Jacob Goldberg, a former senior research fellow at the Dayan Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Tel Aviv University, spoke to a November 4 Middle East Forum Podcast (video). Goldberg is a veteran researcher of Saudi Arabia; Harvard University Press published his book, The Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia: The Formative Years, in 1986. The following summarizes his comments:
Mohammed bin Salman (MbS), the first grandson of Ibn Saud, the Saudi ruler who died in 1953, became “the de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia” in 2015 at the age of 29. MbS “was really the decision maker” from that point on until he formally became crown prince in 2017. In the last ten years or so, MbS “has been displaying a real understanding of the world outside,” a remarkable achievement as he was not exposed to a Western education, having studied only in Saudi Arabia.
“MbS is the first revolutionary, transformative leader in Saudi Arabia in no less than three generations.”
Breaking with the decades-long family dynamic of Saudi rule by “Shura,” or “consensus” as a power-sharing mechanism, MbS leads on his own, circumventing consultation with other senior princes.
From 2015 through 2022, MbS broke from tradition in four “dimensions”: (1) royal family politics; (2) domestic politics; (3) the economy; and (4) foreign policy.
Breaking with the decades-long family dynamic of Saudi rule by “Shura,” or “consensus” as a power-sharing mechanism, MbS leads on his own, circumventing consultation with other senior princes. Disregarding “respect for age,” which was “a basic feature of the Saudi royal family politics,” in 2017 MbS deposed then-Crown Prince Muhammad bin Nayef, who was 30 years his senior. Upon replacing bin Nayef as crown prince, MbS went even further. That same year, MbS exerted his power by placing senior members of the royal family under house arrest, recovering billions of dollars from them and returning the funds to “Saudi national coffers.”
By reining in the royal family, MbS tackled the first of the “two pillars” the Saudi state was built upon since its beginning: “the Saudi family.” He next took the revolutionary step of challenging the second pillar, the “Wahhabi religious establishment” and its ideology. Disrupting the two centers of power placed both groups in a “total state of shock” and “intimidation.” No doubt, MbS is taking into consideration a future possibility that both the royal family and the religious establishment could join forces to challenge his lone rule and “affect the stability and the survivability of his regime.”
Since 2015, MbS has understood “that in order to enter the 21st century, the country cannot rely on oil” and must diversify its economy. Having removed the sclerotic system of “Saudi family and Wahhabi ideology,” MbS engaged in “mega projects” like Saudi Vision 2030 and Neom “at a frantic pace.” He spared no expense luring Western financiers and businessmen with the hope they would invest in high-tech, science, and education projects.
However, in the last two years, “something has changed” from the first “five, six, seven years” of his rule. MbS has instructed his ministries to “slash spending” with the directive, “We have to spend the Kingdom’s money responsibly.”
This recent “turning point” also relates to MbS’s foreign policy. In a series of failed attempts to gain an advantage, MbS experienced humiliating defeats in costly actions against the kingdom’s enemies. Thus, in 2015, he launched an unsuccessful and expensive war against Yemen, which ultimately ended in his unilateral withdrawal. In 2017, he led the Gulf states in a blockade of Qatar in a bid to bring it in line with Gulf policy, only to declare defeat in 2021. Also in 2017, MbS arrested Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri of Lebanon, who was visiting Saudi Arabia at the time, and forced him to resign, thinking it would weaken Hezbollah and, by extension, Iran. The action resulted in a “global outcry,” and a humiliated MbS had to release al-Hariri. In 2018, “the biggest humiliation” occurred with the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, a Saudi journalist who opposed MbS, after being lured to the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. His murder by agents of the Saudi government “gave Saudi Arabia in general, and MbS in particular, the worst PR all over the world.”
MbS is now also at the point where he is considering joining the Russian-Chinese-sponsored BRICS economic group. MbS changed because he does not believe he has “a clear-cut security umbrella” from the U.S.
Taking on Iran just a few years ago, MbS boldly referred to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei as “a modern-day Hitler” who led a “Nazi regime.” Fast-forward to 2023, when China mediated Saudi Arabia’s restoration of relations with the Islamic regime. MbS’s recent deviation from the kingdom’s “anti-Russian, anti-Chinese, pro-American” stances taken by Saudi princes in the past is attributable to MbS’s perception of Iran as “an ascendant power.” The mullahs’ close relations with Russia and China, and the regime’s proxies across the region in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, mean that Iran is a “major regional power that Saudi Arabia cannot ignore.” MbS is now also at the point where he is considering joining the Russian-Chinese-sponsored BRICS economic group.
MbS changed because he does not believe he has “a clear-cut security umbrella” from the U.S. This absence makes it impossible for him to “challenge the enemies around him, first and foremost, Iran.” From 2009-2016, the Obama administration’s entry into the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), i.e. the nuclear deal with Iran, was “a very bad period for Saudi Arabia.” After President Trump came into office in 2017 and withdrew the U.S. from the JCPOA the following year, MbS’s hopes were raised that America was changing policy towards Iran. MbS was disappointed yet again when the Trump administration did not retaliate after Iran downed a U.S. drone over international waters in 2019.
Far worse occurred three months later after Iran launched a rocket attack against Saudi Arabia’s major oil facilities, knocking out “more than half of Saudi oil production.” Trump “did not do anything,” and his inaction breached the basis of Saudi-American relations that had existed since “the days of Ibn Saud and FDR,” which was “Saudi oil for American security.” MbS’s dashed expectations finally led him to the conclusion that “if you don’t have the power to confront” enemies, the prudent path is “hedging,” a position he has taken in the last two years with China and Russia.
MbS’s expectations regarding Israel were bolstered when several other Arab countries signed the Abraham Accords in 2020, which yielded unprecedented results. “Rumors started to circulate that Saudi Arabia would be next.” Regarding the possibility that Saudi Arabia would normalize relations with Israel, “the conventional wisdom was that if Israel would say something or agree in principle to move in the direction of a two-state solution,” the Saudis would agree.
However, as a result of Hamas’s October 7 invasion of Israel, “MbS has been deeply disappointed about what he perceived as the lack of Israeli military superiority and military deterrence and strategic advantages.” This final disappointment confirmed MbS “reversing course in almost all examples” from his first years in power. It remains to be seen if Israel’s recent military successes “restoring its deterrence” by eliminating the Hezbollah command structure in Lebanon, and Hamas leader Yahyah Sinwar in Gaza, will restore Saudi Arabia’s belief in Israel’s military capabilities.
The last two years have shown that “in the economy and foreign relations, he has taken a big step backwards understanding his limits, the limits of Saudi Arabia, and his limits personally.”
MbS, keenly aware of the domestic response among Saudis to the Gaza casualties, saw pro-Palestinian sentiments increase across the kingdom. “Even though he’s [an] autocratic leader, even dictators and tyrants have to take into consideration domestic popular sentiments.” In last month’s Financial Times, the Saudi foreign minister unambiguously wrote, “Palestinian statehood is a prerequisite for peace rather than its byproduct.”
The “best scenario” according to Saudi Arabia would be an end to the Gaza war and the replacement of Hamas by the Palestinian Authority. A peacekeeping force from the Gulf states and other countries would resuscitate the 2002 “Saudi plan of Crown Prince Abdullah” involving the U.S., the EU and Arab states. The Saudi plan stipulated that the “Arab world is ready to normalize relations,” but only if the “Palestinian problem is resolved.” This could only occur if Israel “put back on the table its agreement in principle to the two-state solution.”
As for the U.S.’s approach to Iran, “it’s not enough” for America to continue its policy of de-escalation as a way to prevent war, because it only gives “your opponent the opportunity to arm itself and to reach a stage where it would be too late for you to confront.” Given the prospect of a nuclear Iran, “there is not just a need, but a must, for a total reassessment of American policy towards Iran.”
MbS’s foreign policy shifts in the last two years reveals his understanding of realpolitik as “driven by pragmatism and not by any ideology.” In total, MbS’s revolutionary and transformative leadership in the years since 2015 to the present demonstrates that “in the first two dimensions — royal family politics and the domestic politics — MbS has persisted in the same line from the very beginning until today.” In contrast, the last two years have shown that “in the economy and foreign relations, he has taken a big step backwards understanding his limits, the limits of Saudi Arabia, and his limits personally.”
