In the primarily Druze province of al-Suwayda’ in southern Syria, protests demanding political change have been occurring on almost a daily basis for more than six months now. I myself have been skeptical from the outset about whether they matter in the bigger picture, and still believe that this assessment holds. But what is the current status of the protests? Do they still have the same momentum? And what is their future direction? What are some of the different ideas espoused about the future of Syria and al-Suwayda’ in the protests? Does the ‘autonomous administration’ of the U.S.-supported Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) provide a model? What about talk of turning towards armed rebellion?
To discuss these matters, I conducted an interview recently with Aysar Morshed, an opposition activist based in al-Suwayda’. Last year, I interviewed Aysar a few months prior to the outbreak of the latest protests, and he predicted that there would be a general uprising or rebellion in al-Suwayda’ because of the deterioration in the living situation. This interview was conducted on 3 March. It is slightly edited and condensed for clarity.
The first reason is that people have felt nothing has changed. The second reason (if I were to rank the reasons in ascending order of importance) is disagreements within the opposition itself in al-Suwayda’. The third reason is the rise of competing currents within the protest movement in Dignity Square and in al-Suwayda’. The fourth reason- and this is the most important- is people’s material needs and people’s feeling that the material situation has not changed, and that it is a hard life in all meanings of the word in al-Suwayda’ province. al-Suwayda’ is a poor province, my friend. The people of al-Suwayda’ are poor people. In truth, many of the families do not possess the means for daily living, and these people were expecting quick means of relief. In truth, the protest movement has not reached what might be called agreement on a political program in the uprising, in addition to the appearance or discovery of some operations of covert infiltration within the committee organising the demonstrations, and this is a very important matter. Covert infiltrations of the organising committee were uncovered: people we can say are clearly affiliated with the security apparatus. This was also an important factor in people distancing themselves from demonstrating, in addition to the exposing of some people who claim to espouse revolution or participate with us in the demonstrations and consider themselves to have authority over the people: they have also been exposed in many issues. All this has led to the reduction in the numbers of demonstrators, but we cannot say that al-Suwayda’ is no longer against the regime of Bashar al-Assad in general, but rather the overwhelming majority of al-Suwayda’ is still against the regime of Bashar al-Assad, but many people will have become disinclined to protest in Dignity Square, as they await, we can say, certain things that are connected with solutions or means of relief, or even means of relief in the protest movement itself, a feeling of credibility from the protest movement itself.
Q: I remember you mentioned the idea of an autonomous region in al-Suwayda’ and the existence of a division in the opinions of the demonstrators and accusations of betrayal. Can it be said that the idea of an autonomous administration enjoys widespread support among the demonstrators? Currently what are the main demands? What is your personal opinion on adopting the ‘SDF’ model in al-Suwayda’?
The 7 April hall in al-Suwayda’ is used for ‘regularisation of status’, a process where e.g. people who are wanted for military service can obtain a temporary grace period. Following Jawad’s death, the hall, which was near the site where Jawad was hit by gunfire, was subjected to attacks that caused limited damage.
A: Yes, I am among the people who mentioned the idea of an autonomous administration since the first days or first hours of the uprising, on 18 August specifically. There was a protest movement in all the villages of the province of al-Suwayda’, and there was a protest movement in the locality of al-Kafr that is my locality, and this was our vision that we raised on that day and it still is our vision. Anger and expressing it are not sufficient by themselves. In parallel with expressing anger, rising up and revolution, one has to find solutions. Before the uprising we were looking for solutions to the economic situation in al-Suwayda’, solutions to the reckless behaviour of the regime in al-Suwayda’, solutions to the regime’s intervention, or let us put it more accurately, the regime’s actions with regards to the security branches’ support for very bad persons in al-Suwayda’ who work in drugs smuggling and kidnapping: they are gangs in every meaning of the word, like Raji Falhout and others, like Mu’tazz Mizher. There are many gangs in al-Suwayda’ supported by the regime and security apparatuses in al-Suwayda’. From that the idea of the autonomous administration began to be crystallised years ago and not today. When the uprising began, we considered that presenting a solution is more beneficial than just expressing anger, which is of course very necessary, but also it is more beneficial to present a solution. So at that time we raised the point that we want the implementation of decentralisation, and decentralisation is a broad concept that we can get into in another interview, and specifically with regards to the idea of autonomous administration, because there is a lot of haziness about the concept as there are many political and even educated people in al-Suwayda’ who have understood decentralisation and autonomous administration as being separatism and a separatist project, when they are not like that at all, as any intelligent person with the slightest understanding of concepts knows that autonomous administration is a form of governance and is not a separatist regime or state of separatism, but rather aims to be rid of the current economic sanctions on the centre first, and be rid of the centre’s security grip on the region where the autonomous administration is established. This is what we need in al-Suwayda’. I won’t dwell too long on this as I have a lot to say about it.
Can it be said that the idea of an autonomous administration enjoys widespread support among the demonstrators? Dear sir, yes: it can be said that it enjoys considerable support and it can be simply said that this support is widespread. But there is a minority that appears in the media and rejects the idea of the autonomous administration, whereas the rest of the people of al-Suwayda’ support the idea as a solution and exit for the fact that the protest movement and also people of al-Suwayda’ have fallen into a position of shortcoming and weakness: the people of al-Suwayda’ cannot go back on the uprising after today. Currently, the main agreed upon demand in terms of the protest movement in al-Suwayda’ in general- in all the components without exception- is the bringing down the regime, in addition to implementing resolution 2254, but in truth this resolution 2254 is an international resolution. We are striving in all our effort for there to be an international response in order to implement the resolution, but in truth this is a fanciful resolution. The resolution requires the existence of a recognised Syrian opposition body representing the entire Syrian opposition, representing all the Syrian people who have risen up or stand against the regime. But these days there is no Syrian opposition body that clearly stands against the regime. The opposition coalition is no longer a unifying Syrian body for all the components of the Syrian opposition.
With regards to the SDF model, I respect it as an administrative model, and I respect our Kurdish brothers in northeast Syria, and the Kurds and non-Kurds in northeast Syria, and their insistence on adhering to their Syrian identity.
even as they have an autonomous administration, and nonetheless they continue to insist on their Syrian identity and they have never distanced themselves from their Syrian identity, and this is the greatest evidence that the autonomous administration model is not a matter of separatism. I respect the SDF model but I don’t think the SDF model can be completely applied in al-Suwayda': the SDF model is one that suits the SDF’s situation in northeast Syria and the capacities of that area and the nature and infrastructure of that area historically and geographically speaking, differing fundamentally from the state of al-Suwayda’ and southern Syria geographically, historically and socially speaking. Therefore, we respect the SDF model: my personal opinion, I very much respect the SDF model, but I consider that there are differences between implementing the autonomous administration model in northeast Syria and implementing it in south Syria.
Q: In general the security forces have not violently responded to the demonstrations and the killing of the martyr Jawad al-Baruki was an exceptional instance over the past months. Can it be said that the strategy of the Syrian government is to ignore the demonstrations?
A: Dear sir, here one must bear in mind that this is a very sensitive point. Yes, the Syrian government did not (as it usually does) act in a bloody and criminal way against the demonstrators al-Suwayda’ as it acted in other regions and provinces of Syria. The martyrdom of the martyr of dignity and obligation- Shaykh Jawad al-Baruki- was an exceptional case, we can for sure say that. But this is not, in my opinion, a decision from the government or a convenient decision for the Syrian government or Syrian regime. It is the result of international and regional pressure on the Syrian regime. The Syrian regime has not been able and will not be able to suppress the demonstrations in al-Suwayda’ in a violent way as it has done in the other provinces where it destroyed homes and buildings and dropped barrel bombs on civilians, and launched chemical attacks etc. So this difference exists because of the international and regional situation and very close monitoring of the situation. Also, the people of al-Suwayda’ cannot be accused of being terrorists in any way, because of the religious status of the majority of the population of al-Suwayda’, who are Druze, and the Druze religion is not a proselytising religion, and the Druze do not call on people to join their religion at all. So the regime cannot portray the Druze monotheists as being Islamic terrorists as it does in other provinces. Note also that the regime created this terrorist issue by releasing prisoners to commit terrorist acts.
Q: Some say that the demonstrations won’t change anything without taking up arms and using force. Do you expect this change after the killing of the martyr and do you support this idea?
A: Only a few voices have mentioned that notion, only a few voices have adopted this idea, even in what concerns going to attack the regularisation centre in which some security officers are based, only few were in favour of targeting it. We can say that there are suspicions that the intention of those who sought to go and attack the 7 April centre for regularisation were seeking to stir up this state of bloodshed. The demonstrations will bring about change, the continuation of the protest movement will bring about change. Without any doubt, there is change in the reality in al-Suwayda’ and elsewhere in Syria on a daily basis. Regarding taking up arms, for me personally, a large segment of the people of al-Suwayda’ and his eminence Shaykh Hikmat al-Hijri, taking up arms, using violence and turning away from the peaceful nature of the demonstrations are something to be absolutely rejected. This is the case for most of the people of al-Suwayda': we will remain peaceful until the last moments, unless the regime goes beyond specific boundaries, goes beyond the exceptional instances that you mentioned. In that case, it is the person’s right- and it is a legitimate right- to defend himself. At that point, we say in our local dialect, ya Hamlat Allah: that is, there is no power or force except in God, the use of arms becomes necessary: if the regime goes beyond exceptional instances. But I absolutely do not support military activity in al-Suwayda’ beyond this, rather I support peaceful activity and civilian activity for a transition via implementation of decentralisation, from my point of view, and implementation of the autonomous administration so that al-Suwayda’ can get out of the abyss of the Syrian regime.
Q: Finally, do you believe that the demonstrations have achieved something since they began? What are the accomplishments if so?
A: Yes, there is no doubt that these demonstrations and uprising have achieved a lot. This uprising was a general popular uprising. Before 2023, my friend, the demonstrations that took place in al-Suwayda’ against the regime were elitist, comprising an elite of the educated types or educated types who have a history of opposition activity, not exceeding dozens in number and not more. In contrast, today the general masses of al-Suwayda’ have broken the barrier of fear in all meanings of the word and this is the most important accomplishment. They have been able to rebel in all meanings of the word, they have been able to demand their rights. Of course the political solution model will not come about in a matter of one day and one night, but rather requires time and this is natural because Syria in general never had space for political activity, and also because of ignorance, or we won’t say ignorance, but rather because of weakness of political visions. Nonetheless, the accomplishment of the demonstrations and the uprising’s accomplishment are absolutely clear before people’s eyes.
