegerents (agents of God) delegate their authority to the ruler and it is their opinion that must also be sought in the conduct of state.

Consensus. The Prophet Muhammad is believed to have said, “My Community will not agree upon an error.” Accordingly, consensus has for centuries provided the ultimate validation of decisions in Islam, especially among Sunni Muslims. “Sunni Islam came to place final religious authority for interpreting Islam in the consensus (ijma) or collective judgment of the community.” Subsequently, “consensus played a pivotal role in the development of Islamic law and contributed significantly to the corpus of law or legal interpretation.”²³ However, only learned scholars (the ulama) had a role in reaching consensus; the general public had little significance. When the scholars reached consensus on a subject, it usually ended the debate.

In modern times, Muslim thinkers have imbued the concept of consensus with new possibilities. It need not be static; Hamidullah sees consensus as offering “great possibilities of developing the Islamic law and adapting it to changing circumstances.”²⁴ Further, consensus can provide an effective basis for accepting majority rule. As Louay M. Safi notes, the “legitimacy of the state . . . depends upon the extent to which state organization and power reflect the will of the ummah [the Muslim community], for as classical jurists have insisted, the legitimacy of state institutions is not derived from textual sources but is based primarily on the principle of ijma`.”²⁵ Thus, consensus offers both legitimation of Islamic democracy and a procedure to carry it out.

Independent judgment. Many Muslim thinkers believe the exercise of informed, independent judgment to be the key to implementing God’s will. Virtually all Muslim reformers of the twentieth century show enthusiasm for the concept of independent judgment. Muhammad Iqbal (1875-1938), one of the major figures in modern and modernist Islam, in the 1930s called for “the transfer of the power of Ijtihad from individual representatives of schools to a Muslim legislative assembly.”²⁶ According to Khurshid Ahmad, vice-president of the Jamaat-i Islami, “God has revealed only broad principles and has endowed man with the freedom to apply them in every age in the way suited to the spirit and conditions of that age. It is through the Ijtihad that people of every age try to implement and apply divine guidance to the problems of their times.”²⁷ Advocacy of independent judgment can be a call for radical reform, as it is for Altaf Gauhar:

²⁹³⁰Consultation, consensus, and independent judgment provide the basic concepts for understanding the relationship between Islam and democracy in the contemporary world, and an effective foundation to build an Islamic basis for democracy

Muslims and Western Models

Many Muslims are reluctant simply to adopt Western democratic models, preferring to establish authentically Islamic democratic systems. While not inherently anti-Western, their effort does imply that Western-style democracy has significant limitations. In particular, Muslims often bring up a contrast between the materialist West and the morally concerned Muslim world. Muhammad Iqbal believed that democracy was the most important political ideal in Islam. It is the basis for Islamic state and society, rooted in the absolute equality of its members and the doctrine of the unity of God. Though critical of European colonialism, he praised England for embodying this “Muslim quality":

Although Iqbal recognized democracy as an ideal, he denounced its implementation in the West, for Western capitalism, secularism, and materialism lacked spiritual and ethical values.³² Despite such criticisms, the Western experience has great influence on the Islamic debate. Muslim thinkers of earlier in the century argued that major concepts in Western democracy have their analogs in the Islamic tradition. Simple correlations, like identifying ijma’ with public opinion, lie at the core of the analysis of some of the first discussions of democracy and Islam by the Egyptian authors `Abbas Mahmud al-`Aqqad and Ahmad Shawqi al-Fanjari.³³

More recently, Islamist movements have taken the lead in combining Western experiences and concepts with an affirmation of key concepts arising out of the fundamental sources of Islamic faith and experience. Movements like an-Nahda in Tunisia, the Muslim Brethren of Jordan and Egypt, and the Jamaat-i Islami in Pakistan affirm that democratization consists of more than simply importing a set model from the West. Not anti-modern or anti-Western, they are postmodern in their view that emerging global human order transcends the era of Western domination.

The global dynamics of democratization reflect the dramatic changes of the present. Throughout the world--including the Western democracies--the effort to create more effective democratic structures continues apace. (In the United States, we witness everything from “reinventing government” to term limits.) These efforts attest to the fact that there is no universally accepted or clearly defined model of democracy, even of Western democracy, that can simply be adopted by people engaging in democratization. The difficulties of the new democratic regimes in Eastern Europe as well as the Muslim world reflect the problems and complexities of the global experiences of democratization.

Many Muslims are actively engaged in defining Islamic democracy. They believe religious resurgence and democratization are complementary; they are contradictory only if democracy is defined according to specific Western standards.

Muslims need to develop Islamic programs of democracy, for this allows them to escape simply borrowing Western-based definitions of democracy. Doing so shifts the debate from the legitimacy of importing foreign political institutions to the best way of increasing popular participation.

From a global perspective, the efforts of Muslims to develop authentic and viable forms of Islamic democracy have great significance. Their utilization of traditions of consultation and consensus reflect concerns that are prominent in Western efforts to create more effective forms of participatory democracy. The increasing density of intercommunication and networks of relationships among democratic, democratizing, and nondemocratic societies around the globe make efforts anywhere important for actions and developments everywhere. Muslims have important contributions to make in the process of reconceptualizing democracy, especially in the area of consensual participation and nonadversarial democratic structures.

Narrow American Definitions

Despite the global diversity, Western leaders often give the impression that a global consensus exists on the definition of democracy and the means to attain it. In September 1991, as the Soviet Union was disintegrating, Secretary of State James Baker addressed a Moscow meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Speaking of “democracy’s season,” he presented five fundamental principles that he urged “all Soviet citizens and their leaders” to follow, including multiple parties, free elections, and a Jeffersonian understanding of the rights of minorities.³⁴ Secretary Baker and other U.S. officials then frequently repeated these five principles as they traveled throughout the former Soviet Union, as well as on other occasions.³⁵

When discussing American support for democracy in Africa, American officials emphasized the same essential features of democracy. Former vice-president Dan Quayle admitted in 1991 that “there is no single model of democracy in Africa,” but went on to impose just such a model: “Presidential systems, parliamentary systems, proportional representation, and single member districts--we can respect all of these.”³⁶ This list tends to name conventional Western models for democratic systems and does not note the wider spectrum of democratic styles existing even in the West, including more consensual or “unitary” as opposed to “adversary” democracy,³⁷ some of which might be more closely in tune with African traditions.

Herman J. Cohen, then assistant secretary for African Affairs, promised direct U.S. aid to promote democratic infrastructure, which he described as the creation of a “civil society” with “democratic labor unions, literary and cultural groups, bar associations, women’s associations, and traditional human rights `watchdog’ groups,” as well as a Western-style free press.³⁸ Cohen also pledged assistance for “governance.”

Secretary of State Warren Christopher has explicitly identified global democratization with the American model. In discussing aid for democracy in Russia, he noted that “through exchange programs, young Russians can be brought to the West and exposed to the workings of democracy and the market.”⁴⁰ Timothy Wirth, the undersecretary of state responsible for the democracy-support initiatives, has called for “a lot of small programs that can be exported to the grassroots level.”⁴¹ These discussions reveal a presupposition of a working, effective American model of democracy with specific features. In other words, American political leaders continue to see democratic institutions as things that could and would be “exported” from the United States to strengthen democracy abroad. And when they speak about support for developing democracies, they have a very specific model in mind.

The awareness of an established Western model supported by American policy makers is an important factor in the minds of democrats around the world. It establishes specific and concrete standards, which themselves become contested. It shifts the debate from the content of the criteria for democracy to whether or not it is appropriate to adopt a “foreign model.” Such policies make the United States appear to be engaging in cultural imperialism, advocating imposition of a “foreign system” rather than supporting much-needed local political reform. For example, analyst Mamoun Fandy notes that the fact that President Clinton was a Rhodes Scholar sometimes reminds people of the bitter heritage of Cecil Rhodes who “advocated democracy for the ‘higher races’ and peonage for the ‘lower races,’” and Fandy adds that in discussions of democracy in the Middle East, “many Western analysts suddenly become modern versions of Rhodes. They raise the red flag of Islamic fundamentalism and assert the entirely untested hypothesis that Islam and democracy are incompatible.⁴²

U.S. Policy

U.S. advocacy for a particular form of Western democracy can come to be viewed as a new form of cultural aggression that denies the validity of Islam. This advocacy can lead the United States into situations, such as occurred in Algeria, where “support for democracy” results in the suspension of elections and the alienation of a significant segment of its Islamically conscious public. This then enhances the appeal of extremist Muslim revivalists and weakens the positions of those Muslim leaders who are striving to create more democratic political systems. In short, narrowly conceived U.S. policies give unnecessary advantages to extremist anti-Western elements.

To provide positive support for democratization in Muslim countries, American policy makers have to transcend their narrow, ethnocentric conceptualization of democracy. Washington must recognize the authentic roots for Islamic democracy that might create effective systems of popular participation, though unlike the Westminster model or the American system. A more inclusive conceptualization of democracy, which recognizes the diversity of definitions present even in the West, could provide a more effective foundation for U.S. policy in dealing with democratization and movements of Islamic revival. American policy makers need to be willing to ask questions like “Which style of democracy is likely to be the most successful in a given society?” rather than implicitly asking “Is this system just like ours?”

The stakes are high because Islam has traditions of radical authoritarianism, just as do Christianity and Judaism. Denial of the right of participation in electoral processes on the basis of Islamic identification encourages extremism, while opening an electoral system to all, as demonstrated in Jordan, Pakistan, and Malaysia, provides a basis for Islamic activist democratic participation.

Although the role of the United States is important, the primary responsibility for choosing democratic rather than authoritarian alternatives within the Islamic heritage remains in the hands of Muslims themselves. The stark alternatives of the apocalyptic clash of civilizations or the more pluralistic global vision underscore the challenges created by the dynamics of contemporary democratization in the Muslim world and the need for more open American policies.

¹ Gilles Kepel, The Revenge of God: The Resurgence of Islam, Christianity and Judaism in the Modern World, trans. Alan Braley (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), p. 194.
² Samuel P. Huntington, “Will More Countries Become Democratic?” Political Science Quarterly, Summer 1984, p. 214.
³ Paul E. Corcoran, “The Limits of Democratic Theory,” in Graeme Duncan, ed., Democratic Theory and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 13, 15.
⁴ Michael Levin, The Spectre of Democracy: The Rise of Modern Democracy as Seen by its Critics (New York: New York University Press, 1992), p. 4.
⁵ Corcoran, “Limits of Democratic Theory,” p. 14.
⁶ Hugh Chisholm, “Parliament,” Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th ed., 1911, vol. 28, p. 837.
⁷ Steven Muhlberger and Phil Paine, “Democracy’s Place in World History,” Journal of World History, Spring 1993, pp. 26, 28.
⁸ Sayyid Abul A’la Maududi, Islamic Way of Life, trans. Khurshid Ahmad (Dlehi: Markazi Maktaba Islami, 1967), p. 40.
⁹ Ismail Raji al Faruqi, Tawhid: Its Implications for Thought and Life (Nerndon, Va.: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1982), pp. 5, 10-11.
¹⁰ Fazlur Rahman, Major Themes of the Qur’an (Minneapolis, Minn.: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1980), p. 83.
¹¹ Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini, trans Hamid Algar (Berkeley, Calif.: Mizan Press, 1981), p. 277.
¹² Abu’l A’la Mawdudi, “Political Theiry of Islam,” in Khurshid Ahmad, ed. Islam: Its Meaning and Message (London: Islamic Council of Europe, 1976), pp. 159-161.
¹³ Ayatullah Baqir al-Sadr, Introduction to Islamic Political System, trans. M. A. Ansari (Accra: Islamic Seminary/ World Shia Muslim Organization, 1982), pp. 78-79. On the author, see Chedli Mallat, The Renewal of Islamic Law: Muhammad Baqer as-Sadr, Najaf, and the Shi`i International (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
¹⁴ Imam Khomeini’s Last Will and Testament (English trans. distributed by Interests Section of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Embassy of Algeria, Washington, D.C.), pp. 36-37.
¹⁵ Sadr, Islamic Political System, p. 82.
¹⁶ Bernard Lewis, The Political Language of Islam (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1988), pp. 53-55.
¹⁷ Maududi, The Islamic Way of Life, p. 41.
¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 42-44.
¹⁹ Sadr, Islamic Political System, p. 79.
²⁰ Fazlur Rahman, “The Principle of Shura and the Role of the Ummah in Islam,” in Mumtaz Ahmad, ed., State, Politics, and Islam (Indianapolis, Ind.: American Trust Publications, 1986), pp. 90-91, 95.
²¹ Muhammad Hamidullah, Introduction to Islam (Gary, Ind.: International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations, 1970), pp. 116-17.
²² Sadr, Islamic Political System, pp. 81-82.
²³ John L. Esposito, Islam: The Straight Path, exp. ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 45, 83.
²⁴ Hamidullah, Introduction to Islam, p. 130.
²⁵ Louay M. Safi, “The Islamic State: A Conceptual Framework,” The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, Sept. 1991, p. 233.
²⁶ Allama Muhammad Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1968), pp. 173-74.
²⁷ Khurshid Ahmad, “Islam: Basic Principles and Characteristics,” in Khurshid Ahmad, ed., Islam: Its Meaning and Message (London: Islamic Council of Europe, 1976), p. 43.
²⁸ Altaf Gauhar, “Islam and Secularism,” in Altaf Gauhar, ed., The Challenge of Islam (London: Islamic Council of Europe, 1978), p. 307.
²⁹ Taha J. al Alwani, “Taqlid and Ijtihad,” The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, Mar. 1991, p. 141.
³⁰ Ibid., p. 142.
³¹ Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, ed., Historic Documents of the Muslim Freedom Movement (Lahore: Publishers United Ltd., 1970), p. 52.
³² Muhammad Iqbal, Persian Psalms, trans. A.J. Arberry (Lahore, 1961), p. 86; and Javid Nama (London, 1966), p. 57.
³³ Hamid Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Thought (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), pp. 130-34.
³⁴ James Baker, “Democracy’s Season,” U.S. Department of State Dispatch, Sept. 16, 1991.
³⁵ See, for example, Robert B. Zoellick’s testimony before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, “Relations of the United States with the Soviet Union and the Republics,” U.S. Department of State Dispatch, Oct. 7, 1991.
³⁶ Dan Quayle, “African Democracy and the Rule of Law,” U.S. Department of State Dispatch, Sept. 23, 1991.
³⁷ Jane J. Mansbridge explains how these two types exist in American society in Beyond Adversary Democracy, rev. ed. (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1983).
³⁸ Herman J. Cohen, “Democratization in Africa,” U.S. Department of State Dispatch, Oct. 28, 1991.
³⁹ Herman J. Cohen, “Africa and Democracy,” U.S. Department of State Dispatch, Dec. 2, 1993.
⁴⁰ Warren Christopher, “U.S. Foreign Relations: International Peace,” Vital Speeches of the Day, Apr. 15, 1993, p. 389.
⁴¹ The Washington Post, May 5, 1993.
⁴² Mamoun Fandy, “Clinton: More Fulbright than Rhodes?” The Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 14, 1993.