In recent months international attention is heavily focused on the so-called Mega-Deal between the United States and Saudi Arabia that also includes a Saudi Israeli component. The Biden administration is working to implement a regional initiative that includes Israeli-Saudi normalization, or “integration,” as the Saudis refers to it.
Also, international media attention has focused on Saudi demands from the United States in return for its consent to normalize relations with Israel, including a US-Saudi defence pact, permission to operate a full nuclear fuel cycle on its territory, and the sale of advanced US weapons to Saudi Arabia. Yet, less attention was given to analyze Saudi interests and sensitivities on the matter.
The Saudi Position
For many years Saudi Arabia has shown limited interest in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, along with a palpable aversion to engagement with the issue and to the conduct of the Palestinian leadership – both the Palestinian Authority and Hamas in the Gaza Strip. However, Riyadh is more committed to the Palestinian issue than Abu Dhabi, if only because of its status and role in the Muslim world as the “custodian of the two Holy Places,” and its would-be regional leadership. The Royal House and King Salman himself (who is believed to be more faithful to the Palestinian idea than his son the Crown Prince) are committed to hear the voices of those who object to normalization in the Abraham Accords format, the religious establishment (notwithstanding the erosion of its powers), and feelings in the Saudi and Arab street.
Thus, Saudi Arabia presents progress toward a political solution to the conflict as a condition for normalization and is formally committed to its implementation according to the parameters of the Arab Peace Initiative, which is based on the Saudi initiative. Senior officials in the Kingdom have said that they see the initiative as the basis for negotiations rather than a diktat. It is therefore estimated that in return, Riyadh expects some Israeli gestures toward the Palestinians that it can highlight as genuine progress toward achieving the two-state solution, if only in stages. In a speech at an Arab League summit in Riyadh in May 2023, the Crown Prince stressed that “the Palestinian issue is at the top of the Kingdom’s agenda,” and mentioned the Arab Peace Initiative and other relevant international resolutions on the matter.
True, senior Saudi officials speak in two voices. The differences in nuance between the Crown Prince and his father, the King, or Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin-Farhan, or between their statements at different times and to different audiences, reflect the lack of agreement among the Kingdom’s elite, and perhaps also the desire to maintain some opacity and room for political maneuvering. This would enable the Kingdom to take measured steps toward integration with Israel under cover of the demand for a Palestinian state, while adapting and maintaining flexibility so that the Palestinian issue will not become an obstacle to an arrangement with Israel and acquisition of rewards from the United States.
Since the current Israeli government was formed, and against a background of a security escalation in the Palestinian arena and expansion of settlements and outposts, there has been a significant rise in the extent and severity of Saudi condemnation of Israeli government policy and rhetoric, with special emphasis on the visits by Minister Ben Gvir to the Temple Mount. This development is evidence of the Kingdom’s wish to strengthen its involvement in the matter, while signalling to the Israeli government that its freedom of action in the Palestinian arena is limited. The recent appointment of a non-resident Saudi ambassador to the Palestinian Authority who will also act as consul for East Jerusalem, along with the renewal of funding to hospitals in East Jerusalem, are further indications to Israel, and to Jordan and the Palestinian Authority, that Saudi Arabia intends to increase its involvement in the Palestinian issue and possibly also in the al-Aqsa compound. Moreover, Riyadh has tried, while keeping a low profile, to promote reconciliation/unity between the Palestinian Authority and the PLO and Hamas.
The Saudi Elite
A gradual – if slow process – of normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia has been underway for some time. Riyadh has taken a strategic decision to move cautiously toward improved relations with Israel. Indeed, in recent years there has been slow movement toward more openness in these relations, as shown by statements and actions on the ground designed to test the waters and gradually accustom Saudi public opinion to possible closer relations with Israel in the future, given acceptance of its conditions for progress.
For the Kingdom, caution on all aspects of normalization with Israel is essential, partly because of its status in the Muslim world, its status in the Arab world, anti-Israel sentiment among the Saudi public, and the country’s religious and conservative character. Nonetheless, Saudi Arabia has an interest in improving its relations with Israel and the dividends it can obtain on this account, particularly from the United States. As a result, the assessment is that there will be relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia, but not on the Abraham Accords model – the process will advance at a slower pace and with different parameters than those governing Israel’s relations with Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, for example, and in view of the Kingdom’s specific and sensitivities.
The Saudi Street & Clerics
A series of polls of Saudi citizens before and after the Abraham Accords were signed indicate ongoing opposition to normalization with Israel (around 80 percent of Saudi citizens are against relations with Israel in the Model of the Abraham accords). The extent of the refusal to recognize Israel and maintain ties with it has remained steady over the past decade. Other data even reflect a drop-in support for recognizing Israel following the Abraham Accords. Anti-Israeli and anti-US feelings are widespread and place obstacles in the way of any progress regarding relations with Israel. However, a monarchy that is determined to promote normalization with Israel should be able to bypass public opinion, just as other Arab regimes have done.
But if Saudi Arabia seeks to reach normalization, it will need the backing of the country’s religious establishment and its approval of the move. In the 1980s, following the Oslo Accords, there was a degree of religious consent to relations with Israel from the Saudi Chief Mufti at the time, ibn Baz. Senior religious figures have avoided discussing the subject in recent years and so the current view of the religious establishment is not clear, although it is probable that they would follow the instructions of the monarchy, which provides their funding.
The significance of any religious debate over relations with Israel derives from the importance of Islam as a source of political legitimacy in a society with a traditional character. In addition, the Islamic justifications for peace are intended to soften the cognitive dissonance involved in moving from long years of conflict with Israel, accompanied by religious tension, to a situation of open relations. Moreover, in recent years the Kingdom has been going through a process of cultural and religious opening, with an obvious desire to create a more moderate and tolerant image. Comprehensive changes are taking place in relations between religion and state, including restrictions on the powers of the religious police and clerics, and cutbacks in Islamic studies. It is possible that this process will also have a positive influence on attitudes towards Israel.
The way forward
Although over the years Saudi Arabia has shown limited interest in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and there is a sense of unwillingness to engage in the issue and antipathy toward the current Palestinian leadership, nevertheless the problem is thought to carry more weight in Riyadh than, for example, in Abu Dhabi. The kingdom is obliged to listen to the voices of the opponents of normalization, namely, the public, the religious establishment, which despite the erosion in its authority, is still significant.
The kingdom needs to show to the Palestinians and its Arab neighbors (Arabs and non-Arabs) that it remained loyal to their “cause” especially in light of its more recent ambitions to to lead the Arab world. For these reasons, Saudi Arabia must be cautious and sensitive in the Palestinian context.
Therefore, in return for official ties with Israel, Riyadh would presumably expect gains that can be presented as an achievement that contributes to implementing the two-state framework. However, as an interim stage, Riyadh may be prepared to accept calm in Jerusalem and the West Bank and symbolic Israeli steps toward the Palestinians, even without a significant breakthrough in the political process, provided that at the same time they receive what they consider their due compensation from Washington.
In conclusion, the complexities and considerations surrounding Saudi-Israeli normalization are multifaceted, encompassing factors such as public opinion, religious sentiments, regional leadership ambitions, and geopolitical dynamics. Navigating this path requires Riyadh to strike a delicate balance between these various elements as it pursues its evolving relationship with Israel.
