Turkish foreign policy has undergone fundamental change under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Less understood is the rise of the National Intelligence Organization (MİT) as a tool of Turkish foreign policy. The expanded scope and sophistication of Turkey’s intelligence and clandestine¹ operations have become integral to its foreign and security policy. This paper examines how clandestine intelligence operations have increasingly become a tool of and reflect Turkey’s evolving geopolitical position. Finally, it examines the implications these increased clandestine activities have for regional and international dynamics and highlights the critical interplay between enhanced intelligence activities and Turkish foreign policy objectives.

The story of Turkish intelligence, tracing its origins from the late Ottoman Empire to its sophisticated contemporary operations, reflects Turkey’s complex history. The Turkish intelligence community can trace its roots as far back as 1299 to the early administrative organs of the Ottoman Empire. The empire’s intelligence apparatus was primarily centered around the general administration department, known as the divan-i hümayun kalemi (Imperial Chancery). The divan-i hümayun kalemi was primarily focused on gathering intelligence on foreign powers and internal threats.²

In the waning years of the Ottoman Empire, various attempts to reform and make relevant the intelligence capacity by various sultans were initiated. The first real precursor to the current incarnation of Turkish intelligence came with the establishment of the Yıldız (Star) Organization (1880-1908) under Sultan Abdulhamid II.³ As the empire engaged in World War I, the Teşkilât-ı Mahsûsa (Special Organization, c1913-1920), led by Enver Paşa, played a crucial role in intelligence and special operations, navigating through the complexities of a global conflict and a crumbling empire.⁴

Intelligence activities during the period from the end of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of the republic, between 1918 and 1923, quite rightly refocused the operational mission as various intelligence incarnations became focused primarily on internal consolidation and responding to external security issues that threatened the nascent Republic of Turkey. This period became critical in shaping the Republic’s future, both in terms of internal stability and foreign policy direction.⁵

The transition to the Republic of Turkey naturally brought transition and reforms to the intelligence services, most importantly being the institutionalization of intelligence operations. The new republic established the Millî Emniyet Hizmeti Riyâseti (M.E.H./MAH) in 1926⁶ under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who centralized security intelligence collection and operations but the focus clearly remained on domestic security issues.⁷ As the republic found its footing from 1923 to 1947, the intelligence apparatus began to take a more defined shape. This era was marked by efforts to strengthen the newly founded state and navigate the complexities of an evolving international scene, particularly multiple efforts to draw the nation into World War II.⁸

The Cold War years saw a significant expansion and adaptation of Turkey’s intelligence capabilities to meet these strategic needs. The era presented new challenges and necessitated a strategic shift in intelligence activities. Turkey, straddling the Western bloc and the Soviet Union, needed to manage its foreign policy while keeping a keen eye on both internal and external threats. However, NATO accession provided access to new training, resources, and cooperation, in particular with the United States and the Central Intelligence Agency.⁹

This culminated in 1965, when the MAH underwent a significant transformation, evolving into the current National Intelligence Organization (MİT).¹⁰ The changes represented a strategic refinement of intelligence priorities to meet the republic’s expanding domestic security needs and foreign policy objectives. The newly formed MİT¹¹ became responsible for collecting and analyzing both domestic and foreign intelligence, domestic security intelligence, and military co-ordination. The latter having major and lasting influence on the organization until the twenty-first century as leadership of the MİT was dominated by military officers.¹²

Clandestine operations are not new to Turkish foreign and security policy. An early example of Turkish intelligence’s clandestine operations can be seen in military intelligence and MAH activities against Bulgaria that provided support to NATO collection priorities.¹³ However, Turkey also targeted Greece during the Cyprus conflict from 1953 to 1970. This period marked a strategic use of clandestine activities by Turkish intelligence within the NATO alliance and against an erstwhile ally. The MİT operations were multifaceted, including: support for resistance movements, providing operational assistance, and evaluating military capabilities and readiness. As Sabri Yirmobeşoğlu, an ex general of the Turkish Armed Forces and ex secretary general of Turkey’s National Security Council (MGK) confided in an interview a few years ago, the MIT was responsible for the arming of Turkish Cypriot paramilitaries and the bombing of Turkish Cypriot targets,¹⁴ some to good effect in stoking unrest and building the basis for potential intervention. The bombing of the Bayraktar and Omeriye Mosques in Nikosia on March 25, 1962, was blamed squarely on the EOKA, the Greek Cypriot resistance organization, in order to sow the seeds of division among the island’s communities. A few years earlier, the detonation of a bomb in 1958 outside the Turkish consulate in Nikosia had sparked violent clashes between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. These clandestine operations solidified the rift between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots before the events in 1963 and 1974.¹⁵ The case highlights the developing role of clandestine intelligence operations in its immediate geography, in what the Turks considered a near domestic issue, and underscores the early use of clandestine action in contemporary Turkish foreign policy.¹⁶

By the end of the Cold War, the global geopolitical landscape underwent a dramatic transformation, and so did Turkey’s intelligence focus. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new international dynamics required a re-evaluation and transition in intelligence operations. Turkish foreign policy during this period adapted to these new challenges and opportunities, reflecting the changing geopolitical environment.

Even before the events of September 11, 2001, Turkey had been dealing with an active PKK terror campaign. The Turkish intelligence community focus on domestic threats, however, did not preclude out of area operations. This was most demonstrably expressed in the 1999 rendition of PKK leader Abdulla Ocalan from Nairobi.¹⁷

Like other NATO members, Turkey faced a significant shift in its security landscape with the 9/11 attacks on the United States and the first use of NATO Article 5. Although having a vast amount of experience in counter-terrorism, 2001-2020 saw a particular rise of expanded terrorist and asymmetric threats. This necessitated an evolution in Turkey’s intelligence community, significantly influencing its foreign policy to align more closely with global counter-terrorism initiatives and regional dynamics. Integral institutions, such as the MİT, as well as other security and intelligence agencies such as the chief of general staff, the ministry of interior, the ministry of foreign affairs, and the undersecretariat of public order and Security (KDGM) have been pivotal in this transformation. Their adaptive roles and contributions mirror the changing domestic and international challenges faced by Turkish security. It is in this historical context that sets the stage for understanding the subsequent developments in Turkish intelligence and its broader implications.

The appointment of Hakan Fidan, a known Erdogan loyalist, did not initially appear to indicate a major change. Strictly speaking, MİT was not within the ministry of defense. However, historically, almost all senior leadership had come from the military branches. However, Fidan had been preparing for the position and change in Turkish intelligence structure and focus. Indeed, his 1999 master’s thesis compared the Turkish intelligence community to that of the United States and the United Kingdom.¹⁸ Fidan began restructuring the MİT along the lines of his 1999 plan by and pushing MİT into the forefront of Turkish foreign policy, resulting in the 2012 establishment of a foreign operations department and absorbing the signals intelligence (SIGINT) role of the military.

By 2014, this was further entrenched legally when the Turkish parliament passed a law granting greater autonomy to the MİT and reorganizing its reporting structure. It aimed to address concerns about military dominance and allegations of human rights abuses during previous military leadership. This change has had three major effects on the MİT:

1. Refocus of intelligence priorities. Traditionally the MİT had worked foreign intelligence because there was no other applicable agency. Now it officially included a broader foreign collection mandate.
2. Measures for transparency and accountability to prevent power abuse and ensure operation within legal boundaries. A notable measure was establishing an independent inspector general position within the MİT, allowing internal investigations and monitoring of the agency’s activities for legal and ethical compliance.
3. This oversight also included the establishment of parliamentary committees tasked with monitoring the MİT’s activities. This was the first time elected civilian committees would play a role in intelligence oversight by reviewing and evaluating the MİT’s performance, scrutinizing its budget, and providing a forum for public debate on intelligence matters.

Fidan was assigned “special tasks” by Erdogan that even ministers within the cabinet were not aware of. That explains why Erdogan called him once as “my secret-keeper … the state’s secret-keeper”.¹⁹ These missions included, for a start, the secret negotiations with the outlawed PKK in Oslo and Imrali²⁰ between 2006 and 2011. Despite the ups and downs, these negotiations eventually resulted in the historic message by Ocalan in March 2013 and the start of the “solution process” (Çözüm Süreci).²¹ This was by far the most comprehensive―and ambitious―effort by Turkey to resolve the decades-old Kurdish question through a negotiation and not an armed struggle.

But Fidan was not engaged only in peace talks. In 2011, the Syrian Civil War erupted and very quickly metamorphosed, in the words of the ex-director of the CIA, into “a Geopolitical Chernobyl” with various state and non-state actors locked in a deadly struggle.²² After Erdogan’s public appeal to Assad for reforms and reconciliation ended in a deadlock, Ankara decided to secretly support the rebels within the Free Syrian Army to overthrow the Assad regime.

Despite the US open reservations, Turkey delivered weapons and money―and even training to certain militant groups that were not vetted by the CIA such as Ahrar al Sham or Sultan Murad Brigade. There was one critical problem with this approach, however: these rebels, though much more deadly on the battlefield than the de-centralized FSA, mainly consisted of hardliners who sometimes cooperated with Al Qaeda in Syria.²³ This support for the rebels was done away from the public spotlight by the only agency that Erdogan could rely on for secrecy and efficacy: the MİT. Despite their best efforts, these clandestine ops were eventually documented and publicized by journalists who were later arrested.²⁴

These leaks to the press did not manifest out of the blue; they were linked to the struggle in the shadows between Erdogan and his erstwhile ally against the Kemalists―Gulen. These power struggles would indeed express themselves over the Gezi Park Protests in 2013 and the Corruption Scandals in 2014.²⁵

However, these contests would reach a head in July 2016 when a cabal of pro-Gulen military officers allegedly launched an (ultimately unsuccessful) coup d’état against Erdogan. The role of Fidan in these events is still shrouded in mystery; though the country’s spymaster, he failed to detect any signs of the impending coup and, thus, prevent its occurrence.²⁶ Whatever the case, the MİT headquarters was viewed as a nerve center by coup plotters and was targeted by their helicopters. Despite their efforts, the putschists did not seize Fidan―though they did capture Hulusi Akar, chief of the general staff.²⁷

These attacks against the MİT Headquarters promoted an overhaul of the intelligence agency. First of all, a sweeping purge of suspected and real sympathizers of the putschists was unleashed within MİT with thousands of agents ending in prison.²⁸ Secondly, a new MİT headquarters, nicknamed the “Kale” or “Fortress”, was built outside of Ankara on 5000 acres of land with three-meter high walls and other extensive security.²⁹ Third, the MİT was expanded to include a clandestine paramilitary capability. From then onwards, the MİT would not only be an intelligence agency that collected and analyzed intelligence or co-operated with other services for clandestine operations. It would develop a paramilitary branch with its own direct action capability that would allow the MIT to operate independently in military theaters.³⁰ This has enabled MİT to operate independently of the Turkish military and turn into a more versatile “third-option”³¹ of Turkish foreign policy similar to the CIA.

The aftershock of the new militarized MİT was nowhere felt as deeply as in Syria. The MİT already engaged in clandestine operations within Syria against the Assad regime. Erdogan imposed an absolute control over the army from 2011, and no one opposed his own plans for a buffer zone in Northern Syria. Only one month after the putsch, Turkey initiated Operation “Euphrates Shield” in an effort to eject ISIS from Jarablus; in reality, however, Turkey intended to cut off the Kurds of Afrin from those in Manbij.³² Fidan was on the same page as Erdogan: as early as March 2014, he had suggested a false flag op in order to justify an armed incursion into Northern Syria.³³ During the same period that Operation “Euphrates Shield” unfolded, Fidan went to great lengths to foster a revolt within the Kurdish-controlled territory of Northern Syria; these pro-Turkey Arab and Kurdish militant groups (e.g. the Ahfad Salah al-Din Brigade) failed, however, and thus, vanished from the scene.³⁴

In mid-2015, changing dynamics in Idlib Province had implications for regional stability.³⁵ Besides, these hardliners were considered by Turkey a far lesser evil to the YPG, the Syrian offshoot of the PKK, despite the open objections of the USA.³⁶ MIT was instrumental in the establishment of the Syrian National Army in December 2017―this umbrella organization for the anti-ISIS and anti-YPG militant groups (e.g. Hamza Division and al-Mu‘tasim Division).³⁷ MIT reserved a preferential treatment for the Turkmens of Syria within the newly-formed SNA.³⁸ In time, these Turkmen-heavy militant groups comprised the nucleus of the mercenaries that MIT employed in war theaters outside Syria itself.³⁹

After Operation “Euphrates Shield” (2016–2017), Turkey intervened again in Northern Syria thrice: twice against the Kurds (2018 and 2019), and once against the Assad regime (2020) to solidify its buffer zone along its southern border. Turkey utilized these rebels as auxiliaries or proxies for its own wars against the YPG and Assad; and MIT ensured that the rebel commanders toed the line; those who did not comply, were simply replaced by compliant ones.⁴⁰

These secret networks in Idlib and Northern Syria would serve Turkey well in its interventions in other war theaters. The MIT recruited and transported thousands of rebels from Syria to Western Libya in late 2019 as mercenaries in order to lift the Siege of Tripoli by Haftar.⁴¹ Actually, the only casualties ever reported by Turkey in Operation “Peace Storm” in Libya included an agent of and translator for MIT.⁴² The same story repeated itself in the 2^nd Karabakh War: the MIT arranged for the recruitment and transport of these rebels from Syria (or Libya) to the mountains of Azerbaijan where they were utilized in human waves to overrun Armenian military outposts.⁴³

In other words, the MIT acted as the tip of the spear in the policy doctrine that Erdogan implemented from Operation “Olive Branch” in 2018 onwards: that of “surrogate warfare”.⁴⁴ In this version a la Turca, rebels or mercenaries from Syria acted as the human surrogates with the drones (especially the by now world famous Bayraktar TB2)⁴⁵ as the technological ones. The MIT was an integral element in both versions of these surrogates: it recruited the rebels as proxies, on the one hand, and it provided the drones with the necessary critical intel for the targeted killings, on the other hand.

However, three challenges emerged from the continued use of clandestine operations:

• The primary concern revolved around the political authorization of the National Intelligence Organization’s (MİT) clandestine activities, directed by the presidency. These operations sparked intense debates within the Turkish Parliament regarding appropriate oversight for the intelligence service.⁴⁶
• Secondly, the proxies frequently faced accusations of committing severe human rights violations against civilians in Northern Syria, particularly in Afrin. The inability or reluctance of MİT to control these undisciplined militias has marred the organization’s reputation.⁴⁷
• Finally, Turkey’s engagements with hardline militias in Northern Syria have caused concerns in both Washington and Moscow.⁴⁸

In addition to these, the MİT organized a witch-hunt against supporters of the self-exiled imam, Fetullah Gulen, all over the world in the aftermath of the failed coup d’état. This witch-hunt resulted in renditions without due process from several countries (e.g. Kazakhstan, Moldova) and, according to the victims’ own testimonies, in torture and solitary confinement in “black sites”.⁴⁹ These clandestine programs, operated exclusively by the MİT strained Turkey’s relationship with the West.⁵⁰

These renditions were not the sole instances where MİT’s actions strained its traditional relationships with Western and Western-aligned states. Such activities underscored the growing significance of clandestine intelligence operations’ role in shaping Turkish foreign policy. This change underscores a pivotal shift towards a more assertive and independent stance in Turkey’s international strategy.

Turkish clandestine operations in Northern Syria serve as another example. Throughout 2023, MİT targeted both the military and civil leadership of the Kurds with its own agents and drones. In April 2023, a strike by an MİT-operated drone almost neutralized Mazlum Kobane–the commander-in-chief of the Kurdish YPG/SDF in Northern Syria. The attempted murder of a well-known US ally was not the only affront to the USA: at the time, Kobane was stationed in a US military base in Northern Syria and, thus, the safety of the US Marines was jeopardized.⁵¹ This attack prompted a complaint by the USA―both in public and in private―toward Turkey. But it did little to deter the MİT. Indeed, agents of the MİT continue to stir up the rebellious Arab tribes in Deir-ez-Zor against the Kurds to the extent than an armed uprising―eventually unsuccessful―flared up between August and September 2023.⁵²

Erdogan won the presidential election in May 2023 despite the alliance of the six opposition parties. He appointed his trusted “keeper of secrets”, Fidan, to the post of foreign minister. Ibrahim Kalin, the national security advisor, took over as head of MIT. These changes signaled that hawks would reign on issues of intelligence and diplomacy.

Indeed, this was evident in the ongoing operations in Northern Iraq and Syria. In 2023, the MİT neutralized 201 fighters of the PKK and YPG in total in 181 clandestine ops that involved the use of UCAVs and destroyed 45 targets of critical infrastructure (e.g. oil wells in Northern Syria).⁵³ These operations occurred despite the protests of Washington that resulted in a “blue on blue” incident in October 2023 when the United States downed a Turkish UCAV to protect is soldiers in Northern Syria.⁵⁴ This incident, however, did little to deter the MİT, which continued its campaign of targeted killings.

The appointment of İbrahim Kalın as the new head of Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization marks another significant transition in the landscape of Turkish intelligence and foreign policy since 2010. Kalin brings a distinct background to his new role as the intelligence chief, having previously served as the chief presidential advisor and spokesperson.

Kalin’s elevation to the head of the MİT could signal a nuanced shift in the strategic direction of Turkish intelligence. Given his previous role, Kalin is expected to maintain a close alignment with Erdoğan’s foreign policy objectives. This alignment might lead to a more synchronized and coherent strategy between the presidential office and intelligence operations, potentially enhancing the effectiveness of Turkish foreign policy, particularly with Fidan now heading the foreign ministry.

Kalin’s deep involvement in diplomatic and advisory roles suggests a possible emphasis on integrating intelligence findings more directly into foreign policy decision-making. This could result in a more proactive and strategic use of intelligence in shaping Turkey’s international relations, especially in its dealings with neighboring regions and global powers.

It should be noted that both Fidan and Kalin share the same vision with Erdogan about Turkey’s place in this ever-changing international environment: namely, that Turkey should not stick to its old orientation to the West but side with the rising Euro-Asian powers such as Russia and China which, just like Erdogan, challenge the current status quo.

Under Kalin’s leadership, the MİT is likely to continue its active role in clandestine operations, which have been a significant aspect of Turkey’s assertive foreign policy under Erdoğan. These operations, particularly those aimed at countering terrorism and protecting national interests, are expected to remain a priority. However, Kalin’s approach to such operations might differ from his predecessor’s, potentially focusing more on strategic intelligence gathering and less on high-profile operations, depending on the evolving geopolitical landscape.

Kalin’s tenure could also see a continued emphasis on technological advancements in intelligence, particularly in cyber intelligence and surveillance capabilities. This would align with the global trend of increasing reliance on technological means for intelligence gathering and analysis.

One of the primary challenges Kalin will face is navigating the complex regional dynamics, particularly in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean. How he manages relationships with key players in these regions, while advancing Turkey’s interests, will be a critical aspect of his tenure. Additionally, Kalin will need to address the evolving nature of security threats, including cyber threats and the shifting landscape of terrorism and extremism. Balancing traditional intelligence methods with innovative approaches will be key to effectively countering these challenges.

The appointment of Kalin as the new head of the MİT represents a pivotal moment for Turkish intelligence. His background and close ties to the presidency suggest a potential shift in the operational and strategic focus of the organization. As Kalin takes on this role, his decisions and strategies will not only shape the future trajectory of the MİT but also play a significant role in Turkish foreign policy and its clandestine operations. His leadership will be instrumental in determining how Turkey navigates its complex regional and international environment in the coming years.⁵⁵

1. The term “clandestine” is used here in the nominal intelligence terminology to indicate a secret operation as opposed to the notional term “covert” which is generally applied to deniable intelligence activities.

2. See “Intelligence and Security in the Ottoman Empire in the Time of Murad IV.” Academia.edu. Accessed online: academia.edu., Irkilata, Gaye. “Intelligence Structures and the Turkish National Intelligence Agency.” Dis Politika Institusu, April 19, 2022 and Gürkan, Emrah Safa. “The Efficacy of Ottoman Counter-Intelligence in the 16TH Century.” Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 65, no. 1 (2012): 1–38. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43282441

3. Ateş, A. (2013). Stratejik İstihbarat ve Türk Dış Politikası’na Etkisi [Strategic intelligence and its impact on Turkish foreign policy]. Master’s thesis, Adnan Menderes University.

4. “History of the National Intelligence Organization.” Turkish National Intelligence Agency. Accessed September 27, 2023, web.archive.org.

5. Ateş, A. (2013). Stratejik İstihbarat [Strategic intelligence].

6. “History of the National Intelligence Organization.” Turkish National Intelligence Agency. Accessed September 27, 2023.

7. Yılmaz, İlkay. “Turkey.” In Intelligence Communities and Cultures in Asia and the Middle East: A Comprehensive Reference, edited by Bob de Graaf, Lynne Reiner Publishers, 2020.

8. Dovey, H.O. (1994). “The intelligence war in Turkey.” Intelligence and National Security, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 59-87. DOI: 10.1080/02684529408432240.

9. Yılmaz, İlkay. “Turkey.” In Intelligence Communities and Cultures in Asia and the Middle East: A Comprehensive Reference, edited by Bob de Graaf, Lynne Reiner Publishers, 2020.

10. Zürcher, E. J. (2017). Turkey: A Modern History (4th ed.). I.B. Tauris, p. 254.

11. Originally and briefly named Dalatya-yı Hikmet İstihbarat Teşkilâtı (D.I.T.).

12. Ateş, A. (2013). Stratejik İstihbarat [Strategic intelligence].

13. Bezci, Egemen. “Ankara’s Hidden Hand: Turkish Covert Ops Then and Now.” War on the Rocks, January 1, 2016. Accessed online: warontherocks.com.

14. “Özel Harp işiydi ve muhteşemdi’: 6-7 Eylül Pogromu ve bir Sabri Yirmibeşoğlu portresi”, BirGün, 6 September 2022, https://www.birgun.net/haber/ozel-harp-isiydi-ve-muhtesemdi-6-7-eylul-pogromu-ve-bir-sabri-yirmibesoglu-portresi-401694

15. Manos Iliadis: Turkey’s Secret Services and MIT (Οι Τουρκικές Μυστικές Υπηρεσίες και η ΜΙΤ) (Athens: Infognomon, 1998).

16. Kadıoğlu, İ. Aytaç & Bezci, Egemen. “The mystery of intra-alliance intelligence: Turkey’s clandestine operations in the Cyprus conflict.” Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 56, no. 4, 2020, pp. 638-652. DOI: 10.1080/00263206.2020.1737524.

17. Varouhakis, M. (2009). “Fiasco in Nairobi: Greek Intelligence and the Capture of PKK Leader Abdullah Ocalan in 1999.” Studies in Intelligence, vol. 53, no. 1.

18. Fidan, Hakan. Intelligence and Foreign Policy: A Comparison of British, American and Turkish Intelligence Systems. Master’s thesis, Bilkent University, 1999.

19. “Profile: Hakan Fidan, Turkey’s Long-Serving Intelligence Chief, Becomes Foreign Minister”, Bianet (English), 6 June 2023, https://bianet.org/haber/profile-hakan-fidan-turkey-s-long-serving-intelligence-chief-becomes-foreign-minister-279876.

20. Imrali is the island prison for the PKK’s founder and ex leader, Abdullah Ocalan.

21. Spyridon Plakoudas: Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Turkey: The New PKK (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), pp. 43-44.

22. Marc Perelman: “David Petraeus: Syria Is a ‘Geopolitical Chernobyl’”, France 24, 20 October 2015, https://www.france24.com/en/20151019-interview-david-petraeus-syria-iraq-afghanistan-assad-russia.

23. Charles Lister: The Syrian Jihad: Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and the Evolution of an Insurgency (London: Hurst, 2016), pp. 225-226; Marc Lynch: The New Arab Wars: Uprisings and Anarchy in the Middle East (New York: Public Affairs, 2016), p. 195.

24. Fehim Tastekin: “Turkish Military Says MIT Shipped Weapons to Al-Qaeda”, Al Monitor, 15 January 2015, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2015/01/turkey-syria-intelligence-service-shipping-weapons.html#ixzz8LwEB5WXi; Ayse Yildiz: “Ex-Officer Arrested in Turkey’s MIT Trucks Case”, Anadolu Agency, 8 January 2021, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkey/ex-officer-arrested-in-turkeys-mit-trucks-case/2103498#.

25. Gönül Tol: “The Clash of Former Allies: The AKP versus the Gulen Movement”, Middle East Institute, 7 March 2014, https://www.mei.edu/publications/clash-former-allies-akp-versus-gulen-movement.

26. İdil, Neşe. “Four Years On, Key Questions about Turkey’s July 15 Coup Attempt Remain Unanswered.” Duvar English, July 15, 2020. Accessed online: duvarenglish.com.

27. Patrick Kingsley: “Mysteries, and a Crackdown, Persist a Year After a Failed Coup in Turkey”, New York Times, 13 July 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/13/world/europe/turkey-erdogan-failed-coup-mystery.html .

28. Indicatively, almost 10% of Turkey’s 2 million public employees were removed. Over 77,000 soldiers, agents and civil servants (e.g. judges or teachers) were arrested. Gönül Tol, Matt Mainzer, Zeynep Ekmekci: “Unpacking Turkey’s Failed Coup: Causes and Consequences”, Middle East Institute, 17 August 2016, https://www.mei.edu/publications/unpacking-turkeys-failed-coup-causes-and-consequences.

29. Daily Sabah. (2020, January 6). The Fortress: Turkey’s new intelligence HQ opens in Ankara. Daily Sabah. Retrieved from https://www.dailysabah.com/turkey/2020/01/06/the-fortress-turkeys-new-intelligence-hq-opens-in-ankara.

30. “Turkish Intelligence Thrives with National Defence Products”, Turkish Defense News, 14 January 2022, https://www.turkishdefencenews.com/turkish-intelligence-thrives-with-national-defence-products/.

31. This American term has traditionally referred to an executive controlled clandestine operations capability. For further reading see Johnson, Loch K. The Third Option: Clandestine Action and American Foreign Policy. New York, 2022. Online edn, Oxford Academic, May 19, 2022. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197604410.001.0001, accessed January 11, 2024.

32. Wojciech Michnik and Spyridon Plakoudas: Proxy Warfare on the Cheap: The Partnership Between the USA and the Syrian Kurds (New York: Lexington Books, 2023), p. 42.

33. Fidan, indeed, suggested a false-flag operation with regards to the Tomb of Sultan Suleiman Shah – an extra-territorial possession of Turkey in Northern Syria. Jack Moore: “Full Transcript of Leaked Syria ‘War’ Conversation Between Erdogan Officials”. International Business Times, 27 March 2014, https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/turkey-youtube-ban-full-transcriptleaked-syria-war-conversation-between-erdogan-officials-1442161.

34. Mohammad Abdulssattar Ibrahim and Mateo Nelson: “‘Afrin Is a Red Line’: Kurdish FSA Commander Loses his Faction after Refusing to Fight”, Syria Direct, 23 August 2017, https://syriadirect.org/news/‘afrin-is-a-red-line’-kurdish-fsa-commander-loses-his-factionafter-refusing-to-fight.

35. Liz Sly: “Syrian Rebels Take Strategic Town of Idlib”,Washington Post, 28 March 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/syrian-rebels-take-strategic-town-of-idlib/2015/03/28/59e33562-d55b-11e4-8b1e-274d670aa9c9_story.html ; Lynch: The New Arab Wars, p. 234.

36. Emre Uslu: “Jihadist Highway to Jihadist Haven: Turkey’s Jihadi Policies and Western Security”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 39, No. 9 (2016), pp. 781–802.

37. Engin Yüksel: “Strategies of Turkish Proxy Warfare in Northern Syria” (Amsterdam: Clingendael Institute, 2019), pp. 6-7.

38. Turkmens, though 3% of Syria’s pre-war population, were over-represented within the SNA. Ömer Özkizilcik: “Uniting the Opposition: The Components of the National Army and the Implications of the Unification” (Ankara: SETA, 2019), pp. 10-11.

39. Elizabeth Tsurkov: “The Syrian Mercenaries Fighting Foreign Wars for Russia and Turkey”, New York Review of Books, 16 October 2020, https://www.nybooks.com/online/2020/10/16/the-syrian-mercenaries-fighting-foreign-wars-for-russia-and-turkey/.

40. Thomas Pierret: “Turkey and the0 Syrian Insurgency: From Facilitator to Overlord” in Bavram Balci and Nicolas Monceau (eds.) Turkey, Russia and Iran in the Middle East (Paris: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021), pp. 59-77.

41. Nearly 4,000 Syrians were transferred to Libya to fight for Turkey. Isabelle Debre: “Pentagon Report: Turkey Sent up to 3,800 Fighters to Libya”, Associated Press, 18 July 2018, https://apnews.com/article/c339f71bf029f36b1091ee31c9f0171a.

42. The journalists who reported this story were later arrested and imprisoned. [Staff]: “Turkey Tries Journalists Over Reporting Deaths of Intelligence Officers”, Reuters, 24 June 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/turkey-security-libya-journalists-idINL8N2E1464/.

43. Ed Butler: “The Syrian Mercenaries Used as ‘Cannon Fodder’ in Nagorno-Karabakh”, BBC News, 1 December 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/stories-55238803.

44. Engin Yüksel: “Turkey’s Approach to Proxy war in the Middle East and North Africa”, Security and Defence Quarterly, Vol. 31. No. 4, pp. 137-152.

45. Stephen Witt: “The Turkish Drone That Changed the Nature of Warfare”, The New Yorker, 9 May 2022, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2022/05/16/the-turkish-drone-that-changed-the-nature-of-warfare

46. Alan Makovsky: “An Opposition Foreign Policy in Erdoğan’s Shadow”, Middle East Institute, 8 May 2023, https://www.mei.edu/publications/opposition-foreign-policy-erdogans-shadow.

47. Elizabeth Hagedorn: “US Sanctions Turkey-Backed Syrian Militias over Rights Abuses in Afrin”, Al Monitor, 17 August 2023, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/08/us-sanctions-turkey-backed-syrian-militias-over-rights-abuses-afrin#ixzz8T1NA0wbI.

48. The contacts between MIT and HTS caused the latter to splinter. Yüksel: “Strategies of Turkish Proxy”, pp. 13-14; Erwin van Veen: “Turkey’s Interventions in the Near Abroad: The Case of Idlib” (Amsterdam: Clingendael Institute, 2021), p. 10.

49. Abdullah Bozkurt: “Turkish Intelligence Agency MIT’s Secret Rendition Flight and Black Torture Site Exposed”, Nordic Monitor, 2 May 2021, https://nordicmonitor.com/2020/09/turkish-intelligence-agency-mits-secret-rendition-flight-and-black-torture-site-exposed/.

50. Abdullah Bozkurt: “Turkish Intel Kidnapping Critics in Europe”, Middle East Forum, 23 June 2023, https://www.meforum.org/64569/turkish-intel-kidnapping-critics-in-europe.

51. Amberin Zaman: “Drone Strike Targets US Syrian-Kurdish Ally Mazlum Kobane, Turkey Suspected”, Al Monitor, 7 April 2023, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/04/drone-strike-targets-us-syrian-kurdish-ally-mazlum-kobane-turkey-suspected.

52. Wladimir van Wilgenburg: “The SDF’s Insurgency Challenge in Deir ez-Zor”, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 14 November 2023, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/sdfs-insurgency-challenge-deir-ez-zor.

53. SavunmaSanayiST, 18 December 2023, https://twitter.com/SavunmaSanayiST/status/1736699409054699904

54. [Staff]: “US Shoots Down Turkish Drone Flying Near its Troops in Syria”, Guardian, 5 October 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/05/us-shoots-down-turkish-drone-syria.

55. Pinar Tremblay: ”Post-coup shake-up at Turkey’s intelligence agency,” Al-Monitor, November 5, 2016, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2016/11/turkey-post-botched-coup-shake-up-at-turkish-intelligence.html

Dr. John Hatzadony is Program Chair at Rabdan Academy.
Dr. Spyridon Plakoudas is an Assistant Professor at Rabdan Academy.