Middle East Quarterly: You were quoted earlier this year as saying that unless the coalition partners reach an accord, they will “miss the train to Europe.” Are the coalition partners meeting their responsibilities, and if not, where do you put the blame?
Ismail Cem: Certain juridical / constitutional reforms that we have been discussing for decades, when they are finally realized, will facilitate our relations with the EU. In fact, those long-envisaged reforms coincide with the EU criteria. ‘The train’ is bound for ‘membership to the European Union’, not for ‘Europe’, for we are already European and in Europe (geographically, historically, and by its modern definition, culturally) since seven centuries. The EU train cannot be missed, but being unpunctual might cause grave delays. It seems that the planned constitutional changes, which were put off because of urgent economic reforms that the parliament had to deal with, will be taken up in the fall. This should take forward the long march to EU membership.
MEQ: Only a few years ago, expectations ran high about Turkey playing a leadership role in several regions. In 1999, you yourself said: “Turkey is a multinational power. It is powerful in the Balkans, the Middle East, North Africa, the Caucasus.” But the financial crisis of the past year has raised questions as to whether Turkey can afford such a role. What, if any, has been the impact of the financial crisis on Turkey’s standing as a “power”?
Cem: Turkey, being a multi-regional power, derives its strength in part from her economic presence in several geographies, the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia, in particular. The recent financial crisis did not alter Turkey’s strategic and political capabilities, despite temporarily limiting some of the economic tools it enjoys: new investments, corporate activities, economic support, etc. Obviously, going through financial problems does not help a country’s image and has overall negative impacts, but this does not affect our strategic and political posture.
Turkey-Israel
MEQ: When Ariel Sharon was elected prime minister of Israel, you said: “It’s true that Sharon has a negative image but at this stage it’s not correct to make a judgment only taking that into account.” We are now at a later stage, and Prime Minister Sharon has visited Turkey yesterday. How would you judge his policy to date?
Cem: The policies that are actually pursued by Israel cannot be considered to be a success. Everything, from the security of Israelis, of Palestinians, to the relations with neighbors, with Europe, with the US and international public opinion have all developed negatively.
MEQ: In a March speech in Washington, you mentioned the Arab-Israeli conflict, and urged the United States to “persist in her role of contributing to resolve this problem. She should do this objectively, acting in an even-handed manner.” Do you feel that the U.S. is in fact acting even-handedly in its role?
Cem: Yes. But I believe the US should be more persistent in her role. In fact, it’s not only for the Israelis or the Palestinians sake: if the actual situation lingers on for much longer, US overall strategic interests as well as specific economic interests in the Gulf might be jeopardized!
MEQ: On a July visit to Egypt, you were quoted as saying: “Turkey-Israel relations are being exaggerated by some circles both in Israel and the Arab world.” On what specific points do you believe these relations are being exaggerated?
Cem: Our relationship with Israel, which is indeed strong and substantial for both countries, is not a strategic military alliance and it is not a cooperation directed at any third country. Both Turkey and Israel have declared this officially, and on repeated occasions. In spite of this fact, some Arab circles repeatedly and maybe intentionally exaggerate, claiming that the relationship is of military nature, aimed at Arab countries. Some Israeli circles join in: they too exaggerate our relationship, sometimes intentionally as well. It seems that the motive of the first party is to prevent the growing influence of Turkey in the Arab world in particular, and in the Islamic world in general. For the second, it is to give a false impression to the Arabs, believing that this might help contain the positive development of Turkey’s relations with the Arabs. But the truth is: good ties between Turkey and Israel are an asset for peace, stability and prosperity in our region.
MEQ: Could you characterize the present state of Syrian-Turkish relations?
Cem: Since Fall 1998, when relations were at a critically confrontational stage, they have normalized, following an agreement reached by the two neighbors. Through this agreement, the terrorist – separatist base, which was rooted in Syria, is now to a considerable extent dismantled.
MEQ: In Washington, there is discussion of a more assertive policy vis-à-vis Iraq. What options does Turkey regard as realistic, in the possible revamping of Iraq policy?
Cem: Strong stance on compliance with UN resolutions; gradual and cautious easing of economic sanctions, parallel and simultaneous with Iraq’s compliance to destroy all production capabilities for weapons of mass destruction and means of delivery; and verification. The sanctions regime should be modified so as not to punish the Iraqi people.
MEQ: Earlier this year, you visited Libya. In 1996, when then-Prime Minister Erbakan visited Libya, Muammar Qadhafi lectured him on Kurdish rights. How did you finesse your visit, and do you believe that Qadhafi is a changed man?
Cem: I do not comment on foreign statesmen and politicians. As for my visit, we believe it was positive, after years of mutual neglect. Turkey and Libya have a common history and both peoples have historic affinities. About a decade ago we had flourishing economic relations as well. Needless to say, we have differences on some international issues and as a principle, I always voice our differences on such issues at meetings I have with my foreign counterparts. Overall, our relations have taken a positive turn after my visit.
MEQ: You are identified as the architect, on the Turkish side, of Greek-Turkish rapprochement. What do you see as the next stage in this process? And can it go forward without progress on the Cyprus issue?
Cem: I think we should begin dealing with the Aegean issues. Turkey’s position is clear: we are ready to move in line with the U.N. Charter and EU ‘Agenda 2000’, that is, international law, which stipulates that the peaceful means to settle an international dispute are ‘negotiation’, ‘mediation’, ‘arbitration’, ‘International Court of Justice’. All subjects of dispute in the Aegean defined as such should be brought up and negotiations should be initiated. It’s for the Greek side to decide when they are ready. On the Cyprus issue, progress depends on the Greek Cypriot party. Being encouraged by the prospect of EU membership, the Greek Cypriots remain intransigent and simply refuse any proposal brought up by the Turkish Cypriots. Obviously, Cyprus is not an issue that helps Turkish – Greek relations.
MEQ: Are you satisfied with the degree of American commitment to the Baku-Ceyhan project? What must be done, beyond the “Ankara Declaration,” to move the project forward?
Cem: Yes, I am. I am encouraged as well by the continuing interest, and growing involvement of U.S. companies in the Baku / Tbilisi / Ceyhan project.
MEQ: In your view, what can be done to move forward the Caspian Project.
Cem: To continue the good work; to further encourage the interested companies. Having Russian companies participate in the Baku / Tbilisi / Ceyhan / would bring in a valuable
Follow-up questions
MEQ: In a March speech in Washington, you mentioned the Arab-Israeli conflict, and urged the United States to “persist in her role of contributing to resolve this problem. She should do this objectively, acting in an even-handed manner.” Do you feel that the U.S. is in fact acting even-handedly in its role?
Cem: Yes. But I believe the US should be more persistent in her role. In fact, it’s not only for the Israelis or the Palestinians sake: if the actual situation lingers on for much longer, US overall strategic interests as well as specific economic interests in the Gulf might be jeopardized!
Follow-up question: That sounds dire. Are you a believer in “Arab unity” and the “Arab street”?
Cem: It is. To be a “believer” or not in certain concepts is not among my concerns.
MEQ: Could you characterize the present state of Syrian-Turkish relations?
Cem: Since Fall 1998, when relations were at a critically confrontational stage, they have normalized, following an agreement reached by the two neighbors. Through this agreement, the terrorist – separatist base, which was rooted in Syria, is now to a considerable extent dismantled.
Follow-up question: Well, Turkey threatened Syria with war to gain this agreement, which had eluded Turkey for years. What lessons has Turkey drawn from the Syria episode, if any?
Cem: In our ministry, we try to draw lessons from all experiences we have, whether major or minor. Justified policies resolutely defended have a good chance to lead to agreements contributing to peace and stability.
MEQ: In Washington, there is discussion of a more assertive policy vis-à-vis Iraq. What options does Turkey regard as realistic, in the possible revamping of Iraq policy?
Cem: Strong stance on compliance with UN resolutions; gradual and cautious easing of economic sanctions, parallel and simultaneous with Iraq’s compliance to destroy all production capabilities for weapons of mass destruction and means of delivery; and verification. The sanctions regime should be modified so as not to punish the Iraqi people.
Follow-up question: But “smart sanctions” have been shot down, and Saddam will not accept any verification mechanism. If anything, his actions have become more bellicose. Can you envision any circumstances that would justify the application of more force against Iraq?
Cem: It is not appropriate to discuss the circumstances of the use of force against a neighboring country.
MEQ: On a July visit to Egypt, you were quoted as saying: “Turkey-Israel relations are being exaggerated by some circles both in Israel and the Arab world.” On what specific points do you believe these relations are being exaggerated?
Cem: Our relationship with Israel, which is indeed strong and substantial for both countries, is not a strategic military alliance and it is not a cooperation directed at any third country. Both Turkey and Israel have declared this officially, and on repeated occasions. In spite of this fact, some Arab circles repeatedly and maybe intentionally exaggerate, claiming that the relationship is of military nature, aimed at Arab countries. Some Israeli circles join in: they too exaggerate our relationship, sometimes intentionally as well. It seems that the motive of the first party is to prevent the growing influence of Turkey in the Arab world in particular, and in the Islamic world in general. For the second, it is to give a false impression to the Arabs, believing that this might help contain the positive development of Turkey’s relations with the Arabs. But the truth is: good ties between Turkey and Israel are an asset for peace, stability and prosperity in our region.
Follow-up question: And what about the future? For example, is it possible to take cooperation with Israel to the level of missile defense, and not have a strategic understanding?
Cem: I always refrain from using loose definitions and terminologies like “strategic": Each and everyone might have a different understanding of such terms, interpret it to his understanding and draw wrong conclusions, build wrong images, etc. Therefore, I try to stick to terms and definitions which are not equivocal and which does not bring up connotations. The reality is that there might be cooperation in the technology transfer of defensive missiles. And, as I had earlier indicated, both Turkey and Israel have officially declared that their cooperation in whatever subject does not carry any offensive motivation and is not directed to any other country.
