On August 24th, a senior Israeli official told Ynet news that Israel and Saudi Arabia could potentially establish diplomatic ties as early as “early next year” after progress has been made in talks between the Saudis and the United States. He noted that the discussions between the Saudis and Americans center on Iran and defense concerns, especially the protective equipment the Saudis will obtain from the U.S. to safeguard against Iran. While it is currently unclear whether the negotiations for normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia will come to fruition and what specific terms the agreement between the two states might include, the role of Iran is evidently significant in driving the desire for increased proximity between the two countries.
The discussions between Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United States occur against the backdrop of two significant developments related to Iran. Firstly, the Iranian nuclear program has reached its most advanced stage to date, with Iran now holding enough uranium enriched to 20 percent and 60 percent to produce five atomic bombs. Following recent informal understandings between Tehran and Washington, Iran has reportedly refrained from further significant accumulation of 60 percent-enriched uranium and has committed to not exceeding a uranium enrichment level beyond 60 percent. Nevertheless, the Islamic Republic will maintain its status as a nuclear threshold state.
In addition, the discussions involving Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the United States are occurring in the aftermath of a China-mediated agreement between Riyadh and Tehran in March aimed at normalizing diplomatic relations. While progress in implementing this agreement remains slow and behind schedule, it remains a significant strategic development that opens opportunities for both states. The renewal of ties could potentially grant Iran political advantages and enhance its regional standing, particularly in response to the mounting international pressures it has faced over the past year.
Given this context, a pertinent question arises concerning how Iran will react to the potential prospects of normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia—whether partial or complete. To address this question effectively, it is essential to differentiate between two aspects of a prospective future accord: the normalization process between Israel and Saudi Arabia and the enhancement of Saudi Arabia’s strategic capabilities facilitated through its collaboration with the United States.
The Islamic Republic, Israel’s sworn enemy, has consistently opposed normalizing relations between Arab countries and the Jewish state. Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, has repeatedly criticized the willingness of certain Arab states to forge closer ties with Israel, labeling this process a betrayal of the Islamic world, the Arab world, and the Palestinian cause. On July 31, Iran warned regional countries against normalizing relations with Israel, particularly as efforts intensified to expand the Abraham Accords to include Saudi Arabia. During his weekly press conference on Monday, Nasser Kanaani, the spokesperson of Iran’s foreign ministry, declared that normalizing ties between Saudi Arabia and Israel would harm regional peace and stability. Kanaani emphasized that “Peace with the Zionist regime will not benefit the Palestinian nation” and that Iran views any step toward recognizing Israel as being against the interests of Palestine and contrary to the interests of peace and security in the region.
Nevertheless, Iran does not perceive the tripartite relations between Tehran, Jerusalem, and the Arab capitals as a zero-sum game. The Abraham Accords have shown that the Gulf States can normalize their relations with Israel while enhancing their ties with their neighboring Eastern countries. From Tehran’s standpoint, the rapprochement between Israel and Arab states does not inherently require limiting the ongoing reconciliation between Iran and the Arab world. Iran views this reconciliation as a political asset aimed at reducing regional tensions and demonstrating its global engagement. Furthermore, Tehran acknowledges its limited ability to hinder the progress of normalization between Israel and the Arab world. Hence, while opposition to the process is expected, active efforts to obstruct it are doubtful. Significant Iranian actions are likely to occur only if Iran perceives a substantial threat to its vital national interests—such as a normalization agreement that provides Israel with a military, security, or territorial presence near its borders.
On the other hand, the enhancement of Riyadh’s strategic capabilities, particularly regarding the potential for a defense pact with the United States or access to cutting-edge U.S. weapons systems, presents a distinct aspect. Despite improving relations between the two states, Saudi Arabia and Iran remain regional adversaries with conflicting interests in the Middle East, especially within the Persian Gulf region. The extent to which Iran can hinder a potential agreement between Saudi Arabia and the United States remains uncertain. However, Iran could intensify its determination to safeguard and enhance its strategic military capabilities, specifically its ballistic missiles and drones. Iran has already demonstrated its ability and willingness to utilize these resources against Saudi Arabia, as seen in its attack on the Abqaiq and Khurais refineries in September 2019.
Additionally, Iran could persist in relying on its proxies, notably the Houthis, to challenge its regional rivals. According to U.S. Special Envoy for Yemen, Tim Lenderking, Iran has continued supplying weapons and drugs that fuel the Yemen war despite its agreement to restore diplomatic ties with Saudi Arabia. In the event of a Saudi-American military alliance, Iran might even attempt to assess the strength of the U.S. commitment to Saudi Arabia. For instance, this could involve renewed Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia or an escalation of provocations targeting vessels in the Persian Gulf. Nonetheless, Iran is anticipated to continue to view the agreement reached with Saudi Arabia as a significant achievement that must be safeguarded. It is doubtful that Iran would be inclined to jeopardize this achievement through direct actions against Saudi Arabia.
Granting nuclear capabilities to Saudi Arabia, particularly the ability for uranium enrichment, could constitute a significant component within the emerging framework of the normalization agreement. If the U.S. were indeed to support the Saudi nuclear program, Iran would likely portray this advancement as further evidence of Western countries’ hypocrisy concerning the global nuclear order. Iran could use this as an additional catalyst for solidifying its nuclear stance. Establishing a Saudi nuclear program might also embolden hardliners within Iran who oppose returning to the 2015 nuclear deal (JCPOA) or making compromises regarding Iran’s nuclear capabilities. This move could even potentially amplify voices advocating for pursuing nuclear weapons. It’s worth noting, however, that the likelihood of returning to the 2015 nuclear agreement in the near future is already slim. This is due to Iran’s assessment that the economic benefits of rejoining the agreement do not outweigh the cost of forfeiting the significant nuclear progress achieved since Iran began violating its commitments following President Donald Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA in May 2018. Simultaneously, Iran continues to regard the prospect of a nuclear weapons breakout as a precarious possibility that might trigger a military response from the United States or Israel. Consequently, it can be inferred that Iran’s decision regarding the future of its nuclear program and the potential for further acceleration—such as enriching uranium to 90%—largely hinges on developments in its relations with the United States and possible Israeli actions against its nuclear program, rather than being solely a direct reaction to Israeli-Saudi normalization.
In conclusion, it is anticipated that Tehran will view the agreement as a source of concern. Therefore, it is no surprise that Iran’s Foreign Minister, Hossein-Amir Abdollahian, recently visited Saudi Arabia. During his visit on August 17th, he engaged in a five-hour discussion with his Saudi counterpart and the crown prince. The agenda covered topics such as bilateral relations, potential avenues for cooperation, and regional and international developments. The likely normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel could certainly introduce additional layers of complexity to the already intricate Iranian-Saudi relations. Nevertheless, Iran’s ability to impede this progress is limited, particularly given its desire to uphold the gains of its agreement with Saudi Arabia and further improve its relations with Arab states. As such, it can be deduced that a substantial and concrete Iranian reaction to the agreement would only occur if Tehran perceived a direct and immediate threat to its core security interests.
Despite its inherent limitations and vulnerabilities, Iran has consistently exhibited its knack for turning challenges into opportunities to safeguard its regional influence. Compared to neighboring actors, Iran has adeptly navigated the regional dynamics. Consequently, it can be estimated that even with an agreement, Tehran will likely evaluate how it can adapt its strategy to the new regional landscape. Additionally, it might aim to leverage the deal to validate and advance its ongoing efforts to enhance its military capabilities and further its nuclear program in response to emerging challenges.
