Saied Golkar: While the Assembly of Experts, a body of 88 Mujtahids, theoretically selects a new supreme Leader after Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s passing, the succession may not unfold as smoothly as some anticipate. This is due to Khamenei’s personalization of power over the past decade and growing discontent among the Iranian populace that could potentially lead to unrest.
Most Assembly of Experts members are less independent today than those who picked Khomeini’s successor in 1989 in a smooth, one-day session.
Since Khamenei came to power in 1989, he has undermined political institutions and personalized power, first the military, then the seminary and clerical network, and lastly, the state bureaucracy. Across each, he appoints individuals based on personal loyalties rather than expertise. This has resulted in widespread corruption, state incompetence, and a concentration of power around the leader. All these factors will complicate transition, especially if the leader dies unexpectedly.
Most Assembly of Experts members are less independent today than those who picked Khomeini’s successor in 1989 in a smooth, one-day session. Those ousted from the Assembly of Experts, such as Former Chief Justice Sadeq Larijani and President Hassan Rouhani, could pose challenges to the next supreme leader.
Three decisions could remedy uncertainty about Khamenei’s successor: First, Khamenei could appoint his own successor. Second, he could eliminate possible challengers. Questions continue to surround the deaths of Seyed Ahmad Khomeini and Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, for example. Finally, greater political repression akin to the 1988 massacres of political prisoners could cow the public and especially the youth into compliance.
Patrick Clawson: Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has taken every step to make the transition to a new supreme leader a mess: he has centralized power in his hands, he has created multiple competing institutions, each of which jealously guard its privileges, and he has refused to designate successor candidates or even allow discussion about who might come next. In short, he has made the job extremely valuable and extremely personal (rather than institutional) and succession extremely uncertain.
The most likely prospect is that a new supreme leader will start weak, buffeted by competing power centers, while the system as a whole feels its way without a firm guiding hand.
By contrast, the Iranian president is not particularly important, as he must share power with many others, and he is chosen through a process that largely guarantees the result desired by the powers that be. When a president deviates from the path the supreme leader desires – be it as a reformist like Mohammad Khatami or an erratic populist like Mahmoud Ahmadinejad – Khamenei sidelines him or forces him to accept ministers he does not want and cannot control. There is no such process to check the powers of the supreme leader once he has consolidated his hold. Indeed, the process will take years during which time other power centers will have more independence than they do at present.
By far the most likely prospect is that a new supreme leader will start weak, buffeted by competing power centers, while the system as a whole feels its way without a firm guiding hand. That could go relatively smoothly, with the different power centers working out arrangements to share authority. However, that has not been the norm under the Islamic Republic, where those with power – principally but not entirely the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps– sideline others. Look at how all previous presidents – Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Khatami, Ahmadinejad, and Rouhani – have been shoved aside and ignored. In addition, many once-important figures like Ahmad Khomeini and Rafsanjani have died prematurely, sometimes under unclear circumstances.
Alireza Nader: The succession to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei will be neither as easy nor smooth as the 1989 succession that saw him replace Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, supreme leader of Iran for the first decade after the Islamic Revolution. The Islamic Republic today has very little remaining legitimacy among the Iranian population. The Woman, Life, Freedom uprising, which began with the September 16, 2022, murder of Mahsa Amini, was the most serious threat to the regime’s existence in the last 45 years. While there have been periodic mass protests beginning in 1999, they have increased in frequency and scope since 2016. While Iran may be calm in the short-term, a major anti-regime uprising is likely in the future.
The succession to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei will be neither as easy nor smooth as the 1989 succession that saw him replace Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.
Much of the Iranian population will oppose the undemocratic succession to Khamenei, but even the regime’s ruling elite may not come to agreement on Khamenei’s chosen successor, widely rumored to be his influential son Mojtaba. The Islamic Republic has managed to close ranks when faced with major internal and external threats. However, President Ebrahim Raisi’s recent death may open more space for competition among the regime’s top echelon and may widen fissures within the regime that are not always publicly visible. Mojtaba does not have the charisma, personal standing, political experience, and religious qualifications to hold the regime together and will have to rely on secrecy, intimidation, and violence to protect his throne.
The Islamic Republic has proven itself capable of crushing dissent and Mojtaba is well versed in the ways of repression, but neither he nor any other potential successor can rule through force alone. As the Woman, Life, Freedom revolution demonstrated, the regime is likely to face major challenges that could throw Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guards’ best laid succession plans into disarray.
