Thanos Davelis, director of public affairs at the Hellenic American Leadership Council and host of The Greek Current podcast, spoke to a November 25 Middle East Forum Podcast (video). The following summarizes his comments:
The Eastern Mediterranean has emerged as a region with new “energy, economic, and diplomatic initiatives” after significant natural gas reserves were discovered a decade and a half ago off the coasts of Israel and Cyprus. Proposals such as the EastMed Pipeline, which would bring natural gas from those countries to Greece and the European market, were developed. Greece, Israel, and Cyprus engaged in a trilateral partnership that deepened over a variety of issues that dealt with the economy, security, and tourism.
Greece, Israel, and Cyprus engaged in a trilateral partnership that deepened over a variety of issues that dealt with the economy, security, and tourism.
The trilateral relationship between Greece, Israel, and Cyprus was expanded to include partnerships with Jordan and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). With the discovery of “more gas in the Zohr gas field in Egypt’s exclusive economic zone,” Egypt joined the group. In 2020, the East Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) became the signal achievement institutionalizing regional partnerships over energy, having expanded to include more countries. The organization, which added France, Italy, and the Palestinians and includes the European Union and the U.S. as observers, set the standard on “how to conduct energy diplomacy and deepen regional ties.”
Washington took note of the relationship that led to “the first regional U.S. congressional caucus, the Congressional Hellenic-Israel Alliance Caucus.” In 2019, the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act, “something that Marco Rubio led,” passed, with the U.S. investing in the trilateral relationship as “the three plus one.” Given Russia’s seizure of Crimea a decade ago and its invasion of Ukraine in 2022, “breaking the dependency of countries in the region on Russian energy sources is a priority.”
As an alternative to Russia’s energy, Greece, “the only NATO member” (of the Forum), is playing a key role in “transforming the region.” Its geography positions it as a natural point for energy, serving as a “gateway to Europe.” Liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the U.S. arrives at the Alexandroupolis port’s “new floating regasification unit” in northern Greece, from which gas is shipped north to the Balkans via the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP). Following the TAP, Greece linked Bulgaria to this network through the natural gas IGB pipeline (Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria).
In light of the fact that “the EastMed pipeline has not come to fruition,” Greece is expanding its role beyond natural gas into renewables with “the electrification of the economy.”
Additionally, the Prespa agreement between Greece and what was then the Republic of Macedonia opened “the Western Balkans to NATO and to this new energy and economic infrastructure being built.” Additional infrastructure is planned to connect North Macedonia to a grid that will eventually “link up with Ukraine and bring energy from the Eastern Mediterranean into Central Europe.” Greece expanded its grid interconnectors to encompass initiatives like the Vertical Corridor that extends beyond Bulgaria to include Romania, Hungary, Ukraine, Moldova, and Slovakia. These EastMed developments brought Greece into the Three Seas Initiative. A forum of 13 states in the European Union (EU), its goal is to cooperate in bringing energy and transport projects into the north-south axis from the Baltic Sea to the Adriatic and Black Seas in Central and Eastern Europe. As a result, the region reaches from the Baltic to India through the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC) “And a focal point for that is Israel, Cyprus, and Greece, and Greece’s port city of Thessaloniki.”
In light of the fact that “the EastMed pipeline has not come to fruition,” Greece is expanding its role beyond natural gas into renewables with “the electrification of the economy” –– a target for Greece, Cyprus, and regional partners. “Electricity cables are much cheaper to lay down than pipelines,” and the electricity interconnectors designed to connect the grids of Israel, Cyprus, and Greece will end “the energy isolation of both Israel and Cyprus.” The interconnectors “are going to link North Africa with Europe via Egypt and Greece through the EuroAfrica Interconnector and the Middle East with Europe through the Great Sea Interconnector.” It is also possible, through interconnectors, to physically link EastMed countries with Jordan and Saudi Arabia. “There doesn’t seem to be a ceiling” in ending energy isolation or bringing clean energy through the Vertical Corridor.
These regional relationships have been resilient in spite of the stress caused by the war in Ukraine, and the Mideast war in the wake of Hamas’s October 7th invasion of Israel. One of Hamas’s strategic goals was “to disrupt the process of regional integration” that has occurred in the Abraham Accords, the EMGF, and the IMEC. Although there have been brief halts, the relationships have proven durable, with the hope that the three plus one format “could lay the groundwork for peace.”
In addition to marginalizing Russia, the regional partnerships that have created energy alternatives see China as an element to be marginalized.
Cyprus engaged in energy diplomacy by rallying the U.S, the UAE, the U.K., the EU, Germany, the Netherlands, and Italy to establish a humanitarian corridor to Gaza with the Amalthea initiative, and Washington and European capitals joined with Greece and Cyprus to aid in evacuations from Lebanon. A spoiler in these relationships is Turkey, whose President Erdoğan has alienated his neighbors and countries in the region through strategies including “the so-called Blue Homeland” policy, through which Turkey’s lays claim to maritime zones of neighboring countries, contravening basic international law. Countries in the region will only permit Turkey to participate in regional cooperation if it will play by the rules by changing its provocative behavior.
In addition to marginalizing Russia, the regional partnerships that have created energy alternatives see China as an element to be marginalized. Without a clear policy from Washington about its engagement “it becomes much harder for countries in the region to stand up to bigger players like China.” Marco Rubio, the nominee for secretary of state, put an emphasis on the Eastern Mediterranean and its potential and “probably is one of the people with a clear vision for what it takes both to counter the malign influences” of China and Russia in the region.
In a post-October 7th world, outgoing Assistant Secretary of State Geoffrey Pyatt assessed that Hamas’s attack “showed us a contrasting vision for the region.” Hamas envisions violence and terror, while the U.S. and its allies desire “is to propagate [a vision] that focuses on economic opportunity, on cooperation, and on energy transition.”
