In a Middle East Forum (MEF)/American Jewish University (AJU) June 3 podcast (video), AJU’s Jeffrey Herbst moderated the third of a seven-part series of interviews titled “Israel’s Seven-Front War: Part Three: Gaza Strip.”
Guest speaker: Daniel Pipes, president of the Middle East Forum. The following summarizes his comments:
There are two self-contradictory goals in both the Israeli and U.S. governments’ stated positions post-October 7. The result is inconsistency and a lack of clarity in terms of policy and priorities. Although Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu is committed to the goal of defeating Hamas and the return of the hostages they hold captive, “if you’re going to negotiate with Hamas, you can’t defeat Hamas.” U.S. President Biden, although sympathetic to Israel’s security needs, is equally concerned about his upcoming election and appeasing the “viciously anti-Israel” left-wing base of his Democratic party.
Although Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu is committed to the goal of defeating Hamas and the return of the hostages they hold captive, “if you’re going to negotiate with Hamas, you can’t defeat Hamas.”
Other contradictions involve the rulers in Egypt and Jordan, who have concluded it is time to end the conflict with Israel because of the military and economic price they pay. Yet, Egypt objects to temporarily opening its border to Gaza civilians as Israel conducts its war against Hamas out of fear these civilians will never return to Gaza. And both Egypt and Jordan are anti-Muslim Brotherhood, but are very careful around Hamas, the Brotherhood’s franchise in Gaza. Both want open relations with Israel. However, for 25 years before Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s trip to Jerusalem in 1977, Egypt’s governmenthad “inculcated an anti-Zionist sentiment in the population that remains there” today. So even though Egypt’s government wants peace with Israel, because “the people are not ready” for that “you have lots of conflicts.” The governments of both Jordan and Egypt “grimace at Israel” for domestic purposes.
The surprises of October 7 are that Israeli incompetence led it to be caught unawares, that Hamas itself did not expect to kill and capture so many Israelis, and that the Israeli reaction was greater than Hamas may have counted on. Internationally, the surprise is that, even with the general recognition of Hamas’s history of terrorism, Islamists and the left are convinced that Hamas “is the victim no matter what it does.” On the other side of the ledger, the support for and solidarity with Israel on the right is a surprise. What is unsurprising is the media bias magnifying any Israeli mistake while “we see almost nothing about Hamas and how it treats its own subject population.”
The goal for post-war Gaza should be to establish a situation akin to the current state of affairs in Jordan and Egypt. Both are police states “where if you keep your nose clean, you don’t insult the rulers, you don’t get to be too difficult, you’re left alone.” Although the Biden administration dangles in front of Israel the prospect of diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia in exchange for the PA taking over in Gaza, “the outside-in” deal where “Israel gets something from the Arab states and gives something to the Palestinians,” is “out of the question” post-October 7. “There’s no way that the Israeli government can or should be induced to accept the PA taking over in Gaza in return for diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia.” Relations with the Saudi are a worthy goal, but “it’s not worth it for such a price at this point.”
There are anti-Hamas Gazans who are tired of suffering under Hamas and would be willing to work with Israel if they are assured that Israel will not abandon them to Hamas.
The PA and Hamas may differ “in their personnel, their tactics, [and] their ideologies,” but they share similar goals — the destruction of Israel. While Hamas is overt in its goal, the PA has managed to fool much of the world. “The PA is abominable. The PA is unacceptable. I believe the PA should be brought down.” It need not be by force but can be done by “just not handing over money.” Israel’s security establishment would rather work with the PA, “with all its faults,” than to start over. “I think that’s a big mistake.”
Netanyahu’s day-after scenarios for Gaza involve “a Gaza where Hamas and its jihadi ideology, its anti-Zionist goals, it’s maneuvering, its power are destroyed.” The best solution would place Gaza under Israeli military control for a brief period and prevent control of Gaza under the Palestinian Authority (PA), the Arab states, or international soldiers.
There are anti-Hamas Gazans who are tired of suffering under Hamas and would be willing to work with Israel if they are assured that Israel will not abandon them to Hamas. There will still be Gazans who are pro-Hamas, to be sure, but if Israel controls the strip, and “can find anti-Hamas cousins to work with, or reputable or serious or trustworthy, then I think there can be a post-Hamas Gaza that works, that’s decent—decent is my word.”
“I think we have reached the point after a century and more of Palestinian rejectionism, that there is a cohort of Palestinians who are skilled, energetic, and ready to work with Israel, and Israel should wake up to them.” Although risky, with Israel there in force for protection and working with Gazan administrators, its police force, and its educators, it is possible to build a new regime: “I do believe that it can be done.”
