Governmental Characteristics of the PA
On August 2, 2016, Mahmoud Abbas signed a declaration endorsing a free press and freedom of expression, even designating August 1 as a national day to celebrate these freedoms within the Palestinian Authority. Though this move presented his regime as more open and liberal to Western observers, Abbas soon backtracked on his commitment to fostering a more open society. In 2017, Abbas enacted the Electronic Crimes Prevention Law, a measure aimed at curbing freedom of expression on digital platforms. This law underscored the growing link between the Palestinian Authority’s (PA) restrictions on free speech and its broader political repression. The death of Nizar Banat, a Palestinian political activist and outspoken critic of the PA, serves as a tragic example. Banat died on June 24, 2021, following his arrest and brutal beating by PA security forces. His death drew global attention to the PA’s increasing reliance on repressive laws, such as the 2017 Cybercrime Law, to silence dissent and punish critics.1
Alongside the 2017 Electronic Crimes Prevention Law, the 2017 Cybercrime Law was ratified to regulate social media and internet use. The law granted authorities the power to detain, prosecute, and punish individuals for online content deemed a threat to public order or the reputation of public officials. Activists, journalists, and other critics of the PA routinely faced threats and punitive measures for expressing dissent. Together, the law and its enforcement exposed how the Palestinian legal and security apparatus fostered a climate of fear and political repression.
The development of Palestinian society has been shaped by challenging circumstances, particularly the realities of Israeli rule and the hardships of refugee life. In the absence of national political institutions – prohibited under Israeli military law from 1967 to 1993 – Palestinian society has relied historically on a strong network of civic organizations. Alongside a dynamic media, these organizations played a crucial role in addressing a wide range of political, social, and economic issues.2 Following the Oslo Accords, the creation of the PA in 1994 raised hopes for democracy but also revealed early signs of authoritarianism. The absence of regular elections and the concentration of power in figures like Yasser Arafat and Mahmoud Abbas impeded genuine democratic progress, resulting in a political system characterized by limited pluralism and the growing centralization of authority.3
Since its establishment, the PA has utilized various laws, such as the 1995 Printing and Publishing Law, to limit freedom of expression. Under Yasser Arafat’s leadership, while formal censorship was not rigorously enforced, the boundaries of acceptable speech were clear.
Since its establishment, the PA has utilized various laws, such as the 1995 Printing and Publishing Law, to limit freedom of expression. Under Yasser Arafat’s leadership, while formal censorship was not rigorously enforced, the boundaries of acceptable speech were clear. Criticism of Arafat’s administration was strictly prohibited, and media outlets were often censored to ensure only positive portrayals of the PA and its leadership. Journalists often practiced self-censorship, with editors routinely withholding sensitive information to avoid economic or political reprisals. Meanwhile, PA security officials monitored and censored information on an ad hoc basis, acting without the oversight of an official censorship body or legal framework.4 This suppression of freedom of expression was justified as necessary for national unity and stability, even though it stifled political pluralism and obstructed efforts toward democratization within the Palestinian Authority.
Since the enactment of the 2017 Electronic Crimes Prevention Law, the PA has intensified its efforts to maintain stability amid growing criticism of President Mahmoud Abbas’s rule. The law has become a key instrument for the PA to suppress public dissent. The PA’s focus on stability is especially significant as Abbas confronts mounting challenges to his political legitimacy, stemming from the lack of elections and his failure to deliver meaningful political progress.
The PA’s actions have sparked international condemnation, including from human rights organizations and the European Union. Despite ratifying international treaties on individual freedoms, the PA continues to suppress freedom of expression domestically. This ongoing repression has weakened Palestinian civil society, rendering it unable to prevent the erosion of democratic values or effectively channel dissent. The PA’s restriction of freedom of expression appears to be a deliberate strategy to maintain stability amid political uncertainties, including concerns over succession and internal power struggles.
As the PA continues to face political challenges, including competition with Hamas and a stagnant political process, the suppression of dissent could potentially fuel the instability it seeks to prevent. The PA has systematically restricted freedom of expression, a practice now embedded in legislation, particularly with the enactment of the 2017 Cybercrime Law. This law grants the PA broad powers to control online content, permitting the arrest and prosecution of individuals who publish material considered threatening to the public order or critical of government officials.
The 2017 Prevention of Electronic Crimes Law remains a key tool in the PA’s strategy to control online expression and limit opposition.5 The law builds on older censorship legislation that has restricted the freedom of traditional media, including print journalism and political literature. It is specifically designed to regulate today’s digital media landscape, where websites function as modern town squares and social media posts can have more influence than headlines from mainstream outlets. In the West Bank and East Jerusalem alone, there are an estimated 1.7 million internet users.6 The 2017 Prevention of Electronic Crimes Law grants the PA wide authority to impose heavy fines and arrest individuals, including journalists and whistleblowers, who criticize it online. The law applies to anyone who shares or retweets such content. Those deemed by the PA to undermine public order or threaten national security and Palestinian interests face imprisonment with sentences of up to 15 years of hard labor.7
Along with the 1995 Printing and Censorship Law, the 2017 Prevention of Electronic Crimes Law forms the legal framework through which the PA conducts waves of arrests targeting journalists and civil society activists. Individuals connected to left-wing opposition groups and Islamic organizations are especially vulnerable. Historically, the PA’s arrests were primarily directed at journalists linked to Hamas and Islamic Jihad, particularly those reporting on West Bank events for Islamist satellite channels based in the Gaza Strip. Shortly after the new law was implemented, five journalists affiliated with Hamas – Mamdouh Hamamrah, Qotaybah Qasem, Tariq Abu Zaid, Amer Abu Arafah, and Mohammed Ahmed Halayqah – were arrested. However, as the law was enforced, Palestinian security services also began arresting journalists covering protests against the PA and its policies toward the Gaza Strip. While the arrests of journalists linked to Hamas and Islamic Jihad did not provoke significant reactions among Palestinians, the arrest of social and political activists – many of whom had gained prominence on social media – sparked widespread protests.8
A pivotal case that ignited mass demonstrations was the arrest of Nizar Banat, a social and political activist known for his outspoken criticism of the PA on social media. Banat had also led a political slate, the “Freedom and Dignity List,” with plans to run for elections within the PA. Banat’s death at the hand of security forces in June 2021 sparked several days of demonstrations that spread from his city of Hebron to the rest of the West Bank.9 For the PA, the demonstrations following Banat’s death served as a wake-up call. It became evident that social networks had emerged as powerful tools for challenging its authority. Digital platforms, in particular, played an increasingly significant role in shaping political discourse and mobilizing opposition. Moving forward, the PA would prioritize restricting freedom of expression, making it a central aspect of its political agenda.10
Digital platforms, in particular, played an increasingly significant role in shaping political discourse and mobilizing opposition. Moving forward, the PA would prioritize restricting freedom of expression, making it a central aspect of its political agenda.
The PA’s repressive measures stemmed from its fear that the widespread circulation of images and information could threaten governmental stability. To limit the scope of criticism – often described by critics as a policy serving Israeli interests11 – the PA began adopting measures that infringed on individual freedoms. As part of its crackdown on demonstrations, the PA arrested dozens of journalists covering protests.12 This situation provoked widespread criticism of the PA, both domestically and internationally. Human rights organizations globally condemned the PA’s actions, with the European Union also voicing strong disapproval. In recent years, the PA has ratified international treaties on individual freedoms as part of its diplomatic efforts to secure international legitimacy, a crucial element in its fight for independence. Given this, one might expect the PA to be especially sensitive to concerns about restricting freedom of expression and persecuting journalists.13
However, the PA appears undeterred by criticism over its restrictions on freedom of expression. This resilience is partly due to the inability of Palestinian civil society to effectively challenge the PA’s repressive actions. Since its founding, the PA has struggled to establish meaningful dialogue with Palestinian civil society. Over time, this civil society has diminished in significance, particularly compared to its influential role during the lead-up to the Oslo process, when it was instrumental in laying the groundwork for an independent Palestinian government.14 The Palestinian Journalists’ Association, which tried to protest the PA’s measures, met with failure. Its threats to withhold coverage of the government’s activities did not provoke public outrage against the PA’s decision-makers, who continued to block reports detrimental to the ruling party Fatah’s organizational and political interests.
The Hamas Challenge
A primary reason behind the PA’s increasing crackdown on critics is the growing internal divide within Palestinian society. The PA leadership in the West Bank is deeply concerned about a political coup attempt by Hamas. While Hamas lacks a strong and organized military presence in the West Bank, its well-developed media capabilities allow it to exert considerable influence. The PA is understandably wary of Hamas’s efforts to use the media to cultivate a hostile political environment. While intended to curb Hamas’s influence, the PA’s restrictions on freedom of expression has the potential to provoke even more public criticism and potentially strengthen Hamas’s position in Palestinian society.
Hamas uses media strategically to expand its influence in the West Bank. It does so by broadcasting through satellite channels like Al-Aqsa TV and operating a network of pamphlets, daily newspapers, and news agencies, granting it significant visibility in the West Bank and across the Arab world. As early as May 2007, it launched Palestine, a daily Gazan newspaper that is also accessible digitally to supporters abroad. Its primary website, the Palestinian Information Center, along with other media outlets, reflects a national identity rather than an exclusively Islamic one. This approach underscores Hamas’s self-presentation as a national Islamic movement, a position further outlined in a 2017 political document.15
In an era when social media and instant messaging enable rapid communication, the internet has become a powerful tool for groups like Hamas to expand their political influence. Today, shaping public perception may be as significant, if not more so, than the ability to exercise power on the ground. Hamas-affiliated news agencies, such as Shihab, have attracted millions of followers on platforms like Facebook. However, on July 13, 2021, Facebook removed Shihab’s popular Arabic page, which Hamas had used to attack Israel, the PA, and promote terrorism.16 Despite this, Shihab continues to operate its news agency on X (formerly Twitter) and Telegram.
Hamas’s robust media capabilities have enabled it to amass significant political influence, communicate with existing followers, recruit new ones, and engage in political mobilization. The Shihab news agency, which remains active on Twitter, is one such platform. Additionally, Hamas operates another outlet in the West Bank called Al-Quds. Beyond traditional media, Hamas supports independent journalists and activists who use social media to promote favorable views of the group.17 Some of these individuals are Hamas members or affiliates who discreetly advance its objectives on these platforms.
During the Hamas-Israel conflict following the October 7 attacks, the identities of several journalists linked to Hamas’s military wing became public. A number of these journalists took an active role in Hamas’s October 7 incursion and attacks. Notably, Hasan Aslih, director of the independent Gaza news site Alam24 and a freelance photographer for AP and CNN, was among them.18 Al-Jazeera journalist Osama Abu Amer was another example. Before joining Al Jazeera, he worked as a journalist at the Hamas-affiliated Al-Quds radio station in Khan Yunis. On October 7, Abu Amer accompanied Hamas operatives to Kibbutz Nir Oz to document their attacks.19 While recording their actions, Abu Amer was injured by Israeli gunfire. Without Israel’s knowledge, Qatar facilitated his transfer to Doha for medical treatment. In late 2022, another Al-Jazeera journalist, Mohammed Wasah, began working with Hamas’s air research unit and served as a commander in its anti-tank missile unit.20
In an era when social media and instant messaging enable rapid communication, the internet has become a powerful tool for groups like Hamas to expand their political influence. Today, shaping public perception may be as significant, if not more so, than the ability to exercise power on the ground.
Hamas leverages its media outlets during conflicts with Israel to incite unrest in the West Bank. It also uses these platforms to criticize the PA on civilian and economic issues, including its management of Gaza’s budget. Additionally, Hamas has provided extensive and sharply critical coverage of social protests in the West Bank, particularly the widespread demonstrations sparked by the PA’s enactment of pension and social security laws. By doing so, Hamas sought to link two major sources of public discontent: the PA’s economic mismanagement and its restrictive economic policies toward the Gaza Strip. By highlighting both issues, Hamas was able to rally Palestinians against the PA, creating an increasingly volatile political climate. Between January 2018 and March 2019, the PA responded to this situation by arresting over 1,600 individuals solely for making critical statements, even though they had not committed any violent acts. In 2018, the PA also invoked the Prevention of Digital Crime Law, filing 845 indictments, mostly targeting Palestinians who expressed critical views on social media, resulting in various sanctions and penalties.21
The PA is fully aware of Hamas’s media influence, particularly on social networks. On platforms like Twitter (X), Hamas maintains strong visibility, with its ID directly linked to its primary website – the Palestinian Information Center.22 The PA is actively working to limit Hamas’s presence in the West Bank, both on the ground and in digital space. It especially seeks to restrict the activities of journalists affiliated with Hamas or its media channels, even resorting to detention as a means of control. Hamas applies analogous measures to journalists in the Gaza Strip who are affiliated with media outlets supporting the PA or opposing Hamas’s political and economic interests.23 These developments are not particularly surprising given the authoritarian nature of Hamas’s rule in the Gaza Strip. In 2017, the PA detained five journalists working for Hamas-affiliated media outlets for a week. They were only released after a journalist affiliated with Fatah was freed from prison in Gaza.24
The PA’s political repression erodes the foundations of democracy and stifles the development of an active and vibrant civil society. It is no surprise, then, that the Palestinian public has lost trust in its elected representatives and turns to virtual spaces and digital media as an alternative to traditional political engagement.25
Conclusion
The PA has enacted laws and regulations that restrict freedom of expression as part of a deliberate strategy to address several political challenges. These challenges include the nearing end of Mahmoud Abbas’s term, uncertainty about his successor, and questions about the future of the PA. Amid political instability, the PA is embroiled in internal power struggles within Fatah over succession, all while striving to maintain public order and responding to widespread criticism of its policies toward the Gaza Strip
The PA’s expanding restrictions on freedom of expression underscore the significance it places on media as a tool for shaping public opinion. The growing presence of dissent in both the streets and online platforms are troubling to the PA’s leadership, leading to increased efforts to tighten control. By targeting opposition media, the PA has projected strength and cultivated the belief that it has a firm grip on its security forces and the political apparatus. Media control and messaging are central objectives, as the PA seeks to stay visible in the political and economic spheres while bolstering public support for its policies. Consequently, Hamas’s media outlets have become legitimate targets for surveillance, as the PA monitors alternative discourses and opinion leaders on social networks.
Political stagnation and the ongoing fragmentation and power struggles with Hamas in the Gaza Strip are key factors behind the PA’s aggressive crackdown on media outlets and its restrictions on freedom of expression. The public in the West Bank generally responds to these measures with a sense of resignation. The authoritarian nature of the PA’s rule, which often conflict with the public’s desire for greater democratization, contributes to these measures being passed with minimal resistance. However, this silence is temporary, and any outbreak of violence in the West Bank, even if directed at Israel, could threaten Mahmoud Abbas’s hold on power and the stability of the PA as a political entity.
1. “Palestinian Authority Critic Dies After Arrest,” DW, June 24, 2021, https://p.dw.com/p/3vWJv. (accessed Oct. 20, 2024).
2. Yazid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for a State: The Palestinian National Movement 1949-1993 (Clarendon Press, 1997), 692.
3. Glenn E. Robinson “The Growing Authoritarianism of the Arafat Regime,” Survival 39, 2 (1997): 42-56.
4. Nadav Keren, Owning the Free Media: The Regime and Press During the Early Days of the Palestinian Authority – The Case of AL-Hayat Al-Jadida (Tel Aviv University Press, 2010), 49.
5. See, for example, 7amleh – The Arab Center for the Advancement of Social Media, https://7amleh.org/2017/08/02/the-full-english-translation-of-the-palestinian-cyber-crime-law/ (accessed Oct. 14, 2021).
6. Harel Chorev, “Palestinian Social Media and Lone-Wolf Attacks: Subculture, Legitimization, and Epidemic,” Terrorism and Political Violence 31, 6 (2017): 1287.
7. 7amleh – The Arab Center for the Advancement of Social Media, https://7amleh.org/2017/08/02/the-full-english-translation-of-the-palestinian-cyber-crime-law/ (accessed Oct. 14, 2021).
8. Dalal Arikat, “Layst Filsatin alati Halmana biha, wa-la Filastin alati w’adana biha, Al-Quds,” April 14, 2022, https://www.alquds.com/ar/posts/16348?language=he (accessed Nov. 12, 2023).
9. Yolanda Knell and Nizar Banat, “The Death Shaking the Palestinian Leadership,” BBC, Sept. 7, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-58400442 (accessed Oct. 15, 2021).
10. Yolanda Knell and Nizar Banat, “The Death Shaking the Palestinian Leadership,” BBC, Sept. 7, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-58400442 (accessed Oct. 15, 2021).
11. Daoud Kuttab, “An a-Tarjua al-khatir lil-Huriyya al-T’aabir fi Filasitn,” Al-Arabi Al-Jadid, Aug. 2, 2021 (accessed Sept. 4 ,2023).
12. “Palestinian Journalists Claim Pressure by PA Amid Crackdown,” Al-Jazeera, Aug. 11, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/11/palestinian-journalists-claim-pressure-by-pa-amid-crackdown (accessed Aug. 27, 2021).
13. Noa Landau, “The Full List: These Are the Treaties That Palestinians Wish to Join in Protesting the Recognition of Jerusalem,” Haaretz, Dec. 29, 2017, https://www.haaretz.co.il/news/politics/1.5521775 (accessed Oct. 31, 2019, in Hebrew).
14. Omar Shweiki, “Palestinian Civil Society and the Question of Representation,” Bulletin for the Council for British Research in the Levant 7, 1 (2012): 36.
15. Ido Zelkovitz, “Game of Thrones: The Struggle Between Fatah and Hamas for Political Hegemony in the Palestinian Authority, 2011-2022,” Strategic Assessment 25, 2 (2022): 44-47.
16. Nadda Ossman, “Facebook Blocks Gaza’s Shehab News Agency from Its Platform,” Middle East Eye, July 13, 2021 )accessed Oct.15, 2021).
17. “Photojournalists in the Service of Hamas in the Gaza Strip,” Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/app/uploads/2023/12/E_281_23.pdf. (accessed Nov. 9, 2024).
18. Ibid.
19. Einav Halabi, “Al Jazeera ‘Reporter’ Who Filmed Massacre in Nir Oz Loses Leg After Drone Attack in Rafah,” Ynet, Feb.14, 2024, https://www.ynetnews.com/article/hyie1xqja )accessed April 15,2024).
20. Emanuel Fabian, “Al Jazeera Journalist Is Also a Hamas Commander, IDF Says,” Times of Israel, Feb. 12, 2024, https://www.timesofisrael.com/al-jazeera-journalist-is-also-a-hamas-commander-idf-says )accessed April 15, 2024).
21. “Palestine: No Letup in Arbitrary, Arrests, Torture”, Human Rights Watch, May 29, 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/05/29/palestine-no-letup-arbitrary-arrests-torture (accessed, June 3, 2021).
22. Mohhamed Wisam Ammer, “Hamas in Cyberspace: Social Media and Forms of Political Expression,” Arab Media & Society Aug., 14 (2023) (accessed Sept. 3, 2023).
23. Amnesty, “Gaza: Journalist Facing Prison Term for Exposing Corruption in Hamas-Controlled Ministry,” Feb. 25, 2019, (accessed June 15, 2021).
24. Jack Khoury, “Palestinian Authority Release Hamas-Linked Journalists Arrested for ‘Harming Public Security’,” Haaretz, Aug. 15, 2017, https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/palestinians/palestinian-authority-releases-journalists-arrested-for-harming-public-security-1.5442803 (accessed, Oct. 12, 2021).
25. Hazem Alamssry, “Digital Democracy as a Mechanism for Achieving Participatory Democracy – The Case of the Palestinian Territories-,” Democracy and Security 18, 3 (2022): 263-290.
