Turkey Turns Blind Eye to Hamas’s Use of Turkish Drone on Oct. 7

Published originally under the tile "Despite Evidence, Turkey Downplays Use of Turkish Drone in Hamas Terror Attack on Israel."

Documents and additional media referenced in this article are available in the Nordic Monitor version.

Ahnaf Kalam

In this still shot from video footage, Hamas fighters are observed preparing to deploy a Turkish drone for a bomb attack.


A senior Turkish official dismissed as mere allegation the use of a Turkish drone in a Hamas terrorist attack on civilian and military targets in Israel last year, claiming the government has no such information despite the manufacturer in Istanbul confirming it was one of his drones.

Fuat Oktay, chairman of the parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee and a former vice president of Turkey, responded to an opposition lawmaker’s concern that the use of a Turkish drone in the attack could cause trouble for the country, saying, “We have nothing to verify the accuracy of such an incident.”

A video shared by Hamas’s armed wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, on October 21, 2023 showed that one of the drones used in the October 7 attacks against Israeli targets was manufactured by the Istanbul-based Remzi Başbuğ Assuva Savunma Sanayi (Assuva Defense Industry). The propaganda video featured the simultaneous use of at least three Turkish drones.

A video shared by Hamas’s armed wing, the al-Qassam Brigades, on October 21, 2023 showed that one of the drones used in the October 7 attacks against Israeli targets was manufactured by the Istanbul-based Assuva Defense Industry. The propaganda video featured the simultaneous use of at least three Turkish drones.

The footage showed a Proton Elic RB-128, the standard model of which sells for between $40,000 and $60,000. With upgraded features, its price can go as high as $300,000.

It is a powerful, industrial-type drone with aerial surveillance and underground imaging functions. It scans terrain up to 3,000 meters and has a depth perception of 50 meters, detecting objects for both civilian and military purposes. The Turkish army uses the drone to identify metal objects, trenches, mines and corpses.

Assuva is owned by a Turk named Remzi Başbuğ, a 46-year-old from the central province of Nevşehir. He has been closely associated with the Islamist government of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, receiving VIP treatment in government circles and granted access to senior officials.

Having previously worked in Germany for a manufacturer of metal detectors, particularly those used in treasure hunting, Başbuğ transferred his experience to Turkey by establishing his first company on January 26, 2010, initially focusing on selling various electronic gadgets. He subsequently expanded into manufacturing drones and detectors in Turkey, incorporating software and hardware made domestically.

In 2019 he renamed his company, adding the word “Defense” to its name. Trade registry data indicates that he is the sole owner of the firm.

He delivers drones to the Turkish military, among other clientele, and can manufacture custom-designed drones according to the specific demands of clients. This includes making them more sensitive, retrofitting them with better cameras, extending battery life, integrating drop release mechanisms and incorporating other desired features.

After Hamas’s footage surfaced online, he was interviewed by the Turkish press, during which he confirmed that a drone manufactured by his company was indeed the one used in the video. He said he didn’t know how the drone ended up in Hamas’s possession, stating that drones from his company are exported to over 30 countries, including China, Korea, Japan, Germany, Poland, Albania and many in South America.

Ahnaf Kalam

The Proton Elic RB-128 drone is manufactured by Assuva Defense Industry in Istanbul. (Photo: Nordic Monitor)

Although he did not mention Iran as among the export countries in this interview, in another interview published in March 2023, before the Hamas attack, Başbuğ specifically mentioned Iran as a country to which he had exported drones.

He stated that drones sold abroad could change hands multiple times, emphasizing that he has no control over such transfers. It’s notable that Turkey is one of the main countries that Iran uses to import banned and dual-use goods to support its military-industrial complex, often facilitated by the pro-Iran Erdogan government, which has been criticized for ignoring the sanctions imposed on the mullah regime for supporting terrorist networks.

Although Assuva’s products can have military applications, and the Turkish army has already purchased dozens for active use in military operations to detect and identify targets, the company is not licensed as a defense contractor, which would require special permission and regulatory controls. It operates in the civil sector and advertises that the use of its drones is entirely legal in Turkey as long as they are not deployed to scan prohibited areas such as military bases or airports.

The Hamas video shows that the Proton Elic RB-128 has a bomb-dropping and launching mechanism installed under the belly. According to Başbuğ, this feature was added to his drone after the sale. He admitted that there were demands by his clients to add such a feature in the past, but he did not comply because the company was not authorized to manufacture military-type drones.

“There were requests, but we didn’t get involved because we are not authorized to produce arms. We have not entered that [military] field. We do aerial underground imaging. However, after someone buys it, they can install additional features themselves. For example, they can add a dropping system. They could even attach a gun for firing bullets or add an extra camera,” he said.

Nevertheless, the use of the Assuva drone in a terrorist attack in a foreign country raises questions about the liability of the Turkish government, which may be implicated for failing to conduct due diligence in the export of such dual-use drones abroad, especially to a country like Iran, which has been under Western sanctions.

Ahnaf Kalam

Remzi Başbuğ, the owner of Assuva Defense Industry, is seen posing with a drone similar to the one used in the Hamas terrorist attack. (Photo: Nordic Monitor)

The issue was first raised on parliament’s agenda by opposition lawmaker Oğuz Kaan Salıcı during the General Assembly on May 29. He expressed concern about the potential use of such drones against Turkey and gave the Assuva drone as an example to emphasize his point.

He called for a coordination mechanism to ensure that exported Turkish arms would not be used against Turkey. “Let’s say you sold it to a foreign country, then they sold it to someone else, and it ended up in the hands of a hostile entity. If they used it to attack our borders, overseas bases or our embassy, who would be held accountable?” he asked.

“Do we have any measures to prevent the military equipment we sell to foreign countries from being used in a way that could cause problems for Turkey in another part of the world? Do we have an effective monitoring mechanism to prevent its use outside the countries it was sold to?” he added.

Salıcı again raised the drone issue in the parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee meeting on June 4, expressing concerns about Hamas’s use of a Turkish drone in a terrorist attack. He emphasized the need for the government to take necessary precautions to mitigate potential threats that Turkey may face for allowing the sale of such drones.

"[T]hat drone could have hit Turkish soldiers. I’m not saying this to approve or justify its use in any attack, but it could be used against our own interests, for other reasons, and directly harm us,” he said.

The committee chairman, Oktay, sought to minimize the incident by characterizing it merely as an allegation. The government maintains a stance of complete unawareness regarding any Turkish drone involvement in Hamas’s attack. Representing the foreign ministry during the meeting, Deputy Foreign Minister Mehmet Kemal Bozay refrained from offering any comment when questioned about the incident.

The committee chairman, Oktay, sought to minimize the incident by characterizing it merely as an allegation. The government maintains a stance of complete unawareness regarding any Turkish drone involvement in Hamas’s attack.

Yüksel Erdogan, who serves as head of the international cooperation department at the Presidency of the Defense Industry, Turkey’s principal defense procurement agency, addressed the incident by stating that export restrictions apply solely to military articles, including bans on transfers to third countries. “If a product is widely recognized as a military item,” he said, “procurement necessitates an end-user certificate. Thus, acquiring permission is imperative if there’s an intention to transfer it to a third party.”

In his assessment, Assuva’s commercial drone did not fall within the export-controlled category.

It’s unclear how the Turkish drone ended up in Hamas’s possession. However, even if the Turkish government were aware that Hamas was the end-user, it’s unlikely that it would intervene, given President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s staunch pro-Hamas stance. Erdogan has repeatedly stated that he doesn’t view Hamas as a terrorist organization but rather as resistance fighters, drawing parallels to Kuvay-i Milliye (Turkey’s National Forces), an irregular militia crucial during Turkey’s War of Independence after World War I.

The Turkish president claimed that Hamas is also defending the Turkish homeland as he perceives Israel to have set its sights on Turkish territory following the annexation of Palestinian lands. He has voiced support for Hamas leadership both before and after the October 7 attacks.

Numerous Hamas figures, including several senior leaders, have been residing and operating in Turkey under the protection and support of the Erdogan government. Turkish intelligence agency MIT has provided security details for certain Hamas leaders and has played a role in establishing headquarters for Hamas leadership in Istanbul.

Turkish intelligence and police have also taken action against Mossad assets and informant networks in Turkey while they were attempting to gather intelligence on the Hamas network.

Although some Hamas front companies have faced sanctions from the US, they continue to conduct business and access the Turkish financial and banking systems without impediment. Additionally, some Hamas officials have changed their names in Turkey after acquiring citizenship to conceal their identities.

Abdullah Bozkurt, a Middle East Forum Milstein Writing Fellow, is a Sweden-based investigative journalist and analyst who runs the Nordic Research and Monitoring Network and is chairman of the Stockholm Center for Freedom.

Abdullah Bozkurt is a Swedish-based investigative journalist and analyst who runs the Nordic Research and Monitoring Network. He also serves on the advisory board of The Investigative Journal and as chairman of the Stockholm Center for Freedom. Bozkurt is the author of the book Turkey Interrupted: Derailing Democracy (2015). He previously worked as a journalist in New York, Washington, Istanbul and Ankara. He tweets at @abdbozkurt.
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