Hussein Aboubakr Mansour, a Milstein Writing Fellow at the Middle East Forum and author of his 2020 autobiography, Minority of One: The Unchaining of An Arab Mind, currently writes for his Substack blog, The Abrahamic Critique and Digest. Mansour spoke to a February 17 Middle East Forum Podcast (video). The following summarizes his comments:
The fall of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad in December 2024 ended a major chapter in the country’s civil war. In his place, the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) organization assumed power under its interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, also known by his nom de guerre, Abu Mohammad al-Julani.
Although it has retained the core tenets of Islamist ideology, HTS has adopted an “almost ruthless pragmatism” as a means of consolidating political power inside Syria.
HTS’s rise ostensibly constitutes the transformation of a regional Islamist movement to “post-Islamism” by claiming to prioritize “day-to-day governance” over “theological purity.”
Al-Sharaa, formerly affiliated with al Qaeda and ISIS in Syria, shifted the organization’s style “in the way they formulate their objectives.” Although it has retained the core tenets of Islamist ideology, HTS has adopted an “almost ruthless pragmatism” as a means of consolidating political power inside Syria. Promising to promote a “harmonious Syrian nation-state that will re-embrace its various groups,” HTS claims to be “no longer aligned [with] international jihadism.”
It remains to be seen if “these shifts are genuine,” or just tactical moves, “after which we’ll see a reversion back to the all familiar face of Islamism or jihadism.” However, there is the possibility of a genuine evolution towards “post-Islamist Islamism.” Shifts have been consistent with the movement’s adaptation to “various modes of acceptable legitimacy of prevailing political paradigms.” Islamism, for example, adapted to the nationalist trends at the beginning of the twentieth century. Mid-century political movements in the Third World were influenced by Leninism, with Islamism adopting “those prevailing paradigms of legitimacy.” This model continued in the 1970s, as seen in Iran’s Islamic Revolution with its revolutionary “language of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism.”
After the end of the Cold War, “we saw various Islamist groups, namely the Muslim Brotherhood in many Middle Eastern countries, trying to make themselves into legitimate political actors, becoming political parties, trying to compete over elections.” This led to a body of opinion in the West which assessed that including Islamists in power can moderate them, but that theory failed utterly with Hamas. In Syria’s case, the effects of power on Ahmed al-Sharaa will reveal whether he becomes much better or much worse by claiming “they are for democracy.”
Hamas, the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood branch, was popular with Gazans prior to taking power in 2007 because it was “known for their social services,” in contrast to the corruption for which the Palestinian Authority was known. Once in power, Hamas initially adopted the prevailing political paradigm of democracy, but subsequently “suffocated the Gazan society and the little bit of democracy that they experimented with.”
In the last year, Hamas’s invasion of Israel and subsequent massacre of its civilians exposed the effect of power on this “predatory jihadist” Islamist group to a global audience. Political power “made them one hundred times worse, not better than the group they were.” In Israel’s case, it should not overlook the possibility that “the Shia axis of resistance” would be replaced by a “Sunni axis of Islamist resistance that has Hamas, Turkey, and Syria in it.”
Gulf states, particularly the anti-Islamist United Arab Emirates, do not want Syria to become a Turkish “satellite state,” and they are aware that it is in their interest to prevent Iran’s return to Syria.
Turkish president Erdoğan is eyeing Syria to see if it will become a “client MB state in his orbit.” However, should al-Sharaa secure Saudi backing, he may outmaneuver Erdoğan. Gulf states, particularly the anti-Islamist United Arab Emirates, do not want Syria to become a Turkish “satellite state,” and they are aware that it is in their interest to prevent Iran’s return to Syria.
The biggest challenge for HTS as it consolidates power will be surviving “internal power plays” which are likely to develop from alienated parts of al-Sharaa’s “jihadist camp and coalition.” HTS’s declarations about “commitments to security and limited freedom” for Syria’s Christian groups and the dialogues it is conducting with various political factions could create discord, “including maybe even coup attempts.” Should al-Sharaa gain the support of non-Islamist Syrians relieved with Basher al-Assad’s removal, he may be able to build momentum to “triangulate out of that jihadist support.” The prospect of Gulf state investment in constructing “power stations to restore electricity” lacking in many areas of Syria will build support for al-Sharaa from the average Syrian.
The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which control nearly one third of Syria, represent “one of the biggest challenges, if not the biggest challenge, for the new Syrian government” in that they have their own autonomy as well as troops and are supported by the U.S. The SDF are suspicious of HTS as the new Syrian government seeks to unify Syria. However, it is unlikely HTS will seek a conflict with the SDF that would “hamper their [HTS’s] ability to consolidate power and gain that support that they need.”
There are many interested parties, such as the EU, which would also benefit from al-Sharaa’s success in governing Syria. It would mitigate the destabilizing effects of the Syrian Civil War on European countries from the massive migration of Syrian refugees to Europe. The involvement of European countries with the SDF could result in “mediation through an agreement” to avoid conflict between HTS and the SDF. Even with Erdoğan’s core interest in deciding Syria’s future, al-Sharaa’s success could alleviate the “the discontent of the Turkish working class” over the large presence of Syrian refugees who flooded into Turkey. Syria and its neighbor, Lebanon, have a history of “very bad relations with each other,” but both “have a direct interest in stability.” Neither wants to see further Israeli military operations “on their side of the borders,” nor the return of the Iranians.
It is still too soon to know whether HTS will evolve from its Islamist roots “towards the postmodern moment … we’re in,” influenced by technology and state capacity. Considering al-Sharaa’s background, it is logical to be suspicious of its pronouncements. It is wiser to proceed with “extreme caution, given their origins, their ties to al-Qaeda, [and] their origins in the Islamic State.” At this point, it is prudent to consider both possibilities, i.e., theological purity or pragmatic governance.
Given the jihadi roots of HTS and the example of Hamas, “caution in dealing with these groups and the current situation in Syria is the best approach and the best policy at the moment.”
“All modern major intellectual systems” are experiencing major crises. Such was the case with Marxism as it decomposed into “various forms of cultural Marxism.” Liberalism also shifted from its origins to the varied ways the left currently embodies its ideology. Islamism, “one of those big modern totalitarian ideologies of the twentieth century that wreaked havoc in many part of the world, might be also decomposing into various components.” Much like twentieth century ideologies that decomposed into “offshoots,” Islamism could be going through a similar process. In the West, the decomposition of Islamist organizations with MB connections is evident among young second and third generation Muslims on U.S. campuses, “with their own adaptation of Islamism as a form of identity politics.”
Although liberal theorists in the U.S. contend that including Islamists in power can have a moderating effect on them, that theory utterly failed with Hamas. In Syria’s case, the effects of power on Ahmed al-Sharaa will reveal whether he becomes much better or much worse.
So the key question with regard to Syria is, “Does this evolution means that we’re now seeing something that will come out completely out of the ideological origins of Islamism and works its way towards the postmodern moment in which we’re in and in which you have influence and technology and state capacity or so on, or are we going to see something like what happened with Hamas in Gaza, which basically you have an adoption of the prevailing political paradigm, which was democracy in the case of 2005 Hamas afterwards, then Hamas reverts back or becomes this predatory jihadist group that then completely destroys democracy?”
It is impossible to draw firm conclusions at the present time regarding this. The current Syrian government’s interest in aligning with “the security of the Arab Gulf and security of Saudi Arabia” is one positive indicator. HTS exhibits some signs of a shift towards a political system that maintains aspects of its Islamist identity but is “willing to conduct itself politically, regionally in a very different way.” Al-Sharaa currently appears to be shrewdly signaling this shift to Arab states, as well as to the West, in his attempt “to achieve as much legitimacy as possible.” However, given the jihadi roots of HTS and the example of Hamas, “caution in dealing with these groups and the current situation in Syria is the best approach and the best policy at the moment.”
