Policy Paper: Disarmament of Gaza

The Middle East Forum has released a policy paper challenging Israel’s passive “mow the lawn” Gaza policy, instead presenting a path toward Israel Victory. The paper calls on Israel to rid itself of Hamas’s threat by disarming it, prohibiting its rearmament, and demonstrating conclusively the cost of threatening Israel.

Jonathan Spyer

Israel has in recent years allowed a situation to emerge in which it has accepted the emergence on its southern border of an Islamist statelet committed to its destruction. Currently, Jerusalem’s stance toward the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip amounts, as the author of this paper puts it, to seeking “the longest possible intervals of relative calm between major eruptions of violence.” That is, Israel seeks to achieve a kind of live and let live situation vis-à-vis Gaza. This is maintained via a system of inducements – such as the Qatari financial assistance which Israel permits – and occasional punishments. This policy is not the result of careful formulation and planning on the part of the relevant Israeli bodies. Rather, it has emerged as a de facto response to events since the Hamas takeover of Gaza in 2007.

In this paper, Yossi Kuperwasser attempts for the first time to examine and challenge the assumptions behind this policy. He asks if Israel has ceded the initiative to the rulers of Gaza and in so doing permitted a dangerous situation to emerge in which Hamas is continually improving its capacities and arming itself with more sophisticated systems, while this situation is accepted by Israel in return for periods of quiet. Kuperwasser proposes that Israel rid itself “of Hamas’s threat by disarming it, prohibiting its rearmament, and demonstrating conclusively that threatening Israel is indisputably against its interests.” To do this, the author suggests a series of pro-active steps and initiatives that Israel should implement.

At the present time, Hamas is actively engaged in a campaign of violence against Israel launched from the West Bank and from southern Lebanon. At the same time, it is improving its capacities in Gaza. The movement and its allies are thus dictating the pace and shape of events. Israel, meanwhile, seeking short-term quiet as a cardinal objective, is reactive. In the face of the current reality, a discussion of whether the current contours of Israeli policy remain tenable is long overdue. This paper intends to begin this debate.

Zvi Hauser

Israel’s unilateral disengagement from Gaza in 2005 kindled buoyant predictions of its bright future. Some even envisaged a “Singapore of the Middle East,” hoping that Gaza’s coastline alone with massive international aid and a desire for self-betterment would steer it toward a prosperous, independent existence that would culminate in a comprehensive peace agreement with Israel.

Nothing of the sort happened. As Hamas, an Islamist terrorist organization, gained control of Gaza in the summer of 2007, the Singapore dream gave way to a Somali-Iranian mutation. In 2009, Hamas began implementing the strategy of its Lebanese counterpart, Hezbollah, making massive rocket and missile attacks on Israel’s population centers the cornerstone of its attempt to eliminate the Jewish State.

For its part, Israel’s leadership absorbed the countless attacks and contained their devastating impact through a string of defensive measures, notably the development of the Iron Dome anti-missile system. In other words, Israelis did not attempt to neutralize, let alone eliminate, the threat (contrary to pre-withdrawal warnings that all future terror attacks would be met with unforgiving retaliation). The political-military-media elite seemed to view the thousands of missiles raining down on Israel as a preordained calamity that could not be eradicated, only mitigated and protected against.

As a result, Israel’s four operations against Hamas (2008-09, 2012, 2014, 2021) all ended inconclusively with the latter quickly replenishing its losses after hostilities ended. Since the May 2021 operation (“Operation Guardian of the Walls”), an effective status quo has ensued whereby Israel acquiesces not only to Hamas’s continued rule of Gaza, its partial reconstruction and build-up of its rocket and missile arsenal, but even to its new self-proclaimed role as “defender of Jerusalem.”

The transformation of the home front (particularly the “Gaza envelope area,” as the localities around the Strip are known) into the new military frontline has undermined Israel’s sovereignty and the personal security of its citizens. It has also damaged its status as a regional power and eroded its deterrent posture. To make matters worse, Hamas’s strength grew even as Israel became increasingly desperate to reach a long-term arrangement with it. This explains why Israel engaged in virtuoso, pinpoint military tactical attacks instead of a comprehensive strategy that would ensure the security of its citizens.

As the range of rockets and missiles increases and the technology of destructive unmanned aerial devices becomes widely accessible, the ability of the few to threaten the many, anywhere and anytime, grows. Eventually, the astounding growth in the scope, range, and accuracy of Hamas’s rockets and missiles will leave Israel no choice but to make the dismantling of this deadly arsenal its goal. Jerusalem even articulated this objective at the end of the 2014 operation, only to ignore it altogether in 2021. Israel must now return to this goal, not least since Hamas’s disarmament was already envisaged by the Oslo Accords in 1993. The terror group must be made to choose between keeping its regime or its rockets.

Some doubt the possibility of disarming Hamas, thinking this either not feasible or that it would exact an intolerable cost to Israel. This recalls the debate among the Israeli leadership on the eve of Operation Defensive Shield in April 2002, when there was widespread skepticism regarding Israel’s ability to regain control over large swathes of the West Bank in order to destroy the Palestinian Authority’s terrorist infrastructure. Yet Operation Defensive Shield achieved this goal at a much lower human cost than initially feared despite being implemented too late and only when a rapidly rising death toll forced the issue and broke the mental gridlock that had paralyzed the political, military, and media leaderships.

In its most recent operations in Gaza – “Guardian of the Walls,” “Breaking Dawn,” and “Shield and Arrow,” Israel remained captive to the concept of rounds of fighting. But the Gaza quagmire will not be resolved through further inconclusive rounds of hostility. To create a new reality, Israel must adopt a new policy that conditions Gaza’s reconstruction on the dismantling of Hamas’s rocket and missile arsenal, which threaten Israel’s civilian population, violate the essence of international law, and must be ended.

Israel has often proved to be the canary in the coal mine, and its current woes may thus become others’ problems. Europe, for example, may soon face a similar threat of rocket and missile attacks from ungovernable regions of North Africa.

Demilitarization should become the overriding goal of Israel’s military strategy vis-à-vis Gaza. The most powerful army in the Middle East must immediately remove the threat from a far weaker terrorist organization and achieve a decisive victory after fifteen years of inconclusive fighting.

Brig. Gen. (Res) Yossi Kuperwasser

Israel has in recent years been living with a dangerous phenomenon to which it has become accustomed: namely, a process of adjustment to an unacceptable situation. This process has occurred without any real debate as to its advisability. Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), antisemitic Palestinian terror organizations committed to annihilating Israel through jihad, control Gaza, use its territory and the assistance they get from Iran to accumulate a growing arsenal of arms directed towards Israel, and threaten to launch attacks at a time of their choosing if Israel does not behave as they expect. These organizations use Gaza’s population as human shields to prevent Israel from hitting their terror infrastructure.

Israel has defined its goals vis-à-vis Gaza as achieving the longest possible intervals of relative calm between major eruptions of violence without challenging Hamas’s rule over the Strip. Israel regards Gaza as a de facto state where Hamas is accountable for the use of force, though from time to time, as in Operations Black Belt in 2019 and Breaking Dawn in 2022, it preferred to address the PIJ threat directly, realizing Hamas is unwilling and/or incapable of doing so itself. Israel wants Hamas to be sufficiently weak that it is deterred from initiating armed conflict, yet strong enough to force its will over any potential competitor, such as PIJ, ISIS, or other Salafist groups. Israel also seeks to keep Egypt on its side as a force that can and will help ensure tranquility and stability. Israel desires to help the Gazan economy both because it wants prosperous neighbors and to make Hamas more reluctant to commence hostilities. In the end, Israel believes the division between Hamas in Gaza and the Palestinian Authority in Judea and Samaria is beneficial to its interests.

As in all the arenas of military conflict in which Israel is engaged, in Gaza Israel plays a key role in developing specific rules of the game that determine what the parties can and cannot do. Such rules are meant to support Israel’s security doctrine to give Israel the ability to deter attacks, defend its territory, maintain intelligence dominance, and safeguard the capability to win decisively in the event of war. In the context of Gaza, these rules assure Hamas that its rule over Gaza will not be challenged and that in between the rounds of escalation it will be allowed to continue its military buildup, as Israel seldom strikes first, and its responses to Hamas’s limited attacks are always measured and proportionate.

Israel refrains from using its economic leverage over Gaza for an extended period of time, rules out the possibility of a large ground operation, avoids eliminating key Hamas figures, does not retaliate in Gaza for Hamas terror operations originating elsewhere (even if Hamas manages them from Gaza), does nothing about Hamas incitement, and does not try to alter the negative role that UNRWA plays by eternalizing the conflict and promoting hate. It is also careful to limit the collateral damage of its operations in Gaza and adheres to the law of armed conflict and international humanitarian law.

This policy reflects Israel’s view that Hamas’s challenge from Gaza is a chronic problem that cannot be solved, and yet a minor threat compared with those from Iran, Hezbollah, the Israeli Arabs, and the Palestinians living under the Palestinian Authority. It also reflects an approach that rules out putting IDF soldiers in harm’s way should a ground operation become necessary to effect change, and a fear that reuniting Gaza and the PA will invite international pressure on Israel to succumb to Palestinian demands regarding any permanent settlement to the conflict. Israel is also worried that an attempt to proactively change the situation may raise tensions with the U.S., its strategic ally, and with its regional allies Egypt, Jordan, and the Abraham Accords partners.

The flaws of such an approach are clear: it grants Hamas the self-confidence to develop its military and terror capabilities, increase its power in the Palestinian political arena, and, worst of all, condemn Israelis – especially those living in the vicinity of the Gaza Strip – to persistent threats from Hamas terrorists.

The IDF defines victory as achieving its mission, which in the context of Hamas is realized by inflicting the degree of damage necessary to ensure a renewed and relatively long interval of calm until the next round of violence. This facilitates the win-win scenarios characteristic of the last several cycles, including Operation Guardian of the Wall in May 2021, in which Hamas paid a heavy price militarily in a way that restored Israeli deterrence, but achieved its strategic goals inside the Palestinian political arena and was able to recover quickly to continue threatening Israel.

A far more effective definition of victory would be to rid Israel of Hamas’s threat by disarming it, prohibiting its rearmament, and demonstrating conclusively that threatening Israel is indisputably against its interests. Achieving this goal will not be easy, but with proper preparation it may be feasible, and Israel should craft a campaign to achieve it. It must further improve its excellent intelligence coverage of the terror groups in Gaza, improve and make optimal use of its operational capabilities, and better employ its diplomatic and legal assets. Moreover, Hamas is recognized as a terror organization by the countries whose support in this matter Israel needs, so defeating it should be seen as self-defense.

Achieving true victory also requires Israel to revisit its mode of operation in Gaza. Israel must take the initiative and deny Hamas the ability to produce and develop new weapons even absent Hamas’s provocation. This must be done on a grand scale and not in the limited way it is performed today, which is futile. Economic pressure is one particularly effective option, because Hamas’s leadership should be held accountable as long as it incites and threatens Israel and arms itself to fulfill its threats. Achieving lasting victory also means convincing Hamas (and Egypt) that if there is no other option, Israel might launch a ground operation against Hamas as well as encourage Gazans to revolt.

All of this requires invigorating public debate about Gaza. Discussion on this matter usually dies out minutes after the last rocket launch in any given conflict – a situation arising from Israel’s crowded agenda and its (over)confidence that the Iron Dome and other new defense capabilities will protect it from Gaza-based threats. Politicians, civil society groups such as the Israel Victory Project, and popular movements must keep this debate alive, as otherwise the old paradigm will remain in place.

When to implement any new policy is an open question. On the one hand, immediate execution would be ideal, as there is no justification for allowing Hamas to stall in order to boost its ability to harm Israel and threaten its population. On the other hand, adopting a new policy without sufficient time to properly prepare military and diplomatic forces as well as public opinion would be a mistake. Therefore, it would be best to implement a new policy only after preparations are complete, or if Hamas hands Israel a trigger to apply the new plan. Some elements of the new policy, however, such as clandestine activities, can be adopted right away.

Some of the opposition to forcing Hamas to disarm may stem from fear that it would threaten Hamas’s power in Gaza, thereby forcing its replacement, at least temporarily, by the IDF, a move that would be costly over time. In fact, an Israeli takeover is neither necessary nor inevitable. Even should it occur, it may be preferable to the alternative of never-ending barrages of Hamas rockets threatening Israelis nationwide.

A proactive and decisive strategy must be formulated and implemented to eventually force Hamas to accept a new set of rules that will relieve Israel of this threat. Such a strategy will also make Israel’s strength and resoluteness clear to the Palestinians, weaken Hamas’s political standing, and send a message of deterrence to Iran, Hezbollah, and their allies. Eventually it may also aid the peace process by demonstrating that armed attacks and jihad against Israel harms Palestinians, and that their conditions will improve only after they accept Israel as the permanent Jewish state.

What is needed is not only a change in the rules of the game (see Appendix II), but a change in both the public discourse and in Israel’s definition of victory. This new definition should include denying Hamas the ability to rearm itself so that it will be less willing to reengage in terror campaigns against Israel.

After years of adhering to the rules outlined above, and after repeatedly conducting operations with limited goals, it will not be easy for an Israeli government to change the rules and the definition of victory. Avoiding these difficult decisions perpetuates the current reality of “mowing the grass,” whereby each round of escalation heavily damages Hamas’s infrastructure, but fails to prevent it from rearming rapidly with more sophisticated and capable weaponry. Meanwhile, Israel keeps improving its defensive and offensive capabilities to counter new threats from Hamas and other terror groups.

Operating under the principle of revealed preference (i.e., judging the interests of entities and individuals by their deeds, preferences, and decisions rather than their declared interests), it appears that Israel prefers the option of “mowing the grass” to any alternative. This choice also reflects Israel’s grasp of its limitations on the diplomatic level, where any change in policy might mean increased tensions with the international community, including the United States, Egypt, and possibly other Arab states, such as Jordan and Morocco, despite their collective dislike of Hamas.

The option of “mowing the grass” seems, therefore, to be the lesser evil under current conditions. Yet it is still problematic since it allows Hamas to strengthen and leaves Israel’s population under constant threat. The question, then, is whether it is possible to create and adopt better options that would make Israeli victory clear, weaken Hamas, and diminish or even eliminate its threat to Israelis. For that to happen, it is necessary to explore what changes must occur to make a different outcome possible. These changes will need to address the military and economic spheres, the diplomatic and legal context, and Israel’s discourse and the rules of the game in Gaza.

In the military context, Israel must achieve the ability to totally suppress the capability of Hamas and the other terror groups to launch terror attacks from the Gaza Strip. Instead of counting on deterrence to achieve that goal, Israel should improve its already quite good intelligence coverage of Gaza so that it achieves continuous intelligence dominance over terror activities there. Israel must, therefore, be able to thwart most terror attempts before they are launched and eliminate Hamas operatives at any level at will. Today, in spite of the good coverage and the impressive improvement in producing targets in advance and within real time thanks to the implementation of interdisciplinary intelligence, Israel does not have these advanced capabilities.

On the operational side, Israel must gain the self-confidence to operate in a secured manner from the air, sea, and ground against the terror infrastructure inside the Gaza Strip, just as it does in Judea and Samaria or in the Syrian front. Israel has developed in recent years important tools designed to move it closer to achieving this capability. Most important among these is the concept of intelligence intensified warfare (“LOCHAMAM” in its Hebrew acronym) that is designed to mobilize and make available to soldiers on the ground all the capabilities of the intelligence community in a way that is relevant to the battle in which they are engaged. Another important capability is improved protection provided to ground forces. Israel has made some breakthroughs in this respect since 2014 by deploying more heavily armored personnel carriers in its ground forces (i.e., the Achzarit, Namer) and improving its anti-missile protection. The use of precisely guided munitions from the ground, air, and sea has also been improved considerably, as was demonstrated in Operation Guardian of the Walls in 2021, Breaking Dawn in 2022, and Shield and Arrow in 2023.

To convince Hamas that Israel is ready to adopt a new, more proactive and offensive attitude, including ground operations if necessary, and thus enhance the deterrence against Gazan terror groups, Israel should conduct more exercises focused on operations in Gaza involving both standing forces and reservists, and embark on a campaign against Hamas’s military buildup in the same manner it conducts campaigns against Hizballah’s buildups. It should deploy forces in the area as it does occasionally in times of military escalation, conduct clandestine deniable operations in Gaza, and use influence operations to deliver an unmistakable message.

Diplomatically, Israel can pressure Hamas to reconsider its military build-up ambitions, just as in the past Israel was able to end Sudan’s cooperation with Hamas in delivering arms to Gaza. Today, based on its tight security cooperation with Egypt, improved relations with Turkey, strong security cooperation with some of the Gulf states, and cooperation with Qatar and Jordan, Israel can form a joint effort comprised of all these forces to force Hamas to reassess the benefits from its efforts to arm itself.

This can complement efforts in the economic sphere, where Israel should condition any influx of money and economic assistance that can benefit Hamas, directly or indirectly, on Hamas’s readiness to end all efforts to arm itself. This may be well received by many potential donors to Gaza if it is accompanied by, first, explanations of the severe repercussions of donating without conditions and, second, a plan to improve living conditions in Gaza if Hamas ends all efforts to acquire arms. The complete dependence of Hamas on foreign sources – and especially on Israel and Egypt – for keeping Gaza’s economy functioning is a key tool at Israel’s disposal. Using it involves conditioning the influx of funds and economic activities and benefits, such as entry of Gazan workers to Israel, on accepting this justified demand, which is a component of the Oslo Accords, and not merely on refraining from using its weapons arsenal, as is the situation today.

These efforts are not only necessary to provide Israelis and Palestinians with the security they deserve, but legally justified since Israel handed over responsibility for the Gaza Strip to the Palestinians in the context of the Oslo Accords wherein the Palestinians are committed to not possess weapons beyond those agreed upon. The various weapons that Hamas has amassed today are forbidden by the agreement, and Hamas should relinquish them.

It is worth noting in this respect that the Quartet that oversees international efforts to promote peace between Israel and the Palestinians has three conditions for accepting Hamas as a legitimate player, including denouncing terrorism and accepting the agreements between Israel and the PLO, among them the Oslo agreements. Obviously, Israel has sufficient justification to deny Hamas, a terror organization that boasts of its success in arming itself to kill Israelis indiscriminately, from possessing such weapons to use against Israelis and using them in such a manner to threaten Israel’s security. Moreover, Hamas is designated a terrorist organization by the United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and Japan. Therefore, the Israeli government has the obligation to take harsh steps to force Hamas to disarm and to deny it the capacity to arm itself. Israel should be able to count on the support of every country and organization that recognizes Hamas’s terror status. Some Arab countries, such as Saudi Arabia, also consider Hamas a terrorist organization and may support decisive action by Israel against it.

As noted above, advancing these demands on Hamas and adopting this new policy regarding threats from the Gaza Strip, though justified and feasible, require Israel to revisit some of the rules of the game and change the discourse about Gaza in Israeli society. For example, the rule stipulating that Israel will not take the initiative and will content itself with retaliation needs to be reconsidered. If Israel wants to force Hamas to disarm or to stop arming itself, it should be able to operate on its own initiative and at the time and place it chooses so that, instead of limited military action against arms production facilities, it could hit vital locations as they are discovered. Under current rules, Hamas may learn in advance when its facilities are in danger and make the necessary arrangements to minimize damage, knowing it can expect only a minimal attack against some of them. This severely limits Israel’s ability to punish Hamas for an attack. Moreover, it allows Hamas to maintain weapons procurement and production between terrorist attacks and to store them in hard-to-find locations.

Operation Guardian of the Walls is a notable example of how self-defeating this rule is. For several days before the Operation began, Hamas threatened to launch rockets and made the necessary preparations to attack. Had Israel known about these concrete preparations, it could have prevented the rockets’ launch and made Hamas pay a much heavier price for its intent. Had Israel taken the initiative and hit Hamas’s infrastructure in advance, its actions would have been well within the confines of the law of armed conflicts, not only because Hamas is a terror organization, but because it was clear Hamas was planning to attack Israel. As Israel interprets Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, it reads: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations.” Such intent is a casus belli and Israel is legally allowed to act preemptively against a planned armed attack on its citizens. Israel used this article to justify the attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981, its many attacks against terror groups in Lebanon, and the Six Day War in 1967. In Operation Breaking Dawn, Israel acted to foil a terror attempt in advance in a perfectly legal manner. In Operation Shield and Arrow in 2023, meanwhile, Israel responded to rocket attacks launched by Palestinian Islamic Jihad from Gaza.

The second rule described above – Israel’s choice to refrain from enforcing long-term sanctions or pressuring the Gazan economy to prevent Hamas from arming itself – should also be reconsidered. Because Hamas’s need to provide for Gaza’s inhabitants is one of its principal burdens, economic restraints have an immediate impact on its behavior. Instead of using them only as retaliation in the aftermath of terror attacks against Israel, they can be leveraged effectively to prevent Hamas from arming itself. The same is true of the economic measures Israel takes against Hamas to encourage it to refrain from launching rockets and to commit to longer periods of quiet. These measures could and should be conditioned on Hamas’s commitment to stop arming itself and eventually disarm. Obviously, these actions should also depend on Hamas’s readiness to move ahead on the issue of detainees held in Gaza and the corpses of the two Israeli soldiers.

Regarding the third rule granting immunity to the upper echelon of Hamas’s political leaders, Israel should make clear that as long as Hamas continues to behave as a terrorist organization with no separation between the political and military/terror wings, and as long as it arms itself, its political leadership is a legitimate target, and not merely in the context of a high-intensity confrontation. Hamas may protest, but eventually this new attitude positively affects its decision making.

The fourth rule, which allows Hamas to operate against Israel from other areas without risking its assets in Gaza, must also be reconsidered. This rule makes sense if Israel’s interest is to keep Gaza quiet, but leaves Hamas unrestrained in Judea, Samaria, and Jerusalem. In recent years Israel managed to thwart most of Hamas’s terror plots from areas controlled by the Palestinian Authority or Jerusalem. There is no guarantee these successes will continue forever, however, so deterring Hamas from operating in other areas while its headquarters are in Gaza is necessary. The ongoing effort to convince Turkey to expel from its territory Hamas’s offices overseeing terror operations in Judea, Samaria, and Jerusalem can serve as an example of what can be done regarding Gaza. If Hamas knows that conducting terror operations from areas controlled by the Palestinian Authority and from Jerusalem is costly, it might take this into consideration.

The same is true for the fifth rule regarding inaction on Hamas’s incitement. Israel should take diplomatic action against Hamas in retaliation for its provocation and expose its deadly messages to justify steps necessary to prevent Hamas from arming and to disarm it. Obviously, a terror organization that calls publicly for the murder of Israeli citizens and for the destruction of the state of Israel should not be allowed to arm itself as Hamas does.

The same thinking applies for the sixth rule concerning UNRWA. Israel treats this organization courteously despite its harmful actions because it believes UNRWA contributes to ensuring calm among Gaza’s population and helps improve living conditions in the Strip. This is understandable as short-term logic, but if Israel wishes to change the situation in Gaza for the long run, it must adopt a policy that recognizes UNRWA as part of the problem and not part of the solution. The refugee question should not be treated in a way that perpetuates the problem, which is exactly what UNRWA is designed to do. At a very minimum, Israel must insist that UNRWA removes from its textbooks any indoctrination and incitement toward hate and disengages from and condemns all its employees, especially teachers, who are Hamas members or have openly supported terror against Israel. Israel’s broader goal should be UNRWA’s elimination. The treatment of refugees should be remanded to the agency responsible for providing services to all other refugees worldwide, namely, the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), which defines refugees very differently and focuses on taking care of people in need rather than on political agitation.

Revisiting the seventh rule is key for changing the results of this conflict. As long as Hamas knows that Israel will not attempt to uproot it from Gaza, it can continue arming itself and conducting periodic terror attacks knowing the price it will pay may be heavy – especially if Israel changes the other rules mentioned – but not existential. History teaches us that even though Western powers like the United States and Israel try to avoid overreacting to enemy provocation, an enemy’s own drastic actions may provoke a dramatic and decisive reaction. Historical examples illustrating this include America’s intervention in the First and Second World Wars and the occupation of Afghanistan, and Israel’s two wars in Lebanon and Operation Defensive Shield (2002). Clarifying this as among Israel’s viable options may not only deter Hamas and make it easier to persuade it to stop arming itself, but may also further commit Egypt to pressure Hamas and tighten its control of arms smuggling routes. Egypt is always eager to avoid any decisive Israeli operation that could undermine its own stability.

Unseating Hamas would not necessarily require a ground operation. Much of the work can be accomplished via stand-off capabilities, but convincing Hamas and Egypt that such an option is feasible requires a willingness to seriously consider and then prepare for a ground operation. Most of that operation could focus on the less populated areas and on the Philadelphi corridor between Egypt and Gaza. Still, some of it may occur in densely populated neighborhoods.

The one rule that should not be revisited – rule number eight – is Israel’s commitment to international law, and its efforts to minimize collateral damage. This is not an impediment to achieving the goals Israel should set; on the contrary, it confirms that Israel occupies the moral high ground. This in itself cannot guarantee any softening of the international criticism such Israeli actions would spark, but it is extremely important for Israelis to know they are doing the right thing.

On top of all of that, achieving the goal of preventing Hamas from arming itself or of convincing it to disarm requires a change in Israel’s dialogue on relations with Gaza. First, its assessment of risking soldiers’ lives in a ground operation must change, as mentioned before, to convince Hamas that a ground operation is a viable threat. Second, there must be an understanding that Hamas’s threat is strategic and thus worth the effort required to remove it. Though Hamas does not pose as great a threat as Iran or Hezbollah, its readiness to use force, and the frequency of its attacks against Israel, are much greater and therefore renders it a strategic problem and not simply a nuisance. As long as many Israelis consider Hamas’s threat as a chronic problem of limited importance because other problems are more demanding, the government will not be able to build the necessary public support for such an operation. The strategy advocating Hamas’s rule over Gaza as an asset for Israel in the wider context of the Palestinian problem must also be reevaluated.

Achieving this requires sustained efforts to persuade the public by making use of the strategies described in this paper. The political class in Israel must deal with the matter, and so must civil society organizations and civilians at large. The Israel Victory Project (IVP) and the Israel Victory lobby in the Knesset, which are bipartisan, are well placed to lead this effort. Civil society organizations like HaBitchonistim can help as well. Yet these groups are not strong enough on their own and must be complemented by popular movements with greater citizen participation from the area around Gaza. Generally, such groups are acknowledged for a brief period after an escalation erupts, yet recede shortly afterwards. But there is no ongoing debate on the matter. Because Israel faces myriad threats and challenges, attention spans for a specific issue are short-lived and fail to permanently alter the conversation.

People are also deterred from dealing with this matter because over time they have grown used to the way things are. Despite attendant difficulties and the heavy cost of maintaining the status quo regarding Gaza, one may posit that, after fifteen years of this approach, Israelis have largely become accustomed to it. With Iron Dome operational and other countermeasures being added to active defense capabilities, they are less concerned. They also worry about the consequences should Israel eliminate Hamas’s threat through a ground operation that would leave Gaza under Israeli control because ruling Gaza would prove costly over the long run. It is therefore necessary to devise a way forward that does not leave Gaza under Israeli occupation indefinitely.

Achieving this goal requires convincing people that the alternative future should Israel not force Hamas to stop arming itself and disarm is even worse. Hamas’s determination to harm Israel is not going to disappear, and its ability to terrorize may grow and pose an even greater threat. Time is on the side of those who make the best use of it regarding the ongoing strategic competition between Hamas and Israel.

Summing up the factors of time and habit: Israel is clearly not yet ready – politically, militarily, and most obviously in its public’s opinion – to adopt a different strategy towards Gaza. But the time is ripe to start a public debate about these issues and to develop the strategy and military capabilities and plans that would make such a debate meaningful. The cost of adhering to the current strategy is rising, and the enemy may make better use of the time strategically. Moreover, a change in policy and strategy cannot occur absent the necessary context. This means Israel must reassess its approach and prepare the necessary tools for implementing a different strategy that will remove Hamas’s threat, but it must implement it only after it is ready and once Hamas provides a proper trigger to do so.

Similar reevaluations are in progress regarding Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Iranian nuclear project, and to some extent regarding segments of Arab society in Israel. The threats are growing steadily and Israel’s reluctance to proactively confront the challenges in pursuit of short-lived periods of calm emboldens its enemies to threaten it belligerently and therefore to raise the risk of escalation. A decision to change strategies cannot be postponed much longer. Israel must not be tempted to imagine that Operations Breaking Dawn and Shield and Arrow were sufficient to restore deterrence in the face of all these challenges. A more thorough-going and comprehensive strategy must be formulated.

Hamas is a Palestinian terror organization founded in Gaza in December 1987 as an offspring of the Islamic Association (AlMujamaa AlIslami) led by Shaikh Ahmad Yassin. The movement, which is the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, rapidly gained strength and influence within the Palestinian communities and became the major competitor to the Fatah movement for the leadership of the Palestinian people. It has spread its influence in Judea and Samaria as well as in the Palestinian diaspora and amongst the Israeli Arabs through groups close to it such as the Islamic Movement (especially its Northern Branch).

Hamas’s goal is to eradicate Israel, and it believes the only way to do that is through jihad (Islamic holy war). Its charter, filled with antisemitic tropes, outlines the Islamic roots of its commitment to destroy Israel and describes its national identity as a Palestinian movement. Hamas strictly opposes the Oslo agreements and any sort of recognition of Israel, much less its Jewish identity. Nevertheless, it attempts to gain political prowess and reach out to international audiences. In pursuit of these goals, Hamas integrates some pragmatism into its policy. For example, in 2006 it participated in elections to the Palestinian parliament created by the Oslo Accords. Similarly, its 2017 political plan sought to represent its policies as pragmatic, although its commitment to its radical charter was unchanged.

In pursuit of its goal, Hamas has built an extensive civilian network that assures the population’s loyalty to the cause of struggle and to the organization. It has also constructed an impressive infrastructure for terror and military capabilities in Gaza that enables it to launch occasional rounds of escalation with Israel while creating the impression that an Israeli military operation inside Gaza will be very costly. These capabilities give Hamas the ability to overcome internal challenges to its rule in Gaza or to its policies, including its struggle against Israel. Its military wing AKA, “Iz aldin Alqassam Battalions,” made up of some 30,000 activists, is comprised of several regional brigades, special operations, ground, sea, and air units, all supported by a strong military industrial infrastructure. It possesses impressive terror capabilities centered around a variety of rockets and mortars with ranges of up to 150 km (93 miles) that are often deployed indiscriminately against Israeli civilians. In recent years the organization has been developing and acquiring advanced weaponry, including unmanned aerial vehicles, guided land-to-sea torpedoes, and advanced anti-tank and anti-air missiles that may increase its capacity for inflicting strategic damage on precisely chosen targets in Israel. Hamas had already warned that it will start the next round of escalation with a barrage of 1,111 rockets and introduce new UAVs and other weaponry that will catch Israel off guard.

Hamas’s reasoning holds that whatever happens in its rounds of armed confrontation with Israel, it will be victorious since its military capabilities are inferior to Israel’s. Hence, any damage to Israel, especially if achieved by a surprise attack using a new system or capability, is a great accomplishment. Any damage inflicted on Hamas and the Palestinians, however, is expected and may strengthen the mentality of victimhood and suffering that is a critical pillar of the Palestinian narrative, promote the demonization and delegitimization of Israel, and help present Hamas in the Palestinian arena as the symbol of the struggle against Zionism. That approach is limited, of course, and when the damage inflicted on Hamas is significantly greater than what it perpetrates on Israel, it is deterred and desires to end the conflict. This logic illustrates why the learning competition that characterizes the confrontation between Hamas and Israel is so important for both sides.

Hamas and PIJ’s military capabilities are – to a large extent – a result of their military cooperation with Iran and Hezbollah. Iran supplies them with weapons, military production technology, and guidance along with the financial support necessary for their buildup. Hezbollah provides technological assistance and consultancy based on its military and terror expertise.

The major factor holding Hamas back from being even more confrontational and better prepared, beyond Israel’s actions, is its need to cater to the needs of Gaza’s population. About 2 million Palestinians inhabit Gaza, and many of them suffer from poor living conditions, poverty, unemployment, the inability to use their professional skills, and social disorder.

These conditions, a result of Hamas’s commitment to destroy Israel, generate frustration and animosity among many Gazans towards Hamas, and especially towards its operatives and leadership, who are resented for enjoying a luxurious standard of living in the Strip and abroad in Turkey and Qatar. While Hamas does not hesitate to suppress opposition, it must still be on the alert for it. As a result, it is willing to trade temporary tranquility for better living conditions while remaining committed to its ideology and policy of jihad. Similarly, Hamas must also take into consideration its relations with Egypt, as their border provides the main gate for Hamas operatives and for Gaza’s people to enter and exit the Strip and is a main conduit for products coming into it, including fuel.

This paper focuses on Israeli options in relation to Gaza, yet the conflict between Israel and the terror groups that control Gaza, led by Hamas, is best understood within the broader regional aspects of the conflict and as a part of the wider Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) are significant players among the Middle East’s radical Islamic groups, as they provide an important foothold in the Palestinian arena, which in turn helps justify their activities and their radical ideology calling for Israel’s demise. Hamas’s importance also stems from its unique situation as a member of both the Iran-led Shiite radical camp and of the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood radical camp led by Qatar and, until recently, by Turkey as well.

Simultaneously, Gaza is part of the power struggle for Palestinian leadership. Separated from the areas controlled by the Palestinian Authority in Judea and Samaria since 2007, it has distinguished itself as the embodiment of the idea of jihad/armed resistance against Israel, and it challenges the more nuanced approach of the Palestinian Authority. It also defies the legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority’s political structures and the PLO’s status as the sole representative of the Palestinian people as long as Hamas and PIJ are not members of it. The battle over Palestinian leadership is exacerbated by the competition for influence within Israeli Arab society and by the aging of PA leader Mahmoud Abbas – factors that set the stage for a struggle between potential successors, including Hamas. Fatah’s weakening and fragmentation and the PA’s diminishing ability to control the areas under its responsibility, coupled with Hamas’s relatively strong grip on the territories under its command, give Hamas an advantage in its confrontation with Fatah and the PA.

Israel’s policy in general, and regarding the threat from Gaza in particular, is founded on a vision of a secure and democratic nation state of the Jewish people in their ancestral homeland that can integrate into the Middle East by creating peaceful relations with its neighbors.

Security, the guiding principle of Israel’s policy, is achieved through developing intelligent strategies, strong armed services, and shrewd policies that guarantee its ability to:

1. Win decisively any confrontation with its enemies.
2. Provide accurate intelligence and early warning about the development of threats to its security in a timely manner to enable it to foil these threats.
3. Deter its enemies from threatening its security.
4. Protect and defend Israel should threats materialize despite efforts to thwart and deter them.

Several concepts have been developed throughout the years to achieve these four components:

1. A people’s armed forces, based on conscription and a large reserve army, which enables amassing the necessary well-trained manpower for confronting any combination of threats. That said, Israel’s elite units and air force are based on volunteers from among the conscripts and on recruitment of the best and brightest to allow its security services to maintain an advantage over its opponents. In recent years there is a growing outcry about the erosion of the preparedness of the ground forces reserve units to fight in future armed conflicts. This has many implications regarding, among other things, the readiness of the military and political leadership to engage these units in ground operations in Gaza if they are deemed necessary.
2. Air force superiority and intelligence dominance to guarantee the ability to thwart any military threat. In the Gaza context Israel enjoys complete freedom in using its air force, though in recent years Hamas’s threats include anti-aircraft missiles and an intelligence apparatus that is impressive, though far from perfect.
3. Qualitative military edge (QME) over any opponent or combination of potential adversaries based on the technological lead Israel maintains in military equipment over its neighbors, including Hamas and the other terror organizations operating in Gaza. Maintaining this QME vis-à-vis Gaza is very expensive, as stopping the simple weapons used against Israel requires a huge investment in counter-measures, such as Iron Dome interceptors.
4. Special strategic security cooperation with the United States based on common strategic interests and values as well as reciprocal military and intelligence benefits. Though the U.S. supports Israel’s efforts to stop terror attacks from Gaza, it is opposed to any Israeli attempt to proactively change the rules of the game in the Strip, especially if this means pressuring Gaza’s population. Moreover, to maintain the QME in the Gaza context, Israel needs American support, especially to sustain sufficient production of Iron Dome interceptors while developing and acquiring other weapons options.
5. Fighting the war on enemy territory, both because Israel’s small size precludes fighting on its own territory, and because thwarting emerging threats requires operations on foreign soil. In the last couple of decades Israel’s readiness to use massive ground formations for maneuvering in enemy territories has diminished significantly because of its reluctance to pay the inevitable price in casualties. It withdrew from Lebanon in 2000 and, following its disengagement from Gaza in 2005, it refrained as much as possible from entering the Strip with ground forces. This places most of the burden for taking the battle into enemy territory on the air force and on clandestine special operations units.
6. Inhouse security innovation and creativity reflect the understanding that warfare involves an ongoing competition for knowledge, both in the technological sphere and in operational concepts, especially when dealing with varied and ever-changing enemies. In recent years, for example, Israel had to develop relevant technologies and operational concepts against new challenges emanating from the Palestinian community, often from Gaza, such as suicide bombing attacks, operations within densely populated refugee camps, rockets, offensive tunnels, UAVs, incendiary balloons, and the new challenges posed by Israeli-Arabs. In the wider context, growing challenges of big data, cyber, and cognitive warfare are examples of areas in which Israel needs to lead innovation.
7. The Begin doctrine, which holds that Israel will prevent its opponents from acquiring the capabilities to produce nuclear weapons. Preparedness according to this doctrine is achieved at the expense of the readiness to take the initiative in other arenas, such as Gaza.
8. The retaliation principle, through which Israel is committed to militarily respond to every attempt to harm its civilians or interests. This response is usually related to the effects of the enemy attempt and is exemplified in addressing the terror threat from Gaza. The Israeli retaliation tariff chart is contingent on the damage caused by the terrorists and the kind of targets they try to hit.
9. The campaign between the wars (known by its Hebrew acronym MABAM). To avoid and delay war, Israel needs to keep degrading its enemies’ capabilities so that they will lack the confidence and capability to launch an offensive.
10. Home front resilience: In recent decades, after Israel’s enemies realized they could not win a conventional confrontation against its military, they have focused on their ability to harm civilians. This has required Israel to strengthen the resilience of both its population and its strategic infrastructure to withstand the threat and maintain the functioning of daily life. These are achieved in part by passive and active defense and by inculcating an appropriate state of mind and awareness within the population and by developing the necessary infrastructure and processes to ensure a continuous supply of basic commodities during crises. Still, Israel’s home front is far from being properly prepared to sustain a long conflict.
11. Commitment to the law of armed conflict and international humanitarian law: Israel’s security forces operate in accordance with international law and are proud of adhering strictly to the ethics of armed conflicts.
12. Maintain international legitimacy and international relations to expand Israel’s freedom of action and maneuver and to improve its military capabilities.
13. Self-reliance: Israel should be ready to defend itself alone.

From a policy point of view, Israel seeks stability and peace and is a committed participant in the international war on terror. It regards Iran as the major threat to regional stability and is an avowed supporter of regional cooperation to confront the Iranian threat. In pursuit of these goals, it cooperates with the United States and pragmatic Arab states. The Abraham Accords with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Morocco are a major proof of this commitment, as are Israel’s security relations with Egypt and Jordan. Israel has developed close relations with Eastern European countries as well as with Greece and Cyprus, both of whom offer a potential strategic depth that can compensate for Israel’s narrow territory. Recently, Israel has improved its relations with major Islamic states, including Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Its relations with the Saudis and Emiratis are based on a shared regional outlook regarding both Iran and Sunni radical groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic State as dangerous threats to regional stability. Israel’s improving relations with Turkey are premised on a reduction of Turkey’s support for Hamas.

Israel’s policy toward the Palestinian issue is complex. It desires a stable peace agreement with the Palestinians that will guarantee Israel’s security, but over the years has become increasingly skeptical about the possibility of reaching such an agreement because of the Palestinian leadership’s ongoing terror, incitement, and consistent rejection of Israel’s peace plans. Moreover, many Israelis believe the Palestinians are not ready for a compromise requiring them to recognize Israel’s identity as the nation state of the Jewish people and are committed to struggle against Zionism until it is destroyed. At the same time, Israel does not want to govern the Palestinians and prefers they rule themselves.

Israelis differ on questions of territorial divisions of the areas taken in 1967. Most Israelis believe the Jewish people, based on history and international law as well as Israel’s security needs, have a justified claim to areas in Judea and Samaria that are not populated by Palestinian Arabs. Given these security considerations, they also believe that in any future agreement Israel should maintain sole sovereignty of a united Jerusalem, certain areas along the 1967 line, and the Jordan Valley. Israeli’s lack of trust in the Palestinians is exacerbated by Palestinian antagonism toward Israel in international fora, their opposition to a normalization process with the Arab world and to normalizing their own relationship with Israel, and their insistence on paying salaries to terrorists. Most of all, Israelis’ distrust stems from the indoctrination of Arab Israelis with radical propaganda, a strategy that led to Arab riots during Operation Guardian of the Walls (May 2021) and later to a spree of terror attacks by Arab Israelis.

Also concerning to Israel is the international support for many of the Palestinian positions coupled with Israel’s limited success in convincing segments of international public opinion, especially Europeans and left-leaning Americans, including the younger generation, that Israel deserves the West’s understanding and support in its conflict with the Palestinians. Recent developments in Western politics have portrayed Israel as the enemy among Europeans and the American left, where Palestinians are viewed as the underdog. The result is a readiness to tolerate Palestinians’ rejectionism and eliminationism, including their frequent use of terror.

Faced with this complex reality and with the division inside the Palestinian camp between Hamas in Gaza and the Palestinian Authority in Judea and Samaria, along with its singular domestic political situation, Israel has adopted a policy of “Managing the Conflict.” This means that Israel militarily opposes Palestinian terrorism originating from Judea and Samaria, Gaza, and among Arab Israelis. It therefore carries out military operations in Judea and Samaria, retaliates for and tries to thwart terror attacks from Gaza, and attempts to deny Gaza terrorist organizations the ability to damage Israel.

It also seeks to appease and deter the Israeli Arabs to minimize the danger they pose. At the same time Israel tries to improve the living conditions of the Palestinians everywhere by, among other things, increasing the number of Palestinians allowed to work in Israel. Israel also attempts to improve the Palestinian Authority’s financial situation so it can meet the challenges posed by Hamas and look after its citizens. This strategy assumes the PA is more pragmatic and less supportive of terror than the alternative, and that the existence of the PA is a major asset in maintaining the status-quo. It sees the PA as assuming the responsibility of ruling over the Palestinians and remaining committed to its security cooperation with Israel, which is allegedly aiding the fight against Hamas in Judea and Samaria. In this context Israel refrains from taking decisive steps against the Palestinians’ problematic initiatives on the ground (such as unauthorized construction in area C) and in international fora. At the same time, Israel continues to authorize construction in the Jewish communities in Judea and Samaria and in Jerusalem and takes tentative steps against the PA’s outrageous payments of salaries to terrorists. This policy, filled as it is with internal tensions and contradictions, does not and cannot deliver genuine peace. Yet this status-quo is deemed the least bad option compared with its alternatives, especially as Israel develops close relations with the signatories to the Abraham Accords.

For years, Israel has viewed Gaza as a chronic problem with no easy solution. The densely populated area suffers from insurmountable economic and infrastructural difficulties, and its population has been radicalized for decades. It is home to active Islamists and other extremists who support terror. Many of its inhabitants self-define as “refugees” and their descendants who, unwilling to define themselves as Gazans, nurture their aspirations to return, a stance that makes them susceptible to recruitment for terrorist acts against Israel. For these reasons, Israel willingly handed over Gaza to Palestinian responsibility in the first part of the Oslo Accords in 1994 and in 2005 disengaged from Gaza and uprooted the Israeli communities there. Though no one knows what the outcome may have been had Israel stayed in Gaza, many Israelis believe disengagement was a mistake since it allowed Hamas to present the withdrawal as the result of their terrorism while setting the stage for their complete takeover, including expelling the PA. Without question, the rapidity with which Hamas built up its terror capabilities in Gaza following the disengagement was impressive, and the use of these new capabilities against Israel caused most Israelis to view their unilateral withdrawal as a mistake. That said, Israelis have very little desire to reenter Gaza. Lieutenant General Dan Halutz, the IDF Chief of Staff at the time, told me when I suggested we launch a limited military incursion into the northern part of Gaza in response to Hamas’s first rocket attacks on Israel after disengagement: “We didn’t leave in order to return.”

Israel believes that even though Hamas’s threat is chronic and may at times result in pain and suffering among the Israeli populace, it should not distract it from confronting the more dangerous threats from Iran and Hezbollah. Therefore, Israel’s objective vis-à-vis Gaza is limited to securing long periods of (relative) quiet. Following this approach and bearing in mind the above-mentioned principles of Israel’s security model, Israeli policy towards Gaza over the past sixteen years was based on the following principles:

1. Accept Hamas as the power responsible for Gaza to avoid the need to enter and recapture the Gaza Strip, while incentivizing Hamas to control more radical groups tempted to escalation because of their lack of accountability by holding Hamas accountable for any terrorist acts. Since the disengagement and after Hamas’s takeover, Israel has treated Gaza as a de facto sovereign enemy state ruled by Hamas. This legally disputed stance limits Israel’s options of what can and should be done about Hamas’s weaponry. Additionally, when Hamas launches attacks, Israel spares it from paying any consequences for its actions and either ignores the problem (by attributing rocket launches to lightning) or acts unilaterally (as in Operations Black Belt, Breaking Dawn and Shield and Arrow). Clearly, Israel wants to avoid confronting Hamas and maintain relative calm.
2. Keep Hamas wary and weak to force it to be cautious and reluctant to attack Israel from Gaza. Israel seeks to prevent Hamas from delivering military or dual-use equipment into Gaza and therefore maintains a naval and land blockade over the area and inspects the merchandise entering Gaza to thwart smuggling. It also takes advantage of the sporadic limited or large-scale escalation fighting to attack Hamas and PIJ infrastructure and production facilities in Gaza.
3. Improve the economic conditions in the Gaza Strip to discourage the population from supporting terror activities and to incentivize Hamas to refrain from escalation. This explains why Israel allows extensive trade with Gaza from Israel and Egypt, encourages donor countries to invest in Gaza, permits and encourages Qatar to help Gaza via monthly donations even though this assistance is used partly to finance Hamas’s military build-up, and recently allowed a growing number of Gazans to work in Israel. (In 2021-2022 the number of trade and work permits grew steadily and recently hit 14,000.) Israel’s option to curtail this economic support in the aftermath of terrorist attacks serves as an effective means of retaliating against Hamas and pressuring it to refrain from further attacks.
4. Leverage Egypt’s influence to help maintain calm in Gaza. Egypt, like Israel, is a stability-seeking country and a necessary gateway for Gazans entering and exiting the Strip and as a route for providing its economic needs. It therefore enjoys considerable clout over Hamas and Gaza’s population. During military escalations, Egypt is also the preferred mediator from Israel’s perspective, and both countries are interested in limiting the influence and the involvement in Gaza of groups from Sunni Islamists and Iran.
5. Because Israel seeks to maintain the status quo in Gaza, it does not believe changing Gaza’s ruling party is in its national interests, even though Israel wants to strengthen the PA. This suggests Israel accepts the separation of governments for Gaza, on the one hand, and Judea and Samaria, on the other hand. In Israel’s view, the status quo is beneficial because it makes it difficult for the Palestinians to leverage international and Arab pressure on Israel to accept their demands. Israel is, however, concerned about Hamas’s growing influence in Judea and Samaria, Jerusalem, and especially among Israeli Arabs. This concern intensifies as the prospects of Abbas’s departure from the political scene grow.
6. Israel will develop strategies to better cope with the military challenges originating in the Gaza Strip. Examples include: Iron Dome; the anti-tunnel barrier along the border; the laser anti-mortar system; the anti-UAV systems; and the defense of the gas production platform and the train, all to disincentivize Gazans from launching terror attacks and to thwart attacks when deterrence fails. Even though such systems are expensive, Israel invested in them rather than attempting to disarm Hamas or recapture Gaza for all the reasons mentioned above and perhaps – though no one will admit it – because Gaza is considered a remote border area that may withstand threats better than the sensitive centers of the major cities.

On the surface Israel’s policy towards Gaza, as described above, complements its security doctrine, its principles and concepts, and reflects Israel’s strategic thinking. However, it sets the stage for periodic military escalations with Hamas and other terror groups in Gaza, between which occur sporadic rocket launches and other terror attacks by Hamas and other groups in Gaza. Gazan terror groups’ military capabilities increase unchecked thanks to limited retaliation against weapons-production facilities in the Gaza Strip following periodic rocket attacks. Hamas also steadily increases its terrorist capabilities in Jerusalem and areas under PA control and promotes its stature within Israeli Arab society. This strategy empowers it to encourage this demographic to commit terrorist acts while strengthening its standing as the most prominent political group within the Palestinian community. Hamas’s leaders and its propaganda outlets intimidate Israel’s population, especially those along the Gaza border, who live under the constant threat of attack from the Gaza Strip.

In this struggle, the case of Hamas’s observation tower overlooking the community of Netiv HaAsara, bordering Gaza to the north, is revealing. Constructed in 2022, the tower posed an immediate threat to the community. During a limited escalation round it was attacked as part of an Israeli reaction to a terror attack from the Gaza Strip, but it was rebuilt immediately, empowering Hamas to boast of its ability to do so. A couple of weeks later, direct fire was aimed at Netiv HaAsara from the Gaza Strip.

Israeli policy may deter the terror groups operating in Gaza from entering high intensity conflicts for long periods of time, but it will not deter them from building the cognitive and operational infrastructure necessary for such confrontations or from launching limited rounds of escalation. According to the rules of the game that were established on the ground, Palestinians may retain their hateful propaganda and their incitement against Jews and Israel in order to inculcate in the minds of Gazan youth the desire to participate in the jihad against Israel for the sake of eliminating it and bringing about the “return” of the Palestinian refugees and their descendants to all of Palestine.

Palestinians are not deterred from maintaining their military build-up. As a result of the ongoing learning curve between Israel and the terror groups in the Gaza Strip, Israeli measures minimize the impact of the capabilities of these groups, but do not prevent their impact entirely. Therefore, the logic of terror, which is not to win the war but rather to sow fear in the hearts of the enemy’s population and to degrade its resilience and its policy, is still achieved. The fact is that Israelis, especially along the border with Gaza, still fear a potential attack from Gaza at any time. This is the major goal of Hamas and PIJ that is not addressed by Israeli policy or by the current rules of engagement vis-à-vis Gaza.

Moreover, this policy fails to deter the terror groups from launching major attacks periodically and from trying to impose new rules of engagement on Israel. Over the last year, first Hamas in Operation Guardian of the Walls, and then PIJ in the terror attempt that led to Operation Breaking Dawn, and the rocket attacks that led to Operation Shield and Arrow, tried to force on Israel limitations on its ability to act in Jerusalem. They acted based on several premises and motivations, including the false assumption that Israel is weak and therefore so committed to assuring peace from Gaza that it may accept these new rules. Israel prevented the application of these rules by demonstrating its military might, but at the price of exposing its population to the threat of thousands of rockets launched in their direction, shutting down civilian and commercial traffic in the south of the country, and forcing millions to flee into shelters.

Israelis have been accustomed to living under constant threat since the Jews returned to their ancestral land over 100 years ago. In his 1956 eulogy to Roi Rotberg, the security coordinator of Nahal Oz kibbutz bordering Gaza who was ambushed and murdered by Palestinians, Moshe Dayan, then IDF Chief of Staff, emphasized that his generation of Israelis bears the burden of an ongoing struggle and must be constantly alert and sufficiently strong to defend itself against the relentless hatred of the Arabs (who were not referred to at that time as Palestinians) living in the Gaza Strip. If this approach still prevails, one expects Israeli society to grasp that this is an unavoidable part of its reality, to focus on its ability to maintain a reasonable deterrence, and to foil most terror attempts, rendering the existing situation an unpleasant but bearable reality.

Yet a different strategy views this position as unacceptable and advocates that Israel rid itself of the ever-growing and enduring threat of Hamas. This approach emerges from two opposing arguments. The first does not question the premise that Israel remains a state with a special mission engaged in an ongoing battle for its survival and prosperity. But it suggests that, since there is a huge difference in military capabilities between Israel and Hamas, and due to the formidable advantages of the IDF, Israel cannot afford to let Hamas taunt it for so long and keep its citizens constantly fearful. When the frustration of Israelis living near Gaza increases, whether because of renewed attacks or other political reasons, some claim Israel should take the lead and end Hamas’s threat once and for all.

A second argument supporting this view holds that the era of such struggles should have ended with Israel’s ascent as an affluent society. Not only Tel Aviv – a symbol of this society – but the rest of the country deserves to enjoy the benefits of this progress and should not, therefore, continue to be a target of Hamas’s terrorism. As a result, decisive action must be taken to rid Israel of this threat.

This argument also has a not-so-well-hidden motivation. Many who adopt it support a compromise with the Palestinians and believe that weakening Hamas and strengthening Fatah will contribute to preparing the ground for an agreement to settle the conflict. They believe the main reason Israel fails to deal harshly with Hamas is that it benefits from the current division within the Palestinian camp, which constitutes an obstacle to a settlement.

The flip side of the same argument holds that Israel should strengthen Hamas and thereby rid itself of its threats. This could be achieved, for example, by helping the Palestinians build a port for Gaza, or by easing its blockade and control of the passage of people and merchandise to and from the Gaza Strip. This is a dubious argument, since unless Hamas changes its ideology – a highly unlikely move – it will almost certainly use this new reality to arm itself even faster.

Another debate affecting Israeli thinking about this matter concerns the option of using ground forces to pressure Hamas. Regardless of whether such a ground operation is necessary or helpful for denying Hamas the option to attack Israel with rockets or other means, there are many in Israel who are reluctant to put the lives of Israeli soldiers at harm’s way. Because a ground operation is believed to extract a painful price in soldiers’ lives, they oppose this option. Yet another view holds that if a ground operation is necessary to end Hamas’s threat, it should be executed despite the price, since a soldier’s mission is to protect civilians. The military has a difficult time explaining the added value of using ground maneuvers to improve security, rendering it a moot point.

In recent years, Israel has grown accustomed to living in a dangerous situation: Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) – antisemitic Palestinian terrorist organizations committed to annihilating Israel through jihad – control Gaza, use its territory and Iranian assistance to amass a growing arsenal directed against Israel, and threaten to attack when they choose should Israel fail to behave as they demand. They regularly use Gaza’s civilians as human shields to prevent Israel from hitting their terror infrastructure. This approach gives Hamas the self-confidence to develop its military and terror capabilities and increase its power in the Palestinian political arena. Worst of all, it condemns Israelis – especially those living near the Gaza Strip – to persistent threats from Hamas terrorists.

Operating under the principle of revealed preference (i.e., judging the interests of entities and individuals by their deeds, preferences, and decisions rather than their declared interests), it appears that Israel prefers the option of “mowing the grass,” which allows Hamas to build up its strength and leaves Israelis under constant threat.

According to the prevailing policy, Gaza is a chronic and unsolvable problem not included among Israel’s top priorities. It may therefore be tackled by developing qualitative state-of-the-art defensive systems and through leveraging Israel’s military advantage coupled with Gaza’s systemic economic failings to incentivize Hamas to avoid extensive use of its growing arms arsenal. The policy’s goal is to defer as long as possible the next escalation round, thus extending the time between terror escalation rounds, shortening the duration of these rounds, and using them to inflict heavy damage on the terror group’s infrastructure and arsenal. These will be pursued toward an end of leaving Hamas weakened and deterred vis-à-vis Israel, but strong enough to govern Gaza. For that purpose, Israel vows to keep Egypt, the U.S., Qatar, and possibly Turkey, all of whom are interested in avoiding escalation, as potential mediators and tools to back Israeli policy, even though using their good offices may entail a price.

This paper explains how Israel should replace this policy, and how it can be freed from Hamas’s threat by prohibiting its rearmament and eventually disarming it, while demonstrating conclusively that threatening Israel is unmistakably against its interests. Achieving this goal will not be easy, but with proper preparation it may be feasible.

A proactive and decisive strategy must be formulated and implemented that will eventually force Hamas to accept a new set of rules that will rid Israel of this threat. Such a strategy will also make Israel’s strength and resoluteness clear to the Palestinians, weaken Hamas’s political standing, and send a clear signal of deterrence to Iran, Hezbollah, and their allies. Eventually it may also aid the peace process by demonstrating that armed attacks and jihad against Israel harms Palestinians and that their conditions will improve only after they accept Israel as the permanent Jewish state.

Militarily, Israel should improve its already quite good intelligence coverage of Gaza to enable it to thwart most terror attempts before they are launched and eliminate Hamas operatives at any level. Israel must gain the confidence to operate in a secured manner from the air, sea, and ground against the terror infrastructure inside the Gaza Strip, just as it does in Judea and Samaria or on the Syrian front. It must more widely use intelligence intensified warfare (“LOCHAMAM” in its Hebrew acronym) that is designed to mobilize and make available to the ground units all the capabilities of the intelligence community in a way that is relevant to the battle in which they are engaged, as well as provide better protection to ground forces. Israel should embark on a campaign against Hamas’s military buildup in the same manner it conducts campaigns against Hizballah’s expansions, especially as it has developed these capabilities in recent years. A ground operation would not necessarily be required, but Hamas and Egypt must be convinced that the possibility of a ground operation is very real.

Diplomatically, it is possible to pressure Hamas to abandon its ambition of strengthening itself, just as Israel helped in stopping Sudan’s cooperation with Hamas in the transfer of weapons. Israel should take advantage of its close security cooperation with Egypt, its improved relations with Turkey, its close security cooperation with some of the Gulf countries, and its cooperation with Qatar and Jordan. Diplomatic steps must be taken to retaliate against incitement and to expose Hamas’s deadly propaganda. Israel should demand that UNRWA remove from its textbooks all indoctrination and incitement to hatred and disassociate itself from and cease to defend all its employees who are members of Hamas or have openly supported terrorism against Israel. Israel’s broader goal should be the elimination of UNRWA and the return of care to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which is a non-political aid organization.

Economically, Israel must condition the flow of money and economic aid that could benefit Hamas on its willingness to stop building its arsenal. The absolute dependence of Hamas on foreign suppliers, especially Israel and Egypt, should be leveraged by conditioning the flow of funds and many economic activities and benefits on Hamas’s acceptance of this justified demand – a component of the Oslo Accords – and not only on not using its arsenal of weapons, as is the situation today. Economic pressure should be applied not only as a response to terror attacks, but to prevent arming and terrorist activity.

From a legal point of view, these efforts are justified, since Israel transferred responsibility for the Gaza Strip to the Palestinians within the framework of the Oslo Accords, according to which the latter are obliged to limit armaments to agreed-upon levels. The Quartet overseeing international efforts to promote peace has three conditions to accept Hamas as a legitimate actor, including the condemnation of terrorism and the acceptance of the agreements between Israel and the PLO, including the Oslo Accords. Hamas is defined as a terrorist organization by the United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and Japan. Some Arab countries, such as Saudi Arabia, also view Hamas as a terrorist organization. Of course, Israel must continue to abide by the law of armed conflict and minimize peripheral damage.

A continuous and open debate is needed to convince the public and the policy makers for a change of policy beyond the discussions that arise briefly following an escalation but recede shortly afterwards. We hope this paper sparks a debate that will ultimately lead both the public and elected officials to conclude that now is the time to remove this threat once and for all. Due to the complexity of this issue, the new policy requires significant preparations and will have to be implemented gradually, all while making the best use of options and opportunities that may open to Israel.