Zvi Hauser, national security specialist and former deputy speaker of the Israeli Knesset, spoke to a March 18 Middle East Forum Podcast (video). The following summarizes his comments:
For the last fifty years, many Middle East foes of Israel had come to understand that the Jewish state “is a fact” and is strong enough to “defend itself by itself.” Hamas’s October 7 atrocities convinced some in the Middle East that this is not so. As such, the attacks are not only a unique example of the contrasting values between two civilizations, but are also a challenge for Israel’s “strategy of deterrence.” The invasion started a war and galvanized Iran and its proxies to redouble their efforts to destroy Israel.
The main motivation for the attack was twofold: to keep the waning Palestinian Arab issue relevant in the region; and to scuttle the warming relations between the Saudis and Israel from progressing. That Gulf states “see Israel as part of the solution to the problems in the region, and not as a problem for the region.” This rattled Iran and drove it to act.
The Israel-Hamas war is but one piece of a larger struggle. Tehran and Moscow are in a “strategic relationship.” Thus, the former backs the latter’s war against Ukraine, while Iran, which seeks to upgrade its conventional and non-conventional (i.e., nuclear) capabilities, gains field-tested experience from the weapons it sells to Putin. The conflicts make ripples across other global regions. As the U.S. aligns with Israel, China, with its designs on Taiwan, is seizing the opportunity to align its interests with America’s foes.
To deter a larger regional conflict and other wars, “it’s important for the good guys to win.” Israel’s enemies feared it because, even though Jerusalem’s capabilities were responsible for thirty percent of that fear factor, deterrence accounted for the remaining seventy percent. As of October 7, Israel’s enemies no longer fear it, and they are now calculating how to exploit the shock to Israel’s structure and finish it off.
Israel is prioritizing its defense budget to enhance its capabilities and strengthen its army. Deterrence can be restored only if Israel wins the war. Any outcome short of victory will feed “an appetite to fight against Israel” in another round. The previous rounds of fighting with Hamas periodically contained the terrorists, but October 7 crossed that line. Should Jerusalem not win its war against Hamas, a “weak military power,” the possibility of a “multi-front war” coalescing from Syria, Iraq, and Iran to vanquish the Jewish state will grow. Talk of a “two-state solution” leads Middle Easterners to believe strategic interests are achieved through violence. “We cannot accept an idea that after this brutal attack ... it will be finished with [a] ... historical achievement for the Palestinian side.”
Israel’s challenge is to restore the deterrence that existed prior to October 7. Will a “clear victory” in Gaza suffice, or will Israel need to take on Iran’s Lebanese proxy Hezbollah at its northern border? Will Israel be proactive, or will it leave it to the enemy “to choose the time” for war?
The three issues confronting the West are Russia’s war with Ukraine, China’s threatened invasion of Taiwan, and Iran’s effort to develop nuclear weapons. Although the U.S. is loath to confront Russia and China, both nuclear powers, Iran is not yet nuclear, and hence is more vulnerable. The Saudis are watching to see which countries will lead the world. If “the good guys will be [clearcut]” and take a stand against aggressive countries, “the Saudis will join us.” On the other hand, the West’s abdication of its responsibilities will destabilize the Middle East..
Both active and brewing conflicts result from the “bad guys” perceiving the “good guys” as weak. By stopping Iran’s initiative to make a nuclear bomb, the U.S. can deter Russia and China and do something important, “not only for the region, but for the future of the free world.”
