John Bolton served as the 25th U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. and the 26th U.S. National Security Advisor. Author of numerous books, including The Room Where It Happened: A White House Memoir, Bolton spoke to a July 15 Middle East Forum Podcast (video). The following summarizes his comments:
The October 7 attack was “one piece of the unfolding Ring of Fire strategy by Iran” in its war against Israel, “with the opening gun fired by Hamas.” Developed by Qasem Soleimani, former Quds force commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the strategy’s objective is for Iran to achieve “hegemony within the region” as well as in Islam.
Iran’s regional proxies threatening Israel and the West include the Houthis in Yemen menacing Red Sea shipping lanes; Hezbollah in Lebanon and Syria firing rocket barrages into Northern Israel, making it “uninhabitable”; and Iranian-sponsored Shia militias in Iraq and Syria attacking and killing U.S. military and civilian personnel there. Most important, in April 2024, Iran unleashed a direct conventional military attack against Israel with a variety of drones, cruise, and ballistic missiles.
The October 7 attack was “one piece of the unfolding Ring of Fire strategy by Iran” in its war against Israel.
Those who narrowly focus only on Hamas in Gaza but dismiss the fact that the October 7 invasion was part of Iran’s overarching strategy form a “distorted picture” of the threats against our allies, “not just Israel, but the oil-producing Gulf monarchies, as well as the basic national interest of the United States.” As the Iranian strategy plays out across the Middle East, the axis of China and Russia measures the U.S. and its allies’ response. Thus, the axis gauges any future Western reaction to Iran’s sale of drones to Russia for its war against Ukraine, or to sanctions violations from China’s purchase of Iranian oil, via the lens of U.S. actions in the Middle East at the present time.
Arguments insisting that Hamas’s attack was independent of Iran deny that regional terror groups, which “have been armed and equipped, trained and financed by Iran,” were armed with the intention that they could be activated “at the time and place of Iran’s choosing.” However, due to disagreements, terror proxies do not always comply with Iran’s dictates. “Does that in any way disprove the notion that this is an Iranian directed coalition?The answer to that is ‘no.’”
To understand the dynamic of the Iran-led alliance, consider a “rough comparison” with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). “NATO consultations are probably the most arduous part of alliance management.” Although the U.S. founded the organization, it does not direct what other allies do. Yet, NATO “moves in directions we want.” If it does not, the U.S. would leave, and the alliance come to an end.
Some have claimed that there is no intelligence supporting a “direct order” from Iran for Hamas to attack on October 7, or that there was intelligence leaked by the administration saying parts of the regime were “surprised” by the attack, are excuses made by a U.S. media unfriendly to Israel.
While it is true there is no public document showing a direct order from Iran for Hamas to attack, “that’s not how these things are communicated to begin with.” Israeli and U.S. intelligence failed to prevent the invasion and attack, but “‘the absence of evidence,’ as Donald Rumsfeld used to say, ‘is not evidence of absence.’”Although the strategy is obscured, the “pattern of behavior” is consistent with Iran’s strategy. The surprise registered by parts of the Iranian government points to the preservation of “operational security” by the IRGC or the Quds force; both closely guard any information disclosed to Iran’s foreign ministry diplomats.
Consider all the other military actions taken in the region in the days immediately following October 7. The Houthis, another proxy activated by Iran, could not have attacked global shipping in the Red Sea were it not “armed and equipped by the Iranians.” The attacks against Israel by Hezbollah, the Shia militias, and Iran itself have “been consistent with coordinated action.” Of the 160 ballistic missiles Iran launched at Israel, approximately half failed before reaching their targets. Had the full complement of Iranian missiles reached Israel’s defense systems, the outcome could have been far more destructive.
The regime will be at its weakest during a transition of power when the Supreme Leader Khamenei dies.
The real objective of the U.S. should be “regime change in Iran.” The Maximum Pressure campaign pursued by the Trump administration should be followed up with an even “harder line” should Trump return to office. The Iranian people are disaffected with the mullahs, and although the regime “may be an imposing superstructure … it’s rotting underneath.” The daunting fact, however, is that the IRGC, the Basij militia, and the regular military in Iran have “the monopoly of force.”
The regime will be at its weakest during a transition of power when the Supreme Leader Khamenei dies. Although America is “not talking about U.S. military intervention,” it should offer assistance in terms of resources to the Iranian opposition, while clearly stating that the U.S. favors regime change for the benefit of the Iranian people.
Touting Iran’s new interim president as a “moderate” is a sop to Western media and academics who fall for an Iranian “public relations coup.” There is no change in policy because the only one who “is calling any shots” is the Supreme Leader Khamenei.
The passivity of the Biden administration and the Europeans with regard to the Houthi attacks is attributable to a fear of “irritating Iran.” However, this approach risks substantial increases in the price of commercial goods and oil and signals to our adversaries that the West is unwilling defend the “fundamental principle of freedom of the seas.”
The escalating threat from Iran has been “building for 45 years. Now, we see it manifest.” Rather than “conciliating Iran,” which places U.S. allies like Israel and the Gulf Arabs “in potential jeopardy,” the U.S. should take the stand that violating freedom of the seas, attacking our allies, and continuing Iran’s “ballistic missile and nuclear weapons development program” are all unacceptable.
“That’s not the policy we’re pursuing now. And if we don’t start pursuing it, it will be at our peril and peril for our friends in the region.”
“I think there are many lessons to be learned from what we’ve gone through since the Hamas attack. And it may not be the most important in the near term, but it could be the most important in the big term. Our information statecraft collectively needs a massive review and upgrading because we’re not telling the story that really needs to be told. We’ve allowed the Iranians to focus on what they describe as the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, not the one that Hamas itself and Iran have caused.”
