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Pinar Tremblay, lecturer in the Department of Political Science at California State Polytechnic University (Cal Poly), Pomona, California, spoke to a June 26th Middle East Forum Webinar (video) about the recent parliamentary and presidential elections in Turkey. The following is a summary of her comments:
Historically, a nation’s choice of leadership is exemplified by two “charismatic” twentieth century leaders whose ascension to power resulted in unexpectedly different outcomes. Winston Churchill led Great Britain to victory as prime minister in World War II, but lost the post-war 1945 election. Gamal Abdel Nasser, president of Egypt, resigned in humiliation after losing the 1967 Six-Day War, only to be reinstated by popular demand of the Egyptian people. These examples prompt the question why the British would replace a successful leader, but the Egyptians would cling to a failed one.
Under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the Turkish state fails to uphold human rights, be they women’s rights or gay rights. Education, employment, the justice system, and foreign policy all fare poorly, but reinforced by the government-controlled media, Erdoğan can do no wrong. Tremblay’s analysis of Turkey’s election is based “on the fact that Turkey is an authoritarian regime.” Colleagues and critics disagree with Tremblay’s depiction of Turkey’s governance as authoritarian and instead describe the country under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as “struggling to remain a democracy.” Others are willing to go as far as to describe it as having “a competitive” authoritarian system. Erdoğan’s “populist authoritarian” regime is characterized by the following: (1) Power does not change hands peacefully, (2) dissent is suppressed, and (3) dictatorships accumulate more power as anti-intellectualism spreads.
Those who maintain that Turkey is a struggling democracy expected Erdoğan to lose the election because of (1) a troubled economy, (2) an opposition united to take him on, and (3) an unexpected earthquake that pundits assumed would fuel discontent. Instead, an ill-prepared opposition lost, and the conservative wing of parliament, which now includes lawmakers who separated from the opposition party, is even more right-wing.
The new parliament is likely to vote with Erdoğan, rather than against him. This is because “the coalition against Erdoğan was formed by giving a lot of compromises” to former supporters of Erdoğan, who are now in the parliament. So “the cost of trying to generate a unified opposition actually backfired.” Holding elections remains essential to Erdoğan “to periodically reclaim his legitimacy, and to restructure and solidify his base.”
The government generated “fake identities” to impact the vote, with no objection from the opposition. While there is no proof of “rigging,” it is curious that in the days leading up to the first round, Turkey’s interior minister precisely predicted the election outcome. The government controls the entire system of identification records and institutes new election laws that are incomprehensible, but designed to achieve their desired outcome. Suffice it to say that the government had years to perfect its methods of maintaining power.
As a populist, Erdoğan holds these elections to claim legitimacy, but also at play is Islamism’s impenetrable belief in accepting the election winner unquestioningly as he enjoys the protection of a godly “invisible shield.” The polarization that follows populism includes groupthink that is divorced from reality and that brooks no criticism. Because there is no government accountability, the blame for a mismanaged economy can be placed on “foreign enemies or internal dissidents,” but not on Erdoğan or his monopoly on power. Economic development stagnates because an otherwise robust economy poses a political threat to autocrats by generating independence in the commercial sector and fueling fears that it will challenge an authoritarian system. Cronyism fills the vacuum and contributes to a bloated bureaucracy. Despite attempts by the opposition to change the system, the false hope of improvement is crushed by the disappointing acknowledgement that nothing will change.
Although the Biden and earlier U.S. administrations have assumed that authoritarian regimes can be siloed off from harming other countries, “authoritarian regimes don’t stay within their boundaries.” In its eagerness to get Turkey to agree to Sweden’s acceptance into NATO and to reduce pressures on Turkey’s Kurds, the administration is likely to accept the status quo in Turkey.
Economic development stagnates because an otherwise robust economy poses a political threat to autocrats by generating independence in the commercial sector.
Eager to establish relations with Gulf countries, Erdoğan is reining in his antipathy towards Israel because of the Jewish state’s warming relations with them. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia heads Erdoğan’s list of countries with which he wants to be on good terms because of Turkey’s need to support its shaky economy with “hot cash,” i.e., monies from Asia, the Middle East, and Africa that can be laundered, unlike in the West where the movement of monies is closely tracked. Finally, Turkey’s and Azerbaijan’s close relationship may also benefit Erdoğan if he can realize his plan to build a new pipeline to transport gas from Azerbaijan to Europe via Turkey. In addition, the potential for Turkey’s inclusion in any energy deal between Azerbaijan and Israel pressures Erdoğan to temper his animus towards Israel. Another economic benefit of improved relations between the two countries is a significant increase in Israeli tourists visiting Turkey.
Nonetheless, Erdoğan’s authoritarian system does not bode well for the future of Turkey. Tremblay anticipates that Turkey’s constitution, which proclaims Turkey as “a secular country,” will be “drastically” changed in the fall as part of a hard turn to the right. She expects there will be increasing pressure on gay rights groups and a lower age of consent to marry. Islamist groups are lobbying to legalize polygamy, and the refugee issue will likely worsen as Turkey’s economy declines. As the number of migrants crowding the country increases, so will the native Turkish population’s resentment of them. However, it is unlikely that Erdoğan will relinquish exploiting the refugees as a bargaining chip.
“They’re holding Europe kind of hostage on that front. Erdoğan is constantly threatening to open the gates and let the refugees flood into Europe. So, Europe has to find a solution to that somehow.”
