Drawing on internal Islamic State documents, theological treatises and other lines of evidence, this paper presents a comparative analysis of the Islamic State’s treatment of three religious groups- the Yezidis, Christians and
Shi’a- utilising the analytical framework of in-group/out-group dynamics and how they relate to the Islamic State’s extremist worldview. The paper shows that despite the Islamic State’s hostility to the general mass of ‘out- group’ of ‘disbelievers,’ there is not necessarily a monolithic ‘out-group’ but rather different types with some being deemed even worse than others. This differentiation then has implications for the group’s policies towards different religious groups, especially on the question of identity-based crimes such as persecution and genocide.
Introduction: The Islamic State and Defining the Extremist Worldview
Few external observers would disagree on characterising the Islamic State as an ‘extremist’ group as a matter of intuition and instinct, but what exactly does it mean to make such a characterisation? Analysis of this question is partly relevant because the Islamic State firmly rejects the notion that it is ‘extremist,’ and instead defines itself as following a middle path between the laxity of “Murji’ites” and the excesses of “H̱ārijites.” Both of these designations refer to adherents of trends that emerged in the early years of Islamic history. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss those trends in depth, but the key point to note here is that for the Islamic State, “Murji’ites” are essentially those seen as having deviated from the correct path in compromising on principles and beliefs, especially in the necessity of takfir (declaring someone or a group of people to be disbelievers) on certain groups that claim adherence to Islam, whereas the “H̱ārijites.” are seen as “extremists” in the other direction with a tendency to excessive takfir.
These sorts of distinctions that the Islamic State makes in defining itself have practical relevance and are not merely matters of theory, as the group has gone after those it has perceived as being extremist rivals. For example, in West Africa, the group’s official affiliate (the West Africa “wilāya"/"province”) has repeatedly clashed with a group that was led by Abu Bakr Shekau, who served as the former leader of the Islamic State’s West Africa province but was subsequently removed. The West Africa affiliate launched a major offensive against Shekau’s group- dubbed “H̱ārijites.” and “the people of extremism"- in the Sambisa forest region in 2021, largely taking control of the region and securing the defection of a number of members of Shekau’s group. The Islamic State celebrated this offensive as a proof that the organisations has remained since its founding “a middle path between the “H̱ārijites” and the Murji’ites on the prophetic methodology.”
There is thus the need for a concrete understanding of what constitutes ‘extremism’ or an extremist worldview. In the existing literature, problems have arisen in defining extremism, often marred by relativism and the political context in which the literature is written. For instance, there has been a tendency to equate extremism with mere political radicalism in the sense of calls for revolutionary action and overhauls of the existing political and social system, but there is no single accepted political system in the world, and what would constitute a radical change in one place would not necessarily be seen as such elsewhere. In other words, it is not sufficient to deem the Islamic State as extremist simply because it calls for the eventual replacement of all existing political systems in the world with its concept of a “caliphate on the prophetic methodology,” concisely defined as a system of rule in which the ruler- the caliph- is chosen through a process of consultation among those qualified to choose the caliph, and rules in an absolute sense by “God’s law” that is embodied in the legal rulings of Islam.
To read the rest of this article, please click here.
