The official position of all Israeli governments since the signing of the Oslo accords has been that there is not now, nor will there ever be, a Palestinian army west of the Jordan River, even in the framework of a comprehensive peace deal with the Palestinians. Police, yes, but an army is out of the question. The disqualification of a Palestinian army even became one of former Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak’s four “red lines” for final-status negotiations.1 At the July 2000 Camp David summit, the Palestinians surprisingly indicated that they would be willing to accept major constraints on this right of every sovereign nation—to have its own military force—agreeing in principle to keep the West Bank and Gaza free of heavy weapons and to eschew signing defense pacts with countries that are in a state of war with Israel.2
It might therefore seem that the Israeli desire for a demilitarized state of Palestine is a realistic prospect. But it is not. The Palestinians have no intention of relinquishing the right to have their own armed forces; indeed, a Palestinian army is already in the making.
A Problem of Compliance
From the very beginning of Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy, both sides agreed that Palestinian self-government would include some right to bear arms. The agreements signed between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA)3 provided for the establishment of a Palestinian police force but also imposed strict limitations on its size, weapons, structure, and responsibilities. These limitations, however, were constantly violated. The Oslo II agreement of 1995 allowed the PA to employ no more than 30,000 police officers; the actual number of men in the Palestinian security services exceeds 45,000. The agreement also set a limit of 15,240 on the number of firearms possessed by the police; while it is hard to determine precisely the number of weapons in the PA, here, too, it has a bad record of compliance. In all likelihood, there are more than four times the number allowed. Perhaps most disturbing is the fact that at least 30,000 of these weapons are held by civilian members of the Tanzim, the armed wing of Fatah, which is barely controlled by the official security forces.4 This became known during the September 1996 tunnel riots, then in the Nakba riots of May 2000, and then in the al-Aqsa intifada that began in September 2000; on each occasion, Tanzim activists exchanged fire with Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) troops.
Major discrepancies also exist between the types of light weapons allowed by the agreement—pistols, rifles, and machine guns—and the weapons that the PA actually stocks. Since the beginning of the Aqsa intifada, the Palestinians have used rocket-propelled grenades, mortars, mines, and grenade launchers against Israeli targets. According to reports, the Palestinians have also obtained anti-armor missiles, anti-aircraft guns, and shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missiles.5 Evidence of such armaments came on May 7 with the interception by the Israeli Navy of a boat sailing toward the Gaza coast with a large cargo of advanced arms and ammunition, including Katyusha rockets, mortars, and anti-aircraft missiles. According to Israeli sources, similar shipments have reached their destination and are now in the hands of Arafat’s forces.6
The structure and composition of the Palestinian security services are incompatible with the provisions of Oslo. Israel acknowledged the PA’s need for seven services: a civil police to deal with law enforcement; a public security service to perform security-related missions such as joint patrols; a preventive security service to prevent acts of harassment, violence, and retribution; a presidential guard unit, called Force 17, to protect PA chairman Yasir Arafat and other VIPs; an intelligence service to combat terrorism and prevent incitement to violence; and emergency rescue services. In addition, Israel allowed the PA to establish a coastal police to prevent smuggling and infiltration from Gaza’s shoreline. But the PA today employs at least twelve security apparatuses, including military police, a rudimentary air force, military intelligence, and an enigmatic special security force that reports directly to Arafat. These security services are generally hostile to each other and spend endless effort monitoring and spying on each other, a system that ensures that none of their chiefs amasses enough power to endanger Arafat’s authority. The proliferation of security forces, in short, serves an important role in the application of Arafat’s long-standing strategy of “divide and rule.”
The PA’s poor record of compliance with security-related provisions is a harbinger of two things to come. First, it shows that on security-related matters, the Palestinians do not see themselves bound by signed agreements, and there is no indication that this behavior will change once the Palestinians achieve statehood.
Second, the PA is inclined to invest more resources in security than in other domains and much more than most countries at a similar stage of economic development. The size and structure of the Palestinian security forces impose a heavy burden on the Palestinian economy; indeed, estimates find that almost a third of the $1 billion annual PA budget is spent on salaries for security personnel.7 The percentage of the PA’s defense expenditure as a percentage of its gross domestic product (GDP) for 1996 surpasses even that of such heavily armed countries as Egypt, Iran, and Syria. To be precise: defense expenditure as a share of gross domestic product was 6.4 percent as compared with Egypt’s 4 percent, Iran’s 5.5 percent, and Syria’s 6.2 percent.8 This level of expenditure does not leave enough resources for infrastructure, health, welfare, and education.
An Army in the Making
In 1998,9 this author found that the Palestinian police in its present shape is something between a police force and a regular standing army. It was too complex and overstaffed for what is needed to preserve law and order but lacks the infrastructure of a regular standing army.
Nothing in the past three years alters this assessment except that the PA has taken further steps toward turning the police force into a full-fledged army. At the beginning of 1997, the Palestinian Authority established small factories producing light arms and ammunition. The following year, the Palestinian Legislative Council completed legislation on the Firearms and Ammunition Law, thus officially laying the foundation for a defense industry. New weapons and fighting tactics have been introduced and training has improved considerably with Palestinian company and battalion commanders receiving professional training in Egypt, Yemen, Algeria, Afghanistan, Tunisia, Libya, and Pakistan. In 1998, the training of Palestinian security forces was limited to small units such as platoons and companies; since the beginning of 2000, they have been exercising full battalions in different combat scenarios. In the first half of 2000 alone, six battalions held full-scale exercises in the Gaza Strip.10 These developments suggest that in the event of a Palestinian declaration of statehood—whether it comes about unilaterally or as part of a peace agreement with Israel—the Palestinians will have a military force in place with a relatively high level of combat readiness.
More broadly, the PA has established a highly militarized society. In its seven years of existence, the military uniform has pervaded every sector of society. The per capita ratio of armed personnel to the general population—a ratio of 1 to 50—is the very highest in the entire world. Yasir Arafat, carrying an automatic weapon and dressed in military fatigues, is a generalissimo-style leader of a nation in arms. Military parades and ceremonies are common in the main PA cities and the media show pictures of the armed forces in action on a regular basis. The younger generation is fully mobilized, with scout groups and the Fatah youth movement (the Shabiba) including semi-military activities such as parades, marching drills, and martial arts in their programs. Summer camps run by the PA offer teenagers experiences like handling and firing light weapons, planning and executing mock attacks on IDF posts, and training in first aid. Young Palestinians are led to believe that a Palestinian army is in the making and that it is the historic role of their generation to serve in it.11
A Heavily Equipped Army?
The PA lacks a general-staff-like organ or national institutions specializing in the development of solid security doctrine. It is, therefore, probable that Arafat and his close circle of advisors are as yet undecided on the nature of the nascent Palestinian army in the post-PA era. Despite this indecision, Palestinian legislators, diplomats, security chiefs, and academics are in rough agreement about the necessity of some form of Palestinian army after statehood is proclaimed. They see it fulfilling symbolic as well as functional purposes. “A state,” says Police Chief General Ghazi Jabali, “is not worth anything without an army that protects its civilians.”12 Those who favor a full-fledged conventional army point to its other advantages as well, such as the fact that it would be a major provider of jobs and so mitigate the unemployment problem; they believe the only way to contain the resentment of the unemployed masses is by drafting them and instilling in them discipline and ideology.13
There is, however, little agreement on the military’s purpose, size, functions, and structure, or on the nature and organization of civil-military relations. Those who object to the establishment of a strong, heavily equipped army are mainly concerned that an oversized army will become a drain on the economy, sapping resources needed for development. Another source of worry is the current conduct of the Palestinian security forces: their abuse of power, their human-rights violations, their involvement in crime and corruption. The behavior of the security apparatuses has caused many Palestinians to feel they are living in a police state. This raises concerns among many about a concentration of power in the hands of a dominant armed force. Others note that no matter how strong the Palestinian army becomes, it will never be as strong as the IDF. “As a nation heading toward independence, I don’t think that we need a military power in the traditional sense,” said Nasr Yusuf, director general of Palestinian Public Security and Police Forces, “because our state will never enter into an arms race with Israel.”14 Most Palestinians agree. The PA’s expenditure on defense amounts to just 3 percent of Israel’s.
There are different views on what would constitute the acceptable force structure for the Palestinians. Yezid Sayigh has suggested that since maintaining both a defense force and a police force might prove too costly, the Palestinians should study the option of a single formation, such as a national guard with responsibility for both law enforcement and border security.15 Others insist that the Palestinians should have, in addition to a ground force, an air-transportation wing and a small navy to secure lines of communication and protect Gaza’s territorial waters.
One dilemma the Palestinians will face is whether to equip their army with heavy weapons, such as tanks and artillery, or to keep it equipped with only light arms as Israel demands. In addition to the political implications of violating the agreement with Israel, procurement of heavy arms would take a big toll on the Palestinian budget. The total Palestinian expenditure on defense in the year 2000, for example, is equivalent to what Israel pays to purchase, maintain, and train one top-of-the-line tank battalion or three sophisticated F-15I jets. With such a disparity of military and economic power, the Palestinians are likely to have little incentive to invest in the development of an armored corps. In addition, the Palestinians lack training grounds for heavy formations. Tank and artillery ranges require a lot of vacant space that is lacking in both the densely populated Gaza Strip and the West Bank.
The same limitations that apply on the ground apply to an even greater degree in the air and at sea. Presently, the PA has a small aerial unit that operates a tiny fleet of seven transport aircraft and helicopters. Reportedly, about 200 Palestinians have undergone training as fighter and helicopter pilots, but only a small fraction of them are young and fit enough to serve as pilots in an air force. The only airfield in Palestinian territory, at Dahaniya in the Gaza Strip, is too small to accommodate a large air fleet. Moreover, even following independence, the Palestinian state is not likely to enjoy full sovereignty over its air space, which is used by and considered essential for the training of the Israeli air force. Thus, it is very unlikely that the Palestinians will develop a significant air force, even in the long run. It is likely, however, that over time the extent of civil air transportation will increase. And some of the civilian planes could serve military purposes, such as aerial photography and delivering of military articles between the West Bank and Gaza (assuming that an air strip will be constructed in the West Bank).
Nor is the PA likely to make serious progress toward building a significant naval force. The thirteen craft owned by the PA’s coast guard, Shurta Bahriya, are mostly small Zodiak boats which patrol along Gaza’s shoreline but have no fighting capability. The Palestinians’ first priority after independence would more likely be to invest in a commercial fleet rather than a maritime force. In the longer run, the Palestinians are likely to opt for patrol boats and frigates.
A final consideration is that air and sea platforms cannot be hidden from the IDF’s intelligence gatherers, and for that reason, too, it is unlikely that a Palestinian state would be engaged in serious efforts to challenge Israel in these domains.
The Palestinian security establishment is currently much more preoccupied with the actual struggle to establish a state than with the challenge of protecting such a state from future threats. However, once statehood is achieved, shortage of money rather than treaty obligations is likely to be a constant brake on Palestinians’ military aspirations, although Arab countries in the process of modernizing their armies and fleets may be of some help by providing the Palestinians with training, supplies, and weapons systems that were taken out of service.
Palestinian Threat Assessment
What sort of threat could a Palestinian army pose to Israel’s security? An answer requires an assessment of two elements: capabilities and intentions. Whereas the capabilities of the Palestinian security forces are fairly well-known, Palestinian intentions are more enigmatic. Understanding them requires focusing on the Palestinian perception of threats and how force can address those threats. The two missions of a Palestinian army would likely be regime preservation and defense against Israel.
Regime preservation. The current organization and conduct of the Palestinian security forces shows that domestic stability and the elimination of potential opposition to Arafat are its primary responsibilities. No fewer than five intelligence bodies are involved in intelligence gathering and spying on Palestinian government officials, members of competing security forces, and members of the Islamist opposition, mainly Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Extensive intelligence efforts are also directed toward members of Palestinian militia groups in the diaspora and Fatah activists living abroad. In the event that an agreement with Israel grants the Palestinians control over joint borders with either Jordan or Egypt, a Palestinian army would have to prevent the cross-border infiltration of insurgents attempting to undermine the regime.
Israeli invasion. This perception is, by and large, one of seeing the Palestinians in a defensive role. Life under Israel’s military occupation taught them that military force is the only means to deter hostile action. The Palestinians are likely to continue to perceive Israel as their main threat, even if a state of peace exists in the region. The Palestinians feel a sense of powerlessness vis-à-vis the mighty state of Israel. A peace agreement with Israel is possible, but it will not heal all the wounds Palestinians suffered in recent history.
The Palestinians’ primary fear is an Israeli reoccupation, something that Israel, with its formidable army and aerial dominance, would be capable of doing if the need arose, as indeed it might. The future Palestinian state will be located on Israel’s main water aquifer; if water problems emerge, Israel might want to reclaim direct access to the water. An Arab coalition invading via Jordan is a primary security concern of Israel, which might invoke this contingency to justify an invasion of the West Bank to secure the passes along the Jordan River. This fear of invasion explains why the Palestinian delegation to Camp David refused to accept any IDF presence along the Jordan River Valley.16
When Israeli-Palestinian relations deteriorate, Israel can cripple the PA economy by refusing to employ Palestinian workers or by imposing an air and sea blockade. Israel can also cut off the connection between Gaza and the West Bank, two blocks of PA territory separated by Israel. Palestinians see such actions as a potential casus belli that their military forces would have to address.
Deterring Israel
Each of these two missions requires a specific force structure. Regime preservation implies a force structure not very different from the one already in existence, that is, strong intelligence bodies and police forces trained in riot control and counter-insurgency operations. But tangling with Israel requires quite a different force structure. The Palestinians cannot take on Israel in a classic one-on-one confrontation. To fend off Israel, they have to find means to deter Israel from using force against them. Such a deterrent capability can be achieved in any of three ways.
Enter into defense treaties with Arab states. Military alliances with states like Egypt, Syria, and Iraq send a message to Israel that a military attack on Palestine would invite intervention by other, more powerful militaries.
Develop long-range capabilities. The Palestinians’ proximity to Israel’s population centers would enable them to cover major Israeli cities—Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Netanya, Hadera, Kfar Sava, Modi’in, Rosh Ha’ayin, and Ashkelon - with primitive artillery pieces. Since January, the Palestinians have carried out scores of small-caliber mortar attacks against Israeli settlements near the Gaza Strip, including the city of Sderot. With longer-range ammunition they could also reach a wide range of strategic targets—critical road junctions, oil and gas farms, communication installations, power stations, industrial complexes, IDF bases and headquarters, government buildings, cultural centers, seaports, and airports. To this end, the development of an artillery corps would be the cheapest and most effective form of deterrence for the Palestinians. Artillery pieces such as 122mm and 130mm towed guns, Katyusha rocket launchers, and 120mm and 160mm heavy mortars are easily obtained and cheaply maintained. Likewise, relatively primitive anti-aircraft weapons could disrupt Israel’s entire civil transportation infrastructure because Ben Gurion Airport, Israel’s aerial transportation hub, is located in close proximity to Palestinian territory.
Acquire non-conventional capabilities. Several incentives could influence the Palestinians to acquire non-conventional weapons. First, the weapons are available. Artillery shells and 122mm rockets armed with chemical warheads, ammunition that is easily transferred and cheaply stored and maintained, are being produced by Arab states such as Syria and Iraq. The Palestinians could easily smuggle such ammunition into their territory and store it in underground warehouses. Second, non-conventional weapons are versatile. Chemical ammunition, for example, can be launched from standard artillery pieces and does not require the extra cost of procuring launchers. Third, medium-range artillery pieces cannot be intercepted by Israel’s ballistic missile defense system, the Arrow, now being developed to counter non-conventional threats from distant countries like Iran and Iraq. Fourth, the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction has become far more than the fulfillment of a strategic necessity in the Arabic-speaking countries; it has become a means of enhancing national pride and increasing a country’s prestige. Accordingly, the desire to increase self-esteem and be taken seriously in the region could tempt the Palestinians to consider the non-conventional option.
Each one of these three courses of action would present Israel with such a major new strategic challenge that it could not sit idly by and would be prone to take action against the Palestinians. There was the raid on the Iraqi nuclear installation at Osirak, but that was a one-time event and Israel has taken no such preemptive steps against other buildups.
A future Palestinian state is thus a perfect candidate to become a casualty of the widely-known security dilemma: Any attempt by the Palestinians to enhance their security by adopting means of deterrence against Israel would preempt the Israelis to take defensive actions, leaving the Palestinians less secure, economically damaged, and diplomatically ostracized. Any Palestinian attempt to impose a strategic threat, much less an existential threat to Israel would thus be self-defeating. Though the Palestinians adopt strategies against their self-interest, the likelihood of such an eventuality is small.
Strategic Threats to Israel
There are two main ways in which the Palestinian army could have plausible strategic relevance against Israel: guerrilla war and disrupting the IDF’s mobilization system in the case of a regional war. In addition, there is a possibility of Palestinian commando units invading Israel.
Guerrilla war. Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon created the impression among Palestinians that Israel suffers from war fatigue and that a well-trained, dedicated guerrilla group can drive Israel from an occupied territory. The perceived victory of Hizbullah in Lebanon has made the Shi‘i movement popular among Palestinians and presented them with a viable alternative to the diplomatic track. Attempting to emulate Hizbullah’s success, the Palestinians may adopt guerrilla tactics different from the terrorism and popular uprisings used so far. This could entail more of the tactics used so far in the Aqsa intifada—such as sporadic attacks on IDF vehicles, the ambush of Jewish settlers along Israeli routes of transportation, and snipers’ firing at military and civilian targets—as well as more advanced tactics such as planting side-bombs and mines on Israeli roads, sabotage of Israeli installations, kidnapping of Israeli soldiers, and commando raids on settlements and military outposts. The hilly territory of the West Bank and the densely populated refugee camps of the Gaza Strip would constitute guerrilla-friendly terrain.
The Palestinians are actively contemplating such a “Lebanonization” of the conflict in the event of a showdown with Israel. They believe that Israel would not be inclined to carry out high-level violence against civilian targets because of world opinion. The Palestinians further assume, in light of Israel’s Lebanon experience, that it would under no circumstances be willing to invade Palestinian cities and become embroiled in a costly war in urban areas. That experience also suggests that Israeli society is unwilling to endure a long, violent confrontation likely to take a high toll in life and treasury. The PA has already begun the process of the “Lebanonization” of the conflict, but it would be wrong to assume that the capabilities so far shown by Tanzim activists reflect the true potential of the Palestinian military establishment. The core of Arafat’s military power—that is, the Palestinian division of the National Security Force in the Gaza Strip, composed of nine fully operational infantry battalions—has not yet been activated. If unleashed, the challenge to the IDF would be much greater. Through the use of guerrilla tactics, the PA could change the disparity in power between the IDF and the Palestinian forces. The results of such a guerrilla war could enable the Palestinians to accomplish political goals through the use of force; in this sense, the threat constituted by the Palestinian army could indeed be considered strategic.
Disruption of the IDF’s mobilization system. Were full-scale war to break out between Israel and a coalition of Arab states, the Palestinian army’s main contribution would be to create chaos and confusion in Israel, thereby disrupting the IDF’s mobilization system. Since the backbone of the IDF is its reserve units, the speed of their call-up, of travel to bases and from there to fighting positions carries strategic importance, especially in the event of a surprise attack. Israel’s miniscule size, its unusual dependence on reserve forces, its congested traffic, and the IDF’s heavy reliance on a limited number of transportation routes, many of them running in mountainous terrain, could be weak spots easily exploited by a future Palestinian army. The Palestinians’ greatest impact on the Israeli deployment could be felt in routes connecting Israel’s major population centers along the coastal plain with the security strip along the Jordan River Valley. This threat would force the IDF to send armored reserve formations to the eastern border which would have to force their way through Judea and Samaria’s narrow corridors and could be easily subjected to the Palestinian army’s direct fire. While the impact of the Palestinian army on an Israeli mobilization should not be underestimated, this would probably not have a decisive effect on the outcome of an Arab-Israeli war. The IDF would apply sufficient air cover to allow reinforcements to reach the front line early enough to confront enemy forces crossing the Jordan River.
Palestinian commando units invading Israel. A scenario, presented by the Israeli parliamentarian Yuval Steinitz, suggests that in addition to the above, teams of truck-mounted Palestinian commando soldiers could infiltrate deep into Israel, attacking military and civilian targets such as IDF headquarters, government buildings, and electronic media installations.17 Although it is likely that most of those teams would eventually be eradicated by the Israeli security forces, such penetrations could cause significant operational as well as psychological damage.
Calling a Spade a Spade
Past experience has shown that Israeli governments, fearing an erosion of domestic support for the peace process, have turned a blind eye to Palestinian violations of signed agreements. By failing to insist on full Palestinian compliance with the security provisions of the Oslo agreements, Israel enabled the PA to clandestinely build its army. And despite the many unresolved issues that still exist between the two sides, when it comes to the issue of a Palestinian army, both sides take a similar approach: for contrary reasons, each would like the other side to believe that a Palestinian army west of the Jordan River does not really exist. In reality, however, this army is in the making and Israel is doing very little to halt this process.
Israel’s lax attitude has created a feeling among Palestinian security officials that there is a wide gap between Israel’s declared policies regarding the PA security forces and its actual willingness to enforce these policies.
Once reality sinks in, Israel must prepare conceptually and operationally for the emergence of a Palestinian army. The Israeli defense establishment has to adapt its existing defensive and offensive plans to a new environment in which Israel is faced with one more hostile Arab state. The IDF will have to prepare operational plans to deal with the different threats that the Palestinian army could present. More: it will have to take a new look at the Middle East military balance and factor the new Palestinian military in the overall Arab order of battle. This means reconsidering the allocation of forces, in terms of quality and quantity, to the different regional commands, and assessing whether the current order of battle and its equipment are suitable for some of the scenarios presented above. In addition, the IDF will have to develop a counter-guerilla doctrine for the Palestinians and establish new units to specialize in this type of warfare. This, incidentally, is not as difficult as the Lebanon experience might suggest; Israel proved in Lebanon that it has the ability to incorporate cutting-edge technology and tactical sophistication with real success.18 That ability has to be applied to the Palestinian front in a short period of time. To assess accurately the intentions and capabilities of the growing Palestinian army, Israel will also have to invest a great deal in intelligence gathering by means of electronic and airborne devices to compensate for the loss of its presence on the ground.
All of these activities cannot take place without Israel’s first recognizing that a Palestinian army is already in formation and that this will introduce a new threat to Israel’s security. That threat could, in certain scenarios, cause psychological and operational problems for Israel. Once acknowledged, however, it can be contained and acted against. The key problem for Israel, in other words, is conceptual; the key to a serious treatment of the problem lies in its recognition—not by the IDF so much as by the country’s civilian leadership. Yet that leadership has, so far, been loathe to acknowledge the inevitability of a Palestinian army for two reasons: it turns the Israeli populace against diplomatic efforts with the PA, and it denies Israel important bargaining cards in the security negotiations on a final-status agreement. The Palestinian al-Aqsa intifada has taught Israel something about the potential dangers of hostile Palestinian armed forces west of the Jordan River. As a result, the Palestinians may find Israel’s new prime minister Ariel Sharon more insistent on compliance than his predecessors. A much more serious effort on behalf of Israel and other interested parties to force the PA to stick to the letter of previously signed agreements would hinder the Palestinians’ ability to establish a significant military force. Conversely, continuous Israeli government treatment of the Palestinian army as a mirage would deny the country the tools with which to treat a serious problem with the serious care it deserves.
1 The others being: no return to the 1967 borders, no division of Jerusalem, and no acceptance of full responsibility for the creation of the refugee problem. Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak’s address to the Knesset on the Camp David Summit, July 10, 2000, at http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0hmf0.
2 Yedi’ot Aharonot, Aug. 18, 2000.
3 The 1994 Cairo agreement, the 1995 Oslo II agreement, and the 1998 Wye agreement.
4 Ma’ariv, Weekend Supplement, Oct. 20, 2000; Yedi’ot Aharonot, Weekend Supplement, Oct. 13, 2000.
5 Ha’aretz, June 23, 2000; July 6, 2000; Yedi’ot Aharonot, Weekend Supplement, Feb. 16, 2001.
sup>6 Ha’aretz, May 8, 2001.
7 Ibid., Nov. 3, 1999.
8 Adapted from Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, The Middle East Military Balance, 1999-2000, ed. Shlomo Brom and Yiftah Shapir (London and Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2000), pp. 161, 182, 346.
9 Gal Luft, The Palestinian Security Services: Between Police and Army (Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1998), p. 19.
10 Ha’aretz, July 12, 2000; Yedi’ot Aharonot, Weekend Supplement, Feb. 16, 2001.
11 The New York Times, Aug. 3, 2000.
12 Khaled Abu Toameh, “Uniform Culture,” The Jerusalem Report, July 31, 2000, p. 28.
13 Ahmed Qurie (Abu Ala), speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy’s Soref Symposium, Washington, D.C., May 7, 1998.
14 Defense News, July 13, 1998.
15 Yezid Sayigh, “Redefining the Basics: Sovereignty and Security of the Palestinian State,” Journal of Palestine Studies, Summer 1995, p. 10.
16 Ha’aretz, Aug. 14, 2000.
17 Yuval Steinitz, “When the Palestinian Army Invades the Center of the Country,” Commentary Magazine, Dec. 1999, pp. 39-42.
18 Gal Luft, “Israel’s Security Zone in Lebanon—A ‘Tragedy’”? Middle East Quarterly, Sept. 2000, pp. 18-19.
